German tank superiority!?

[Zinegata]

Dont forget the US had almost 2:1 but most often 5:1 and most enough also 10:1 superiorty to reach that..
They fought most times only few tanks at a time and when those were well placed suffered heavy losses. Thats also "well known".

This is called inflating unsupported pop-history assertions as fact. What is "well known" may in fact be just complete fabrications.

Most small engagements were fought by the US Army's independent tank battalions - and checking their records is actually very easy since the 90s thanks to the US Army releasing most of their after-action reports in the 90s.

Checking the records is in fact so easy that a book on the independent tank battalions had already been written by Harry Yiede - called "Infantry's Armor" - and it shows that the "few encounters resulted in heavy losses" school of thought is nonsense.

http://tankandafvnews.com/2015/02/25/interview-with-harry-yeide-part-1-us-armor-in-world-war-ii/

What instead happened is that tank losses tend to be directly related to unit experience. Tank units, at the start of their careers, tend to fight poorly and suffer heavy losses, but this steadily drops as the unit gains experience especially if the tank unit remains with the same infantry outfit.

In Europe you have high intensity battle pretty much all the time. The one thing I will say about tank losses in the European theatre is that, in the separate tank battalions at least, there was a clear pattern by which losses are heaviest in the first weeks and then losses drop dramatically. There are two factors at work here. One, the least competent commanders are putting their tanks into situations where they get killed. And two, everybody else is learning. And the infantry is learning and losses go way down.

And indeed, reading actual after-action reports is what allows Yiede to know about stuff like this:

The big beef I have with that hardware centric thinking is first off, you have the fact of rapidly dropping losses as a unit gains experience, which tells you the hardware was ok. My conclusion from viewing a lot of after action reports is that there is a crucial factor and a secondary factor that determines who lives and who dies and the crucial thing is the tactical situation. Most of the time the US army is advancing and the Germans have the benefit of concealment position and so on. When you’re advancing, the enemy gets the first shot in most cases. So your tank losses are relatively high. When the Germans are attacking, plain old vanilla 75mm Sherman tanks handle Panthers with no problem. In the Bulge for example, there were cases were American tankers did quite well against better German hardware.

They also never had to get a 10:1 numbers advantage just to kill one German tank - even while on the attack as few as 2 were needed; and in any case the independent tank battalions rarely deployed tanks in larger than platoon-sized formations anyway. Meanwhile the Germans very rarely deployed their tanks singly and often tried to get company or platoons together before deploying them - meaning that you had equal numbers in most of these small engagements. The American Army's armor superiority instead made itself known by how the Germans kept fighting battles without any armored support at all - because for every Sherman vs Stug platoon battle, there would be a dozen engagements where the US infantry with armor support would overpower German infantry with nothing more than towed anti-tank guns and panzerfausts.

That the "small, isolated groups of Panzers inflicting great damage on the US Army" myth still persists shows how the vast majority of popular history cannot be relied upon to tell the truth; because it's largely based on ancedotes that are taken at face value and yet completely fall apart with some investigation.

One famous anecdote for instance is Barkmann's corner, where the "ace" Barkmann claims he led a single Panther to destroy a compaany of Shermans in one afternoon. In reality, this account comes entirely from Barkmann himself and is not supported by American sources - who record losing only 2 armored cars in the area Barkmann fought his "corner". It is also not supported by any other German sources except Barkmann's commander, who accepted the story despite having no other witnesses, and the Nazi propaganda machine.

Indeed, I know of German-language researchers who snarkily point out that Barkmann in fact most likely got lost, spent a whole day finding his unit (and robbing a Frenchman of his wine in the process), and then invented the whole story to escape getting chewed out for wasting a day driving around the country side. That the German propaganda machine then seized upon the fake story and made Barkmann into a hero instead of an idiot who couldn't read a simple map is then all simply ignored because Germans are supposedly incapable of lying.

 

[Zinegata]

I think what you ment, was that tank vs tank was not the majority of combat in which tanks participated, because tank vs tank combat was extremely common at least from 1941, as the armored pincers of the attacker tended to be counter-attacked by armored formations of defender.

There were no large scale tank vs tank battles during the Polish Campaign, around half a dozen regiment-sized or bigger tank vs tank encounters in France 1940, and maybe a dozen or so that we know of in Barbarossa.

