German tank superiority!?

[Mjarr]

US lost nonetheless many tanks. Otherwise Logistics would not have a hard time in bringing in replacements or US had to get them from UK..

Or perhaps because there can be only so much supplies and equipment brought on shore as much as the ports and logistics allow, and if we broadly look breakdowns and even non-battle-damage or possible issues as out of action, lack of sufficient depots or resources to keep up with field repairs regardless of the cause makes it easier to get new tanks instead, which in turn are limited by number of ports, railway schedules, fuel etc to get them to the front and there is pretty big pond standing between USA and UK which exaggerates that shipments take time and there still aren't enough ports to supply necessary amount of perceived goods? US Army had severe lack of proper clothes at the frontlines in late 1944 to 1945 since shipments of ammunition and other direct war material took priority over clothes, whereas new troops shipped to Europe were fresh with new field uniforms and gear and all and only by Spring '45 because ammunition and such wasn't needed in such large amounts, suddenly clothes started to pour in more.

Edit: I do not claim nor intend to say this is the only reason, but small things can add up to bigger problems. Like lack of necessary number of cavalry boots which in turn causes good chunk of cavalry to be forbidden from riding not to get frostbites and not to fall off horses. Or due uneven shredding of sabot and muzzle brake impacts APDS accuracy (by shot dispersion) is almost half of standard APBC which in turn turns it into a modern musket which in turn means at ranges it might be best needed it cannot be utilised reliably.

 

[Sid Meier]

I keep hearing this "needed quality over quantity" canard, but it doesn't really stand up to the reality of Germany cutting corners on their tanks to try to produce more of them, such as the poor, but easy to produce straight-cut final drives on the Panther or the entire Panzer IV Ausf. J, even if it meant that the tanks were less reliable and less useful.

It also presents a false dichotomy between quality and quantity, when it is fully possible to have both or neither.

We need the ability to tag posts, this one would be "Truth".

The germans pretty much epitimized the desire for "quality", good long range highly penetrating guns. Excellent armour, good mobility*, and handling. But we see that:

(1) Often were over-engineered and maintanance nightmares.
(2) Too heavy to drive over most bridges.
(3) Had greater difficulties in the eastern front where the infrastructure didn't support their weight.
(4) German industry being under incredibly stress and barely able to provide adequate spare parts even for the Panzer IV's.

We have to remember that a German tank actually being knocked out because of enemy tanks is a rarity, mostly they ran out of fuel (weight is bad for fuel economy) or had to be abandoned when they broke down over long drives. Which were frequent with the Germans having to keep shuffling tank divisions across the front, and horrendous on the tigers that needed the treads removed/replaced to board the trains.

The germans needed a DECENT all around tank that could be (a) Produced in large numbers (b) Highly mobile both tactically and strategically (c) easy to maintain.

With the failure of Barbarossa I think the imperative should have immediately gone to upgrading/redesigning the Panzer IV to be that tank instead of an entirely new over-engineered tank that was too heavy for the role.


Again, it comes down to strategic mobility and availability, what good is some UberAwesome Tank that can take on 100 enemy tanks if it can't be there when you really need it? Look at Bagration, and how several German tank formations were pinned down in the south.

 

[DocMorningstar]

God yes.

On a tank-by-tank basis - on the battlefield - the panther and tiger I / II were superior machines. Excellent guns, great armor (for their time)

They fell down on the job via their complexity, poor reliability, and limited operational flexibility. What good is a superior tank (tiger I) in the wrong village, without the fuel to drive to the next one?

The tiger worked well when the battle was predictable. Either moving forwards where the germans wanted OR defending key points. It sucked wind when the operational theater was fluid - since it ate gas and spare parts like a SOB. I suspect the panther would have been the same way.

A true pz III/IV successor would have been alot more useful for the Nazis.... rebuilt around the same 75mm that the pz IV was already using (or maybe the stugs 75mm...)

 

[f1nalstand17]

God yes.

On a tank-by-tank basis - on the battlefield - the panther and tiger I / II were superior machines. Excellent guns, great armor (for their time)

They fell down on the job via their complexity, poor reliability, and limited operational flexibility. What good is a superior tank (tiger I) in the wrong village, without the fuel to drive to the next one?

The tiger worked well when the battle was predictable. Either moving forwards where the germans wanted OR defending key points. It sucked wind when the operational theater was fluid - since it ate gas and spare parts like a SOB. I suspect the panther would have been the same way.

A true pz III/IV successor would have been alot more useful for the Nazis.... rebuilt around the same 75mm that the pz IV was already using (or maybe the stugs 75mm...)

