German tank superiority!?

[Liquid Sky]

All tanks are highly vulnerable to infantry AT...the problem is all infantry are vulnerable to the infantry accompanying the tank...

 

[32karakter]

Ergh, the Soviets never really considered the T-54 to be an MBT

Well, albeit this, i think, that the t-54 came awfully close to the term of MBT, even if its not called one - i would not make a big mistake, if i call the Panther the first tank as designed for the right direction to be an MBT (maybe a little bit obfuscated definition, but probably this is the most acceptable one), the t54 is 2-3 steps closer in that regard.

 

[32karakter]

I did indeed post Carius' interview where he said he never had a Tiger break down under him in combat, but: Tiger's aren't Panthers. They had different problems and also had a much large maintenance section assigned to them. And in his book he does see plenty of other Tigers break down - he has a few stories about recovering them under fire. Although yes, green troops and bad drivers can certainly have a large effect on tank reliability.

I think, this part of the interview maybe highlights a bigger part of the picture (or an important part of the big picture? whatever): the heavy tank batallions wer econsidered as an elite force and had priority in manpower, trained, seasoned manpower - and the panther units were just regular tank units, "common" crews from and for the panzer regiments. We know, that the germans late in the war hadserious problems with tank crew training or the lack of it, combine those green, hardly trained troops with an unforgiving and demanding tank will give at least mixed results.

 

[Sid Meier]

Ergh, the Soviets never really considered the T-54 to be an MBT, at least based on the Western definition.

Why would you apply the Western definition to Eastern block armour? They're designed under two entirely different doctrines for armoured warfare; the Soviets originated Deep Operations as a "scientific" non-luck based way of winning wars and nearly all their tanks were designed with this in mind. With Deep Operations the goal is to have several breakthrough points that armour can swarm in and exploit, the Soviets didn't put that much concern on tactics, all strategic thinking was done at the corps level and above with all regiments/battalions/divisions expected to be able to instantly abide by new orders and fight according to their interchangeable roles. So the Soviets focused on lighter, smaller, more mobile tanks and phased out the "heavy" break through tanks when ATGM's provided stand-off engagement capability to their tanks to take out any armour.

So tl;dr the Western definition is irrelevant to how Eastern bloc tanks are defined.

 

[Chromos]

@Zinegata

Wait a moment:
Where it is stated that Ircyk didn't had access to more sources as his own experience? One year after the war.. Seriously..
And as he did wrote that for a Military School you can at least assume that his article was checked and supported to be printed or would not have made it into that report.
The report does defend the Sherman as a "strategical choice" over "tankers choice", so I really don't know what picture you like to make out of it here.
Posting that I put his article above("trumps other books") another source is again only a product of your own fantasy. I never did that. Yet you repeatedly try to pull me into such comparisons I never did.

I used one of the "Green Books" some month earlier here already about the Battles around Arracourt..
And the "Green Book series of the US Army" is not a "collection of all after action reports" like you seem to indicate in my opinion, but a summarize of WW2 by other historians. And by now I can only assume that you would dismiss them If I would start quoting that source here.. I'll do nonetheless.

And shifting focus to Independent Tank Battalions is ok for me. It will not help you in any way. As I'm well aware of the Independent Tank Battalions. That just for the record.
Patton wrote also quite some stuff about that ones and afaik I quoted above how Patton saws the usage of tanks. That stands also for the usage of tanks in independend tank battalions. He had an own article about that Battalions.. Do you know about the tactics they had to use? Lets look at Pattons "opinion":

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403
U.S. ARMY
AG 353 Armd Comd
15 April 1944
Subject: Tactical Use of Separate Tank Battalions.
To: Corps, Divisions, Tank Group, and Tank Battalion Commanders

..
17. Tanks acting in conjunction with infantry will attack hostile tanks, regardless of the numerical superiority of the latter. If these enemy tanks are distant, our tanks will use HE against their tracks. If he is close, they will use armor piercing projectiles against the body of the tanks. Should the first round of AP miss, they will immediately fire several rounds of white phosphorus short and maneuver for a new position from which they can fire on the tank when he emerges from the smoke.
..

So that was in contrary to the orders given to Amroured Division. No halt order and wait for Arty/CAS/TD..
And we know what military personnel/historians wrote about when you attack well placed defense. And most times it was US attacking and not GER..
That applies for US the same as for other nations.

And you are aware of that Yeide wrotes in the Interview that in the West Allies had ~11k tanks and GER about ~90 in the end. That this number ratio wasn't that good/bad all the time since D-Day should be clear, but GER was nowhere having equal numbers to Allies in the West at any point(strategically). Tactically they rarely achieved sometimes to have equal amount of units. Thats also stated by Zaloga..
So numercial superiority in tanks was at hand any given time even shortly after the landing in Normady! Not to mention the superiorty in Art/CAS and even Strat Bombers had been used for CAS role..

So here some quotes from the Green Books that also state/back up the same things I posted from Irzyk/Zaloga/Yeide..

Logistical support of the Armies

Ordnance Class II and IV supply problems in the last few months were concerned largely with maintenance. Shortages of major items, such as tanks and general purpose vehicles, which had become so critical in the fall, were largely eliminated by February. The losses of the Ardennes had also been replaced by that time. In March the armies were reporting for the first time in months that items such as small arms, artillery weapons, and fire control and sighting equipment were in sufficient supply to cover losses. The main shortages that were to persist to the end were in spare parts, accessory items, major replacement assemblies such as truck engines, axles and transmissions, hot patches, brake fluid and lining, batteries, and, to some extent, tires and tubes. Shortages of tank tracks and bogie wheels became especially acute in the final week. Lacking spare parts, forward maintenance units made it a common practice in the final months to strip salvage vehicles of all serviceable parts. Ninth Army, for example, obtained about 30 percent of all the automotive spare parts requirements for Operation GRENADEby systematically stripping damaged vehicles.50 The supply ofcombat vehicles was unusually good in the final months. The medium tank shortage had been solved once and for all by the allocations which General Lutes had arranged in December and by the increase in the replacement factor. Some improvement was already noticeable by early February, when theater resources totaled 6,374 medium tanks against total theater requirements for 7,095. Against aT/E requirement for 5,255 there were actually 5,434 on hand in the armies. The armies thus possessed only a small reserve of 179 tanks, but an additional 940 were in theater pipelines.