Tank vs tank combat was in fact not "extremely common", not when you're counting a couple of dozen large-scale encounters between armor when we are talking about armies that number in the millions; and that the armor Divisions are outnumbered by 5 or even 10 to 1 by the infantry Divisions.

In fact starting 1941 onwards tank vs tank combat became even less common because the Panzer and Tank Divisions themselves began divesting themselves of tanks - the German 1941 Panzer Division for instance having only half or sometimes even a third as many tanks as a 1939 Division, yet the infantry component doubled.

Heck, the US Army in fact did not even fight a single major tank vs tank battle in France until the 18th of September, 1944 - and that didn't even involve a full armored Division on the US side.

For starters, the technical know-how about the three key things when discussing armor is usually Firepower, Mobility, and Armor are really only technical aspects of a vehicle and nothing more.

But, but, how else can we compare our toys to each other? How else can I prove that the Maus is the bestest tank ever because it has 18 inches of armor plate?! [/sarcasm]

Amateurs discuss paper statistics. The ones who stop being amateurs are those who instead start figuring out where each weapon fits in the complex system known as the "army". Unfortunately, too many prefer to treat weapons as toys instead of making the leap that enables them to understand actual design requirements that you described in your post. (And how the German 45+ ton tanks were in fact gross perversions of effective German warmaking practice; developed primarily because they needed a placebo for a leadership still in denial that the war is already lost)

 

[1alexey]

There were no large scale tank vs tank battles during the Polish Campaign, around half a dozen regiment-sized or bigger tank vs tank encounters in France 1940, and maybe a dozen or so that we know of in Barbarossa.

Tank vs tank combat was in fact not "extremely common", not when you're counting a couple of dozen large-scale encounters between armor when we are talking about armies that number in the millions; and that the armor Divisions are outnumbered by 5 or even 10 to 1 by the infantry Divisions.

In fact starting 1941 onwards tank vs tank combat became even less common because the Panzer and Tank Divisions themselves began divesting themselves of tanks - the German 1941 Panzer Division for instance having only half or sometimes even a third as many tanks as a 1939 Division, yet the infantry component doubled.

Heck, the US Army in fact did not even fight a single major tank vs tank battle in France until the 18th of September, 1944 - and that didn't even involve a full armored Division on the US side.

Define "large scale" and "common/uncommon", would you?

As I did say, the tank vs tank combat was not nearly the majority of combat, however it is easy to note that in terms of absolute numbers tank s tank encounters did vastly increase after 1941.

I can count at least Neman(Неман) bridge 7th German armor division vs 5th Soviet armor division on 22th of June 1941, German 11th armored division vs Soviet 32d division 23 june 1941, Радзехув, German 6th armored division vs 2d Soviet armored division 24th june, of the top of my head.

Yes, at least according to what I read, battles of divisions that had at least 100 tanks on each side, and loses are around 10-20 tanks on each side, which is far more than Polish campaign ever had, over the space of 3 days right there, and I can probably find at least 5-10 ish similar engagements in 1941.

Overall, tank vs tank combat was common enough to up gun each "main" medium tank with longer guns purely for penetration sake, despite each armor division having dedicated AT battalion(s), which is all the evidence necessary.

 

[Darkrenown]

Well that was primarily due to Germany running out of Molybdenum as the war progressed, so why can't the KT in this hypothetical scenario not have its proper armor? Just in case we have some people here that believe Germany's access to rare materials in the war was the same throughout (due to the British blockade) let me provide some sources:

Because, again, I was talking about a historical matchup between the tanks as they were and not as they could have been. I did provide another source showing the change in quality of German armour though, the linked named British guns vs German armour talked about it some.

I think what you ment, was that tank vs tank was not the majority of combat in which tanks participated

It is what I meant, but it is also what I said. I'm not sure what you think your statement differs with mine, but I think we agree in substance.

Overall, tank vs tank combat was common enough to up gun each "main" medium tank with longer guns purely for penetration sake, despite each armor division having dedicated AT battalion(s), which is all the evidence necessary.

I wouldn't say that was entirely true - upgunning was often a balance between penetration and HE shell size, take the T-34-57 vs the regular T-34 or the later T-34-85, for example.

 

[shri]

No- TANK on TANK eh?

something wrong with your info- please see this, in the battle of France 1940- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gembloux_(1940)#Forces_involved
The French gave a real scare to Gen Hoepner.

In Russia too there were several battles, esp. in the South, GFM. von Kliest's forces were involved in most of them.