Yes and no. The Tiger was actually not too bad reliability-wise (don't quote me on that about the Tiger II ), but they were more often than not used as a sort-of "fire brigade" along the front (a role that they were not designed for), and the reason for their breakdowns was mainly because (as you said) they weren't mobile enough on a operational and strategic level. Now the only large drawback of the L/70 gun that Panthers historically used, compared to the L/48 (which you're advocating) is basically the added weight, and the longer production time.

 

[PlacidDragon]

A true pz III/IV successor would have been alot more useful for the Nazis.... rebuilt around the same 75mm that the pz IV was already using (or maybe the stugs 75mm...)

From 1942 and onwards they used the same gun

 

[Zinegata]

@Zinegata
But diregarding completely a man that has first hands experience in the field and writing article for the official US army as a source at all..
Seriously assuming that he was only lookig at his own command and did never exchange infos/experience with others.

Again, if you would stop pretending that Armored Divisions and Independent Tank battalions did not operate very differently and in general did not operate together, you wouldn't be constantly talking past what I actually said - which is that he is a battalion commander in an armored Division and they fought a very different war from the independent tank battalions.

This is why he has all this talk about shooting up the enemy's rear area - Armored Divisions did that. The Independent Tank battalions by and large didn't. Again, context matters; not your posturing that "he fought in combat so he must know some things!". I am pointing out the actual limitations of his experiences in 1946; while you're too busy exaggerating them to cover up the fact you picked a very out-of-context and limited source.

At least that we know from the US area, UK was different.

I have the British accounts too, and the big difference is that the UK was generally bad at mixing tanks with infantry; hence the tanks attacked on their own and got badly chewed up by anti-tank guns. It is telling that out of 100 British tanks lost at Goodwood, only 20 or so actually saw any German armor; and inflicted equivalent losses on their opposite numbers anyway. That again shows that it was not German armor that contested Allied armor in the West.

Thats just because GER could not field that much. But US on the other side had much more tanks all around. Alone the overall numbers of 6k should get clear that much INF-DIV had their own Tank Battalion(!) at hand. Not only a platoon.

If you hadn't been too busy ignoring Yiede then you'd realize that the "independent tank battalions" are the exact same tank battalions attached to the infantry divisions that you are now talking about. Did you make the logical leap and read Yiede? No. You just used them as a punchline to continue the mythology of "woe poor Germans so badly outnumbered!"

You then followed that up by ridiculously challenging my (and Yiede's) assertion that the battalions typically spread the armor around and deployed them in platoon-sized formations to support infantry companies of those Infantry Divisions, hence in most engagements it was just that one tank platoon and one infantry company fighting whatever the Germans had (which in most cases was just infantry. If the Germans had tanks, they were almost never deployed singly and would have been platoon strength too at least).

That you accuse me of making the mistake of claiming that an Infantry Division had only a platoon of tanks in support is a gross misrepresentation of my argument. The reality is that you're the one who doesn't realize that a tank platoon supports an infantry company, and that these tank platoons are part of a tank battalion that is attached to a Division. This is again terribly basic knowledge about how the Us Army operates and only demonstrates how much pretense laces your posts; which strongly suggests you don't even know that infantry companies are not the same thing as infantry divisions.

Really, do you even know the difference between a company and a division?

Writing/implying that the Armoured Divs were only second to the Independent Battallions in doing the fighting in the west campaign is also again only a poor excuse attemp of you. They had different orders how to engange tanks because of the role they should play, nonetheless Armoured Divs took part in many battles until the final end. Just because they were more used to spearhead the breakthroughs along with armoured Inf-Divs..

There were around five infantry Divisions for every armored Division. Infantry Divisions moreover were generally never taken off the line, whereas the armored divisions stayed for long periods in reserve. That you don't think this is a significant difference and instead use it as a talking point for a personal attack ("poor excuse attempt of you") again simply shows how you have very little actual knowledge about how the US Army actually operated, how important and how much the independent tank battalions actually fought, and how you are ignoring evidence that does not conform to your biased vision of the war.

Really, it took you what, four posts to even acknowledge the independent tank battalions existed? When that's what I had been actually talking about since I first brought up Yiede?

 

[Zinegata]

I keep hearing this "needed quality over quantity" canard, but it doesn't really stand up to the reality of Germany cutting corners on their tanks to try to produce more of them, such as the poor, but easy to produce straight-cut final drives on the Panther or the entire Panzer IV Ausf. J, even if it meant that the tanks were less reliable and less useful.

It also presents a false dichotomy between quality and quantity, when it is fully possible to have both or neither.

Quality over quantity is indeed a completely discredited concept as far as WW2 was concerned. We are talking about a war that has a front over a thousand kilometers long. If you don't have enough quantity, you will simply have massive holes in your line which the enemy will exploit.

