Gettysburg, why does the south lose?

[King]

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

Longstreet may have been correct, but he was not the man in charge lee was, lees plan for the campaign which prior to starting out on l-Street was in agreement with, was to totaly remove the AoP from the board, lee had striven always to achieve this aim, and sought to do it now because the writting was already on the wall, the attritional ability of the south to wear down the north was not his policy or his aim, at that time or ever prior to 64, when circamstancesthen dictate a new policy be adopted. The kind of victory sought was the one that brought the northern politicians to the table to thrash out a peace, or if the campaign failed, at least to allow the ANV to support itself in PA, and allow the harvests to be gatherd in VA that would then allow the ANV to stay in the field upon its return.

longstreets views were molded during the war, his opinions at the end of it were from the experiences he had of war first hand, and how best with hindsight, the war could have been prosecuted, by adopting a different strategy, one he never adopted during the war, even if he was in such a posistion to authorise its use, because he seldom had such an apointment.

All true, but isn't his post war views that Longstreet get critised for? So although he may have thoguht differently during the war it was the views in his post war that world turn him into a Southern Villian. Being a republican just adds insult to injury. In my opinion if he had said nothing contrversal after the war he would have been a Southern Hero, or at the very least just left alone.

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

yes l-street was slow to organise an attack, he usually was, but when he hit there was no errors, and he got the job done better than most, l-Street was no slower here than elshwere, and in fact got his corps on hand to act as lee determined very promptly on the night of the 1st, its then that the delay occurs, but its largely not his fault.

You do know that lees remark that longstreet was "SO Slow", is from Early and is first found in response to longstreets depreciation of lee tactical combat abilitys, in the 1877 Phillidephia weekly times, to which early responds with the oft quoted pharase you mention in a southern historical society paper intitled, "causes of lees defeats", where he deflects blame from lee and puts it elshwhere.

Have you read of the sickles "Historicus" argument?, where he defends his reputation/honur in the press, over critism of his actions at G-burg.

I am unsure about this. In the 7 days and Chickamuga I feel Longstreet was quicker. At 2nd Mannassas he got Lee to agree the delay. I think that Longstreet could of done more to support his chief. I have seen arguements pointing out the Lee went out of way to insult Longstreet. For example issuing orders directly to McLaws in front of Longstreet, whenthe chain of command should have had Lee ordering Longstreet and Longstreet ordering McLaws. This is in part hwy Longstreet would refuse Hood permission to chnage thelineof attack.


The Sickles Historicus arguement, got a link?

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

Dissapointment with l-street?, do you mean p491, last para "more impatience than i ever saw him exhibit on any other ocaison", if so then this line is lifted from the Times special correspondant who had acompanied lees for the last 18 months, he prefaces that line with this one,"Both gens lee and l-street yielded reluctently to the policy of pressing forward at once, undoubtedly l-street wanted to wait for hoods div(lighty engaged at fredricksburg and absent from chancellorsville), Lee was *insert footes line*, though it took close observation to observe it. In spite of the strength of the union posistionand eligibility for defence, which has not been surpassed in 27 months of warefare, it was deemed undesirable to wait for picket"." The success of the first day,memories of past victorys, the impracticility of turning either flank, combined to inspire the leading CSA generals with an undue contemp for the enemy"

Does this change how you read that para, or is it another one that gives you your view?

what l-street wants is largely irrelevant, he expresses his view, as do many others on the day, but its lee and lee alone who is the commander of the ANV, and he had made his wishes known in no uncertain terms, there was to be an attack on the 2, the question was how, how and when.

It is the line below it that give me my view. "Observing his chief's disappointment at finding the two First Corps divisions still occupying the standing positions in which he had left them two hours earlier, Longstreet did not presume to suggest that he wait for Pickett". Also reading the paragraph Foote does not say it was a Times corrispondent but an "an officer who rode with him". Does the line about Lee's impatience appear in more than one source? If it isn't, doesn't the report says that Longstreet is reluctantto attack. It also says that Lee is both reluctant and impatiencent to attack. Paradoxical if you ask me.