The theater as a whole had a reserve of 1,119 tanks and lacked 721 to meet its full authorized reserve of 1,840 tanks.51 In January the War Department had refused the theater's request for an increase in its on-hand reserve of medium tanks to 70 percent. It agreed instead to a 35-percent reserve on the basis of the new 14-percent replacement factor, and agreed to create an additional 35-percent reserve in the zone of interior on which the theater could draw if necessary. T h e theater in turn had authorized the armies to have the bulk of the reserve—28 percent, or a sixty-day level-in their own areas.52 Under these arrangements the War Department had scheduled shipments of about 1,200 medium tanks per month beginning in February. Receipts under this program greatly improved the tank situation in the theater. On the eve of the Rhine crossings theater stocks totaled 7,620, only 159 tanks short of the total T/E and reserve requirement of 7,779. Against a T/E requirement for 5,477 the armies actually had 6,606 on hand, giving them a reserve of 1,129 against an authorized reserve of 1,535. While the armies’ stocks included nearly 600 unserviceable tanks, the armies had another 600 in reserve, and additional tanks intended forthe army reserves were in theater pipelines.53

page 453 ff Logistical support of the Armies

Field commanders had long looked forward to the arrival of the new 90-mm. gun T26, or Pershing, in hopes that they would at last have a tank to match German armor.
..
There was little doubt that the new weapon represented a great improvement over the Sherman. But Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Holly, head of the theater’s armored section, felt constrained to correct any impression that the T26 was superior to the German Tiger and Tiger Royal. The Pershing’s 90-mm. gun, he pointed out, was superior to the German 88 only when firing the new high velocity armor-piercing (HVAP) ammunition, and was still definitely inferior to the enemy’s gun when using ordinary armor-piercing ammunition. In extension of this sobering fact, he noted that the better ammunition was being manufactured in very limited quantities because of the shortage of tungsten carbide, a critical metal used in the core of the projectile.

page 456

Meanwhile the theater continued trying to replace the obsolescent 75-mm. gun medium tank with 76’s, and to get more HVAP ammunition for the latter. Production difficulties limited the ship ments of the improved ammunition, however, to less than two rounds per gun per month. Late in February the theater made plans to convert 75-mm. gun tanks into 76’s. But the program was slow to get under way, and the theater subsequently canceled the project in view of the high rate of receipts from the United States and the declining loss rate. At the time of the Rhine crossings about 40 percent of all medium tanks in the theater were of the 76-mm. gun type.59

page 458

The pages about ammo shortage and consequences about it shows the importance of Artillery for the US to advance once again. People interested should read that books.



More interesting stuff from "Breakout and pursuit"..:

The field commands had continued to urge the theater to obtain a higher replacement factor, arguing that a larger flow of replacement tanks was imperative if the habitual infantry-tank co-operation which had characterized all operations thus far was to continue. The 12th Army Group noted that at no time since the middle of August had the armies had their full T/O&E allowance of tanks, and that not since the early days of the Normandy beachhead had they possessed a reserve. It maintained that a 25 percent reserve in each army was an operational necessity. 81

..

Only two days before this the War Department had raised the replacement factor from 11 to 14 percent. On General Lutes’ recommendations it now agreed to raise it still further, to 20 percent, but with the understanding that this was a temporary concession and was to apply only during the next critical months, or until 1 May 1945.84 In a memorandum to General Somervell several days later Lutes admitted that a higher replacement factor should have been adopted earlier even though there were doubts as to whether U.S. production could have met the demand. The theater later reported a cumulative loss rate of only
12.8 percent through January 1945.85

..

ETOUSA next asked 21 Army Group to survey its resources to determine whether any number of tanks up to 500 could be made available, promising repayment in February. Montgomery responded by offering to release 351 tanks to U.S. forces, 254 of which were delivered to the First Army and 97 to the Third before the end of the month.88 British forces could easily afford such a transfer, for they held disproportionately high reserves—totaling 1,900 Shermans—in the United Kingdom.

page 238 ff

That shows clearly that the "Arsenal of Democracy" was already running at full capacity and nowhere had the possibilities to produce "unlimited" amounts of everything contrary to many beliefs.
And why have a necessity of 25% reserve if so few tanks where lost out of these(max.) 7,7k?..

tl;dr
The Green Books also indicate that US had such big losses that it even borrowed M4's back from UK again.
And the numbers of tanks for US alone was up to ~7,7k(max).
Compared that with the available GER numbers make 10:1 ratio in favour for Allies not unlikely as having #superiority most times..







And why should I show you an incident where a Panther shot up 5 tanks in a row?
You came up with this stories, not me. I just wrote that it might have been possible alone from simple logic, and you can read about it also from the winning side. I wrote already that I won't dig into such again after I did with Köhler.. You have the Wittman story wich is checked by both sides.



Christos blog is not a terrible source. It uses the same sources you like so much like Zaloga, Jentz and Spielberger etc..
You naming others using the same sources being "idiotic" speaks again for you overall attitude in this matter. You're also "just an guy on the internet" as many others too. Maybe you should remeber that from time to time.
And you also might be surprised that some here have also connections to "real historians" as also with tank restoration experts/places.. You just might not know..

 

[Chromos]

The final drive for the Tiger is not the same as for the Panther - The Tiger used a better planetary gear system which the Panther could not use as the Germans did not have the machinery needed to produce it in enough numbers. I suppose it is not surprising the Tiger and The PzIV had similar problems though since it mostly comes down to the tanks getting heavier and overloading the drive system, The Tiger of course also getting larger during design and the PzIV going from 15 tons to 25 as it was steadily upgunned and uparmoured.

I'm aware that the Tiger had a better solution. I just wondered why in the statement all are put in the same "basket". That makes the Tiger even worse as the Panther compared the produced numbers of Panthers and Tigers. And even more worse for the PzIV, as that had equal numbers as Panther, but more breakdowns of final drive!
Reading now Spielberger again, it seems PzIV was much more unrealiable as I had remembered. And sure, it was getting really "fat" in his last years of service.
In the end it was a ~1935 tank design and did well enough long time. At Tiger I'm not sure yet wich part of the final drives broke that often.