"Auftragstaktik" should be the only bonii Germany gets(with others not being able to research this,simply because they could not and even today except ironically the IDF forces no-one else uses this), this immediately means the German Wehrmacht until you go to the final level of Manpower mobilisation is immediately more effective on 1-1 terms (nearly equal numbers and weaponry) than its enemies, this coupled with 'machine gun focus platoon/squad' unlike the infantry-rifle focus platoon/squad resulted in at-least 20% more effectiveness in defensive battles and 5-10% in offensive battles. The % can be disputed upward/downward, but the reason for the success was not a better Tank (at least till 1943, German Tanks were <= Allied Tanks) or better weapon systems (the 'Door Knocker' was the main AT gun not the famed '88), it was the 'training' and 'leadership' of the NCO's and Officers coupled with the propensity to lead from the front (the list of General level officers in most German Wars from Frederick's time and in general death of Officers is disproportionately higher than most other armies).
This can be shown with the divisions getting - slightly more org and morale and also defensive/toughness and soft attack but consuming more time to construct.

 

[Darkrenown]

After all, a point was made that modern tank designs seemingly have thrown away the much promoted value of slopes for very flat shaped turrets. All I ask the viewer take a time out and try to figure out why modern tank designs made up of a great many very technical folks would seemingly do something like that and follow your own research there for knowledge discovery. I hope this helps in some way.

Well modern tanks have different armour technologies and face different threats, but here's an article relating to your main point and WWII tanks.

 

[1alexey]

It is what I meant, but it is also what I said. I'm not sure what you think your statement differs with mine, but I think we agree in substance.

Well, the difference is that "uncommon" is not something that happens regularly (almost) every time an offensive worthy of note happens.

I wouldn't say that was entirely true - upgunning was often a balance between penetration and HE shell size, take the T-34-57 vs the regular T-34 or the later T-34-85, for example.

When you say "often" and have one half-true example,..
Initially T-34 had a "short" 75mm L-11 gun, and was later upgraded to longer F-34, for which it was intended initially.
Pz4 had 75mm from start to finish, just longer.
StuG had 75mm, with length and mussel brake upgrade.
M4 started with 75mm, and got 2 76mm cannons(17 pdr and M1A2).
...
I mean, if tank vs tank combat is truly "uncommon", why bother touch the gun of tank, when the AT battalion of armored division can do the job for this rare and unimportant occasion, just like it does for infantry division.

 

[fabius]

This is complete and utter nonesense to begin with. The most reliable studies on US vs German armor vs armor engagements in fact show that the US Army had a 3:2 kill rate to their advantage in armor vs armor engagements (See Forczyck). The first major tank vs tank battle that the US Army ever faced was in fact Arracourt, therein the US Army notched a 3:1 kill rate in their favor (see Zaloga).

The only reason the 5:1 myth keeps getting repeated is because German fanboy sites have built up an enormous wall of self-inflicted ignorance; wherein they refuse to look at documents available since the 60s in the case of the US Army and the 90s in the case of the Soviets showing that German tank vs tank combat performance was in large part a myth created out of whole cloth; and instead resort to accusing Americans of "victor's history" and the Soviets of "communist propanda".

Hell, there were a grand total of three times that the US Army faced the vaunted Tiger - never more than in company strength - and only one of those three engagements may have involved a Sherman. Maybe one. (Although another one involved Pershings which did fine against the Tigers). The documentation to know this existed since the Green Book series of the US Army!

The Panthers and Tigers moreover in fact performed worst than the lighter German tanks, because they only had half the reliability. Superior armor and gunpower don't matter when you're in the repairyard nursing a broken drive because of the tank's obesity. Indeed, Stug battalions regularly outscored the best Tiger units, because Stugs were actually reliable enough to keep fighting while the Tiger battalion commanders wrote fanfiction to justify their inaction to high command.

=====

Finally, what people again don't realize is that the vast majority of land combat experience went to improving doctrine, tactics, and organization - not petty stats on tanks. The Second World War was in many ways the story of how the German, British, French, Soviet, and US Armies evolved from the uncertainty of a pre-war doctrine unsure of how to employ tanks - to armies that were all using tanks largely the same way.

