German tank superiority!?

[Darkrenown]

Interesting, could you please provide a source for this? I was under the impression that the Panther was always unreliable as the designers cut corners when it came to the gearbox and final drive which hindered it strategic reliability wise for its entire operational service. When you referred to reliability, did you mean the strategic reliability, or tactical reliability?

It improved, but it never got good. Take, for example, the French impressions of the Panther from their post-war use of it. I'm also going to paste in a post of mine from a previous Panther thread, because quoting stuff with quotes in it is hard to read:
Reliability was a problem with all Panthers from the day they were deployed at Kursk -only 15% of them managed to get to the battle, and throughout the war:
Germany's Panther Tank by Thomas Jentz

Panther-Abteilungen in the West

On 28 June 1944, Guderian reported on experiences in opposing the Allied landing in Normandy: The Pz.Kpfw.IV, V, and VI have proven to be successful. The Panther appears to catch fire quickly. The lifespan of the Panther's motors (1400 to 1500 km) is significantly higher than the Panther's final drives. A solution to the final drive problem is urgently needed. The fasteners for the Schuerzen must be strengthened to prevent them from being torn off by the hedgerows in the Normandy. Soon the troops will demand that protective armor shields be mounted over the rear decks because of the success of fighter-bomber attacks. The height of the guns in the Strumgeshuetz is too low for the terrain in Normandy.

The general consensus of the industry was that inner-toothed gear wheels could not be produced due to a lack of proper machinery. This meant that a final drive using planetary gear reduction and pre-selector spur gearing - found to be reliable in company testing - could not be installed in the production tanks. All attempts to improve the final drive met with failure, despite the offers of a special bonus as an incentive. The housings, which initially had proven too weak and whose outer mounts had been bent out of alignment by the track's pull, were eventually replaced by stronger ones.

Panther and its Variants by Walther Speilberger

Minutes from a meeting of the Panzer Commision 23 January, 1945
Final Drive

From the front there continues to be serious complaints regarding final drive breakdowns in all vehicle types. Approximately 200 breakdowns have been reported with the 38(t). Prior to the 1945 eastern offensive there have been 500 defective final drives in the Panzer IV. From the Panther 370 and from the Tiger roughly 100. General Thomale explained that in such circumstances an orderly utilization of tank is simply impossible. The troops lose their confidence and, in some situation, abandon the whole vehicle just because of this problem. he requests an increase in efforts for the final drive, since only this way can the problem be laid to rest. With the previously intense criticism of the engine and the final drive continually playing such a roll, it is welcome news to learn that the gearbox generally enjoys a good reputation. Direktor Wiebicke claims that the Heerestechnisches Buro of the Waffenamt had for its part rejected the sun-and-planet final drive and demanded the spur wheel reduction drive. This claim led toa confrontation between Oberst Holzhauer and Oberbaurat Knonagel. Oberingenier Wiebicke clarified that for the past on and a half years there has been ongoing discussion regarding the introduction of the planetary gearing but as of yet nothing significant has been accomplished. Whereas during this entire time attempts have been made to improve the final drive, with only minimal improvement being noted. It must, however, be kept in mind that MAN, as the responsible manufacturing firm, cannot now hold other companies responsible. MAN as availed itself of all offices which have the prospect of providing a way out of these difficulties with the final reduction drive.

Soon after the introduction of the Panther Ausf. D into service, the steering unit exhibited reliability problems. After the war, German tank designers told their British captors that they were well aware of this defect. Their defense of the steering unit design was based on the belief that the steering brakes would outlast a vehicles transmission and final drives. Hence, it was not the serious problem to the Germans that the British portrayed in their report.

During World War II, a German prisoner of war informed his British captors that the weakness of the Panther's steering mechanism was well known. Panther tank drivers were instructed to use the auxiliary skin brakes for steering and to avoid pivot steers. He went on to say the steering unit problem appeared to be result of the overloading of the steering clutch during tight-radius and pivot steering maneuvers.

A late-war U.S. Army report noted of the Panther's auxiliary skid brake steering ability, "The skid turn feature of the steering system, which is utilized by pulling the seering lever all the way [back] and locking one track, cannot be employed at speeds in excess of approximately 8 to 10 miles per hours, and can only be used when the vehicle is in second gear, as the engine will be stalled if such a turn is made in a higher gear."