What was the state of the running gear development for German tanks prior to the introduction of the Panther?
The Panzerkampfwagen III and IV originally were of limited usefulness to the German armored forces. The chassis of the Pzkpfw.III was definetly an asset - after the double-boge running gear of the initial series vehicles did not prove effective. The tank was relatively reliable with the execption of the rubber tires on the wheels(wich had too small a diameter). until the process of cloudburst hardening had been invented the torision bars of the Pzkpfw. simply did not have enough fatigue resistance. The vehile was basically too small to accomodate a 75mm L/50 gun in its turret - meaing that when the Russian T-34 appeared, the Pzkpfw. III lost its effectiveness.
In spite of a few flaws in mounting the gun, however, the chassis turned out to be acceptable as as Sturmgeschütz platform and was used with success in this role up until the end of war.
On the other hand the chassis of the Pzkpfw. IV chassis was large enough to carry a 75mm L/50 gun in its turret. However, the chassis revealed a number of basic technological design flaws. Once it was determined that the better Pzkpfw. III chassis was to small for the 75mm L/50 gun, production of the Pzkpfw. IV intensified. At this point it no longer became possible to alleviate the weakness of the Panzer Iv's chassis. Practically speaking, it would have meant a new design of the steering brakes resulting in a total redesign of the steering unit, the running gear, the hull, the radiator and the engine compartment. This approach was repeatedly studied and discarded. The road wheels wheer of too small diameter to provide the rubber tires with even a barely acceptable lifespan. The track swheer too narrow. The leaf spring bogie wheel suspension frame no longer mirrored the current state of technology.
Test using a volute suspension did not offer any useful results.
The band brakes used in the steering mechanism were technologically obsolete, less reliable and required a considerable amount of maintenance. The engine and transmission operated in a satisfactory manner. The combustion air filtration provided entirely inadequate in light of the radiator and cooling fan arrangement. The special seperation of the fans and radiators automatically resulted in a poor effective cooling temperature.
The Panzer IV was clearly inferior to the Russion T-34 in all crucial areas.
Given this situation it was imperative that a new, significantly more capable tank to be developed as rapidly as human possible.

*As of this time, the ballisticans had not yet been able to assert themselves over the tacticans, who did not want to see the maneuverability of the tank be restricted in favour of the barrel overhang of the gun.

This new model was designed in an inconceivably short amount of time in the form of the Panther tank. This chassis made great advances into the most diverse areas of transportation technology. Some of these ventures were a complete success; some suffered minor setbacks but where worked out into acceptable solutions; some would only reach a mature stage of development in the closing days ofthe war, and some would only fulfill their puropse in very restirced conditons.


"Panther and its variants", by Spielberger page 60 ff

The Jentz availability numbers are interesting - but what to they represent? As we know, German units didn't consider a tank lost unless it was unrecoverable - tanks that broke down or were knocked out were not considered losses until they were totally destroyed or were too far behind enemy lines to be plausibly recovered. So are these numbers actually reporting, say, 75% of the tanks are 100% ready for combat, or just that 75% of tanks are not in tiny pieces but may be at varying stages of in maintenance/repair/recovery?

I agree, all nations tried to resue their tanks. Look at the Green Book quotes in my Zinegata reply. I don't know wich sources Jentz took for his numbers, but the table states: Percentage Operational At The Front. Wich I assume means combat rdy.

After I read again some more, it really seems that experience is even more important if the equipment needs careful treatment.
From the Spielberger and others infos we see, that careful treatment of the cats can make them pretty deadly and not that careful treatment a piece of junk in notime.

If the steering levers or brakes were handled in a rough manner, such great mommentum could build up as to cause break in the weak gear teeth or the mountings of the under-sized final reduction drive shaft.

"Panther and its variants", by Spielberger page 60 ff

Combat record of a Panther battalion

The latest operation of the unit, during wich apporximately 30 Panthers were in constant combat over a period of six consectuive days, have solidified the outstanding capabilities of the Panther tank. With a combination of well trained personnel, carefull handling and tactically sound operations great victories are possible. During these six days the battalion was abl eto destroy 89 tanks and assualt guns, 150 guns, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns etc..
Despite the massed enemey defenses only 6 vehicles wer put out of commission by enmey fire. The following lessons were learned during the operation:
...
In spite of the improved engine performance(the battalion had reached an average of 700km per tank, with only 11 engine changes), i is basically recommended that the tanks be loaded when travelling distances of over 100 km - since the running gear suffers tremendously,es pecially in winter.
..
4. At long last the battllion was employed as a single entity, contrary to the often used tradionally methods. Succes lies at the heart of these types of operation. In and istself it offers rapid and decisive results.
..

"Panther and its variants", by Spielberger page 244 ff

That way also Spielberger among others see this tank as one of the finest designs, even with the problems it had.

Foreword
It was intentional that the Panther would begin this history, for more then any other German design the Panther has exerted the greatest influence on the development of modern combat tank.
Considering that the timespan from the initial concept to the first prototype took less than a year, it can truly be said that the German Army and arms manufactors had performed a feat unique in the history of tank development.
The Panther tank was succesfully employed in the field despite the many technically hurdles wich go hand in hand wich such advanced design. -an achievement wich can be directly attributed to the untiring efforts of all those who participated in the project.

"Panther and its variants", by Spielberger page 9

A total of 6042 Panther tanks were built by the end of the war. Once the majority of the technical difficulties had been overcome, the Panther was, until the very end, the dream vehicle for the German Panzertruppe (a drem wich, unfortunately, was often not allways attainable).

"Panther and its variants", by Spielberger page 160

If it had been possible to forsee what difficulties the final reduction gearing was to cause, it would have been a much better solution to have selected a more expensive final drive wich provided a greater degree of reliability. In the end, the final drive proved to be too weak to handle braking with the Klaue disk break when steering through tight curves. The use of epicyclic gearing for the final drive hinged upon the bottleneck being encountered in the supply of gear cutting machines for producing the hollow gearing.
When passing judgement on the double-spur final reduction gear it should be noted that the high-quality steel originally planned for the spur gears in the final drive was not available for mass production and was unexppectedly replaced by VMS135(today 37MnSi5) tempered steel(not as suitable for this purpose.)

"Panther and its variants", by Spielberger page 54

The French report being hard to find doesn't mean we can ignore what it says though. Apparently it's mentioned in


So if you have access to that book you could perhaps check it out.

I did indeed post Carius' interview where he said he never had a Tiger break down under him in combat, but: Tiger's aren't Panthers. They had different problems and also had a much large maintenance section assigned to them. And in his book he does see plenty of other Tigers break down - he has a few stories about recovering them under fire. Although yes, green troops and bad drivers can certainly have a large effect on tank reliability.

I didn't meant that Spielberger quote but afaik there was another floating around.
All who are interested in that book, I found an online version wich can be found here:
http://de.scribd.com/doc/227025153/Panther-Its-Variants
So I didn't needed to translate, but just took that one for some quotes.

