German-Soviet Front

[shri]

Not really, the people of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gained its freedom. Still Russia/USSR lost 3 different wars vs 3 different nations 20+ years before Barbarossa. Russia also had significant trouble vs the small nation of Finland so the outcome Germany vs Russia/USSR was not certain.

AH!
But you have discounted one thing- Joseph Stalin. Any other leader sitting on the throne, esp. Tsar Nicholas who was responsible for those 3 military defeats and things would be different.
Stalin was perhaps the best read and most cynical tyrant to ever sit on the throne of Russia and possibly Europe (says a lot about the man).
by the time of Barbarossa, the Aristocrats of Russia had been sent packing (to migration or Holiday Inn), the Farm labourers had become factory workers, farms had been replaced by tractor factories (which could and did produce light tanks when needed), serfs toiling on the steppes was replaced by vast electric blast furnaces, steel plants, truck and auto-mobile factories, all opposition was banished or sent to the holiday Inn.
Hitler underestimated Stalin when he invaded and paid the price.

 

[MGL 86]

Not really, the people of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gained its freedom. Still Russia/USSR lost 3 different wars vs 3 different nations 20+ years before Barbarossa. Russia also had significant trouble vs the small nation of Finland so the outcome Germany vs Russia/USSR was not certain.

One reason Germans can`t win 20 years after Tsarist Russia is STALIN. That guy is a brutal killer. That guy ruthlessly stripped country from its wealth and invested in military industry. He is a poor tactician and mediocre strategist. But he is also great organizer, propagandist and perfect bureaucrat. His main advantage over Hitler is he doesn`t micro-manage.

Compare Stalin to Nicholas II. Now you can see why Soviet Union is stronger than Russian Empire.

 

[scroggin]

On the original idea of having the eastern campaign be a drawn out affair with defense in depth. Getting the AI to pull back and set up primary and secondary lines of defense behind rivers, and defensive ground like a human would, is something that would be very hard to program.

One thing that could be easily done is, program the AI to keep say 40 divisions in the far east. This battlegroup could be transferred to the west when a certain trigger is met such as three months from invasion or certain regions captured.

It would be awesome to have a super AI that could perform like a human, but it isnt realistic.

 

[jetfx]

I would posit the notion that if the Germans hadn't implemented their policy against "subhuman" slavs, they would have been welcomed by the populace as liberators (as was the case early in the eastern war before the reality tragically struck behind the front lines) and Stalin likely would have had to deal with both the war and a revolt/coup at the same time.

I see this argued as a counterfactual a lot but it doesn't really make sense as the Germans wouldn't have invaded in the first place if they didn't have these policies. This was their reason for attacking, and it overrode concerns about the feasibility of such a massive invasion because their policies preemptively discounted the ability of the USSR to resist. This issue coloured all German planning as well as exacerbating the supply situation.

Secondly, I'm pretty sure the Germans were going to face massive partisan activity in their rear areas regardless, particularly in ethnic Russian areas. In western Europe where they did not act with such extreme brutality, they still faced considerable resistance to occupation. Furthermore, a German invasion has the effect of further legitimizing a regime that spend over a decade propagandizing that fascism wants to destroy everything the workers have built because now it's literally, obviously true to every Soviet citizen.

 

[zyphial]

I see this argued as a counterfactual a lot but it doesn't really make sense as the Germans wouldn't have invaded in the first place if they didn't have these policies. This was their reason for attacking, and it overrode concerns about the feasibility of such a massive invasion because their policies preemptively discounted the ability of the USSR to resist. This issue coloured all German planning as well as exacerbating the supply situation.

Secondly, I'm pretty sure the Germans were going to face massive partisan activity in their rear areas regardless, particularly in ethnic Russian areas. In western Europe where they did not act with such extreme brutality, they still faced considerable resistance to occupation. Furthermore, a German invasion has the effect of further legitimizing a regime that spend over a decade propagandizing that fascism wants to destroy everything the workers have built because now it's literally, obviously true to every Soviet citizen.