British engineers concluded that Panther final-drive units had inadequate bearings and poor housing strength. IN addition, critical areas of some gears were not hardened properly. these and other major design and manufacturing defects lead to poor final-drive reliability. Later information revealed that the Germans had approached a French firm during the war years to investigate the practicality of producing a new type of final drive for the Panther tank. The French received the assembly drawings, but nothing ever came of the proposed project.

Jaqcues Littlefield talked about what he has learned about Panther tank final drives in the process of restoring a Panther Auf. A:

"My understanding is that the final drives were always a problem. I've heard different things, for instance, that [the Germans] couldn't get the proper alloy, they couldn't heat-treat it properly, or whatever. When we test ours, the alloy and the strength of these particular gears was as good as what you could make them from today. [We] looked at maybe duplicating them, using the same physical size, but just using a stronger alloy or better treatment, and the answer we got back was that it was as good then as we can do it now.


Part of the problem with the final drives was no doubt due to the vehicle's growth in weight. It grew in weight from its original goal of 30 to 35 tons to the low 40s. I'm going to guess that what ended up happening with the final drives is that they were designed for the lower-weigh vehicle, and there wasn't the physical size [available] to where you could make the gears wider and stronger. Since they weren't able to make them wider, they just left them the way they were originally designed.


It is interesting that the American Sherman tank used double-herringbone gears in the final drives, which provides more torque capability for the given width of a final drive. The Panther uses straight spur gears, so there must have been a manufacturing limitation, as double herringbone gears were well known at the time for their ability to carry larger amounts of torque for a given width."

^ It's somewhat interesting that the Germans tried to have a French company improve the final drives.

Panzers at War Michael and Gladys Green

Although the Panther's AK 7-200 transmission was nominally superior to the clumsy transmisison on the t-34, about 5 percent broke down within 100km and over 90 percent within 1500km in combat. The final drive on the Panther Ausf. D was so weak that the tank could not even turn whlie it was backing up, which occurred frequently in the retreat to the Dnepr River. It's two fuel pumps were probably the biggest mobility weakness in the Panther Ausf. D because they were prone to leaks and caused serious engine fires. As least three Panthers were destroyed by fuel pump-caused fires during Zitadelle, and a high proportion of the mechanical breakdowns was caused by this troublesome component. Nor did the problem go away after Kursk: the initial batch of Panther Ausf. A tanks what were handed over to the SS-Leibstandarte in Italy in September of 1943 were so problematic that every one was rejected for service.

The Panther's poor mobility forced the Wehrmacht to move units around by rail and get them as close to the front as possible before unloading. Throughout 1943, the Panther was essentially tied to conducting all major movements by rail, including the equally short-legged tiger, and units could not even move 100km without significant losses. Thus, the Panther did not meet Guderian's requirement for a tank with superior mobility, and it was the t-34's continued advantage in mobility and reliability that contributed greatly to the Soviet victory in the Ukraine in 1943.

I underlined the most interesting parts of these quotes.

 

[Centerbe]

Most time of WWII the Germans weren't able to produce nearly as much equipment as most of there enemies (specially the USA and the SU)! The reason, they still where so successful!? They compansate there quantitative weaknesses with quality ... See: the Americans need four to five Shermans to destroy only one German Tiger (on average ...). And even the Pershing wasn't complete on a level with a Tiger or a Panther never mind the TigerII! :excl:

Now I'm worried about how the game will hadle this ... we've seen both, the German and the US tank tech tree and in what we've seen the Pershing will be the counterpart to the German TigerII! We also know, that all the tanks of one level will just be different in their names, but not in their stats (except for the boni of the companies)... So the Pershing will be (nearly) the same tank than the TigerII, with the only differene, that (if they simulate the (late war) econemy in the right way) the Americans will be able to produce much more Pershings than Germany TigerIIs ... remember this! :huh:

Older HoIs 'solved' this problem at 'the part' of the tech: (for example HoI3) the Germans have much more leaderpoints than the US, so they can research more techs and tech up to bether tanks (in my opinion the best way to do so, even if the system with the leaderpoints was more than awful) ... (or in DH) the German tech teams were more specialize in tanks ...