I wonder however why the french did not implement a new final reduction gearing(final drive) after the war. After all a working prototype was tested prior and just not used because of the production problems you also mentioned by GER. So why not use that instead? After all they used that tank quite some time.
Biggest shortcomings where that drive and the engine wich had better power/kg and was using up less gas. But also Diesel engines where underway. So overall that design was not bad, but the "sourroundings circumstances. Btw. the remaining Panther in Munster got a Diesel engine as no Maybach was at hand.

The final drive served as a further reduction of the driving r.p.m.. It conatined two spur gear sets. The housing was sealed off by labyrinth packing at the point of the drive sprocket hub. The drive spocket was joined to the final drive by its sprocket shaft. The toothed rims on the drive sprockets could be replaced without actually having to rmeove the sprockets themselves. The final drive(gear teeht and bearings) was the weakest part of the Panther. It was a risky proposition to use as spur gear system fro transferring the drive power - especially considering that the available steel during the war did not have a particular high stress tolerance. A better solution would have been to use an epicyclic gear system; a prototype final reduction drive using planetary gear reduction had already been tested and had performed flawlessly. However, as mentioned previously, a shortage opf gear cutting machinery for the hollow gearing prevented this tyoe of final drive from being mass produced.


"Panther and its variants", by Spielberger page 60 ff

Interesting turret speed values:

In the US tanks the hydraulic pump for the traverse mechanism is driven electrically. For the Panther and Tiger we use adjustable constant hydrostatic drive of the same type as found in machinerey construction. The drive is accomplished from the vehicle engine. the follwoing times are established for a complete turret revolution:

10 seconds T34
30-35 seconds KV
35-40 seconds British tanks
15 seconds USA tanks
30-35 seconds Panther/Tiger

"Panther and its variants", by Spielberger page 271

Also interesting to read the:

Excerpts from a report by Oberst Dipl.-Ing Willi Esser concerning newer tank models, given 7 Februar 1945 before the Wehrtechnische Gemeinschaft des VDI in Berlin
"Panther and its variants", by Spielberger page 271

And many more in this book. So you can see how much better the new Schmalturm would have been, gun/armour tests etc..

 

[f1nalstand17]

I'm aware that the Tiger had a better solution. I just wondered why in the statement all are put in the same "basket". That makes the Tiger even worse as the Panther compared the produced numbers of Panthers and Tigers. And even more worse for the PzIV, as that had equal numbers as Panther, but more breakdowns of final drive!
Reading now Spielberger again, it seems PzIV was much more unrealiable as I had remembered. And sure, it was getting really "fat" in his last years of service.
In the end it was a ~1935 tank design and did well enough long time. At Tiger I'm not sure yet wich part of the final drives broke that often.

I agree, all nations tried to resue their tanks. Look at the Green Book quotes in my Zinegata reply. I don't know wich sources Jentz took for his numbers, but the table states: Percentage Operational At The Front. Wich I assume means combat rdy.

After I read again some more, it really seems that experience is even more important if the equipment needs careful treatment.
From the Spielberger and others infos we see, that careful treatment of the cats can make them pretty deadly and not that careful treatment a piece of junk in notime.

That way also Spielberger among others see this tank as one of the finest designs, even with the problems it had.

I didn't meant that Spielberger quote but afaik there was another floating around.
All who are interested in that book, I found an online version wich can be found here:
http://de.scribd.com/doc/227025153/Panther-Its-Variants
So I didn't needed to translate, but just took that one for some quotes.

I wonder however why the french did not implement a new final reduction gearing(final drive) after the war. After all a working prototype was tested prior and just not used because of the production problems you also mentioned by GER. So why not use that instead? After all they used that tank quite some time.
Biggest shortcomings where that drive and the engine wich had better power/kg and was using up less gas. But also Diesel engines where underway. So overall that design was not bad, but the "sourroundings circumstances. Btw. the remaining Panther in Munster got a Diesel engine as no Maybach was at hand.

Interesting turret speed values:

Also interesting to read the:

And many more in this book. So you can see how much better the new Schmalturm would have been, gun/armour tests etc..

Thank you very much for the link, Chromos Unfortunately, he did not go too much in detail on the E-50, do you know any good sources on it?

 

[Dark Jakkaru]

I really don't see the problem with those facts, of having a bad final drive and still being able to get along with it in the field.

The chief drawback and limiting feature of the Panther tank with a weak final drive was that you could not in any sense of longevity drive the tank constantly at 40+ kph like you see in the testing footage from Kummersdorf if you want to keep it "reliable". The Kummersdorf footage makes the Panther look amazing how it drives fast and the suspension shows for a smooth ride. However, as far as I am aware of, you don't see Panthers ever doing anything in terms of blitzkrieg like the Panzer III used to do since this was the true replacement tank after all. The Panzer IV was jury rigged into a medium tank role due to necessity and not an ideal solution to replace the Panzer III and merely a stop gap until a suitable replacement came about. Hence, something new was cooked up and probably why they went with MAN's Panther design as a consideration amongst other reasons I won't mention here.

So in short, Panther drivers didn't really push their heavy machine with a weak final drive to get the most out of it like they did at Kursk with predictable results. So a key feature of blitzkrieg, that being mobility, was one of the chief liabilities of the Panther if you pushed the machine to drive like a Panzer III. It also didn't help with the declining war fortunes that over loading the front with armor also would take away from the survivability of the tank in attacking (which the Wehrmacht would increasingly do little of other than fighting to release encircled forces).

 

[Chromos]

Thank you very much for the link, Chromos Unfortunately, he did not go too much in detail on the E-50, do you know any good sources on it?

Not that I'm aware of in english/officially.
Would need to dig through german sources, but that would maybe just repeat more in detail what Spielberger and others already wrote.
The next mediums coming with E-project had nice stats, and show a much higher standardisation as all nations had before. Similar to nowadays platform we have in automobile production. So it shared many parts with heavy variants and lighter ones aswell. So more of a tank family wich had small/medium/heavy AA/Art tanks etc..

The chief drawback and limiting feature of the Panther tank with a weak final drive was that you could not in any sense of longevity drive the tank constantly at 40+ kph like you see in the testing footage from Kummersdorf if you want to keep it "reliable". The Kummersdorf footage makes the Panther look amazing how it drives fast and the suspension shows for a smooth ride. However, as far as I am aware of, you don't see Panthers ever doing anything in terms of blitzkrieg like the Panzer III used to do since this was the true replacement tank after all. The Panzer IV was jury rigged into a medium tank role due to necessity and not an ideal solution to replace the Panzer III and merely a stop gap until a suitable replacement came about. Hence, something new was cooked up and probably why they went with MAN's Panther design as a consideration amongst other reasons I won't mention here.

