One question for potential additions:
Perhaps a couple of one off doctrines dealing with the development of specific unit doctrines that remove limits on unit production. For instance, darkest hour's idea of an 'armored divisions' doctrine which would release the cap on how many tanks can be fielded in a division thus allowing for spearheads which would represent an institutional acceptance of tank warfare. Armored divisions would come quickly to someone using mobility doctrine but not firepower or battleplan, and could come quickly to someone using manpower. It could also unlock the ability to research other units, like mobile artillery and mechanized infantry and would give a couple of other advantages.
After this you would have 'anti-tank doctrine', which would come in around 1940 and would be more easily accessible to firepower and battleplan doctrine users. It would improve your anti-tank artillery (or add hard attack to normal artillery if we're doing away with AT-art as a unit), the hard attack of your air forces, and unlock tank destroyers.
You could have a couple of others, like paratrooper doctrines and marine doctrines (which would improve air and sea assaults respectively; these troops are so specialized that I imagine if you put access to them behind another tech that they'd never get used). Because the 'optimal' use of these forces was not determined by technology alone, if it were then the French would have won the war. Rather, similar to how skirmisher tactics were only reluctantly accepted over the 18th and 19th centuries, organizational limitations formed one of the largest barriers to the application of innovative strategies.
The collapse of the British & French empires were anything but 'natural', massive social changes rarely were. Beyond that Hitler faced the same problem that the Kaiser did twenty years earlier, the longer he waited the more developed and competitive Russia became.
Perhaps a couple of one off doctrines dealing with the development of specific unit doctrines that remove limits on unit production. For instance, darkest hour's idea of an 'armored divisions' doctrine which would release the cap on how many tanks can be fielded in a division thus allowing for spearheads which would represent an institutional acceptance of tank warfare. Armored divisions would come quickly to someone using mobility doctrine but not firepower or battleplan, and could come quickly to someone using manpower. It could also unlock the ability to research other units, like mobile artillery and mechanized infantry and would give a couple of other advantages.
After this you would have 'anti-tank doctrine', which would come in around 1940 and would be more easily accessible to firepower and battleplan doctrine users. It would improve your anti-tank artillery (or add hard attack to normal artillery if we're doing away with AT-art as a unit), the hard attack of your air forces, and unlock tank destroyers.
You could have a couple of others, like paratrooper doctrines and marine doctrines (which would improve air and sea assaults respectively; these troops are so specialized that I imagine if you put access to them behind another tech that they'd never get used). Because the 'optimal' use of these forces was not determined by technology alone, if it were then the French would have won the war. Rather, similar to how skirmisher tactics were only reluctantly accepted over the 18th and 19th centuries, organizational limitations formed one of the largest barriers to the application of innovative strategies.
The collapse of the British & French empires were anything but 'natural', massive social changes rarely were. Beyond that Hitler faced the same problem that the Kaiser did twenty years earlier, the longer he waited the more developed and competitive Russia became.
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