Hearts of Iron IV - Developer Diary 10 - Naval Combat

[SlinkyTWF]

Well during the battle for Okinawa TF 58 had 88 ships in it's taskforce. Operation Ten-Go was the Japanese attempt to break through in a suicide run. While the Japanese only had 10 ships the US had way over 50 for the battle.

So in this situation you would see over 50 US ships on one side and 10 Japanese on the other side.

If you look at the diagrams SE Morison included in his official history, you would see that "TF 58" was actually about 6 individual CV groups and SAGs that were organized under the same flag, but sailed at a significant distance from each other, so I'm unconvinced that this example validates the argument.

 

[SlinkyTWF]

As at least one other poster has replied, I'm a bit concerned about how CV TFs will behave when they make contact with a SAG. In HOI3, to its credit, and despite deficiencies in the system, CV groups with CL and DD screens would maintain distance (and if they included BB and CA units, they would close to gun range instead of providing close AAA support).

Will it be possible to define stances for groups, perhaps designating them as SAGs or as "Stand-Off" groups to influence how they will behave when they make contact, or (as was the case with HOI3) if I add a BB to a CV TF as a heavy AAA platform, will it suck my CVs into melee?

 

[SlinkyTWF]

To add to the SS vs CV debate, I'd like to note that in the vast majority of cases, SSs did not engage capital ships *during* naval battles, but before or after (IIRC, Shokaku and Taiho at Philippine Sea were the sole exceptions? Doing this from memory here, so I may be misquoting history.). The chief factor being the speeds of the TFs when they are engaged. CVs *do* have a window of vulnerability when they conduct air operations and turn into the wind to launch/retrieve a/c, which the US subs took advantage of (again, IIRC).

I can see the argument turning either way (perhaps with all sides being correct within their own context), but within the greater context of naval operations, ships engaged in battle, statistically, were less likely to be successfully engaged by submarines because the sub had to be in position and undetected when the torpedo launch happened (no "stalking").

There were other factors as well, such as the Japanese ASW detection equipment being less effective at battle speeds (as was UK's ASDIC before c. 1943) that made it easier for the sub to be undetected when it WAS in position ahead of a CV group that was conducting air operations. (A concatenation of ideal circumstances, i.e., luck.)

From what I read from Podcat, it sounds like PDS is on the right track by making SS attacks against capital ships somewhat random, and highly dependent upon luck, which, in the heat of battle, seems to have been a deciding factor in scenarios where SSs were able to launch successful torpedo attacks against capital ships.

 

[Klausewitz]

Luck surely is one thing in u-boat attacks.
Another however is technology.
Having larger batteries, better electromotors, advanced snorkels, sonar, etc. can all serve to reduce the necessity of luck.
One of the XXI types dove under the screen of a cruiser, closed to torpedo range and then left (the war had already ended) and the captain later was able to ascertain that he had not been detected... attacking a task force at speed.

 

[Secret Master]

Keep in mind that planes, subs, and surface ships misidentified enemy ships all the damn time. And not just the lesser skilled commanders, either.

I mentioned Prien's raid on Scapa Flow earlier in the thread. He misidentified a seaplane tender as a Renown class battlecruiser. A sea plane tender. A ship that looks nothing like a Renown class battlecruiser. I know, because I double checked. The bow was the only thing he could see, but their bows don't look that similar.

Sure, it was at night. And the seaplane tender was hidden behind Royal Oak. And he was kind of busy at the time. But I can dig up countless incidents during the war where ships were horribly misidentified even during daylight, in calm seas, and with experts in play. It's actually really hard to identify ships visually. (Well, without fancy tools we have today.)

Letting planes, ships, and submarines deliberately target enemy ships in an order your specify with any kind of accuracy would be both ahistorical and abusive.

Now, HOI3 solved this problem with targeting doctrines. While they were not transparent in their application, according to podcat, better targeting doctrines (air or surface) increased the chance of targeting either a heavily damaged ship (to finish it off) or a capital ship (which is the target you want to kill most of the time). But it had a very incremental impact. There was no "Ha, ha! We are sending 100% of our torpedo bombers and dive bombers against Enterprise, and there is nothing you can do to stop them, even though there are 20 different ships in the area. Our perfectly accurate GPS technology, coupled with FLIR and satellite imagery, tells us exactly where she is."

 

[SlinkyTWF]

Keep in mind that planes, subs, and surface ships misidentified enemy ships all the damn time. And not just the lesser skilled commanders, either.

I mentioned Prien's raid on Scapa Flow earlier in the thread. He misidentified a seaplane tender as a Renown class battlecruiser. A sea plane tender. A ship that looks nothing like a Renown class battlecruiser. I know, because I double checked. The bow was the only thing he could see, but their bows don't look that similar.

Sure, it was at night. And the seaplane tender was hidden behind Royal Oak. And he was kind of busy at the time. But I can dig up countless incidents during the war where ships were horribly misidentified even during daylight, in calm seas, and with experts in play. It's actually really hard to identify ships visually. (Well, without fancy tools we have today.)

Letting planes, ships, and submarines deliberately target enemy ships in an order your specify with any kind of accuracy would be both ahistorical and abusive.

