France has the wrong Land Doctrine

[jamesd]

I look at the doctrine trees and think that many powers drew from multiple doctrine trees during the war. For example the Americans start with maybe 1 grand battle plan doctrine from WW1, develop some mobile warfare doctrines between the wars and then start adding on superior firepower doctrines from about 1943. Similarly the British should start with a couple of grand battle plan doctrines from WW1, then between the wars added some mobile warfare, then under Montgomery went back to grand battle plan for a bit before starting on superior firepower late in the war. The Germans could start with 1 grand battle plan and be the most advanced at mobile warfare come 1939, but later in the war they add on defence based doctrines from grand battle plan and from late 1944 work on mass mobilisation to try and stave off defeat. The Russians start with mobile warfare but with the deep German penetrations of 41/42 they work on mass mobilisation for a time before adding on some grand battle plan doctrines in 1943, and then some superior firepower in 44/45.

Once the game comes out I'm going to have a good look at the doctrines and see if I can turn off the function that means researching 1 tree deactivates all the others. I'll also see if I can add a function whereby each doctrine researched adds to training time. This would mean a country could go all out to get the most professional and versatile army in the world, but it would take a lot longer for the troops to be fully trained and able to effectively use the multitude of options open to them.

 

[mursolini]

Aye, one piece of a 3000-km front line, one piece that stretched for like 500-700 km.

Yes, supporting Stalingrad with an offencive near Moskow(Rzhev offencive) proved stupid and wastefull. Even distracting multiple axis attacks near Stalingrad proved to yeilded bad results.

Which isn`t all that surprising, warfare evolved fast in WW2, and WW1 ideas in WW2 often proved bad, regardless of their performance in WW1 itself.

 

[Opanashc]

Yes, supporting Stalingrad with an offencive near Moskow(Rzhev offencive) proved stupid and wastefull. Even distracting multiple axis attacks near Stalingrad proved to yeilded bad results.

You think so? Imagine, that there was no Rzev offensive. Germany's reserves are not tied up in a battle close to Moscow. Germany's attempt to relieve their 6th Army came within 30 km of succeeding. If Germany's forces were not engaged at Rzev, they could have launched a much heavier strike, quite possibly even succeeding.
A report by one of OKH generals in early November 1942 stated, that a Soviet counter attack was coming in the central sector of the front (Rzev) and that Red Army was incapable of 2 large-scale offensives simultaneously. They discarded the possibility of one at Stalingrad, because they knew about the one at Rzev. Thus, operation Uranus succeeded.
Think about Rzev as maskirovka for Stalingrad. Besides, it did bleed the Germans too.

 

[mursolini]

You think so? Imagine, that there was no Rzev offensive. Germany's reserves are not tied up in a battle close to Moscow. Germany's attempt to relieve their 6th Army came within 30 km of succeeding. If Germany's forces were not engaged at Rzev, they could have launched a much heavier strike, quite possibly even succeeding.
A report by one of OKH generals in early November 1942 stated, that a Soviet counter attack was coming in the central sector of the front (Rzev) and that Red Army was incapable of 2 large-scale offensives simultaneously. They discarded the possibility of one at Stalingrad, because they knew about the one at Rzev. Thus, operation Uranus succeeded.
Think about Rzev as maskirovka for Stalingrad. Besides, it did bleed the Germans too.

It`s not I who think so, it was Soviet Generals who thoght so. If Soviet forces were not wasted attacking Rzhev, Germans wouldn`t be able to come so close. Again, this is not my conclusion. This, is the conclusion Soviet generals came up with, and that battle led to Soviet strategy revamps, which, led to succesful offencives in 1943 - 1945.

Also, amaisingly enough, "maskirovka" is the word almost exclusivly used in western literature, for strange reason. Russians themselves don`t use it in relation to military strategy.

 

[Opanashc]

It`s not I who think so, it was Soviet Generals who thoght so. If Soviet forces were not wasted attacking Rzhev, Germans wouldn`t be able to come so close. Again, this is not my conclusion. This, is the conclusion Soviet generals came up with, and that battle led to Soviet strategy revamps, which, led to succesful offencives in 1943 - 1945.