The Wermacht, rather than realizing this, instead doubled down on this insanity in 1942 when they tried to capture the Caucasus - which nearly doubled the frontline again when the German infantry was already overstretched; forcing them to overstretch the Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian units instead which were still waiting for the heavy equipment the Germans promised them. That the German generals and the Internet fanboys have ever since resorted to blaming the Axis Minors (most of whom fell under communist rule and were thus acceptable targets in the Cold War) for the defeat at Stalingrad instead of the Wermacht's basic ignorance of a simple, cardinal rule of warfare again only demonstrates how the narrative of the Eastern Front is so mythological rather than factual in nature.

Anyway, that most quality-quantity commentators do not even take into account the frontage or size of operating theater really demonstrates the amateurish nature in which this argument is typically used on the Internet.

The problem really is that Western mythology is besotted by the idea of Thermopylae and that few could beat the many - and so many would-be soldiers and Internet commentators want to be the 300 Spartans holding off a million-man Persian Army.

Unfortunately for them, they don't realize that the Spartans actually had a lot of backup - several thousand other Greeks held the pass with them - and they completely fail to take into account the the Spartans were defeated and annihilated as soon as the Persians found a way to flank the positions. Or worse, that Sparta ultimately ended up as a Persian vassal state subjugating the rest of the Greeks; at least until the Macedonians wrested power from them while the Persians were facing a dynastic crisis.

 

[Dark Jakkaru]

Well the cross country possibilities of that tank was never beaten by other designs as far as Spielbergers as a source is taken into consideration.

What does this mean for "possibilities"? I know the English translation of some of Spielbergers books I have are quite inadequate and sound funny in English so I do take it with a pause to understand what is trying to be said and what is actually being said. I could name the cross country capability of the T-34 in Manchuria campaign that could easily have beaten the Panther if somehow a mistranslation had occurred.

The final drive was "only" problematic in rough acceleration and steering. The machine had heating/burning problems.
So that a good driver could compensate much in that regard. Similar to Tiger wich had to be treated different as the much lighter tanks. 20-30 tons more as PzIV does need different treatment with automobile possibilities of that time.
But also Spielberger wrotes that by that time of Panther it was already knowed that you couldn't "outarmor" the upcomming guns that much anymore and more emphasis was put into mobility already. That way the formidable driving system and gun. (Exept the final drive, wich we know was due to production limitations, but initially had planned a different solution. Spielberger wrote about it too.) The Panther engine had way more HP/ton as the 20 tons lighter PzIV had, so we see that focus was more on what we know today as speed/gun/armour..
If Tiger had been given up and the Panther got the priority for those better final drives, it would have just needed the new diesel engine to be much more worthwhile as it was even with that big drawbacks. And if we look at why the diesel wasn't pushed it seems clear what again was was also a problem behind it all.(Speer was confident that Maybach will solve the engine problems etc., Hitler interrupting, Industry claims this, army that..)
Spielberger has some nice info about those things happening into his book too.

This is not technically sounds like in the right order for this to be possible. More armor was put on because it was less likely the tank was doing anything other than buying time and fighting to relieve encircled troops. Hence why there is a reference to "meddling Hitler" when it comes up with the Panther's armor spec where in the failure of blitzkrieg to force a Soviet Collapse he put his own two cents to do "better". So, later models of the Panther could not possibly have better cross country and mobility with added frontal armor as tanks tend to age by getting heavier over time, not lighter. It was really just left to be substandard in mobility than what was originally promised out of the design for the tank.

And in initiall "Blitzkrieg", also PzIII/PzIV broke down quite often. You can compensate with good mechanics/maintenance. In that way, Panther would need much more maintenance, but it would be possible. In the end even the big initial marches in the East (up to 200km a day, or check out wich many tanks of Rommels Ghost division where the Spearhead..) where not done with the whole DIV but only parts of them.
As you need to hold "org" you need to limit speed anyway below max speed wich is still fast enough to do maintenance "underway" etc..
Logistics train(maintenance among it) is way more important as max speed or reliability in that terms in my opionion as you can compensate much with that. GER showed that also in the defense later where quite big distances where overcome also with Panther/Tiger. Look at what the logistic of the Allies in the West was like for the offensive capabilities. They had to stop not only because the fighting, but to catch up supplies/reinforcements again..
"Luckily" the way behind frontlines can also use railroads much easier and it was used to great advantage. But otherwise it would have meant "just" bigger maintenance.
Seeing that logistic trains(well maintenance was not bigger in those..) of allies was much(!) bigger in comparison to GER ones leaves an impression of the possibilities.
If we look at some quotes above it was asked to use railroads if distance was bigger as 100km(Initially in '43 it was down to 25km by times though, imagine that these numbers vary in different seasons- Rasputizia comes to mind..). So in a constant advance, you will never have to travel that big distance at once, but advance constantly all the time.(Until you got redeployed to different location maybe..)