So in short, Panther drivers didn't really push their heavy machine with a weak final drive to get the most out of it like they did at Kursk with predictable results. So a key feature of blitzkrieg, that being mobility, was one of the chief liabilities of the Panther if you pushed the machine to drive like a Panzer III. It also didn't help with the declining war fortunes that over loading the front with armor also would take away from the survivability of the tank in attacking (which the Wehrmacht would increasingly do little of other than fighting to release encircled forces).

Well the cross country possibilities of that tank was never beaten by other designs as far as Spielbergers as a source is taken into consideration.
The final drive was "only" problematic in rough acceleration and steering. The machine had heating/burning problems.
So that a good driver could compensate much in that regard. Similar to Tiger wich had to be treated different as the much lighter tanks. 20-30 tons more as PzIV does need different treatment with automobile possibilities of that time.
But also Spielberger wrotes that by that time of Panther it was already knowed that you couldn't "outarmor" the upcomming guns that much anymore and more emphasis was put into mobility already. That way the formidable driving system and gun. (Exept the final drive, wich we know was due to production limitations, but initially had planned a different solution. Spielberger wrote about it too.) The Panther engine had way more HP/ton as the 20 tons lighter PzIV had, so we see that focus was more on what we know today as speed/gun/armour..
If Tiger had been given up and the Panther got the priority for those better final drives, it would have just needed the new diesel engine to be much more worthwhile as it was even with that big drawbacks. And if we look at why the diesel wasn't pushed it seems clear what again was was also a problem behind it all.(Speer was confident that Maybach will solve the engine problems etc., Hitler interrupting, Industry claims this, army that..)
Spielberger has some nice info about those things happening into his book too.

And in initiall "Blitzkrieg", also PzIII/PzIV broke down quite often. You can compensate with good mechanics/maintenance. In that way, Panther would need much more maintenance, but it would be possible. In the end even the big initial marches in the East (up to 200km a day, or check out wich many tanks of Rommels Ghost division where the Spearhead..) where not done with the whole DIV but only parts of them.
As you need to hold "org" you need to limit speed anyway below max speed wich is still fast enough to do maintenance "underway" etc..
Logistics train(maintenance among it) is way more important as max speed or reliability in that terms in my opionion as you can compensate much with that. GER showed that also in the defense later where quite big distances where overcome also with Panther/Tiger. Look at what the logistic of the Allies in the West was like for the offensive capabilities. They had to stop not only because the fighting, but to catch up supplies/reinforcements again..
"Luckily" the way behind frontlines can also use railroads much easier and it was used to great advantage. But otherwise it would have meant "just" bigger maintenance.
Seeing that logistic trains(well maintenance was not bigger in those..) of allies was much(!) bigger in comparison to GER ones leaves an impression of the possibilities.
If we look at some quotes above it was asked to use railroads if distance was bigger as 100km(Initially in '43 it was down to 25km by times though, imagine that these numbers vary in different seasons- Rasputizia comes to mind..). So in a constant advance, you will never have to travel that big distance at once, but advance constantly all the time.(Until you got redeployed to different location maybe..)

And yes PzIV was never intended as what it turned out to be later on. As a '35 design it was some sort of faster but weaker armoured Inf-Support tank that should be able to stay along the "cruiser" PzIII.

I like to point out again. PzV was in no way a "übertank" because of its problems. If it had those main ones solved(wich could have been done in different state of war) than noone would ever argue if that tank was "bad" or not.
The tank proved to be very successful already in its state it was fielded historical. And being most of its lifetime on the defense in the East/West, also a better engine/final drive would not have helped that much more if we look at the odds GER faced strategically.


Edit:
Look at that quote from above about US maintenance need:

Ordnance Class II and IV supply problems in the last few months were concerned largely with maintenance. Shortages of major items, such as tanks and general purpose vehicles, which had become so critical in the fall, were largely eliminated by February. The losses of the Ardennes had also been replaced by that time. In March the armies were reporting for the first time in months that items such as small arms, artillery weapons, and fire control and sighting equipment were in sufficient supply to cover losses. The main shortages that were to persist to the end were in spare parts, accessory items, major replacement assemblies such as truck engines, axles and transmissions, hot patches, brake fluid and lining, batteries, and, to some extent, tires and tubes. Shortages of tank tracks and bogie wheels became especially acute in the final week. Lacking spare parts, forward maintenance units made it a common practice in the final months to strip salvage vehicles of all serviceable parts. Ninth Army, for example, obtained about 30 percent of all the automotive spare parts requirements for Operation GRENADE by systematically stripping damaged vehicles.50 The supply ofcombat vehicles was unusually good in the final months. The medium tank shortage had been solved once and for all by the allocations which General Lutes had arranged in December and by the increase in the replacement factor. Some improvement was already noticeable by early February, when theater resources totaled 6,374 medium tanks against total theater requirements for 7,095. Against aT/E requirement for 5,255 there were actually 5,434 on hand in the armies. The armies thus possessed only a small reserve of 179 tanks, but an additional 940 were in theater pipelines.

page 453 ff Logistical support of the Armies

So we can see how much logistics play into this een for the Allied side.

 

[Zinegata]

@Zinegata

Wait a moment:
Where it is stated that Ircyk didn't had access to more sources as his own experience? One year after the war.. Seriously..

As a battalion commander who was not part of the army's historical section Irzyk would not yet have access to after-action reports other than his own subordinates; nevermind the independent tank battalions which belonged to other units. Complete army-wide AARs were not disseminated throughout the US Army in 1946. The only collated accounts available in 1946 were some general Divisional histories - such as "Spearhead in the West" - but these did not feature tactical battles (mainly they track the Division's movements) and in any case don't feature the independent tank battalions.

This is again shockingly basic knowledge that you seem completely unaware of yet you keep trying to posture that Irzyk and yourself are knowledgeable about subjects you are clearly ignorant about.

In short, Irzyk had no access to the knowledge you claim he has in 1946. This is you making up his credentials in order to disguise the fact you picked a very poor source with a very limited context. 8th Armored Battalion is again from an armored division. Much more of the fighting was done by the independent tank battalions. That you continually attempt to talk past this reality and invent false credentials for your sources again merely demonstrates the constant deep flaws in your historical "analysis" - it is not analysis, it is merely biased cherry-picking.