Stalingrad area did not have many rail lines. Its easier to support same number of men dispersed over different supply lines.
We will never know what could have happened, had there been no Rzev battle. Maybe your point of view is right, maybe mine is. But it is history of over 70 years.

 

[mursolini]

Stalingrad area did not have many rail lines. Its easier to support same number of men dispersed over different supply lines.
We will never know what could have happened, had there been no Rzev battle. Maybe your point of view is right, maybe mine is. But it is history of over 70 years.

Please, for love of god, don`t challenge me, challenge those idiots in Soviet HQs who came up with the conclusion that attacking in multiple places, dispercing forces over multiple objectives was futile and wastefull.

I`m only saying that that was the direction Soviet doctrine actually took mid-war.

 

[Opanashc]

Please, for love of god, don`t challenge me, challenge those idiots in Soviet HQs who came up with the conclusion that attacking in multiple places, dispercing forces over multiple objectives was futile and wastefull.
I`m only saying that that was the direction Soviet doctrine actually took mid-war.

You seem to misunderstand what I am trying to say about the Soviet doctrine. Their doctrine chose an objective (like destruction of Army Group Center), and included penetrating attacks on multiple axis of advance in order to prevent the enemy from being able to stop them all. Successful breakthroughs were reinforced by second-echelon troops, who continued the advance with fresh strength. There was ONE objective - MULTIPLE lines of advance towards that objective. I am not saying, that Red Army was trying to liberate Leningrad, march into Baltics, advance to Brest and capture Bucharest at the same time!

 

[mursolini]

You seem to misunderstand what I am trying to say about the Soviet doctrine. Their doctrine chose an objective (like destruction of Army Group Center), and included penetrating attacks on multiple axis of advance in order to prevent the enemy from being able to stop them all. Successful breakthroughs were reinforced by second-echelon troops, who continued the advance with fresh strength. There was ONE objective - MULTIPLE lines of advance towards that objective. I am not saying, that Red Army was trying to liberate Leningrad, march into Baltics, advance to Brest and capture Bucharest at the same time!

Problem is, that was precicely what happened during Winter offencive of 1941, which, resulted in Germans giving ground in some places (near Moskow) and disasterous encirclements in other places like Leningrad, where the spearhead proved to be far too weak to sustain attack to flank. Stalingrad itself, was lirgely a product of Soviet may offencive being conducted on front from Leningrad to Kharkov, and it resulted in disasters near Kharkov and Leningrad. Here, you can see at least 4 clear attacks with their own objectives, Leningrad, Moskow, Kharkow and Krimea, 3 of which, were simply destroyed by Germans peacemeal.

Likewise, battle of Stalingrad coincided with Rzev offencive, draining Soviets far more, as they were attacking. That kind of thing was abandoned by Soviets afterwards, as too wastefull.

 

[Opanashc]

Hey, did I say soviet strategic thinkers were without fault? You said it yourself - doctrine evolved over 1941-43, to be "perfected" in 1944. I agree with you there.

 

[Daelyn75]

Problem is, that was precicely what happened during Winter offencive of 1941, which, resulted in Germans giving ground in some places (near Moskow) and disasterous encirclements in other places like Leningrad, where the spearhead proved to be far too weak to sustain attack to flank. Stalingrad itself, was lirgely a product of Soviet may offencive being conducted on front from Leningrad to Kharkov, and it resulted in disasters near Kharkov and Leningrad. Here, you can see at least 4 clear attacks with their own objectives, Leningrad, Moskow, Kharkow and Krimea, 3 of which, were simply destroyed by Germans peacemeal.

Likewise, battle of Stalingrad coincided with Rzev offencive, draining Soviets far more, as they were attacking. That kind of thing was abandoned by Soviets afterwards, as too wastefull.