Rasputitsa or not, the Panzer III accomplished more because the tank was design to do that as part of a combined force working along side the infantry and artillery as a functioning unit. If the Panzer III was rail-bound, it was usually being moved into an assembly area so we're not technically discussing road marching as a formation with reconnaissance units , infantry, and supporting elements.

Also, Rommel's "Ghost Divsion" didn't fight an armored counter attack with better armor head on as tank nerds would have a wet dream over. Instead, he brought up the 88s like you were supposed to do as part of blitz doctrine seeing the 37mm Pak was inadequate for the task and the infantry couldn't knock out the tanks. So, Rommel's Ghost Division didn't out run his guns, infantry, or Pak Units one bit as we like to believe happened in complete intention and purpose. Of course, everything is in "parts" but to understand true blitz then you would get the notion why things click they way they are supposed to.

Lastly, in terms of speed, this is only critical if you're assaulting the weak point and you're exploiting the rear. In this case the whole "pieces of the division" aren't going to flat out stop for a handful of tanks. They get recovered and moved to the front as we advance. So we get cases of long marches of tank losses to maintenance which isn't out of the ordinary. But, being normally a lighter design, they were recovered for the most part.

The tank proved to be very successful already in its state it was fielded historical. And being most of its lifetime on the defense in the East/West, also a better engine/final drive would not have helped that much more if we look at the odds GER faced strategically.

Strategically, if it was such a strategic defensive tank, the Reich should have allowed Hungary, Romania, Italy, and probably also the Czechs too, to actually build this strategic defensive war winner of a design. Apparently it wasn't seen in that way at least when I look at it strategically.

 

[scroggin]

Ok here is a question about the balance between mobility defensive armour and firepower. Obviously it's easier to make a lighter tank reliable and fast. But as soon it's the crew in a lighter tank begin to think they might get blown apart around the next corner they are going to start being very cautious in advance.

So which tank will gain ground more quickly on the battlefield, the semi-invincible behemoth or the quick reliable tank?

 

[stantz]

Heh, one of the loading screen artworks could be a King Tiger surrounded by burnt out Shermans, with the tank captain shaking his fist at thousands of Allied bombers overhead and the city of Dresden on fire in the background.

 

[Zinegata]

Ok here is a question about the balance between mobility defensive armour and firepower. Obviously it's easier to make a lighter tank reliable and fast. But as soon it's the crew in a lighter tank begin to think they might get blown apart around the next corner they are going to start being very cautious in advance.

So which tank will gain ground more quickly on the battlefield, the semi-invincible behemoth or the quick reliable tank?

This post is a classic example of Steel Panthers videogamism where Panthers and Tigers can take hit after hit without consequence.

In real life heavily armored tanks are not capable of taking multiple high-calibre hits to begin with even with theoretically invincible armor, because getting hit by a high calibre shell is already a pretty terrifying experience to be on the receiving end of and each hit degrades the tank's ability to absorb additional hits. Mortal crewmen therefore do not sit still after taking a hit - they immediately move (often in retreat) to get out of the kill zone; often rendering them combat-ineffective. Each shells and bullet hit likewise has a cumulative effect on a piece of armor regardless of what bad lessons movies teach us; which is how an anti-aircraft unit armed with .50 calibre guns was able to annihilate a platoon of disabled Tigers in one of the three Tiger I "engagements" ever fought by the US Army - they simply kept shooting the rear until the armor broke and they thrashed the engines.

In fact, it is worth noting that there is only one account of a US tank surviving more than 2 hits and yet still kept on fighting - and that account is appended to a Medal of Honor citation. There are only three further verified accounts of tanks surviving multiple high-calibre hits - one of them a Char B at Stonne, and two of them by KV tanks in Barbarossa; where the three tanks took as many as a hundred 37mm guns hits apiece but the KVs were eventually done in by larger-caliber hits or close assaults. There are zero British accounts, and the sole German account of a "hundred-hit" survivor was a Tiger that was shot at by machine guns and anti-tank rifles, not actual anti-tank guns, and in any case is unverified.

More importantly, the vast majority of actual hits are to the sides and rear of the tank where the armor is weaker to begin with. This should be no surprise as the sides and rear are more than 75% the surface area of a tank.

The reliable tank always wins. The British infantry tank philosophy was simply wrong. Armor is an insurance policy. Anyone who tried to court hit after hit in an actual battlefield is simply applying for a Darwin Award and is violating virtually every manual in every competent army of the Second World War.

And in any case, you don't send tanks to "go around the corner" blind anyway. That is what reconnaissance assets are for - infantry scouts in the case of cities and light armored vehicles in the case of the country side. If you go around the corner blind you are again just applying for a Darwin Award. Any veteran unit would know this and would find your "question" to be grossly ignorant of basic tactical practice.

 

[Darkrenown]

With the failure of Barbarossa I think the imperative should have immediately gone to upgrading/redesigning the Panzer IV to be that tank instead of an entirely new over-engineered tank that was too heavy for the role.