And you are aware of that Yeide wrotes in the Interview that in the West Allies had ~11k tanks and GER about ~90 in the end.

No, that's from Zaloga's interview.

And what you're ignoring is that these are strategic-level numbers. At the tactical level what this actually meant is that most of the German army fought with no tank support at all. When a tank battle did occur, it was usually 1 platoon of US Shermans supporting an infantry company fighting a platoon of German Panzers. This is again something you'd know if you read the whole Green Book series instead of simply mining it soley for facts that only support your position; which is the long-discreditted notion that German tankers regularly fought while outnumbered 5:1.

The 5:1 assertion is again complete fiction. The largest actual tank vs tank battle in ETO occurred in September 1944 and featured nearly 200 German Panzers fighting 50-odd US tanks and TDs at Arracourt - a 3:1 advantage in the German's favor. The pattern repeats itself at Puffendorf and the initial phases of the Bulge. This was the norm. The Germans did not like committing armor unless they had local superiority.

And note how I can name a dates and actual places of engagement; instead of the constant stream of hearsay that Chromos keeps producing which is not backed up by any actual incidents. If they're as common as he claims, then it should have been really easy to name some engagements to support his argument.

The Green Books also indicate that US had such big losses that it even borrowed M4's back from UK again.

No, you selectively quoted from a portion of a single Green Book. Which again demonstrates how you're among the crowd still pretending the Titanic didn't break in half because you're ignoring all the other evidence.

Again, Yiede read through the whole series instead of your cherry-picking. His conclusion is very different. Losses dropped dramatically as a unit accumulated experience. Losses had almost nothing to do with tank vs tank combat. The entire basis of your argumentation is based on hearsay and conflating exceptions and rumors as the norm; because you are still unable to name a single date or engagement where the Shermans suffered heavy losses and are content to quote anecdotes. If the Sherman losses were so heavy that they required replacements from the British (ignoring they swapped ammunition and other supplies around too), then naming a date and place of engagement where Shermans lost heavily should be easy, isn't it?

Yet you never actually do that. Because the Green Books actually show that tank vs tank losses weren't the norm and the when heavy losses were taken it was by inexperienced units against non-tank opposition; exactly as Yiede described despite your constant attempts to ignore him and overinflate Irzyk's credentials.

But hey, apparently some people are impressed by childishly big fonts despite the words being little more than cherry-picked nonsense; which should easily demonstrate who in this thread are too wedded to biased mythology to ever treat this subject with the degree of objectivity it deserves.

 

[Zinegata]

Well, albeit this, i think, that the t-54 came awfully close to the term of MBT, even if its not called one - i would not make a big mistake, if i call the Panther the first tank as designed for the right direction to be an MBT (maybe a little bit obfuscated definition, but probably this is the most acceptable one), the t54 is 2-3 steps closer in that regard.

MBT is honestly just semantic obsfucating to begin with. What I'm pointing out is that in terms of weight, the T-54 was not much heavier than a Sherman and was much more long-lived; just as the Sherman and T-34 proved to be hugely long-lived.

Why would you apply the Western definition to Eastern block armour? They're designed under two entirely different doctrines for armoured warfare; the Soviets originated Deep Operations as a "scientific" non-luck based way of winning wars and nearly all their tanks were designed with this in mind. With Deep Operations the goal is to have several breakthrough points that armour can swarm in and exploit, the Soviets didn't put that much concern on tactics, all strategic thinking was done at the corps level and above with all regiments/battalions/divisions expected to be able to instantly abide by new orders and fight according to their interchangeable roles. So the Soviets focused on lighter, smaller, more mobile tanks and phased out the "heavy" break through tanks when ATGM's provided stand-off engagement capability to their tanks to take out any armour.

So tl;dr the Western definition is irrelevant to how Eastern bloc tanks are defined.

Two things: The Soviets - using their own definitions - classified the T-54 as a medium, not an MBT. It was not until the T-64 that they really amalgated heavies and mediums into an MBT.

Secondly, that they believed mediums were supposed to be deep penetration units was precisely why they kept it at 36 ton tank instead of the 50 tons reached by the Centurion or the 45 tons reached by the Patton. It just wasn't possible to keep tanks that heavy running for extended road marches.

Keeping the tank under 40 tons was a big deal from a reliability perspective with 1950s technology; and indeed it applies to a large extent to the modern day. That's what the Sherman and T-34 and Panzer IV demonstrated. That's why they didn't go with a bigger tank despite the fact they proved they could make a bigger tank in the form of the 45 ton IS-2.

===

That said, it never fails to disappoint me how people (not the people I'm quoting above) keep lauding the 45 ton Panther, when for the same weight the Soviets could make an IS-2 which had bigger gun and all-around better armor than the Panther, with acceptable reliability. Or that one Tiger II weighs as much as two T-54s, yet the T-54 in fact is better in all regards with a 100mm gun, plenty of armor, and the mobility of a medium. It just goes to show how people again treat tanks as toys when so many insist the heaviest and biggest is the bestest; as opposed to the ones that actually managed to squeeze maximum capability out of a limited chassis.

 

[Big Nev]

...
I don't wanted to "prove" the Barkmann incident..
The Barkman comment of mine was because Irzyk mentioned that specific incident where a M4 shot down 5 Panthers with 6 shots once.
And the Köhler story you brought up last time was incorrect. That much about doing your homework..

I'd just like to clarify a point relating to this "incident" with the M4 and the Panthers. It's taken from a report by General Irzyk where he’s defending the Sherman and is included in his writings about how the 76mm gun was good but also saying the 75mm gun was perfectly adequate much of the time. But he’s actually miss representing the facts.

Yes, the incident in question was one where a single Sherman took-down five Panthers with six shots.

But the Sherman in question wasn’t any ordinary M4. It was a Firefly

I’m sure this an unlikely enough event (5 Panthers, six shots) that it only ever happened once.

Defense of Norrey-en-Bessin. 9th June 1944

 

[Zinegata]

I'd just like to clarify a point relating to this "incident" with the M4 and the Panthers. It's taken from a report by General Irzyk where he’s defending the Sherman and is included in his writings about how the 76mm gun was good but also saying the 75mm gun was perfectly adequate much of the time. But he’s actually miss representing the facts.

Yes, the incident in question was one where a single Sherman took-down five Panthers with six shots.

But the Sherman in question wasn’t any ordinary M4. It was a Firefly

I’m sure this an unlikely enough event (5 Panthers, six shots) that it only ever happened once.