Funny thing, I didn't even know about the Rzev offensive until watching Soviet Storm last year. Some of those German divisions would have helped out at Stalingrad they said but were occupied defending the center. However, like you wrote, if those Soviet forces weren't attacking at Rzev then they would be around Stalingrad. The Soviets did lose a lot during the battle, more than the Germans did by several hundred thousand; if I remember it correctly.

 

[griffor]

u can always change the land doctrine you want to use it's just u can only have 1 open at a time

 

[mursolini]

Hey, did I say soviet strategic thinkers were without fault? You said it yourself - doctrine evolved over 1941-43, to be "perfected" in 1944. I agree with you there.

Well, if you look back, my broad point was that German doctrine and Soviet one were quite different, not least is the difference shown in their respective 1940-1942 offencives. Soviet doctrine initially emphased havin multiple smaller forces attack different targets to obscure the main strikes That, was something Germans didn`t really have. The tactic was later scrapped because while it seemed beneficial in theory, in practice it didn`t work in WW2, where motorised reserves could arrive to defence or counter-attack much faster than in WW1.

 

[Opanashc]

The tactic was later scrapped because while it seemed beneficial in theory, in practice it didn`t work in WW2, where motorised reserves could arrive to defence or counter-attack much faster than in WW1.

Actually it kind of did. Part of the reason Operation Bagration was so successful, was because Red Army tricked the Wehrmacht into thinking it will attack in Ukraine, instead of Belorus. Soviets did undertake an offensive there (Yassi-Kishinev operation), but later, after the reserves stationed there were moved to recreate the front up north. Soviets could plan and prepare offensives all along the front, but execute only one at a time, forcing Germans to engage with their reserve/counter-attack formations, never giving them time to rest.

 

[mursolini]

Actually it kind of did. Part of the reason Operation Bagration was so successful, was because Red Army tricked the Wehrmacht into thinking it will attack in Ukraine, instead of Belorus. Soviets did undertake an offensive there (Yassi-Kishinev operation), but later, after the reserves stationed there were moved to recreate the front up north. Soviets could plan and prepare offensives all along the front, but execute only one at a time, forcing Germans to engage with their reserve/counter-attack formations, never giving them time to rest.

They didn`t attack simultanuously though, and the reserves moved after the offencive was finished, so it is not comparable to May 1942 offencives. Every Soviet offencive in 1944 was given enough forces to succed on every objective, they weren`t supposed to just attack to conseal where the main strike lands, and make little progress. After they succeded, the direction of strike was often moved away, but that is normal.

 

[Klausewitz]

It's one of those things that bugs you without really working out what it was but after watching the latest World War Wednesday and doing some rereading of the Dev diaries I'm prepared to say it:

France has the wrong Land Doctrine.

Far from being focused on Grand Battleplan Doctrine, inter war France was obsessed with a defensive doctrine that was designed to blunt the German offensive and hold the enemy until the blockade and allies created the overpowering firepower and numbers needed to win the war.

Their land warfare doctrine was called the Methodical Battle but this has obviously been misunderstood. It doesn't mean the sort of battle planning that the British used but instead it was designed to place severe limits of French commanders to ensure lives were not wasted through ill planned offensives. Instead of being "Grand", the methodical battle was designed to limit French offensive action to small counter attacks or where local superiority of geography created an opportunity for an easy victory.

Their focus was on firepower and, to them, maneuver was designed to bring superior firepower to bear rather than as some sort of attempt to break through the lines of the enemy.

It is for these reasons that France should be placed on the Superior Firepower doctrine.

I ask that Paradox reconsider their decision in this regard as it is historically inaccurate. If their decision was based on game balance considerations then I'd accept that but I believe it is an actual misread of the evidence.