Now, HOI3 solved this problem with targeting doctrines. While they were not transparent in their application, according to podcat, better targeting doctrines (air or surface) increased the chance of targeting either a heavily damaged ship (to finish it off) or a capital ship (which is the target you want to kill most of the time). But it had a very incremental impact. There was no "Ha, ha! We are sending 100% of our torpedo bombers and dive bombers against Enterprise, and there is nothing you can do to stop them, even though there are 20 different ships in the area. Our perfectly accurate GPS technology, coupled with FLIR and satellite imagery, tells us exactly where she is."

While many historical battles validate the identification problems you cite, the battles of Coral Sea, Santa Cruz, Midway, and Philippine Sea all validate the targeting of flattops over other ships by CAGs. While attempts were made to camouflage their CVs by painting gun turrets and other surface ship infrastructure on their flight decks (didn't help the IJN Zuiho), pilots were, *far more* often than not, able to single-out enemy CVs for attack. Only in the absence of CVs were other ship classes selected by naval pilots. The history is pretty consistent on that, with the outliers being exceptions rather than rules. The biggest problem was *finding* the ships in the first place, especially given the carrier group's tactic of using cloud cover as concealment. IIRC, at Midway, a cruiser group was misidentified as a carrier group by scout planes, but when the CAGs found the Japanese CVs, they went after them unerringly, as did the Japanese air groups when they went after the US CVs. I don't think your argument is valid for carrier warfare based on the historical outcomes.

 

[SlinkyTWF]

Luck surely is one thing in u-boat attacks.
Another however is technology.
Having larger batteries, better electromotors, advanced snorkels, sonar, etc. can all serve to reduce the necessity of luck.
One of the XXI types dove under the screen of a cruiser, closed to torpedo range and then left (the war had already ended) and the captain later was able to ascertain that he had not been detected... attacking a task force at speed.

Using a single anecdote as evidence for an argument is tricky, as there can be many special circumstances which can make each case unique--it's difficult to determine when an event is statistically unlikely as opposed to common. Out of curiosity, do you know the source? I don't doubt that it could have happened, but the Type XXI's were still painfully slow when submerged compared to surface ships at cruising speed. The TF it infiltrated would probably have had to sail over the sub for it to get close enough to the core to obtain a firing solution, and it would have had to climb to periscope depth, making it much more vulnerable to detection and counter-attack (active sonar targeting--even if they had it, which I doubt--would have been near-suicide against Allied ASW tech and tactics in 1945--since we're mentioning technology). Sea conditions could also have played into the outcome. Tech could make a difference, granted, which I suppose is your point, which I agree is a valid one. But a Type XXI infiltrating a 1941 ASW screen is far different than a 1945 ASW screen--the tech works both ways.

 

[Klausewitz]

The source is Adalbert Schnee, captain of U-2511, as cited by Reinhard Hoheisel-Huxmann: DER FRONTEINSATZ DES UBOOTES U 2511 - WIRKLICHE DICHTUNG?, Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv (DSA) 23, 2000, S. 347–372, according to Wikipedia (i also have a secondary source based on the German translation of Erminio Bagnasco's "U-boote im 2. Weltkrieg, ISBN 3-613-01252-9, S.86).
I have no way of confirming the original (i don't own the book), but i sutmbled over it in 2 printed accounts about the Type XXI and the internet is awash in it.

 

[Mannstien]

Looks nice, so am I wrong to assume that Sub's, DD's, and Light Cruisers will be single ships and can be managed as such? Because in HOI3 I thought they were all suppose to flotillas.

 

[Secret Master]

While many historical battles validate the identification problems you cite, the battles of Coral Sea, Santa Cruz, Midway, and Philippine Sea all validate the targeting of flattops over other ships by CAGs. While attempts were made to camouflage their CVs by painting gun turrets and other surface ship infrastructure on their flight decks (didn't help the IJN Zuiho), pilots were, *far more* often than not, able to single-out enemy CVs for attack. Only in the absence of CVs were other ship classes selected by naval pilots. The history is pretty consistent on that, with the outliers being exceptions rather than rules. The biggest problem was *finding* the ships in the first place, especially given the carrier group's tactic of using cloud cover as concealment. IIRC, at Midway, a cruiser group was misidentified as a carrier group by scout planes, but when the CAGs found the Japanese CVs, they went after them unerringly, as did the Japanese air groups when they went after the US CVs. I don't think your argument is valid for carrier warfare based on the historical outcomes.

Yes, but if you just have a blanket rule that says, "All airplanes target carriers first, all the time, unerringly, then proceed down an priority list of other ship classes," you end up with a Pacific War that looks like this:



Perfect targeting and identification of capital ships by planes and subs in a game like HOI4 would result in some really skewed warfare. Now, if planes try to hit carriers and other capital ships first, but don't always succeed in targeting them properly, that would be just fine by me.

Looks nice, so am I wrong to assume that Sub's, DD's, and Light Cruisers will be single ships and can be managed as such? Because in HOI3 I thought they were all suppose to flotillas.