If you aks me Longsteet's view is important. When asking someone to exicute your plan, there person doing so needs to have confidence in it. Without that confidence the subordinatre may not be prepaired to follow the plan through properly. Lee did not have Longstrete confidence and we see the plan being jeperdised by (in my opinion) Longstreet's stalling tactics.

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

l-street and lee during g-burg did indeed have that kind of communication, ie verbal discusion on broad strategy, or if at a distance by notes through couriers, much the same as lee and Jackson operated earlier. later the staff work cathes up withe thinkg process, l-street knew that an offense was happening for the 2, he was told this late on the 1, and cut the orders to bring his 2 divs up close for whatever form that action would take, when it was decided, and where it decided for it to happen. i should add that lee directs broad concepts, corps commanders take that and determine divs posistion, formations and objectives, and those orders are passed on to div commanders and so on down the chain of command, the lower you go the less likly personal discussion becomes, and its mostly written.

l-street cant just head of into the blue, he has to be told if its a tactical envelopment, a strategic envelopment and so on, each requires differnt recce of the ground ahead.

Hanny

Longstreet knew the offenisive was happening. He knew exactly where Lee wanted his Division to deploy he knew the line of attack he was expected to take. The only thing he had not been told explicitly was to move out. This i swhy I feel Lee was a disapointed in Longstreet. Lee having told Longstreet all these things expected Longstreet at the veyr least to start getting his troops in posisition. Longstreet did none of these things. Considering the time it took to get the II corps in posistion, Longstreet didn't seem to have used the 3 hours from 9 till 11 to do much recce either.

P.S. applied for the HOI Beta yet?

 

[King]

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

Excellent you point up the problem nicely.
Yes its post war l-street gets it from his former comrades, and thats when the finger pointing at l-Street is first found, its not found in the weeks after G-burg, where the ANV look to see what went wrong, and lee adopts a thourough revision of how orders are issued and acted apon, its at that time that the finger pointing is at the staff system, coupled with critiscm of Anderson as the cause of faiulure on day 1, Ewell for day 1+2, both who have the defense of orders sent to them alloweing to wide a lattitude of circamstance, as you know in the CW if any order is followed by conditional cercamstance, it no longer becomes an order, and the recipient has lattitude to its intpretation. Lee saw this as a weakness during the review of the campaign and tightened up the order writting procedure, particulary in view of the relativly large number of new commanders to posistions of authority, what had worked with Jackson/L-street did not return the same at G-burg, it took some 9 months for Lee to allow the same lattitude for commanders again.

When after lees death they were concerning themselves with presenting their version of history for posterity, those who found no fault, or would allow no fault to be levelled at lee sought instead to paint others blacker than they were, primarily in the SHSP that form the backbone of documents for research into the CW(along with the OR), political oponents who stood on their war record made ideal targets, but there is really little condeming facts to support that l-Street was either slower than anyone else, or slower here than before, he was guility of not wanting to attack in the manner orderd, and that was all.

Which is my main issue, its only 1870s that this microscopic looking at l-Street occurs, the reasons that Early, Long and others want to deflect critiscm of Lee is one off loyalty to lee, even though he is now dead, but at that time, not at the time of battle review, their was a desire to know why the south lost, because they lost someone must have failed, they sought to make sure Lee shared no part in any who fucked up finger pointing. l_|street in his recent book did just that, and thats when the shit hits the fan. But what was happening was that those people were now dying off, and historys were being written, and people wanted to know why the south lost, it followed that G-burg was an importand turning point, since the south lost the battle someone had to take the blame...and here we are argueing if the blame is where it should be...

Let's start with a proposistion: Lee hero of the South was falible. That at least some of the critisms leveled at him are valid. Lee was a great a general but not perfect. The critisms leveled at him by Longstreet have a foundation. Now if Lee was falible why not Longstreet? These critisms of Longstreet performance can not be just made up, can they? There must be some foundation to them. So although it has with out doubt been embelished over time, I believe there must a some truth in these.

If we want to start throwing blame around with the benefit of hindsight let me give the people I blame.

Villian 1) Robert E. Lee: The idea of saving Vicksbrug by invading Maryland and Peenislvaina is flawed to begin with. Even if Lee had been successful it was too late. Troops should have been sent to Johnston in the hope he might actually laurnch an attack. The odds of this might be slim but it the Suths best hope of keeping Vicksburg.