Not quite. In the west (and Poland) there was little ability for the Germans to appear in anything but a harshly negative light. They were a foriegn invader intent on destroying their well being, with nothing against which to compare but their previous, presumably happy lives. Compare that with the unmitigated hell the Ukranians were facing and it makes sense that the Ukranians would have met the Germans not as invaders but as potential liberators.

If Germany weren't absolutely crazy (that is, crazy enough to have idiotic notions about race, but not so crazy that they would pursue those goals without thinking things through), they could have set up a "provisional government" or something that would "temporarily" organize the Ukranians. Naturally this would be dissolved and full German brutality would be unleashed after the Soviets capitulated, but until then had they given the Ukranians every reason to believe the Germans were there to defeat communism, crush Stalin and free them from oppression, they would have had extremely enthusiastic support. A few random communists might have agitated against the Germans, but they would not have had much local support - the populace had seen enough of communism already.

It doesn't have to be true, you just have to give reason for them hope or believe it's true, and suddenly people will flock to your banner.

 

[Opanashc]

If, if, if...
Revaunchists. Germany lost. Mistakes they made outweighed the mistakes made by the Soviets. Period.

 

[zyphial]

If, if, if...
Revaunchists. Germany lost. Mistakes they made outweighed the mistakes made by the Soviets. Period.

Ironically that's a revaunchist argument in and of itself. Far more accurate to say that Soviet successes outweighed German ones, leading to a German defeat. Giving all agency in the war to the Germans is revaunchism.

As for taking exception to "if" - well duh all arguments are predicated on ifs. I don't think anyone here is arguing that the Germans secretly won WW2 and there's some global conspiracy suppressing the "truth." So yes, anything diverging from history is predicated on an "if."

 

[Opanashc]

As for taking exception to "if" - well duh all arguments are predicated on ifs. I don't think anyone here is arguing that the Germans secretly won WW2 and there's some global conspiracy suppressing the "truth." So yes, anything diverging from history is predicated on an "if."

Lets say Germans made a different decision. That would lead to different decisions by their enemies, leading to different decisions by the Germans, etc. Say, instead of securing the flanks, Army Group Center forged on ahead towards Moscow. It receives a blow in its flanks, leading to a temporary encirclement and defeat. Instead of having advanced to Moscow and Rostov, Wehrmacht is now stopped at Dnieper line in the south, and Smolensk in the center. SU has more breathing space, Kharkov factories are pumping out tanks for the Red Army, and catastrophe of summer-fall 1942 does not befall USSR. War ends in fall 1944, with the fall of Berlin, Red Army meets the Allies on the Rhine. How is that for "if"?

 

[Adonnus]

While I agree that the Japanese would not have the forces to successfully defeat the Soviet divisions stationed there, honestly they only need apply enough pressure to prevent them being redeployed. As for your assertion that the fall of Moscow does not change the strategic balance, I dispute that. The importance of that city is not the industry, though that certainly does have some merit, but in the fact that Moscow was the node point for the majority of the Soviet logistical system. If you take Moscow, you cut off much of the north and south of European Russia from each other. The Soviets would have had to build an entirely new network of logistics for their forces.
Not to mention the loss of Moscow would have further eroded Stalin's already unsteady political position circa 1941 due to the continued losses. I would posit the notion that if the Germans hadn't implemented their policy against "subhuman" slavs, they would have been welcomed by the populace as liberators (as was the case early in the eastern war before the reality tragically struck behind the front lines) and Stalin likely would have had to deal with both the war and a revolt/coup at the same time.