But in HoI4 I don't see such mechanics ... or will the German companies give more and bether boni to their tanks than the American ones!? (<-- specially asked to the Dev.)!
And than I'm really scared about the Variants: remember two parts before: the Americans will produce more Pershings than Gemany produces TigerIIs ... so they can use more tanks on the battleground and gain more combat experience, won't they? So they can make bether variants and ... uups, suddenly they don't just have more, but also better tanks than Germany ...

Maybe (and I really hope so) the Dev. have already mentioned this problem and this hole thread is useless ... but if not I'm really hoping the Dev. will see the same problem as I or can explain at least, why this problem don't exist at all ... :excl:

Thoughts!?? :unsure:

Not sure in all cases germans tanks was superior in every aspect, they concentrate more on armor thickness and firepower/penetration for some models.
But in general require more time for repairing, less mobility (except for some specific models), and slow aiming time (turret rotation velociy ecc ecc).
About to the five sherman lost to hit a tiger, was referred to some specific battles where tiger was at long distance from them. And in early models sherman 75mm penetration was much inferior than Tiger I 88mm L56 expecially at long distance. This do not mean germans tank guns was the best in comparison to every other countries.

An example about famous Rheinmetall 88mm L56, was less penetrating and powerfull (9,2kg shell at 820m/s) than the analogous 90/53 Ansaldo cannon (10,2 kg at 840m/s). And this last one have also a short barrel with only 53 long caliber.

 

[guga912]

Personally the myth of German tanks being superior exists because it's easier to accept that Germans built better tanks, than to accept that they had superior crews used better tactics and fought with admirable discipline through most of the war.
German tanks during their greatest military successes were not better and did not outnumber their enemies(Poland is an exception), they were put to better use and led by better tacticians, and had more qualified crews in them. Taking into account Nazi ideology it's much safer to explain the often superior performance of German tank divisions by having better tanks, rather than the reality of better crew, officers and tactics.

 

[Centerbe]

Personally the myth of German tanks being superior exists because it's easier to accept that Germans built better tanks, than to accept that they had superior crews used better tactics and fought with admirable discipline through most of the war.
German tanks during their greatest military successes were not better and did not outnumber their enemies(Poland is an exception), they were put to better use and led by better tacticians, and had more qualified crews in them. Taking into account Nazi ideology it's much safer to explain the often superior performance of German tank divisions by having better tanks, rather than the reality of better crew, officers and tactics.

The myth exist because Germany invested before the war a lot of research, manpower, crew training ecc ecc on the panzers. Panzers was protagonist of blitzkrieg doctrine, their best weapon.
But during the war all their opponents adeguate quite well their tanks and stuff to this german initial advantage. In opposite situation Germany during the war did not have many more resources to continue to develop this weapons so well as before (research, manpower, crews, ecc ecc).

 

[Lollardheretics]

Personally the myth of German tanks being superior exists because it's easier to accept that Germans built better tanks, than to accept that they had superior crews used better tactics and fought with admirable discipline through most of the war.

This.

This explication is quite good to explain why the Panzerwaffe succeded so well in the beginning, and so badly in the end, exception made of a few top elite crew who survived all the war (Otto Carrius, Wittman or Kurt Kniespel), BUT i maintain that the success of these individual rely also on the tank they were given. Even if the Tiger was a logistical disaster, had poor reliability, these elite crew made them shine and had great success with them.

If you give a T34 to an elite crew, he will do well, but give him a Tiger, he will annihilate a whole brigade.

 

[Centerbe]

This.

This explication is quite good to explain why the Panzerwaffe succeded so well in the beginning, and so badly in the end, exception made of a few top elite crew who survived all the war (Otto Carrius, Wittman or Kurt Kniespel), BUT i maintain that the success of these individual rely also on the tank they were given. Even if the Tiger was a logistical disaster, had poor reliability, these elite crew made them shine and had great success with them.

If you give a T34 to an elite crew, he will do well, but give him a Tiger, he will annihilate a whole brigade.

This is true because Germany develope better the armament of their early tanks. Expecially the heavy tanks. And allies understand too late the importance of high penetrating/long barrel guns.
Reason why Tiger I was used primary as defensive/long distance target role. Poor mobility and reliability but great firepower.