I think CLs were individual ships, but yes, DDs and subs were flotillas in HOI3. It looks like they will be individual ships in HOI4.

 

[Communitnerd92]

looks awesome

 

[jju_57]

If you look at the diagrams SE Morison included in his official history, you would see that "TF 58" was actually about 6 individual CV groups and SAGs that were organized under the same flag, but sailed at a significant distance from each other, so I'm unconvinced that this example validates the argument.

But over 400 dive bombers attacked the Yamato and they came from almost all the CV's in TF 58. Point is the surface ships never were engaged but the planes from the CV's were.

 

[potski]

Whether this has been addressed, has not or will be in a future diary I don't know, but please don't be to upset by this question I'm about to ask. For naval fleets will you have fleet commander then all of his subordinate commanders commanding his other task forces, squadrons or what have you? Say for example you have Nimitz as a fleet commander then Spruance, Halsey and Fletcher as his task force commanders.

If it follows the land units then there will be no OOB hierarchy. My guess is there will be an interface like the air forces, where you select the missions carried out in a strategic region by the ships based within range of the region. That will cover subs and other small forces carrying out patrols etc. Larger fleets will be formed like Divs and grouped together into a childish nonsense like "the red fleet" commanded by Mitscher, which then is part of a battle plan.

 

[Radioactive]

Can you understand stuff by yourself? Do I need to post maps of every single engagement and shove them down your throat?

No, thanks, I have no such tastes. I think it's not even necessary to see if the HOI4 map has a naval province border or not where you'd think the fight happened to discuss this one.

Leyte was a series of HOI3 battles. It was´nt a 50 ship engagment at ANY time. Got that?

No, I think it was a battle with quite a bit over 800 ships and not quite 2000 planes involved. How HOI4 will simulate this battle (as one big battle to resolve, or as the "series of engagements") is kinda hard to tell from the screenshot in the dev diary. But either way, in some extreme circumstances basically all of these *might* have engaged over just a few hours of continuous fighting. So the engine and GUI should probably support such bigger engagements.

And ALL instances of carriers being sunk were done by lone subs, NOT sub flottillas. Don´t create alternate history.

You've gone from "surface ships hunting" to "carrier sinking". Alternative histories seem to work better for you than me.

Besides I never said you couldn´t have flotillas in that role, just that it wasn´t THE common doctrine to stalk task forces with 10 ships and attack all at once. And that therefore the game should simulate that if possible.

Simulate what? That it wasn't the doctrine in WW2 but is now a doctrine in the player nation... by making the screen a mess when 50+ ships are involved? Odd choice.

 

[SlinkyTWF]

Yes, but if you just have a blanket rule that says, "All airplanes target carriers first, all the time, unerringly, then proceed down an priority list of other ship classes," you end up with a Pacific War that looks like this:

Perfect targeting and identification of capital ships by planes and subs in a game like HOI4 would result in some really skewed warfare. Now, if planes try to hit carriers and other capital ships first, but don't always succeed in targeting them properly, that would be just fine by me.

I never said it should be "perfect." There were many instances of friendly fire owing to mis-identified targets, and occasional bomb hits on alternate targets. I was merely referring to reality, which, of course, does not always make for the most interesting game. Given the real-life results of carrier airstrikes against opposing carrier task forces, however, any mechanic that does not HEAVILY skew the target selection toward flattops is both ahistorical and unrealistic.

 

[Will Steel]

I have a question, somewhat unrelated to a real naval battle, but still.

Will we be FINALLY allowed to designate our super-heavy battleship as 'Pride of the Navy'? In HoI3, I found it ridiculous and weird that you could mark normal, smaller battleships as pride of the fleet, but could not do the same for the grand-zized super heavy battleship as your navy's flagship.

 

[Daelyn75]

I have a question, somewhat unrelated to a real naval battle, but still.

Will we be FINALLY allowed to designate our super-heavy battleship as 'Pride of the Navy'? In HoI3, I found it ridiculous and weird that you could mark normal, smaller battleships as pride of the fleet, but could not do the same for the grand-zized super heavy battleship as your navy's flagship.

So far they won't be implementing pride of the fleet in HOI IV.

 

[Secret Master]

I have a question, somewhat unrelated to a real naval battle, but still.

Will we be FINALLY allowed to designate our super-heavy battleship as 'Pride of the Navy'? In HoI3, I found it ridiculous and weird that you could mark normal, smaller battleships as pride of the fleet, but could not do the same for the grand-zized super heavy battleship as your navy's flagship.

That was fixed in TFH. I always designate Yamato as pride of the fleet when I run a battleship strategy.

Well, until the 1942 battleships get in the water at any rate.

 

[Cybvep]

Another question to the devs - have you done sth to combat the submarine doomstack problems? An age-old problem of HOI games is that subs are often useless in small stacks and OP in massive stacks.

 

[misterbean]

Will Heavy Cruisers still be capital ships? I think that only Germany, as a standard, used them as such (not counting when one is heading a DD-squadron or such).

With the new production system, will there still be a system where you can get an efficiency bonus like HOI3's Practicals (BC into BB, CA into CL, that sort of thing)?