The Wages of Production: The Breaking and Making of the European Economy
"Europe has become a colony of those more fortunate than us. The time has come for the French, German, and perhaps other European economies to find a way to counter the competition that weighs heavily on us all."-Gustav Stresemann before the Reichstag, 1929.
While historians today like to trace the European Coal and Steel Community back to the time before the Great War, when increasingly free flows of capital labor had pushed Europe along the steps towards a common market, most historians agree that actual credit for the plan goes to Jean Monnet. Monnet's plans in the fall of 1939 were nothing new; he had proposed similar pooling of coal and steel in the aftermath of the Great War. But at the time they had been designed as a way for France to extract reparations from a defeated and battered Deutschland; a poor way to preserve peace, and something which had been rejected in favor of opposition on the part of Berlin and the occupation of the Ruhr on the part of Paris.
Disillusioned, Monnet had ended up travelling the world, serving in China for the League of Nations and helping to rebuild the finances of several Eastern European nations. Under the Fourth Republic, Monnet became a, if not a friend, a respected advisor to La Rocque, helping transform the French economy in ways that would revolution the French economy in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Among the cornerstones of the so-called "Monnet Plan" was the rapid increase in the expansion of French steel industry. But in order to expand, the French needed more coal than the fields of Northern France could provide. Polish steel was considered, and purchased, but it could not be bought in sufficient quantities. British coal was too expensive, and transport costs made American coal prohibitive. [1]
Born in the town of Cognac, he had always been connected to the wider world, living in America and Britain for several years. And so, moreso than many contemporaries in either nation, Monnet was aware of how continental Europe was falling behind the Anglo-Saxon powers. He was also aware of how protectionism, at least on a national level, was a dead end. And so by January of 1939, he had a clear idea of the stakes. "German industry expanding; re-establishment of cartels; and France falling back into the old rut of limited, protected production."
And so the French Foreign Officer was already circulating the proposed steel agreement even before the Berlin Summit. There was opposition; La Rocque himself was skeptical, saying, "I understand why we are sharing coal, since we are short of it. But why are we sharing iron, which we possess?"
And yet the Treaty held, out of fear and out of greed; and apparatus of the European Community sprung up alongside it. To legally enforce rulings related to anti-trust regulations, a Court of Justice was needed. To appease French Socialists, a parliamentary assembly, which met one day a year, was drafted. To the surprise of Monnet, the Belgians, Dutch, and Luxembourgers wanted to join, and duly did so; and to help stabilize the tottering post-Mussolini regime, Italy was let in. And then, of course, came the rest; Czechoslovakia, which joined in 1942, and then Poland, grudgingly joining in 1946.
Thus, by 1947, tariffs within the CS were abolished, restrictive practices were eliminated, and rail freight rates were harmonized. Naturally, this had people outside of the Coal and Steel Community a bit worried. And it is here that Wendell Willkie's greatest (only?) achievement must be discussed: The World Trade Organization.
Yet as noted, there had been signs of international cooperation despite the Depression, most notably from the Bank of International Settlements in Switzerland. Established in 1930 to facilitate the flow of reparations under the Young Plan, after the reparations moratorium it continued to promote central bank cooperation. Meanwhile, regional efforts at cooperation continued; the Benelux nations ultimately agreed to a customs union in 1938, and signed an agreement to stabilize their currencies in 1939. [1] And yet things stagnated. Britain was serene and sedate beneath its Sterling Bloc, musing, indeed, how to persuade Scandinavia to join it. [2] Germany's sclerotic bartering agreements threatened Eastern Europe with mercantilism, while the 4th Republic was committed to plannism and the Empire, unhappy with the idea of tying its currency to anyone's or anything.
Historians would later describe the situation as prisoner's dilemma. Each nation would be better off with a return to a liberal trading order, even Britain; yet unless most nations agreed to do so, it would be better off to resort to economic warfare and protectionism. To break the cycle, the world needed a vain, arrogant SOB with an understanding of finances. And it found one in Willkie.
Like many Americans, Willkie saw the British Empire, and Britain, as the main stumbling bloc towards reestablishing a liberal world order, and (more accurately) as the main rival with America for control of the global economy. And so he began talks to break the Sterling Bloc, turning to an unlikely ally: Germany.