Villian 2) Ambrose P. Hill: Given explict orders not to bring on an engagement, what does he do? Brings on a general engagement. We know wknow that Stuart would soon return to the army. When he returns Lee will finally have decent recon about the Federal deployment.

Villian 3) Richard S. Ewell: Having the oppertunity to take Cemetery Hill on the evening of the 1st and throws it away. The battle could of been won that day, and Ewell threw it away.

Villian 4) James Longstreet: In my opinion could have done more on the morning of the second day. Knowing now how close the South came to unhindging the Union Left, I believe that an attack earlier in the day, when the Federals where less ready could of been more successful. I know you present much evidence here but I can not quite shake the suspicition that Longstreet could of done more

Villian 5) Why its Richard S. Ewell again: Given instructions to prevent the union reinforcing the left with troops form the right. He somehow allows the left to be reinforced with troops from the right and thendoes not attack himself till these troops are available to return. Nice work

So although for me Longstreet is not the biggest villian of here, he must carry hishsare fo responcibilty for what happened on those 3 days.

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

Nope coddington, has the numbers, he use them to demonstrate the logisticl nature of manouver in the CW, 1st corps wagon train occupys 20 miles or road, Johnstons div similary occupys 14 miles of road in its approach march, you just simply run out of road when you have large numbers of troops to move, as i mention before l-Street has the arty on the road net, as it is first in lee orders of approach, when lee sets of at 10 to visit Ewell, when he returns at 11, the road net is still occupied by the artys appraoch, the wagon train is racked up on it and had to move off, Alexander spent further time in recce the ground ahead, and at that time lee sends l-street off, after giving him 30 mins to wait for the lead inf brigade(McLaws) to arrive, and Lee still instructed that the approach be made in dead ground so as to be unobserved, which he knew would take more time than a direct march, during the march L-street orders Hoods lead elements ahead to clear fences that obstruct the movement cross country, That is not the action of a man wanting to waste time( orderd his divs up to the field 5.30 morning of the 1 day to be on hand), nor was it when he got his 2 divs on hand for action on the 2nd day, despite lee not having formed definative concepts for the 2nd and telling l-street of them and his role till the morning of the 2 day, and lee let 1 corps sleep in because they marched up past midnight, and they were still ready, by 8.30/9.00, but lee was still not ready to order the enelopment till 11, after further consultation with ewell, however the ground proposed was scouted and the arty in motion in anticipation of no change to circilar order( circular order is the same order sent to all who particpate in the same genaral op) for 1 corps and the art reserve.

lee insult L-street/, you have the facts wrong, military protocl dictated that Lee could cictate orders to anyone at any time as CiC, or through the usual chain of command, any failure of a subordinates actions was then approriated back through that sequence, this was no insult to l-street, as lee had consulted McLaws prior to the metting you refer to, l-street was unaware of this and thought Lee was removing mclaws from his supervision and asuming direct responsobilty, he was rather put out at the thought/ alternativly as argued by Mclaws himself, L-street was under the impression that a debate about the wisiest choice of deployment was settled by lee pulling rank. This follows on to Hood being fefused permision not to put his attack in because acoding to the orders, based on longs recce earlier dictated only 2 brigades of union to push back, but Hood faced more than this and said so, but the orders stood, as you say.

Is coddington wriiten before Foote's account? The narritive is consider one the best accounts of the civil war and yet you are presenting evidence of a glarring ommision. It strill leaves me with a question if they had no evidence why did they throw the accusations at Longstreet? If they had no evidence then why do these accusations continue to circulate even now? I willing to accept that things have been embelished by Early for example who didn 't exactly cover himself in glory at Geytsyburg but there must me some fact there. The March was going to take time I agree. If Longstreet had sent his artillery on the road at 10, why did he ask for a delay at 11 for Law to arrive? If McLaws lead the advance why do some accounts say that Law did?

Was really military protocol fo rthe army commander to order a subordinate of the Corps commander in his presencthe full details of his orders right the way down to the line of advance? I really did not think so.

