As complex as France was at the time, debating strategic and tactical theory is one thing, proving France could actually maintain, equip, and train something like a mobile force was something Weyland was already doing with the French cavalry in the 30s with some great difficulty but on par to the developments of Mechanized Formations of other countries. Given the impact of the Great Depression on military budgets at the time, it becomes clear that the French had actually LOST the tank race compared to the Germans that ironed out all of the early problems associated with the panzer drives through Austria and Czechoslovakia prior to the Polish Campaign and had a year head start on tank production. The very large amount of break downs and lack of support was something France could not avoid as they did not have the luck in invading and testing out the tanks in action in long stretches of advance in other words.
Firstly, in terms of tank numbers, removing obsolete FT-17 tanks from the French roster, the tank ballpark which the French Army deemed ready for combat was not that much different than the total amount of tanks the Germans had. After all, when a factory says they completed a tank for a contract it is usually just the base tank without the armaments or turret in place being of course unusable number in this state. To actually be counted as combat capable it had to be fixed with all equipment and ready to be assigned sitting in reserve. When the real combat capable tank numbers are counted the numbers are not all that much different in total amounts.
Secondly, in terms of tactics, one can simply take advantage of the fact of having to know the complete outcome of the war to know quite clearly the normal foot infantry did have armored units assigned and routinely found tanks and armored fighting vehicles themselves in direct support of infantry assaults in all armies in WW2. The French were actually no different in assigning armored support to infantry formations and had a rough percentage comparable to other armies on the field even to the end of the war, which is about 40-60 percent of the tank ball park assigned in support of the infantry with around 40% for their Mechanized Cavalry Formations (AMR, AMC, etc). The misconception of French tank assignment was truly not the sole cause of failure and defeat. The failure primarily was a lack of anticipation the Germans would do a sickle-cut across the wooded forests with as many armored formations as they could where the French were caught being unable to compensate or counter when the battle was joined. One can easily view how much value the Stug or Sherman armored vehicles late in the war had provided to the infantry formations the valuable service very much required for close support operations.
Thirdly, French Cavalry Tanks were normally designed and requested to have one and a half men to two man turrets which can be seen on the Somua S-35 APX 1CE turret. The controversy of the one man orchestra tanks can be plainly understood with the regular army tanks whose sole intention was not rapid advance but slow methodical pace with the infantry in direct support which would make a one man turret sensible given that it is not expected to perform anything beyond that role. Unfortunately for French Industry, they could not actually produce the required vehicles and saddled the Mechanized Cavalry with the very much unwanted H-35 tank which was not actually fit for Cavalry service and deemed unacceptable. Given the problems with French Industry gearing up to produce tanks, the Cavalry had no choice but to accept the poorly designed tank into its TO&E. Despite both the infantry and especially the cavalry not wanting the Hotchkiss tank ... French Industry was still receiving orders to produce the tank! Also recall that the very numerous Panzer I that was only intended to be a training tank that still equipped Panzer formations or held in reserve even in 1940 were all 1 man turret tanks.
