Alaric's Footsteps
The winter had come, and the winter was beginning to fade. And Germany still stood unopposed. Britain and France, for all of their pronouncements, all of their threats, and all of their military preparations, still refused to challenge Adenauer's aims or to contest his actions. Poland continued its military buildup, beginning to strain its modest economy, while in Italy, Benito Mussolini had contented himself to strut around Rome, almost daring Adenauer to attempt to repeat his successes in Austria and Yugoslavia.
Germany knew that Italy would be next. Britain, France, and Poland knew that Italy would be next. Italy knew that Italy would be next. And everyone waited for Adenauer to make his move.
Adenauer had expanded the Heer by a further 32 divisions, but given the need to garrison Serbia and Croatia and to increase the forces opposite Poland and France, the amount of troops allocated to the invasion of Italy would be no greater that that which carried out the liberation of Yugoslavia: six divisions set aside for the liberation of Albania, and a mere 25 divisions set to occupy Italy proper. There were many voices of concern in both the government and military that this force would be insufficient, given the failure to occupy Yugoslavia with sufficient speed, especially given that the terrain in Italy should be no less formidable than that in Yugoslavia. But after spending a whole winter preparing the Wehrmacht for the operation, and having restructured it according to the designs of Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein - Germany's most decorated generals - Adenauer was confident that the operation would so smoothly.
On April 12, Adenauer gave the word.
25 divisions of the Heer and 16 squadrons of the Luftwaffe vs. Italy
The advance into Venice and Lombardia could not have been more successful. The Italians, confident yet poorly equipped and led by indecisive officers, were shredded by the initial strike. Guderian and von Manstien led from the front line, with Fieldmarshal Fedor von Bock assuming overall command of the operation, and each moved with a speed unprecedented in the history of warfare. Italy's alpine forces were engaged and pinned down from the north, and finally cut off in the south by Guderian himself, following the seizure of Milan. With Germany's elite Bergsjaeger forces infiltrating their lines from the front, Guderian's panzers poised to flank them, and with the Luftwaffe raining devastation from above, Italy's best-armed and best-trained forces surrendered a mere three days into the operation.
With Guderian threatening to penetrate past the Po and reach the French border, Manstein instead struck across the undefended river en route to Rome itself. He met little resistance; Italy had few reserves. It was no more than a paper tiger.
On April 16, Manstein was on the outskirts of Rome itself. As Guderian had managed to funnel any potential reserves from the north instead westwards towards Genoa - assuming they could have had any chance of reaching the capital in time - Manstein met only paltry resistance in the capital itself. The Italians who were present at the city quickly threw up their arms and either surrendered or fled; Mussolini's government was not worth dying for. A democratic Italy, even one initially subjugated to Germany, was not worth resisting. Further Italian resistance in the south collapsed, and after a mere six days of warfare, Rome surrendered.
In the north, however, the cream of the Italian Army continued to resist. The news of Rome's surrender and Mussolini's subsequent flight to Sicily failed to reach them. The Italian regulars dug into strong positions around Genoa and Turin; they knew that a breakout was impossible, but merely resisting and tying up half of the Heer would be worth it. Initially, their efforts to resist Germany's attacks were quite successful.
Level 5 fortifications + 10 dissent = -67% attacking efficiency
Every element of the Heer, save the Panzerkorps, suffered sizable casualites in the first assault on Genoa. Von Bock urged disengagement, to give the Luftwaffe time to reduce the defenses, but Guderian asked that he be allowed to press the attack, with merely his Panzerkorps and minor supporting elements. He was convinced that even the Italian regulars would collapse in the face of his raids, that his panzers could maintain the attack in light of the dearth of Italian anti-tank equipment. Adenauer was reluctant, but asceded to Guderian's request.
Three panzers maintained an assault against 10 fortified divisions for four days, while re-enforcements were brought forth
Having received word of Mussolini's flight to Palermo, Adenauer grew concerned that, so long as Sicily held, the Italian government might choose to resist making peace while awaiting foreign assistance. The Wehrmacht was unequipped for an assault across the Straits of Messina. Germany's Marine elements remained at home, guarding Germany's shores and serving as reserve elements in the event of a Franco-Polish attack, while its small Fallschirmjaeger divisions were undersized, untested, and suffering from a critical shortage of transport aircraft. Adenauer had failed to give them his proper attention; they were little better than reserves themselves.
Von Manteuffel's rapid capture of Naples gave Adenauer the opportunity to plan a limited paradrop operation; it
would be the first in history. But coupled with intensive Luftwaffe bombardment, it
could succeed, which should provide all the necessary leverage to force Italy's surrender.
In the meantime, Adenauer ordered elements of the Kriegsmarine - 20 flotillas had been redirected to Croatia and Montenegro over the winter - to harrass the Regia Marina and to clear the Straits of Messina.
U-Boots begin their campaign of harrassment
By the end of the month, Guderian had finally forced the surrender of the Italian army in Genoa, while von Manstein and von Manteuffel had overrun the rest of Southern Italy, but Sicily still stood, defended by the Regia Marina. Luftwaffe strikes and U-Boot raids had thus far failed to win control of the Strait.
For a week and a half, the fate of Sicily hung in the balance, while Germany and Italy both awaited a foreign response. But again, none came. Eventually, the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe were able to drive the despirited Regia Marina to Tripolitania, allowing von Manstein to lead the assault across to Messina.
On May 16, Mussolini was arrested, and two days later, Italy, abandoned by the rest of the world and facing an invader who had nearly as much popular support in Italy as they had had a mere six weeks earlier, surrendered. As promised (and as expected by the world), Italy's empire was immediately dismantled.
The Campaign in Review
The Wehrmacht's assault on Italy - one of the formal Great Powers, and certainly its most powerful foe yet - was viewed as a model operation of modern warfare. Again, the Panzerkorps proved their near-invincibility in combat, and the Luftwaffe's control of the sky over Italy was never contested. Casualties were certainly greater than in Yugoslavia, but given the opposition, that was only understandable.
Casualties: 33,120 KIA †
The only difficulties that presented itself were over Germany's failure to quickly collapse the fortified lines around Genoa - something that would need to be remedied rapidly before any operations would be conducted against France - as well as its upreparedness to rapidly seize Sicily. The Kriegsmarine performed magnificently, sinking two cruisers and two dozen destroyers and torpedo boats, and helping to drive Italy's capital ships to flight, while losing only four submarines itself.
But Germany had planned badly, failing to properly appreciate the difficulties involved in an amphibious assault. Had it been able to strike at Sicily as soon as the opportunity presented itself, the war could have ended almost two weeks earlier; instead, an uncomfortable lull had set in following the fall of Genoa and Taranto, one that may have given France and Britain an opportunity to intervene, and one which certainly gave Mussolini time to consolidate his hold over Sicily. Adenauer's goals
required a swifter, more demoralizing style of warfare that never hesitated, something that would never fail to impress its enemies, something that would never fail in its goals. He needed total success in order to convince any potential foes not to challenge his aims. And while the timidity of London, Paris, and Warsaw stood as examples of how his plans were working well enough so far, he knew he would have to do better in the future.
The time would come when the governments of the world would turn against him, perhaps all at once. And when that day comes, he can not afford to make any mistakes. Best to fix any problems before they arise. The next war would need still greater co-ordination, still more detail given to "unconventional" tactics. The Luftwaffe would need to be expanded and made still more aggressive, the infantry would need to be modernized, and its logistics network would need to be streamlined.
Perfection could never be achieved, of course. But Adenauer had no excuse not to strive for it in any case.