Well the PzIV was already showing its age so a new design was probably for the best, but the plan was to either make a Germany copy of the T-34 (Guderian apparently didn't think the German industry was up to it) or a new 30-35 ton medium. Then some shenanigans happened, MAN got the contract, and Hitler wanted bigger guns and more armour. As Speer says:

Since the Tiger had originally been designed to weigh fifty tons but as a result of Hitler's demands had gone up to fifty seven tons, we decided to develop a new thirty ton tank whose very name, Panther, was to signify greater agility. Though light in weight, its motor was to be the same as the Tiger's, which meant it could develop superior speed. But in the course of a year Hitler once again insisted on clapping so much armor on it, as well as larger guns, that it ultimately reached forty eight tons, the original weight of the Tiger.

What does this mean for "possibilities"? I know the English translation of some of Spielbergers books I have are quite inadequate and sound funny in English so I do take it with a pause to understand what is trying to be said and what is actually being said. I could name the cross country capability of the T-34 in Manchuria campaign that could easily have beaten the Panther if somehow a mistranslation had occurred.

When it was running, the Panther was pretty good at going cross-country with its high hp/ton ratio. The torsion bar suspension also ensured a pretty smooth ride for the crew. I think the T-34 could actually drive a bit better, but it was less smooth so tougher on the crew. Panther was also easy to steer and in theory could pivot turn on the spot, of course it couldn't really pivot turn often, but if we're talking about possibilities...

This is not directly related to your post, but I was looking for mobility trials and re-found the Soviet Panther testing article which might be interesting for people to read.

 

[Mjarr]

Ok here is a question about the balance between mobility defensive armour and firepower. Obviously it's easier to make a lighter tank reliable and fast. But as soon it's the crew in a lighter tank begin to think they might get blown apart around the next corner they are going to start being very cautious in advance.

So which tank will gain ground more quickly on the battlefield, the semi-invincible behemoth or the quick reliable tank?

Non-penetrating hit can still cause concussions, spalling, damage the plate(s), and in general induce panic to the crew and the effect becomes more and more pronounced the larger the calibre even if the shell broke on impact rather than penetrate. Early in war it was not impossible for heavy tank (or even medium) to ignore lots of even small AT gun fire (37mm or so) without even realising they were hit or with no other adverse effects that someone is firing at them and the anticipated panic that may follow, but since larger projectile also applies more stress relation to the surface area it will be hard to ignore even few 75mm hits coming on short notice. Experienced crews may keep cool to a point but all it takes is one hit in the right spot to give someone really bad day and the tank is effectively out of action... while the shell broke off on contact; ricochets usually occur only against sloped surfaces or bad angles of impact.

Hence even in the usual conjecture of frontal tank vs tank engagement from afar, landing the first hit can decide the winner even if no physical penetration occurs. Combine that with German tank optics having essentially built-in rangefinder which makes it more likely to get the first hit from afar and there you go. Now the tricky thing is, how easily one can tell in middle of a combat is vehicle out of action or abandoned? From afar it can be difficult to tell the difference between penetration and non-penetration and thus we have the common principle to keep firing until the target is on fire or the crew is seen bailing out, and obviously penetrations do offer better argument to abandon the tank or withdraw although simply being hit from nowhere is not far behind.

 

[Chromos]

@balmung60
Well "quality over quantity" is often used with maybe different meanings.
I understand it that way in this case:
Pz. Iv was technically outdated with by '41 as it was PzIII(check Spielberger about a more detailed anlysis). Even before '41 GER could not field anywhere near that amount of tank units as its main enemy and as it needed. And later with another main front it couldn't do that even more. So it needed a better tank as its enemies to be able to counter the numerically superiorty with quality of tanks.
That is similar as NATO went for "better" tanks route instead or "more".

Panther was that 35 ton design that went then bigger as it was seen important to have better protection as with less armour. They traded already all around approach with mostly frontal and way less side armour.

Thats not that I have that opinion, but what hapened back then. Afterwards you can allways be much smarter.
And afaik all nations went for someting like Panther(Pershing/Centurion) but only SOV went down that route that many seem to favour here, just a slightyl more heavy tank like T-34 but modernized in other areas. So you are advocating soviet tank design style. I'm fine with that, I just like to point out that it for sure had its own drawbacks ans it is telling that only SOV went down that route. SO GER/UK/USA might have other drawbacks, but also must have other benefits in being bigger/heavier.