During the 1920s, America and Germany had maintained something of an uneasy alliance. American capital proved critical to the maintenance of the Dawes Plan and its replacement, the Young Plan; American capital helped finance what economic growth the Weimar Republic witnessed; and American influence had helped expel the French from the Ruhr.
Yet the Depression, and Smoot-Hawley, had destroyed this fragile relationship. By raising tariffs even as it continued to demand debt repayments, America forced Germany (and Europe as a whole) into an untenable position, demanding repayment in dollars without letting Europeans sell their products. This had led to Stresemann's reparations moratorium. Meanwhile, Roosevelt's decision to take the dollar off gold in 1932 had singlehandedly destroyed the World Economic Conference, and American-German commercial competition had done little to endear relations between the two countries.
Moreover, perhaps in reaction to the dimming of hopes of aid from America, Germany had become increasingly Americanophobic. Even during the 1920s, Germany had been afraid of "Americanization." It flocked to the theaters to watch Westerns and musicals; it listened to jazz at clubs as its girls emulated the American women; and its engineering and production were the envy of the world.
Yet for the conservative, frightened German, there was another side to America. A country where gangsters ruled cities; their jazz was the animalistic offspring of primal Africans; they encouraged their women to be asexual Amazons; and their culture was, frankly, a bit base. Hence Germans across the political spectrum railed against the working class's affection for short shorts and Charlie Chaplin, while the German government published posters like the following, to warn people of the dangers of American culture.
And yet to another extent, by 1942 Germany's efforts to expand trade in Eastern Europe and Latin America had hit a dead end; as Schnacht had predicted, "You do not get rich by selling to coolies." Hence Willkie's decision to approach the Schumacher administration.
Schumacher, for his part, had been a profound admirer of the New Deal, which he perceived as instituting a new era in capital-labor relations. And he had a tremendous respect for a society in which the military didn't get whatever it wanted when it whined pitifully and propped up fascist parties.
The first talks came in 1942, with the details of the Warburg Plan hammered out of the months to come. In essence, it abandoned Germany making concrete moves towards economic liberalization. The Reich would abandon its currency exchanges, make efforts to abolish the clearing accounts, and commit itself to returning to multilateralism. What did Germany get in return?
Access to the world's largest, richest market. And in return, this released the Oslo Group [3] from the threat of retaliation by Germany if they agreed to liberalize trade restrictions. To be sure, Britain was a threat; it had attacked the Oslo Group's proposals to liberalize trade in the 1930s, threatening them with economic retaliation. [4] Yet with the support of Germany, the other main trading partner of the Oslo Group, they could move to liberalize trade (especially as Britain was in the midst of the Pacific War) and not face opposition.
How did Willkie get the power to do this? In the aftermath of the Smoot-Hawley Bill, the Democratic Congress recognized that, quite simply, Congress couldn't be trusted to handle tariff negotiation, and so delegated their power to reduce tariffs to the President in the 1934 Reciprocal Tariff Act. Despite domestic opposition, Roosevelt had managed to get the act renewed in 1937, but in the aftermath of the 1939 recession, Willkie ran into trouble. The isolationist western states were opposed to trade liberalization, while Republican victories reduced the Democratic majority. Willkie was forced to rely on the Southern and Northeastern states to back his proposals, and doing so meant, sadly, ditching much of his civil rights rhetoric.
But once he had this power, rather than bothering with a series of multilateral trading agreements that would require Congressional approve, the US constructed a series of bilateral agreements with a Most-Favored Nation Clause, meaning that each bilateral treaty Willkie could approve would have multilateral effects.
<More to Follow, I just wanted to prove I'm still thinking about this>
[1] Astute readers will note that there is no Tripartite Monetary Agreement, which was signed by France, Britain, and America in the 1930s (later joined by the Benelux) to stabilize their exchange rates. This is because the French only signed it in order to get English support; quotth Blum, currency controls "would have the fatal effect of straining our ties with the Anglo-Saxon democracies."
[2] Actually there was talk in the 1930s of Norway joining the Commonwealth. It wasn't that serious, but it was a sign of the relationship.
[3] Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Holland. Latvia was involved, but is not considered an official member. The Oslo Group were nations who had agreed to reduce trade restrictions without violating free trade agreements.
[4] In essence, Britain said, even with the Ottawa Preference system in place, that any lowered reductions in tariffs would kick in the MFN clauses of their agreements with Britain, even though Britain's tariffs would remain the same.
Thoughts?