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

yep, although i have it better in book form, i mention it as an example, along say with Jacksons rash of courtmartials, of how those who fuck up are brought to book instantly for it, not 12+ years later by those with axes to grind, scores to settle, reputations to protect and so on.

http://www.civilwarhome.com/historicus.htm

In my opinion one of the best fuck ups of the Civil War is in the 7 days when Jackson rather than attacking decieded that it would be better of he spent the day kipping under a tree. NOw if you ain't getting courtmertialed for that you ain;t getting court martailed for being a bit slow in carring out orders. Let's face it courtmartials ain't Lee's style he tended to transfer commander he thoguht where substandard to other commands Like Huger and Magrugers transfers to the Kirby-Smithdom.

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

factualy wrong though, ANV war diary shows Lee/L-Street together at 10, lee present to hear the couriers sent to bring up the arty under Alexander, 3 battns = reserve, and to see Alexander ride of on his recce, l-street points out the attack plan he has devised, lee leaves and consults with ewell, and returns at 11, again from the ANV war dairy, its an impossobility that lee could expect some 60 arty pieces to recieve orders, some took 20 mins to arrive, move 4-6 miles, after a recce that took 20 mins for alexander to make and clear the road net.

The actual big picture was lees, but the rest was l-streets responsobility to plan, and the paradox is easily explained (if i had carried on typing the first time), because lee had to finish what was started on the first day, he had to attack to do so, yet was presented with poor options to do so, hence his reluctance at the lack of better prospects. Moving strategicly around to the right, was a no go as it would expose his LOC, something he did coutenance before the campaign, as evidenced by the disposistion of the cav in the rear and his letter to davis, but given the circamstances he found himself in, he ruled it out, for other reasons other than that though.

Anyways back to footes line, he is refering to the Times special correspondent, this acount appears in the times 18 aug 1863 in its entirity, and is cited by l-street in his manassas to apotoamx book, Col Alexanders "Causes of lees defeat at g-burg" and others acounts, so there is no doubt as to where the passage comes from.

Lee dissapointment was lees own fault, his orders require the arty to initaite the aproach march, 1 hour is all that has transpired, lee impatience appears in numerouse accounts and you have to be specific as to which one, a couple of examples ought to illustrate the problem, but yes lee wanted the attack that dau es early as practible, not at dawn as was pendeltons recolection, but as early as practible, and as we know few battles can have a decisive outcome(which was what lee wanted) in a single day, during the cw, franklin is the one that sticks in my mind and that was largely as a result of a retreat in winter through devestated land, after a severe thrashing, that removed an army from the orbatt.

Major schiebert of the prussian engineers, another forgien observer, afternoon/evening of the 1 day notes, "his careworn expression and unease, constintly changing his posistion and making inquirys", but his full acount mentions siattica as the possible cause, l-street and early both mention much the same.

Blackford a staff officer, notes,"he moves as if weak and in pain", but expands latter that it was the diarrrhea that causes these, as do many others, buttermilk was the probable cause.

add to that the more general comments that revolve around the fact that Stuarts usual flow of intel has stoped, so lee is unsure as to the full extent of what and where he faces, along with the anxiety for the fate of his beloved stuart, and his 3 brigades, forced to march in close proximity to the enemy by the road net,not having fully concentrated his inf/arty corps till midday on the 2nd, and when they were he had little ability to support himself for long in the presence of the Aop who would prevent foraging, there was much to cause worry in lee thinking process that "was a painfull, studiously long process that weighed every detail however small". more from schieberts views on lee.

i believe footes refering to l_Street forgoing another chance to offer an opinion as not to attack that day, but instead wait for picket and move into posistion for and attack on the 3rd, a view he had twice pressed and had regected, and now just after 11 had impressed upon him the importance of the attack he was about the iniate, lees view just after the battle was if both wings had acted in acordence with his wishes, the battle would have been won.

I mahaged to find this http://www.wtj.com/archives/longstreet/ in it give Longstreets account of the battle.

In his version: "About ten o'clock General Lee returned to his head-quarters, but his engineer who had been sent to reconnoitre on his right had not come back. To be at hand for orders, I remained with the troops at his head-quarters. The infantry had arms stacked; the artillery was at rest."
The artillery was not moving at 10 according to Longstreet.