@Mjarr
Right about shipping priorities. And you can find many interesting point in that books about such,

About the tanks we cann see from the quotes of the logistic books we that they estimated ~11% reserve of tanks and planned around that for shippig. But then they suffered more heavy losses and army was asking for more then double the resereve up to 25% and later even 30% was asked for(wich was denied by Supreme Command).
That shows that they lost quite some more tanks as estimated and army command kept that estimation up untl the end of war. Supreme Command only allowe dto raise the reserve % to 14% though. Thats why the US later had to get some M4's from UK as they had urgent need for repleacments.
By now, I wonder how US got higher kill ratio above GER with these lvl of replacemnet needs. Thats seems contrary to what is stated in combat records. As 10& of ~6k tanks is 60, *20(percentage of needed reserves) thats 1.2k tanks. An amount GER was never able to field against US or maybe even whole West Front. Thats quite interesting.




@Sid Meier
Ger tanks were not maintenace nighmares. just more intense. And the numbers form Jentz show a pretty good availability given the circumstances.
The often quoted bridge problem seem to have not been that big operational problem in the end.
The infrastructure was for all combatants a big problem, same for SOV. With an interleaved road wheels you need to keep more attention/maintenance in one season each year, and that is after Rasputiza when the mud is freezing. So not like it was all day that way.
For the industry I aggree.
And for the "need" I wrote above about that the Panther was planned to be that tank you ask for.
It just went out a bit different because of reasons we know too.




@DocMorningstar
For the "true successor" look at what I wrote above.
And the 75mm was not seen good enough to kill enemy tanks.
We should not forget that the design was done when most fighting was done in SOV and not in Europe. There you could take much greater advantage wich much better guns as with the one from PzIV. The Panther 75mm had better AP value as the 88mm from TigerI! And the Panther 75mm would not have fit into the PzIV turret.
And the true successor with better armour and big enough fighting compartment had later 20 tons more weight, not only 10.. I guess we can all accept that GER would have been happy if they had managed to stay at 35 tons.



@finalstand17
The TigerII was not worse than TigerII. It had many improvemenst over the former already.
There have been after war test that gave this tank a much better rating as some people on the internet.




@Zinegata
No, I never pretended that what your write. I was it who pointed out towards the different articles of Patton wich shows that they had different basic orders, not you.
And the tactical orders to a approach enemy tanks if they do, were nearly the same. Armoured Divs had infantry support too you know?
Also independent should try to flank etc.. Patton writes detailed about even the angles and distance etc..
And Irzyk's info is not limited useful. As I pointed out the the #superiorty. You might have forgotten that by now. And that #superiorty is also shown in logistics books from Green Book series and other sources I brought up. While you just keep on trying to not acknowledge that.

UK was not generally bad at mixing units..
And again you state wrong numbers and false "facts".
GER lost way less numbers in tanks. Even more if we take into account that UK repaired much much more later on. So the disabled by this battle was way higher as the overall numbers for GER.
Many GER tank of that losses were put out of action with ART/CAS/hvy bombers..
UK needed to make some bold decisions as the few bidges in the area meant a traffic chaos if all units had to pass. So they sent in the tanks first followed up by their INF. Thats nowhere near as UK was dumb in doing such in general! Also GER knowed about the coming attack 3 days before already..

Again you just keep onmixing up facts and spread wrong info about it all making UK look bad again.

And I know that the independent tank battalions are the ones attached to the INF DIVs. Didn't you read that I quoted Patton? You seem to be unaware of his writings.. Seriously..

Your statement about how the tanks from the independent tank battalions were used along the INF just shows your fundamental lack of military tactic understaning again.
Again read Patton or the field manuals to get a better basic understanding. And then go on and try to understand battle reports.

If you find that stating my opinion with the wording of "poor excuse attempt of you" was a "personal attack", then I wonder what you think about the words you used in conjunction with other poster/historians/vets..




@Dark Jakkaru
It does mean here that it had good cross country driving abilities. Check Spielberger for more detail if you like.

And I'm not sure I understand what you seem to say with the follwoing after: "This is not technically sounds like in the right order for this to be possible. "?
Panther should have been better armoured as PzIV, but it was also seen that in future you can't do that game that much more. Same to what happend later when "MBT-design" was inroduced in the 50'ies. As you can't build good enough amrour to prevent the current guns to be not dealy and have still a very mobile vehicle.
That was also seen already back then, and the focus was also put on having a high mobility with the Panther. That resulted in good driving capabilities as also in good engine HP/ton.
The "joke of history" is, that it was so bad in that mobility later on because of the final drive and the fire catchin' engine.
I'm sure and we see that form E-50 sepcs we know, that more armour was not the main focus for tank design.

Panther was the same a part of combined forces. I again can't follow you here. Can you describe it different?

Sorry for not being clear on Rommel:
I didn't ment Rommels earlier engagements where he used 88mm AA guns and 105mm Art to fight of enemy tanks..
I mentioned Rommels Ghost Division just because it rushed deep in the Hinterland leaving the rest of Div way behind. And if you look at how much tanks were in running conditions along that march..