 

[Darkrenown]

Speaking of Carius, here's an interview with him from last year:
http://tankarchives.blogspot.se/2014/08/carius-interview.html
Sadly, he died recently

 

[Mjarr]

Most time of WWII the Germans weren't able to produce nearly as much equipment as most of there enemies (specially the USA and the SU)! The reason, they still where so successful!? They compansate there quantitative weaknesses with quality ... See: the Americans need four to five Shermans to destroy only one German Tiger (on average ...). And even the Pershing wasn't complete on a level with a Tiger or a Panther never mind the TigerII! :excl:

I have a better starting point:

How about realising Tiger was highly specialised tool meant for certain purposes? Shall we compare 18th century rifles' superiority for 18th century muskets? I mean, those rifles were pretty awesome for skirmishing and sharpshooting but utterly pointless to arm entire armies with them because they are more expensive and the benefits of early rifles is either negated or lost when fighting in formed line? Shall we compare B-17 for any other fighter of WW2 because it had shitload of .50cal machineguns which would tear anything apart if they get too close while ignoring it couldn't dogfight even if the plane was unpainted, no bombs, and everything unnecessary was stripped off the reduce its weight? I mean come on, it's big, somewhat resilient to damage and has shitload of guns. Who needs fighter aircraft and who gives a crap it can't do tight turning circle to save its life without breaking into six pieces at full load?

Also what about those thousands of Pz3s, Pz4s, their variants, captured tanks and whatnot which collectively killed more enemy AFVs than few big cats combined? Sure those big cats earned their reputation but if say in 1943 80% of my hypothetical Panzerwaffe is still made of Pz3s and less than 1% are new big cats, and the other 19% are variants of Pz3, Pz4s, Panzerjägers, radio tanks, captured tanks pressed to service, training tanks etc, what does that really tell about the situation? Besides big cats are probably concentrated where they are needed in same manner as US army concentrated tank destroyers whenever they assumed big cat concentration? Or that if my hypothetical Panzerwaffe in 1944 is still 3\4 Pz4s and StuGs? And only after spectacular losses of equipment and changes in production it finally veers way that old refitted divisions and new divisions are finally getting large numbers of some big cats?

(Edit: I am aware those ratios or "numbers" are purely made up and very likely do not hold up to reality, hence the claim hypothetical. Or conjecture.)

Dont forget the US had almost 2:1 but most often 5:1 and most enough also 10:1 superiorty to reach that..
They fought most times only few tanks at a time and when those were well placed suffered heavy losses. Thats also "well known".
So 5:1 need has a reason. And also don't forget that this was only for US.
UK had slightly different experience as had SOV..

If I have air force with 2000 fighter pilots but 30.000+ fighter aircraft ready to use, very high portion of that 30k+ is unused but inflates total numbers. If I have six billion helmet liners for an army that sizes few million, does that mean I assume six billion soldiers to be at arms or mass production of helmet liners is just ridicuosly effective and most of them will sit in the storage awaiting helmet to be put into, or become spare parts for lost or damaged liners? And that the mass production of helmet liners still remains ridicuously effective for the needs?

 

[hjarg]

I read the thread (mostly) and to be fair, you seem to be comparing Axis and Allies, but totally forgetting Soviet tanks.

For example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Raseiniai

Yes, the soviets lost the battle, but mostly because stupid orders from high command, bad leadership and unwillingness of men to fight.

The KV-1 & KV-2, which we first met here, were really something! Our companies opened fire at about 800 yards, but it remained ineffective. We moved closer and closer to the enemy, who for his part continued to approach us unconcerned. Very soon we were facing each other at 50 to 100 yards. A fantastic exchange of fire took place without any visible German success. The Russian (sic - Soviet) tanks continued to advance, and all armour-piercing shells simply bounced off them. Thus we were presently faced with the alarming situation of the Russian (sic) tanks driving through the ranks of 1st Panzer Regiment towards our own infantry and our hinterland. Our Panzer Regiment therefore about turned and rumbled back with the KV-1s and KV-2s, roughly in line with them. In the course of that operation we succeeded in immobilizing some of them with special purpose shells at very close range 30 to 60 yards. A counter attack was launched and the Russians (sic - Soviets) were thrown back. A protective front established & defensive fighting continued

And KV tank was virtually unbeatable until 42, unless Germans used their 88mm flak guns.