The logistics is probably the most important point here but why the Germans would not bleed themselves and exhaust themselves taking Moscow but would do so in our timeline... it seems very unlikely to me, and the possibility of a Soviet counter attack, even a less successful one which doesn't fully recapture the city is probably also likely given the effort the Wehrmacht will need to expend to take it in the first place. So that leaves an exhausted Wehrmacht and several months before they begin a southern offensive. I don't know why construction of rail lines, highways etc would be particularly affected by a southern campaign. At most it would probably give the Germans an advantage for another year or so, and maybe extend the war by 6 months - 1 year. This is remembering that the Germans had their own massive supply issues, and most of those won't be resolved by taking Moscow (and you can imagine much of its infrastructure will be destroyed during its capture) It probably wouldn't do much to help them win the Battle of Stalingrad in the following year either. If anything it would teach them that attacking east ambitiously and constantly will result in victory and that certainly isn't going to stop Operation Uranus from succeeding. As I said, without a way of stopping mass industrial production and the easy formation of new armies there isn't a way to win the war for Germany, unless of course you would like to have them liberate conquered people. But that requires that the Nazis be totally different people to what they were, and using that particular logic you may, as well as a very ahistorical degree of tolerance, give them an IQ of 2000 and have them build 100 nukes in 1939.

This if of course all assuming the Germans did take Moscow. Seeing as they couldn't take Stalingrad and much of that fighting was at an earlier and less freezing date than any Battle of Moscow would begin at... you can see why it's a big ask to have them taking the city at all.

As for stuff about Stalin's political position, I would like to see some evidence that it was unstable in any way either before or after the invasion. He had spent more than a decade at this point shoring up his position so that everyone who even thought of overthrowing him was terrified of ending up in a hole in the ground, had Beria and a huge amount of NKVD forces to bully his citizens into obedience. I highly doubt there'd be a revolt or coup of any kind, seeing as their original plan was, upon losing the city, to evacuate to Kuibyshev and just continue the war.

 

[GundamMerc]

Lets say Germans made a different decision. That would lead to different decisions by their enemies, leading to different decisions by the Germans, etc. Say, instead of securing the flanks, Army Group Center forged on ahead towards Moscow. It receives a blow in its flanks, leading to a temporary encirclement and defeat. Instead of having advanced to Moscow and Rostov, Wehrmacht is now stopped at Dnieper line in the south, and Smolensk in the center. SU has more breathing space, Kharkov factories are pumping out tanks for the Red Army, and catastrophe of summer-fall 1942 does not befall USSR. War ends in fall 1944, with the fall of Berlin, Red Army meets the Allies on the Rhine. How is that for "if"?

You look back with the benefit of hindsight, but the commanders on the ground have no such benefit. You know what the German army is doing because you have a past perspective, but a commander in an actual war has to make guesses based on incomplete and sometimes faulty intel as to what their enemy's aims are. And they have to do it ahead of time, because by the time you react to something, it's often far, far too late.

So your argument is imbecilic at best, it does not have any basis in the realities of warfare.

 

[GundamMerc]

The logistics is probably the most important point here but why the Germans would not bleed themselves and exhaust themselves taking Moscow but would do so in our timeline... it seems very unlikely to me, and the possibility of a Soviet counter attack, even a less successful one which doesn't fully recapture the city is probably also likely given the effort the Wehrmacht will need to expend to take it in the first place. So that leaves an exhausted Wehrmacht and several months before they begin a southern offensive. I don't know why construction of rail lines, highways etc would be particularly affected by a southern campaign. At most it would probably give the Germans an advantage for another year or so, and maybe extend the war by 6 months - 1 year. This is remembering that the Germans had their own massive supply issues, and most of those won't be resolved by taking Moscow (and you can imagine much of its infrastructure will be destroyed during its capture) It probably wouldn't do much to help them win the Battle of Stalingrad in the following year either. If anything it would teach them that attacking east ambitiously and constantly will result in victory and that certainly isn't going to stop Operation Uranus from succeeding. As I said, without a way of stopping mass industrial production and the easy formation of new armies there isn't a way to win the war for Germany, unless of course you would like to have them liberate conquered people. But that requires that the Nazis be totally different people to what they were, and using that particular logic you may, as well as a very ahistorical degree of tolerance, give them an IQ of 2000 and have them build 100 nukes in 1939.

This if of course all assuming the Germans did take Moscow. Seeing as they couldn't take Stalingrad and much of that fighting was at an earlier and less freezing date than any Battle of Moscow would begin at... you can see why it's a big ask to have them taking the city at all.