In his version: "At the intimation that the battle would be opened on the right by part of the First Corps, Colonel Alexander was asked to act as director of artillery, and sent to view the field in time to assign the batteries as they were up. It was eleven o'clock when General Lee's order was issued,"
Alexander does not begin his recce till 11.

In his version: "General Lee ordered his reconnoitring officer to lead the troops of the First Corps and conduct them by a route concealed from view of the enemy. As I was relieved for the time from the march, I rode near the middle of the line."
Longstreet deceides the best place for the corps commanders as int he middle of the column for the march. Noy exactly the palce I would choose if I were Longstreet, surely you want to be at the front?

Now Longstreets account has some interesting differences form the versions you present. If we accept that Longstreet is wrong and the war dairy is right fairly easy to claim to make) then the question becomes why? We know memiors are written for the audience not for the facts. The German Generals of World War II get the award for that. If only that looney Hitler wasn't in charge we could of stopped those dirty commies, does 50's America want to hear that message? So what is Longstreet trying to say? He is presenting a different version when things are running far slower than the accounts you present. All of sudden nothing is moving till 11, all of sudden there is not reccon. To put out an opinion Longstreet is trying to suggest that it took so long to get into posistion because of Lee's failure to give him clear instructions till 11. Which I take to suggest that Longstreet knew post war that his march was a bit too slow. Just an opinion.

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

oh do you need coddingtons book, ive listed some, by no means all the recce undertaken, long, lees most trusted staffer only completes his recce and reports to lee while he as with ewell at between 10-11, and gives his report then, and he is one of the early ones sent out.

add to that the times lee and l-street confer and lee determines what role for 1 corps and you will find l-street has acted very swiftly during the 1st day to get his divs on hand, has them ready early on the 2nd, but its lee who has yet to determine what specific role for them, and its only during the march itself that any critiscm of time wasting (due to countermarching) can have any cridability, as the war diarys, coddington, and the after battle reports will all bear out.

Just a thought Longstreet makes much of the late return of Col. Venable, I take it this the man you refer to. Yet Foote says that its Captain Johnston who leads the I Corps. Who returns at 9 and says he has been up Little Round Top. Why did he lead lead the I Corps and not Venable? I am stilthink there is some smoke here and thus some fire.

An interesting thoguht here. I do not disagree that Longstreet was very prompt prior to the morning 2nd of July. This when he has no idea what Lee was planning. When he still thinks he can convince Lee to do things his way. It is only after this when Lee makes it clear that it will not be done Longstreet's way that the contraversy starts. A conisidence?

 

[King]

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

Lee was falible?, why sir, thats the kind of lose talk we wont stand for, its that kind of talk that gets l-streets house burnt to the ground for the utterances he makes in reference to lee in his M to A, which you have a link for, so when he says "That Lee was excited and of his balance was evident on the afternoon of the first, and he laboured under that opression untill enough blood was shed to appease him", Alexander who was one of the lee defenders, while also being am admirer of l-street, said "many a soldier will never forgive him for such a sentiment, i do not believe he knows how it reads to a lover of lee". Early and others went further, when he rebutes the book in the SHSP, he suddenly rembers conversations from 12 years earlier verbatim and recalls in it that lee says l-street was "So slow", despite not ever commenting on it before, nor can it be corroborated by others occounts. And that acording to earlys account, longstreets attack was to have comenced at dawn, notice something wrong there?

I suspect there are places where you still cant say lee was fallible, certainly it took decades for history books to come around to that idea. Also its only in the last decade or so that historians have rexamianed the record, and found l-street got the shaft for all the wrong reasons, many of which do not bear close examination, as they can be cleary shown to be false, that dont mean the man was slow, he was, byt not slower than necessary, and when he hit the hit went deep, thats why why Lee when he promoted him to LietGen placed his name above that of jackson, that may not mean much to you but it ment much to those men then.

You will find that lee never had the intention you think, there is no record that his campaign had any reference to grant/vicksburg, or rosecrans/bragg, Lee was concerned with the eastern seaboard and virg, as shown by the surviving records of his planning and consultation with davis and seddon,(may63) and his prliminary(july63) and final(jan 64) reports for the caimpaign, none refer to events and consequences in/for the west.

another example of hindsight, and its problems, lee is usually portrayed as, with the war now over, Lee set an example to all in his refusal to express bitterness. "Abandon your animosities," he said, "and make your sons Americans." He then set out to work for a permanent union of the states."

however this is not the full story of lee thoughts.