T-34 was a great tank as well, and better then anything Germans had in 41.

 

[Centerbe]

Speaking of Carius, here's an interview with him from last year:
http://tankarchives.blogspot.se/2014/08/carius-interview.html
Sadly, he died recently

 

[Lollardheretics]

About Big Cat', technical issue and crew :

About the Tiger. How reliable was it?

Initially, there were growing pains. The first company with Tigers was used at Ladoga, near Volkhov. The terrain is nearly impassable for tanks, and it was winter. All Tigers broke down! This happens always, with every new technology.

A significant factor in a Tiger's reliability was the training of the driver. An experienced driver can reduce technical issues. At first, thank god, I had experienced drivers. Then we had young drivers for Jagdtigers, and it was a catastrophe. My personal tank #217 had to be blown up at Danzig, and it held out until almost the end of the war.

What position would you give reliability?

I can only talk about my company. You mean Tigers, right? They say that it was unreliable often. In my company, barely any Tigers were lost in battle due to technical reasons. They mostly broke down on marches. I did not have a single Tiger breakdown in combat!

It depends on the driver. It's a 60 ton vehicle with 700-800 horse power. You cannot treat it lightly, you have to drive with feeling. Otherwise something breaks. I repeat, I have never had a Tiger break down in combat for technical reasons!

 

[Darkrenown]

Tiger =! All cats. Tigers generally ran ok because they had a huge support group on hand at all times. It also had non-shit final drives because they were made in strictly limited numbers.

 

[jju_57]

Take, for example, the French impressions of the Panther from their post-war use of it.

But that was just because it didn't have multiple speeds for reverse. :blink: Sorry couldn't help myself.

 

[fabius]

In past reading I got the impression that one of the soft factors that is harder to quantify is that the German Panzer arm was viewed a elite by them in a way that was more reserved for specialist light infantry formations of colonial nations.

 

[balmung60]

I have a vague memory of there being something about Germany's tank manufacture that was pretty wasteful of steel too. Any idea what I mean, and if so, have you a source?

Well, all else being equal, building tanks that weigh 50% more than their counterparts will use correspondingly more steel per tank and if you're not getting correspondingly better performance, obviously some of that extra steel use is wasteful.

 

[ingwe]

Well, all else being equal, building tanks that weigh 50% more than their counterparts will use correspondingly more steel per tank and if you're not getting correspondingly better performance, obviously some of that extra steel use is wasteful.

That is a simple and excellent point. That is one of my many complaints about German tank design. If you put more resources into something, it needs to perform that much better. I think that is the biggest arguments in favor of the PZ IV, Sherman, and T-34.

 

[Red Barron]

I am sure this was covered earlier:

It was my understanding that the German success at the start of the war did not have to do with panzer tech superiority. It had more to do with superior doctrines in using those tanks, Guderian developed and advocated the strategy of concentrating armored formations at the point of attack. This allowed the Germans to overwhelm larger and superior opponents.

Hearts of Iron 3 had modeled this in the technology section using blitzkrieg and schwerpunkt doctrines.

 

[f1nalstand17]

Speaking of Carius, here's an interview with him from last year:
http://tankarchives.blogspot.se/2014/08/carius-interview.html
Sadly, he died recently

Good interview, but one must always take veteran memoirs with a grain of salt. For example:

"One day a Tiger Royal tank got within 150 yards of my tank and knocked me out. Five of our tanks opened up on him from ranges of 200 to 600 yards and got five or six hits on the front of the Tiger. They all just glanced off and the Tiger backed off and got away. If we had a tank like Tiger, we would all be home today."
- Report by tank commander Sergeant Clyde D. Brunson from 2nd Armored Division, 1945.

Would they really though? The answer is no.

 

[Sic Domine]

The reason the German tanks were so succesful and regarded as the best is simple.

They actually were the best. The Germans simply made the right decisions considering the tradeoffs and general thought of development. There is a reason why the Germans could keep up such a high tradeoff ratio in their battles, even though the tides were massively against them.

 

[keynes2.0]

Oh gee I dont think anyone considered that before.