And GER never put their Allies into consideration as much as Allied did. I agree that aiding them more would have helped in holding out longer. Afaik only Italy should get some Panthers just before they turned down the weapons. After that, it was not thought of again. An dthat example also shows maybe why it was never done.




@scroggin
The behemoth will hold ground and many shots may bounce without taking the tank out or even scratch it.
In the extreme thinking of Maus getting hit from 100m distance with 75mm Sherman gun.. Maus would have a lucky day..
Same happened with early KV tanks and later Tiger/IS.
Green units will maybe bail out under hvy fire, but crews that know their tanks will not and inflict serious dmg. like it happend historically.
The light tank will be only that good/bad as its main gun cantake out other tanks.
So if that one is around enough times and has a good gun, then you can knock out even more heavy armoured ones and your loss rate will be less if you can outnumber/outmaneuver them.

But even then, from today we know that this is not the route to go, as "wheeled tanks" are not seen that good as a tracked tank. Wich has the main benefit of better protection and cross country capability.
The same as we know that fielding Maus might have only bring up some aerial/artillery gifts coming along shortly after the locations are reported..

A middle way is maybe the best route.




@Darkrenown
Spielberger has comparisons in his book. Panther was way better as any other tank, and Second was Sherman.





@Mjarr
In the West some sources writes about that Shermans often scored the first hit but it didn't hindered the return fire of the enemy. We see that incorporated in the advice to fire white phoshorus right after such things happening. Afaik I quoted Pattons statemenst about it somehwere in this thread alraedy.

 

[amalric de g.]

This post is a classic example of Steel Panthers videogamism where Panthers and Tigers can take hit after hit without consequence.

Did you ever watch a doku about the battle of the bulge. A canadian tank (M4) hided behind a hedge and tried to drive through the hedge, on the other side a Tiger I was waiting, the canadians spotted the Tiger first. They shot 4 times at point blank on it. The Tiger fired one shot, the APC went straight through the turret. Luckily no one got killed and the canadians escaped the Tiger. The guy who told the story was in the canadian tank.

 

[keynes2.0]

Did you ever watch a doku about the battle of the bulge. A canadian tank (M4) hided behind a hedge and tried to drive through the hedge, on the other side a Tiger I was waiting, the canadians spotted the Tiger first. They shot 4 times at point blank on it. The Tiger fired one shot, the APC went straight through the turret. Luckily no one got killed and the canadians escaped the Tiger. The guy who told the story was in the canadian tank.

an·ec·dote
ˈanəkˌdōt/
noun
The singular form of data
"That anecdote shows what is happening"
synonyms: proof, evidence, investigation

 

[Sid Meier]

Did you ever watch a doku about the battle of the bulge. A canadian tank (M4) hided behind a hedge and tried to drive through the hedge, on the other side a Tiger I was waiting, the canadians spotted the Tiger first. They shot 4 times at point blank on it. The Tiger fired one shot, the APC went straight through the turret. Luckily no one got killed and the canadians escaped the Tiger. The guy who told the story was in the canadian tank.

This happens esp. w.r.t the tiger, but never with rear shots; usually its because of a bad angle when trying to shoot the sides or front.

 

[DocMorningstar]

From 1942 and onwards they used the same gun

the different muzzle brakes always throws me. ...

Yes and no. The Tiger was actually not too bad reliability-wise (don't quote me on that about the Tiger II ), but they were more often than not used as a sort-of "fire brigade" along the front (a role that they were not designed for), and the reason for their breakdowns was mainly because (as you said) they weren't mobile enough on a operational and strategic level. Now the only large drawback of the L/70 gun that Panthers historically used, compared to the L/48 (which you're advocating) is basically the added weight, and the longer production time.

Don't forget the new shell needed. Even though it was virtually identical (just had a double drive band that was slightly larger) the 39/42 couldn't be fired out of the L/48, and vice versa.

That meant complicating the logistics (again).

Plus a pz IV sized vehicle was already straining to carry the L/48.

The tiger *was* very good tank, but it was abused operationally. Running it all over the countryside was *not* how they were supposed to be used.

Ok here is a question about the balance between mobility defensive armour and firepower. Obviously it's easier to make a lighter tank reliable and fast. But as soon it's the crew in a lighter tank begin to think they might get blown apart around the next corner they are going to start being very cautious in advance.

So which tank will gain ground more quickly on the battlefield, the semi-invincible behemoth or the quick reliable tank?

Not even addressing the whole 'semi invincible behemoth' question; but most advancing is *not* made in heavy combat. You advance, then there is some combat, then you do it again.