Everyone in fact came to rely on their reliable 30-ton mediums - the Sherman, the T-34, and the Stug/Panzer IV - and used them primarily as infantry support or breakthrough exploitation vehicles. Fighting tanks head-to-head against each other was in fact frowned upon by all sides; which is why the commentary of experienced German Panzer Division commanders (Guderian, Bayerlein) on the German fat, overweight tanks was always laced with deep misgivings or outright derision. They understood that the tank was a mobile weapon. A 45 ton semi-mobile bunker is not the same thing.

Much in that, especially the effort in to improving doctrine, tactics, and organization. Regarding stats of losses- we have to be careful because other factors definitely played a role. For example, the German Armour counter attack against the US at the end of Normandy. Enigma and other intel had the US warned and so they had their TDs positioned well to take them.

Overall the evidence is that there was some slight superiority in some areas of German tanks (optics and radio v the Russians et al- armour and gun, and optics in some cases for the west). And often that superiority would only practically be beneficial at key ranges, for example the Pershing being able to penetrate front of big Cats at 450 yards, which is very close for tank duel.

That said the mobility is a key strategic and tactical quality so T34 etc has some benefits. HoI level of play should grind the small differences out so that we have realistic outcomes. Like, the penetration and armour values should never completely make the tanks invulnerable, especially in close terrain.

 

[Had a dad]

Define "large scale" and "common/uncommon", would you?

As I did say, the tank vs tank combat was not nearly the majority of combat, however it is easy to note that in terms of absolute numbers tank s tank encounters did vastly increase after 1941.

I can count at least Neman(Неман) bridge 7th German armor division vs 5th Soviet armor division on 22th of June 1941, German 11th armored division vs Soviet 32d division 23 june 1941, Радзехув, German 6th armored division vs 2d Soviet armored division 24th june, of the top of my head.

Yes, at least according to what I read, battles of divisions that had at least 100 tanks on each side, and loses are around 10-20 tanks on each side, which is far more than Polish campaign ever had, over the space of 3 days right there, and I can probably find at least 5-10 ish similar engagements in 1941.

So 8-13 engagements in 1941. Even if it's 13 and there was only 1 engagement per day for the year that's 3% of the battles for 1941, not exactly what you would say as "common"

 

[1alexey]

So 8-13 engagements in 1941. Even if it's 13 and there was only 1 engagement per day for the year that's 3% of the battles for 1941, not exactly what you would say as "common"

Well, how many division-scale infantry vs tanks engagements actually were there in 1941?
Of the top of my head, armor divisions did spent quite some time maneuvering, thus assuming that even if we account for all German armored divisions, to say that they fight a division-scale engagement every day is a stretch.

I mean, If we look at the casualties, armored division suffered around 1/5 to 1/10 of it`s tanks damaged or destroyed from each such engagement. Assuming division loses 20 tanks/day of combat, which seem like realistic estimate, Germans would lose over 4k tanks to sustain a division scale engagement of 1 armored division every day of fight(~20tanks*200days), while historically they lost 2700 in 1941.

Now I hope you realize why 1 such engagement per day is far too optimistic from you, and thus the figure of armor vs armor engagements is actually significant.

 

[Dark Jakkaru]

Well modern tanks have different armour technologies and face different threats, but here's an article relating to your main point and WWII tanks.

True with regards to modern tanks that they do have different armor tech and different threats. I would add that many of the points raised about WW2 tanks linked also applies to modern tanks if you consider a modern tank like the Leopard 2 has a crew of "4" with the turret being very much larger than they were compared to WW2. Tanks largely are effective based on the crew's capabilities servicing the vehicle within the fighting compartment and what the designers meant for the crew to accomplish with the space provided to them. In other words, the volumetric space inside the tank is impacted by such design decisions that cannot be sufficiently explained only via a technical overview. In most cases what people have technically is all they have in terms of official disclosed information (normally lacking Operational reports) but usually that's not enough as it leaves giant gaps in understanding intent and overall goal of what really makes a design effective.

So I will add to my previous quoted post below so I will talk a bit more generally and not really in direct response to the dev above.