"Governor(this is with the gov of Texas, Stockdale), if I had foreseen the use those people designed to make of their victory, there would have been no surrender at Appomattox Courthouse; no sir, not by me. Had I foreseen these results of subjugation, I would have preferred to die at Appomattox with my brave men, my sword in this right hand." CSA General Robert E. Lee.

Hindsight is not easy to remove, but as hinsight husky shows in the Japan thread, if you base your apreciation of 1941 capabilitys on 2000 data you get rubbish as your answer, if you use the same data as the japs had for their choices, the same data for the US as they had then you get a damn closer viewpoint.

Its quite clear just post g-Burg that the union people and politicians thought AoP missed the chance to finish the ANV, and that the people of the south were in shock that the ANV under lee was defeated. No one at the time said gee if only we won that one we win everything.

Now Hanny limited hindsight can be useful up to point. For example knowing that Stuart's cavalry will arrive around the evening of the 2nd. If the battle is delayed till the 3rd Lee will have Stuart to perform reccon for him. This will imrove his abilty to fight the battle. Saying that since the lost South the real war, so the must loose every possible counter factual scenario is of course not very useful hindsight at all.

From this link http://www.gdg.org/shlong1.html . Longsteet claims that he talked witht he secetary of War and suggest that a corps (his own) should be sent to the West to invade Tennesse and Knetucky to help relieve the preasure on Vicksburg. Longstreet then discusses the same plan with Lee who argues that an invasion of Marlyland and Pennsilvaina will achieve the smae results. So there are accounts which support the view that the Gettsyburg campaign was fought for those reasons. Additionally I find it hard to believe that Lee, Davis and Seddon tottally ignored the West when planning the campiagn. It might of been mentioned much but it would of played in the back of their minds.

I agree that Longstreet got flak for daring to critise Lee. I also read your account of who Early amoungst others leads the charge against Longstreet. However considering the poor performance fo the ANV over those three days. To say that Longstreet was the only senior office to be compitant is a bit much.

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

about the same time,(coddington died and his wife published it much later) coddingtons was/is?, the book the guides use to tell you what happened on the tours, its known as the g-Burg bible, and is the diffinative account of the battle, 900 pages, 300 of which explain in full where the references come from and there context. There is no better book for the 63 campaign.

because law was assigned the extreme right front posistion, he needed to be the lead element to avoid counter marching later to redeploy, if, as was possible, he could have marched to the deployment area he would need guides, they did not exist, so a string of staffers would be needed to string them to the posistion asigned for them, l-street thought 30 mins was a better way to do so, Lee agreed. You dont go into action with your flank end brigade not present, no action would take place untill it come up. Not to mention again, that lees plan was 2 fold, first was that the arty be placed, followed by the infantry. step 1 move and posistion arty, underway by 10 or so, move and posistion inf underway by midday, step 3 actually attack.

Lee had spoken to mclaws earlier(unknown to l-street), and then again latter in l-streets prescence, where the exchange of lee/L-Street occurs,(hence the bitchy l-street) Lee had asigned johnston as a guide, directed McLaws personaly as to his posistioning, that under protocal and regs made them temporaily in charge of the troops and overranked L-street, which is why he went to the middle and rode with hood(because hood was still under his command not having been instructed or even present earlier where lee gave orders to mclaws), and you note while there he dipatches men ahead to expediate the advance by removing fences. Further he overtakes mclaws div by taking a more direct route around 1.30, this is because although hood starts behind Mclaws he arrives first as hood explains "L-Street orderd the quicking of the pace and we paced to the front of McLaws, this was acomplished by throwing out an advance gaurd to clear fences for the way ahead". This was necessary because Jhonston missed the way and Mclaws countermarched a further 4 miles to get forward 1 mile, arriving to deploy at 3 in the peach orchard. hood with L-Street went a different route, its this point in the day that most usually say the time was lost, not before.And its a matter of a couple of hours or so, no more than that.