All of you speak of taking Moscow in terms of a direct attack, but that's idiocy. It's exactly why Stalingrad was such a failure (not to mention it wasn't the entire 6th Army, which had been stripped of most of its support for a push South into the Caucuses). The best way to take a major city like that is to surround it and cut it off from all reinforcement and supply, like what the Wehrmacht did with Sevastopal or Kiev. In the meantime new supply bases can be built, railrway links put into place, etc. It's also important to realize that other than the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the USSR has very, very limited infrastructure East of Moscow, while the Wehrmacht would either be using existing networks or rebuilding them in the west. This would in the long-term favor the Wehrmacht, as without Moscow the Red Army cannot send supplies to all of its fronts efficiently as it did in real life.

The reality is the Wehrmacht was at the High Command levels very indecisive in its actions, especially in cases where Hitler got involved.

 

[Adonnus]

Pretty highly debatable whether that alone would allow the Germans to win the war - it wasn't a lack of supplies that for example led them to defeat at Stalingrad. They won't be able to supply their other fronts as efficiently, it's true, but these things can be built if militarily necessary. I didn't say they would try to take Moscow in a direct assault, they may well try to encircle it as they did IRL. But I can't recall a successful Wehrmacht encirclement that took place during the dead of a freezing winter (possibly excluding Kharkov but that may have been significantly warmer) and to be sure even if it is a successful encirclement it'll be a slow, grinding battle that leaves them badly placed for any counter-attack. Take Moscow or no the Wehrmacht is still setting itself up for a long, drawn out war of attrition on a very broad front which it isn't suited for. They'll be in a better position if they do, but will they succeed at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus because of it? I very much doubt it. Soviets in the Caucasus can still be supplied from Iran. The Germans most likely wouldn't have the manpower to advance to, and hold, a line that goes to the Caspian sea.

Also you didn't answer the last part about substantiating your claim that Stalin's political position was in trouble before and during the invasion.

 

[GundamMerc]

Also you didn't answer the last part about substantiating your claim that Stalin's political position was in trouble before and during the invasion.

I'm going to ignore the other stuff because we've been arguing in circles, but you are correct in this. I would posit the question to you, how would you personally feel if the person running your country killed 600,000 to 1.2 million of your fellow countrymen, and then was caught in a war with a seemingly liberating force from the outside? You might be tempted to attempt to overthrow the one in control of your country, wouldn't you? Not to mention that not only was the Great Purge still affecting the army, but the NKVD was still purging elements of the Army, specifically the ones that dealt with logistics! Talk about doing everything possible to lose a war before it is even fought. The Soviet Union was not some invincible mythic creature, just as despite early war Allied fears, the German army was not an unstoppable juggernaut.

This of course changed after 1941, when the Germans began the whole thing that we'll leave out to avoid angering the mods. After that (1942 onwards), the Soviet Union unified significantly (helped by Stalin taking an uncharacteristically soft approach, at least propaganda-wise towards the average Russian).

 

[Adonnus]

I don't think we've been arguing in circles but fine.

"How would you feel, you 21st century person with internet and hindsight, if this dictator did a lot of bad stuff, you'd want to revolt right?" Sure. But you know the mentality of someone living there at that time is so totally different as to render this a not really a valid line of reasoning to deduce that a revolt was imminent. It's a very silly argument that simply cannot replace hard evidence. Aside from the fact that the brutality of the Nazis was very well known and publicised by Soviet propagandists. There was a huge amount of hatred towards the invaders and patriotism, with it being compared to Napoleon and Karl XII's failed invasions of Russia. The country was really gripped by the fever of this patriotism from the very beginning, and combined with the political steps Stalin had taken to make himself incontestably powerful within his own country nothing short of being actually pushed back to the Urals IMO is likely to result in his overthrow, and even then it's possible he'd hang on.