@DocMorningstar
For the "true successor" look at what I wrote above.
And the 75mm was not seen good enough to kill enemy tanks.
We should not forget that the design was done when most fighting was done in SOV and not in Europe. There you could take much greater advantage wich much better guns as with the one from PzIV. The Panther 75mm had better AP value as the 88mm from TigerI! And the Panther 75mm would not have fit into the PzIV turret.
And the true successor with better armour and big enough fighting compartment had later 20 tons more weight, not only 10.. I guess we can all accept that GER would have been happy if they had managed to stay at 35 tons.

It's the same caliber debate you get into with self defense afficionados. The number of instances where the L/48 was insufficient, and the L/70 would have 'done the job' are not huge. The L/48 could usually penetrate the frontal armor on a T-34 or KV-1 out to 1 km. The L/70 would pen out to 2km - but the *vast* majority of engagements were within 1 km.

 

[Sid Meier]

Well the PzIV was already showing its age so a new design was probably for the best, but the plan was to either make a Germany copy of the T-34 (Guderian apparently didn't think the German industry was up to it) or a new 30-35 ton medium. Then some shenanigans happened, MAN got the contract, and Hitler wanted bigger guns and more armour. As Speer says:




When it was running, the Panther was pretty good at going cross-country with its high hp/ton ratio. The torsion bar suspension also ensured a pretty smooth ride for the crew. I think the T-34 could actually drive a bit better, but it was less smooth so tougher on the crew. Panther was also easy to steer and in theory could pivot turn on the spot, of course it couldn't really pivot turn often, but if we're talking about possibilities...

This is not directly related to your post, but I was looking for mobility trials and re-found the Soviet Panther testing article which might be interesting for people to read.

I dunno what the German industry was capable of, but if I were in charge of the tank design with the obvious benefit of rose tinted 20/20 hindsight vision, maybe what I'd do is design something using as much as I can salvage from the Panzer IV for the new design as possible. A large-ish boxy tank to give the crew room tow work in, sloped armour at the front and the L48 gun which the poster above me mentions was "good enough".

So something that maybe looks like a slopped tiger but with a smaller gun, slightly smaller, and less armor but the same engine.

 

[Zinegata]

And the tactical orders to a approach enemy tanks if they do, were nearly the same. Armoured Divs had infantry support too you know?
Also independent should try to flank etc.. Patton writes detailed about even the angles and distance etc..

No, again they operated very differently, and you're still making stuff up as you go along.

The Armored Division didn't "support" infantry Divisions on a regular basis - because they were self-contained units that had their own mechanized infantry and artillery elements. This is why most major tank vs tank battles involving 50+ tanks involved only Armored Division units - 4th Armored at Arracourt and 7th Armored at St Vith being two of the most outstanding examples - because only an Armored Division Combat Command can move fast enough to bring a full set of toys (Armor, Mech Infantry, Armored Artillery) at a meeting engagement; and the Germans likewise saved their Panzer Divisions only for these kinds of time-critical missions too. This is why both sides kept Armored Divisions in reserve in the first place - you don't waste units whose main virtue is mobility on grinding, attritional warfare.

On occasion elements of an armored Division would fight alongside an infantry or paratroop unit - such as the case of Noville wherein Team Desobry (of 10th Armored Division) fought alongside elements of the 101st Airborne - but both units were still ultimately reporting to their own Divisions and this was an extraordinary case.

An infantry Division by contrast was supposed to take a spot on the line, and grind the enemy down through attack or defense at the pace of a marching infantryman. Independent tank battalions were always attached to infantry divisions and were not given the freedom of action to do most of the stuff Armored Divisions did - for one thing the battalion didn't have enough tanks (60 tanks only) and they didn't have mechanized infantry or artillery to support them.

The job of the independent tank battalion was instead to support the infantry - which is why the battalion got broken down to platoon-sized formations, each of which was assigned to an infantry company. That ensured every American infantryman fought every battle with tank support theoretically on hand. This also freed up the Armored Divisions to actually operate as a mobile force instead of getting bogged down in infantry-pace advances.

That you again keep not understanding this very simple distinction - which was fundamental to understanding how the American Army operates - is why it's very hard to take anything you ever say seriously. You do not understand what kind of war Irzyk fought, and you're still too busy conflating his achievements to cover up the simple fact that you have no clue as to how the American army actually operated.

UK was not generally bad at mixing units..
And again you state wrong numbers and false "facts".

Really? Then name the British equivalent for the American Combat Command, the Soviet "Forward Detachment", or the German Kampfgruppe.

Don't dissemble, don't talk past. Name the British equivalent, because I'm getting very tired of your posturing and attempts to sneak in personal attacks when your knowledge of the war is so lacking that it's probable that you have no idea what those three things I named are.

And assuming you are able to name the equivalent, then please explain where this equivalent was at Operation Goodwood; and explain how the British could lose 100 tanks to anti-tank guns positions that had little German infantry support if their armor-infantry cooperation is not "generally bad" as you claim.