We can ask a number of good questions even going as far back as the Panzer I "training tank". The Panzer I was successful for what it did in the early part of WW3 as a 5 ton light tank because the design didn't assume you needed such a light machine needed to fire a pair of MG 18s or 34s with a larger 2-man turret. In fact, this "training tank" hardly explains how this relates to training a 2 or even a 3 man turret crew at all if we only accept a handful of comments about this interesting vehicle that did a lot of the work supporting infantry early on. Of course, many were re-purposed to schools such as the NSKK (which largely took that responsibility when the war started) without a super structure or turned into support vehicles. None of those other reasons adequately explains the design intents of a single manned turret being the key feature of this in terms of design specification. Or, the fact that several design iterations were still being worked on long after the IB left the production line. Many attempts were made trying to revive a role for a very light 5 ton vehicle that clearly has an intended purpose beyond just for "training". If that didn't make much sense then let's word it from another angle. Why waste precious brain power beyond the IB when it is largely considered to have long over run its development potential if all that was needed were heavier designs to really achieve strategic goals?

Also, it does little to show for when we get to the original design spec of the Panzer III whose 5 man crew only had sufficient armor for ~15mm staying in line with the mid-30s requirements of a 15 ton vehicle with a 37mm and 3 machine guns. That's a lot of machine gun ammo and I always take pause when folks mention the roles of the Panzer III and IV easily forgetting the fact that the Panzer III would largely engage infantry than specifically going out looking for tanks to fight. This is after all the Doctrine of Blitzkrieg not Star Craft mobile Anti-Tank Spam. Also, it was during the time it was known the trusty 37mm gun did such a good job during the Spanish Conflict in '36 knocking out scores of T-26s the folks designing the tanks specifically crafted a lighter vehicle to be their mainstay knowing full well it would have to engage infantry with AT guns that could knock them out in return. Sure, it got a small armor buff when production started to pick up, BUT this largely doesn't explain the design intent of the 5 man crew with such a roomy fighting compartment would trade off having that space OVER armor protection. See where I am getting at? Or, see where the designers were focusing their efforts on which the WW2 article DOES rate the Panzer III for its ergonomics (which is basically rating the fighting compartment)?

We can actually continue this discussion further to other parts of the Panzer III. The whole debate over the 50 mm gun in the late 30s has largely been overshadowed by events that occurred later on in the Soviet-German war that obfuscated the point of having a larger gun beyond mere tank to tank engagements. Many times I have come across the same incorrect derived notion that the 50mm solely was for anti-tank capability thanks largely to the impact of the French tanks (whose legion of infantry support tanks designed only for 1 man did such an impression on) when in fact having to rely on a 37mm and 3 machine guns for infantry support was not as effective as a large short barrel 75mm gun and two machine guns. This logic flies right in front of the absolute fact that a short-barrel 50mm gun was actually put on the tanks to correct this rather than the long barreled "AT" version of the gun provided to the infantry. More over, it is why time and time again the Panzer IV was not rated particularly well as a machine in comparison to the Panzer III even though later on it had a longer barreled 75mm gun because of the fact this came at the cost of the fighting compartment which the Panzer III provided the best DESIGN use FOR the crew as a battle tank. Makes me wonder why folks technically cherry pick 3 main technical points of tanks in general or even have to talk about crew training when it largely comes down to how effective the crew is in the space they operate in to really make the machine run. This largely impacts operationally what the expectation is by the folks responsible for winning the war if they understand the design intention behind the vehicle and correctly employ this with regards to their overall strategy.

Or we can just accept the fact the Army Ordnance Office gave Hitler the New York salute and put in a short barreled 50mm gun because they wanted to lose the war.

Edit: Some clarification and grammar corrections.

 

[Had a dad]

Well, how many division-scale infantry vs tanks engagements actually were there in 1941?

The comment was based on combat in general, Inf vs Inf was the most common engagement.

 

[jju_57]

This recent discussion actually leads to the biggest issue and problem between HOI games and real life. In HOI we fight tank battles everyday and our units go from battle to battle day after day. This wasn't how real life worked.

In real life a unit may fight for 3-5 and maybe 10 days and then pull out of combat for MONTHS. A big battle usually resulted in a lull of a few months as troops were resupplied, refitted etc. Losers would retreat and then the attacker would prepare for the next battle in a month or so.

 

[eleetsdier]

This thread has been both interesting and informative. I'm definitely in the camp that feels the Germans did well primarily through superior doctrine (and a certain amount of luck) rather than superior equipment.

People have brought up comparisons between the Panther and Sherman in terms of frontal armor. Here's an interesting report on British Sherman losses which suggests increasing the armor isn't worth the effort so long as the Allies are primarily on the offensive. http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1422&context=cmh The implication seems to be that when attacking against concealed opposition you're very likely to expose your side or rear armor, rendering strong frontal armor less valuable.