 

[Opanashc]

You look back with the benefit of hindsight, but the commanders on the ground have no such benefit. You know what the German army is doing because you have a past perspective, but a commander in an actual war has to make guesses based on incomplete and sometimes faulty intel as to what their enemy's aims are. And they have to do it ahead of time, because by the time you react to something, it's often far, far too late.
So your argument is imbecilic at best, it does not have any basis in the realities of warfare.

Precisely because of you argument the Wehrmacht paused in its advance on Moscow and secured its flanks - because they could not be sure, that the outcome I described would not come to be. Because both sides lack hindsight - and hence your argument has little merit.

 

[Opanashc]

I'm going to ignore the other stuff because we've been arguing in circles, but you are correct in this. I would posit the question to you, how would you personally feel if the person running your country killed 600,000 to 1.2 million of your fellow countrymen, and then was caught in a war with a seemingly liberating force from the outside? You might be tempted to attempt to overthrow the one in control of your country, wouldn't you? Not to mention that not only was the Great Purge still affecting the army, but the NKVD was still purging elements of the Army, specifically the ones that dealt with logistics! Talk about doing everything possible to lose a war before it is even fought. The Soviet Union was not some invincible mythic creature, just as despite early war Allied fears, the German army was not an unstoppable juggernaut.

This of course changed after 1941, when the Germans began the whole thing that we'll leave out to avoid angering the mods. After that (1942 onwards), the Soviet Union unified significantly (helped by Stalin taking an uncharacteristically soft approach, at least propaganda-wise towards the average Russian).

I have relatives who survived that war. They all say, that everybody around them was determined to fight the Germans. Not a large selection, but quite definitive.
PS Purge was a drop in the bucket compared to expansion of the 1939-41. 10,000 of officers were fired from the army in1937-38, but in 1941 there was a shortage of ~80,000 officers. You saying, that a shortage of only 70,000 would have significantly changed anything? Or are you going to play "best and brightest" card? That is bullocks. In fact, percentage of officers and generals with college education INCREASED due to the purge. How about them apples?

 

[MANkoto]

I will just quote Sun Tsu
"Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win."

Proves the Germans never stood a iota of chance to win against the USSR.

War had changed so much in the time between Sun Tzu and Hitler that I don't think any quotes have a point. If Wu had advanced as far into Chu as Germany did to the Soviet Union, the Soviets would've folded.

 

[Lionace]

I think it should be easier to make this war drag for longer due to how supply works now. Look how Daniel struggled to move forward sometimes as Japan, even though he was obliterating Chinese army. The gap between German and USSR army will be smaller and there will be much more land to go through.

 

[Uniform764]

People should bare in mind that the strategy of racing to Moscow through increasingly bitter winter and further outrunning supply lines was based entirely on the (false) belief that the Red Army was at breaking point and that bleeding out the frontline divisions to secure victory in 1941 was worthwhile. This was partly encouraged by the increasing myth of the invincible Wehrmacht, where divisions were given harder and harder tasks with less and less resources to achieve them, but they retained just enough combat ability and manoeuvrability to muddle through without a complete crisis.

Despite losing ground in the Russian counter offensives the Germans maintained enough men and material to launch Case Blue which was massively successful in 1942 and maintained a clear tactical superiority in manoeuvre warfare.

Had the Germans been aware of the depth of Russian resolve and reserves, I could see them stopping short of Moscow in 41 and building up strength for a renewed spring offensive to take the capital instead of burning through their most irreplaceable troops. There's no guarantee it'd work obviously, but I can certainly see ways Germany "could" have won the war if hints played out differently.

War Without Garlands by Robert Kershaw is an excellent if weighty tome which gives an excellent oversight of how Ze Germanz "victored themselves to death"

 

[Opanashc]

Had the Germans been aware of the depth of Russian resolve and reserves, I could see them stopping short of Moscow in 41 and building up strength for a renewed spring offensive to take the capital instead of burning through their most irreplaceable troops. There's no guarantee it'd work obviously, but I can certainly see ways Germany "could" have won the war if hints played out differently.

Germans stopping short in 1941 - how short? No Vyazmya kessel? That's 650,000 soviet troops who are not POWs.