Defense of Norrey-en-Bessin. 9th June 1944

Actually, that incident may not have occured. A quick look at some sources regarding Norrey-en-Bessin reveals that while the 12th SS did lose half a company of Panthers, Allied accounts do no agree that it was a sole Firefly that did all the work - there was also an anti-tank gun unit in the town and a company of Shermans who also claimed to have flanked the Panthers. Which should again show why one should not be quoting battalion commander's opinions from 1946 as gospel.

There is one verified incident however of a lone US Tank Destroyer soloing 10 enemy Panzer and destroying seven of them; as part of Team Desobry at the defense of Noville on the 19th of December.

 

[32karakter]

MBT is honestly just semantic obsfucating to begin with. What I'm pointing out is that in terms of weight, the T-54 was not much heavier than a Sherman and was much more long-lived; just as the Sherman and T-34 proved to be hugely long-lived.

Honestly, MBT as class or definition is not a clear one - happens in military, HMG/MMG/GPMG or tank classifications in different countries in ww2, etcetcetc - however, maybe a "we do not _really_ need another tank in a different class for general purposes, so we call it an MBT" as a definition, maybe could cover the issue. Somehow. Other than that, soviet/eastern MBTs are more of mediums and western ones tend to be heavies by their weight - thats a no-brainer - however, this design decision IMHO could not be based on operational or strategic mobility only (past experience, conclusions, the predicted battlefields and operational circumstances (fe.: im quite sure, that modern western designs would have perform extremely poorly in the russian far east, or again, the Merkava would be eaten alive in central europe), design, production and maintanence ability, etcetcetc had all their influence on the designs).

But back to the ww2 and the german tank superiority - wich i also see as nonexistant, at least i cannot find any "über" panzer, the perfect tank in either sides inventory - this is not how it works, we are speaking about complex designs, its like the perfect car: nonexistant. All sides had decent designs, of course, with flaws and room - maybe not so much actual room - for imporvement - and thats were the training, experience, doctrine - and all the little design/operational advances could make the difference. (Yes, the crew ability is somewhat a fetish for me )

 

[A_Spec]

A big issue with the later German tanks was also the amount of recovery vehicles needed to get the Panthers and Tigers back on the field after being knocked out. The initital recovery vehicles were based on the P.IV chassis, which caused issues when trying to recover the larger chassis of the Panther or the Tiger variants. Another problem was that the Tiger (A and B batches) were around three times more expensive from the Panther (which was slightly more expensive than the P.IV.)

When it comes to the mythical German tank superiority, it had more to do with tactics and the fact that they a radio operators rather than having commander dual wielding the role.

 

[Sid Meier]

MBT is honestly just semantic obsfucating to begin with. What I'm pointing out is that in terms of weight, the T-54 was not much heavier than a Sherman and was much more long-lived; just as the Sherman and T-34 proved to be hugely long-lived.



Two things: The Soviets - using their own definitions - classified the T-54 as a medium, not an MBT. It was not until the T-64 that they really amalgated heavies and mediums into an MBT.

Secondly, that they believed mediums were supposed to be deep penetration units was precisely why they kept it at 36 ton tank instead of the 50 tons reached by the Centurion or the 45 tons reached by the Patton. It just wasn't possible to keep tanks that heavy running for extended road marches.

Keeping the tank under 40 tons was a big deal from a reliability perspective with 1950s technology; and indeed it applies to a large extent to the modern day. That's what the Sherman and T-34 and Panzer IV demonstrated. That's why they didn't go with a bigger tank despite the fact they proved they could make a bigger tank in the form of the 45 ton IS-2.

===

That said, it never fails to disappoint me how people (not the people I'm quoting above) keep lauding the 45 ton Panther, when for the same weight the Soviets could make an IS-2 which had bigger gun and all-around better armor than the Panther, with acceptable reliability. Or that one Tiger II weighs as much as two T-54s, yet the T-54 in fact is better in all regards with a 100mm gun, plenty of armor, and the mobility of a medium. It just goes to show how people again treat tanks as toys when so many insist the heaviest and biggest is the bestest; as opposed to the ones that actually managed to squeeze maximum capability out of a limited chassis.

You said "by the Western definition" which is what was irrelevant, as for the Soviet sources the point is that it is the T-54 that starts the trend developing on top of what the T-34 accomplished until the development of ATGM's (making "heavy tanks" obsolete).

This is why I agree that the "big cats" of the Germans aren't at all what they are cracked up to be, it ended up forcing a situation where they often simply didn't have any tanks when they needed to have tanks, I could see the Tiger for either the role of the breakthrough tank or as a fire battalion response force but they should have kept making Panzer IV's.

 

[Chromos]

@Zinegata
I stay corrected here it was Zaloga pointing out the 11k to 90 ratio.

But diregarding completely a man that has first hands experience in the field and writing article for the official US army as a source at all..
Seriously assuming that he was only lookig at his own command and did never exchange infos/experience with others. Not in his command time and also not after the war where he continiued his career. I can only point out again to what Yeide said towards usage of source..
You claiming that he had no access to further sources is just that, a claim by yourself. As we just don't know by now how much info he had when writing that one.

If that was allways fighing platoon against platoon like you try to imply, then come up with the sources/quotes and don't just make me look up again to prove you wrong..
Most engagements descriptions I found in that series indicate that only up to(!) platoon size was present in given areas was around most times. But rarely a full platoon took action together, most times only up to a pair if not a single tank with Inf support.
At least that we know from the US area, UK was different.
Thats just because GER could not field that much. But US on the other side had much more tanks all around. Alone the overall numbers of 6k should get clear that much INF-DIV had their own Tank Battalion(!) at hand. Not only a platoon. And they could call the whole Bat in like it is advised for independent tank bats when seeing enemy tanks..
Armoured Divs had even more tanks at hand. All tactically... I could quote again from the Green Books, but will not do again.

Writing/implying that the Armoured Divs were only second to the Independent Battallions in doing the fighting in the west campaign is also again only a poor excuse attemp of you. They had different orders how to engange tanks because of the role they should play, nonetheless Armoured Divs took part in many battles until the final end. Just because they were more used to spearhead the breakthroughs along with armoured Inf-Divs..


How good you know the sources you seem to use to defend your points is again shown in your last example of Arracourt again.
At least doing the math of your point right, it would have been 4:1 in GER favour..
But that doesn't matter much, as it was not 200 Panthers attacking just some few 50 "odd US tanks", but smaller as 50 tanks per group of Panthers attacking again and again the US positions wich had at least equal numers due to clever repositioning it forces. Additionally in dense fog where Panther could not use its advantage at all.
Again attacker sufferd more losses, and here exeptional as it was carried out not that clever by green ger units again US vet. I pointed out to the difference/importance in experience too quite some times by now.