 

[fabius]

This thread has been both interesting and informative. I'm definitely in the camp that feels the Germans did well primarily through superior doctrine (and a certain amount of luck) rather than superior equipment.

People have brought up comparisons between the Panther and Sherman in terms of frontal armor. Here's an interesting report on British Sherman losses which suggests increasing the armor isn't worth the effort so long as the Allies are primarily on the offensive. http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1422&context=cmh The implication seems to be that when attacking against concealed opposition you're very likely to expose your side or rear armor, rendering strong frontal armor less valuable.

Indeed and let's remember early war in the West Verses Allies and Early Barbarossa, many of the German tanks were inferior and fewer overall.

 

[Dark Jakkaru]

Indeed and let's remember early war in the West Verses Allies and Early Barbarossa, many of the German tanks were inferior and fewer overall.

Question. If German AFVs were designed for the doctrine they had in mind that brought them success, then where exactly were they inferior with regards to their intended role within this successful doctrine? Looking at it in another direction, If they did well what was intended for them to accomplish then why mention they are inferior if they are put into a position they weren't design to operate against?

 

[Lollardheretics]

Last time, i stated that it was the Panzerwaffe that was feared and not the Panzer itself.

However, some saying here are making me grind my gear. What make an armored vehicule a good tank, is the Gun.
A Tank in WW2, is nothing more than a way to bring a gun on a battlefield. A more efficient way than a towed gun, and well more protected and mobile.

What made the Tiger feared isn't the fact that it was a heavy mofo'. It was the damn gun on it. A 8,8 cm with a huge range, a sub zero pen, a Deadly aim... And a very good rate of fire. Even if some here are in denial, the 8,8cm kwk L56 was by far the most feared gun when it started raping tank on the eastern front, and the western front. However, yes, the tiger tank wasn't maybe the best way to bring this gun to the battlefield.

However, i know a very neat way to bring a 8,8 cm on the battlefield, and make everyone shit their pants.

What ? You think its not enuff ? What about the Wespe ? The Hummel ? The Stug ? The Stuh ?


Ironically, maybe the best German tank, were the one that weren't...

 

[fabius]

Question. If German AFVs were designed for the doctrine they had in mind that brought them success, then where exactly were they inferior with regards to their intended role within this successful doctrine? Looking at it in another direction, If they did well what was intended for them to accomplish then why mention they are inferior if they are put into a position they weren't design to operate against?

I see what you are saying and "hear you"; but in relation to real and hypothetical tank-vs-tank combat. The Px IIs and IIIs, on the tactical level, and early IVs. They of course achieved much on the Operational level.

 

[Dark Jakkaru]

What ? You think its not enuff ? What about the Wespe ? The Hummel ? The Stug ? The Stuh ?

Ironically, maybe the best German tank, were the one that weren't...

Your picture there expresses the circumstances the Wehrmacht was in to put an open topped fighting compartment vehicle negotiating rubble of a brick building, usually seen in larger towns and cities, in an attempt to provide some means of fire support or putting themselves in a position outside of the foliage cover they were in prior to taking of this picture. After all, with the driver having to expose himself to negotiate that ruin dedicating all his attention to it and his commander appearing to be providing commands behind him it is clear what this picture is suggesting what is happening.

Also, a vehicle like that wasn't designed with the crew in mind to be engaging infantry targets having an open topped fighting compartment easily exposed to infantry mortar support, artillery, or grenades. That's why you bring in a tank to facilitate a combined arms tactic. The vehicle up above like the one in the picture going up against Soviet Infantry would go down faster than the Ferdinands did in Kursk. It's also why armored half-tracks also with open topped compartments didn't drive into the actual battlefield in order to provide direct fire support along with the infantry because they were just taxis and not Bradley AFVs. The Panzer Is were the machine gun fire support vehicle that was the first backbone of the panzerwaffe instead of the Leich or Grosstraktor. Due to war constraints, such vehicles like the 251 were repurposed with heavier guns in order to provide support because of the lack of tanks or other AFVs with the declining war situation. Also, I wouldn't say the SDKfz 234/4 was the WW2 equivalent of the Stryker because it is very much a scout car intended to provide support to the scout group not act as a sub in for a Panzer IV.

 

[nikosmy]

The experience system will allow the Germans tanks to be much more upgraded in terms of reliability armour and weapons as they are at war for longer and on more fronts constantly.