I must add coddringtons book to my shopping list. Although being terminally broke it might be a while till I get my hands on it.

Longstreet could of lined up his brigades the other way round. WIth Mclaws marching out first and alining with Anderson and then Hood marching in behind. Considering the ammount of road space that McLaws brigades would of needed, by the time Hood set of the marhc Law would probably arrived, and since Law would be the last brigade in the line his troops might even get a short rest after their long march. Considering who narrow the margin was for the the union gettign troops onto the Round Tops, half an hour might well of made all the difference.

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

When l-street says he goes to the middle of the column, he is refering to the fact he is not in command, at that time, and goes where he wants, not where he has no authority.

Longstreet is refering to his 1 corps arty, Alexander was in command of a battn in the reserve, its those who are coming up, as alexander does his recce, under lees order to bring them up.

Alexander after battle report mentions that "10 oclock in the prescence of lee, he reported to l-street, for orders, and was diredted at seminary ridge to posistion his guns on the right of the line", which further corroborates the ANV war dairy, lee then leaves to consult with ewell, so where is the confuson?, its quite a straight forward chain of events, i thought you had access to the time of orders?, was i mistaken.

Alexander rode fast with only a couple of couriers, and completed his inspection, dispatched a courier for cabel and henry and his own battns, and returned to them, all in under an hour, you can find his full acount of the battle at UNC, "Battle at G-Burg", Alexander papers.

http://www.gdg.org/shlong1.html
Heres the article that bears mostly on the post war bitching, and puts l-streets posistion clearly, and those who attack him, they alledge a dawn attack, notice something wrong?

Hey Alexander commanded the I corps reseve artillery and answered to Longstreet. Brigadier General William Nelson Pendleton commanded the ANV reserve artillery. Since he wasn't very good at his job, he didn't actually have any guns under his direct command. It was one of the problems with the barrage to support Picket on the 3rd day. Alexander was trign to coordinate troops that were not under his command. Pendelton should of but didn't.

I read thorugh some of Longstreets stuff. Will read thorugh all of it later. I know a dawn attack is not in question. IT will take a fair ammount of time to move the troops. However I do believe that if Longstreet had moved sooner the attack might have been more successful. I also think that Longstreet could of done more to do this. This is my opinion anyway.

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca

Following the interview where l-street gives alexander his orders, lee goes to vist ewell, earlier in the day he had sent venables ask about the proposed attack on his front, venables remained and recce the ground in front of II corps, and was still there at 11 when lee arrived followed shortly after by long. Its c marshal an ADC who cites venables as sounding out ewell for the main effort, due to l-streets reluctence on the other flank, is that the refernce you refering to?, because to my knowledge he dont recce in front of 1 corps.

no i refer to Col Long, Col Walker, capt Johnston( with Maj Clarke of l-streets eng) and pedelton who recce ahead for 1 corps, under lee direction to form" some eastimate of the ground ahead, and the best mode of attack", they set out at sunrise, returning at different times(9.00 - 11.00). Its pendeltons route l-street follows.

The contraversy that l-street cost them the battle cos he was slow, and that they lost the war because they did not win at g-Burg, starts 12 years later, so no.

The fact is 1 corps attack on the 2nd day achieved a great deal, 13 union brigades were chewed up and worthless at the end of it, instead of asking could not more have been done, why not ask how was it done by an inferior force.

Hanny

Edit, you might want to reread the first day acount from your link, or footes page 480 top paras, as to lees intentions and L-Streets appraisal of them on the evening on the 1st.

I beleive that Longstreet may have cost the South the battle by his actions. However both Hill and Ewell had their chance to not cost the South the battle and blew it. There are many villians in this piece and Longstreet is not the greatest offender. However Longstreet was the most expierence corps commander, he was the man that Lee should of relied on. Yet he refuse to alter Lees order in the face fo the actual situation. He laurnched the attack in echelon (the way Lee wanted) rather all at once (the way he preferred). He seemed to give no direction to Anderson (who had been attached to his command) and concentrated on the Peach orchard. Considering that some Anderson's brigades did reach the summit of the ridge a bit of better cordination there could of made a difference. Then there is the contraversys over Longstreets advance into possistion.

 

[King]

No probles,