Also, a last time, I did not ever claimed that US needed to have 5:1 numbers.
Like I also never claimed that US lost so many tanks due to "tank vs tank battles". So why should I go out and find sources about that? Thats nonsense.
You try just again to put words in my mouth. A last time, stop putting words in my mouth.
Looking at the overall numbers should make pretty clear that US couldn't have lost that much tanks due to "tank vs tank battles" anyway. As also most GER tanks were fighting the UK anyway from the few that were around in the West. But US lost nonetheless many tanks. Otherwise Logistics would not have a hard time in bringing in replacements or US had to get them from UK.

Also I quoted from 3 Green Books by now, just for the record. Being selective is based on what PoV? I posted about things that state that your ideas/opinion is pretty not much that backed up by facts written in books you brought to the topic in first hand to prove your PoV. Really..
Making use of big font is maybe not helpful for you, I just thought other wold have an easier time to see the imo important parts easier too.
And well, having quotes that way is maybe better as just bringing up claims like you did but never be able to back them up in any way.

I don't know why you still insist of bashing that 5:1 myth all over as if some here keep on posting: "Sherman was a bad tank, it needed 5 to overcome a single German one".. I've seen that sort of posting not for a long time. And not at all in this thread.
Fact remains that also some few GER tanks -if encountered at all- gave US hard times aswell as well placed AT-guns gave them a hard time. They overcome all in the end, but took their losses. Similar as to when GER attacked them later.


Your wording choices of "silly/hearesy/idiotic etc." and lack of facts seem more to indiacte that in fact you are some kind of fanboy -or better an "anti-fanboy"- who is just around to insult people with a different opinion? Be it high ranking military vets, forumites or historians.




@Big Nev
Maybe thats what he had in mind. It is maybe also possible at around Falaise pocket and its creation.

There is one verified incident however of a lone US Tank Destroyer soloing 10 enemy Panzer and destroying seven of them; as part of Team Desobry at the defense of Noville on the 19th of December.

So we see that it was possible also for US forces if the enemy amass more units.
Also in the East, the terrain was more often very suitable for long range gunfights. A situation where GER tanks could outperform the Soviets.
Dismisisng the possibility that these things can occur and not having many cross checked situations are two different things..

A big issue with the later German tanks was also the amount of recovery vehicles needed to get the Panthers and Tigers back on the field after being knocked out. The initital recovery vehicles were based on the P.IV chassis, which caused issues when trying to recover the larger chassis of the Panther or the Tiger variants. Another problem was that the Tiger (A and B batches) were around three times more expensive from the Panther (which was slightly more expensive than the P.IV.)

When it comes to the mythical German tank superiority, it had more to do with tactics and the fact that they a radio operators rather than having commander dual wielding the role.

That way the Bergepanther was introduced. As before only the heavy Wehrmachtschlepper was able to pull the heavies(Up to 3 in a row combined), or other Tigers even that using Tigers to pull Tigers was forbidden. And the Bergepz IV was only build in '44. Even some "Bergetiger" have been produced accoring to Spielberger, but as with the Beregepz IV they lacked the pulling equipment and were likely more for field repairs.
I agree that the tactics played a great role. That is shown also later with Allies when fighting green German units.
Also the plain fact that one can shoot much earlier in a deadly manner is an explainantion why sometimes one side had big lossses and the other side not.
Same to air superiority or Artillery support and so on.

This is why I agree that the "big cats" of the Germans aren't at all what they are cracked up to be, it ended up forcing a situation where they often simply didn't have any tanks when they needed to have tanks, I could see the Tiger for either the role of the breakthrough tank or as a fire battalion response force but they should have kept making Panzer IV's.

But they kept making PzIV up to the end and Tiger was either breakthrough or firebrigade. Also Panther was nearly only as costly as PzIV but much more potent weapon. Look at what Spielberger wrote about PzIV capabilities. I quoted that in post #206.

We have roughly 1.3k TigerI and ~500 TigerII.
In comparison to: PzII: ~5500 / PzIV: ~8500 / PzV: ~6000 -> Sum: ~20000 Mediums : 1800 Heavy = ~10% of combat tanks are heavies.
(I left the AG/TD out here, so it would be even smaller ratio.)

Germany didn't had more tanks because it fought much more enemy personnel/tanks and other equipment at the same time while also its industry was bombed heavily.

 

[Sid Meier]

But they could have made 1.8 Tiger I's, and perhaps 18,000 PzIV's instead, going up closer to maybe 30,000 Mediums if they didn't have the retool production lines. At a minimum, Kursk wouldn't have been postponed for so long just to wait for these new tanks to become available you see?

 

[Chromos]

But they could have made 1.8 Tiger I's, and perhaps 18,000 PzIV's instead, going up closer to maybe 30,000 Mediums if they didn't have the retool production lines. At a minimum, Kursk wouldn't have been postponed for so long just to wait for these new tanks to become available you see?

Yes, but by that logic they could have build even more PzI. Sorry, couldn't resist, just kidding.
If you read what Spielberger wrote about PzIV and the need for them to field a superior tank as PzIV wich was '35 design and Sherman and T-34 were newer designs.
GER needed more quality over quantity. So I would agree more to a statement that instead of Tiger/Tiger II use up the equipment machine tool to produce the Panther with better final drive.
In the end that one was build nearly as much as PzIV but was also much better in many areas of tank design.

 

[balmung60]

Yes, but by that logic they could have build even more PzI. Sorry, couldn't resist, just kidding.
If you read what Spielberger wrote about PzIV and the need for them to field a superior tank as PzIV wich was '35 design and Sherman and T-34 were newer designs.
GER needed more quality over quantity. So I would agree more to a statement that instead of Tiger/Tiger II use up the equipment machine tool to produce the Panther with better final drive.
In the end that one was build nearly as much as PzIV but was also much better in many areas of tank design.

I keep hearing this "needed quality over quantity" canard, but it doesn't really stand up to the reality of Germany cutting corners on their tanks to try to produce more of them, such as the poor, but easy to produce straight-cut final drives on the Panther or the entire Panzer IV Ausf. J, even if it meant that the tanks were less reliable and less useful.

It also presents a false dichotomy between quality and quantity, when it is fully possible to have both or neither.