I disagree with your assessment.
Based on 'Seeds of Disaster' by Robert Doughty the bataille conduit was not mainly about defense or limiting offensive.
The obsession of the French in the interwar was the attaque brusque a sudden attack by Germany with little warning through Belgium against Northern France were most of France population, ressources and industry were concentrated.
While the Germans saw their chance at victory by attacking and breaking through the French saw theirs in blunting this first attack and then advancing methodically, 'conducted' like an orchestra, in the offense.
The main idea was the superiority of the defense over the offense.
Control was centralized (just like the British did) and a huge premium was put on artillery superiority and the importance of artillery support.
Attacks were not necessary limited or only local although they would be in the defense were only counterattacks would be launched. In the offense they would be grand, extreme grand indeed, with the whole frontline being advanced by five kilometers at a time, then bringing the artillery up (because the infantry would then risk outrunning the artillery) and repeating the process.

Why i would argue that France does not belong to the Superior (American) firepower doctrine is that while the Americans decentralized their artillery bringing artillery support dwon from the corps to the division (each division or even lower level formations having their own individual artillery support with the option of getting more assets from higher up the chain) the French centralized the artillery with support being bestowed by higher command.
Americans also favored the 'on-call' deployment and 'opportunistic' artillery fire and developed the capabilities to make that feasible.
The French still preferred timetables and rigid control.

 

[The Tactician]

It's one of those things that bugs you without really working out what it was but after watching the latest World War Wednesday and doing some rereading of the Dev diaries I'm prepared to say it:

France has the wrong Land Doctrine.

Far from being focused on Grand Battleplan Doctrine, inter war France was obsessed with a defensive doctrine that was designed to blunt the German offensive and hold the enemy until the blockade and allies created the overpowering firepower and numbers needed to win the war.

Their land warfare doctrine was called the Methodical Battle but this has obviously been misunderstood. It doesn't mean the sort of battle planning that the British used but instead it was designed to place severe limits of French commanders to ensure lives were not wasted through ill planned offensives. Instead of being "Grand", the methodical battle was designed to limit French offensive action to small counter attacks or where local superiority of geography created an opportunity for an easy victory.

Their focus was on firepower and, to them, maneuver was designed to bring superior firepower to bear rather than as some sort of attempt to break through the lines of the enemy.

It is for these reasons that France should be placed on the Superior Firepower doctrine.

I ask that Paradox reconsider their decision in this regard as it is historically inaccurate. If their decision was based on game balance considerations then I'd accept that but I believe it is an actual misread of the evidence.

In support I ask them to view the writings of Doughty http://www.amazon.com/Robert-A.-Doughty/e/B001ITRGAE; and Kiesling http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_1?url=search-alias=stripbooks&field-keywords=eugenia kiesling.

Duritz.

actually if you watch the world war wednesday that was about finland you will find that the grand battle plan doctrine are actually more like world war 1 with a lot of defensive bonuses to infantry especially if you go down the infiltration tree and trench warfare technology research, the doctrine also is about slow massive offensives hence grand battle plan so actually I think the doctrine actually fits france perfectly there is also some mechanized and armour bonuses down the assault tree also in the same doctrine depending on if your chosen country has an industry that can allow you armour and mechanized troops. plus superior firepower is specifically made for usa as mobile is for germany as they were probably the only ones with the industry to afford it bullets more than men which required a very strong industry that the usa had but france did not technically have they had a strong industry but not like the usa.

Well, Mobile Warfare is actually the best tree for Deep Operations to be under; both German and Soviet doctrines share the same mother of military cooperation in the Union.
They also share a great deal of doctrinal similarities, such as an overreliance on offensive manoeuvres and mobility, the use of tanks to force a spearhead open and encircle defenders to be eliminated by reserve troops, paralysing the enemy forces with shocking aggression and speed,
Really the big difference was that German style thinking only had a single Schwerpunkt where force was to be concentrated, while the Soviets emphasised multiple penetrations over a broad front.

The only way Mass Mobilisation could be justified is in the military incompetence of the post-purge Red Army. But the game currently hamstrings a non-purge Union down the same path when they definitely would not have followed it.

I plan on modding a fix to this.

actually the deep battle concentration inside the mass mobilization is made specifically for the soviet union as they concentrated on just throwing infantry first then found out that wan't working so decided to introduce armour, mechanized and airforce to jump in so I actually think the doctrines trees are to a certain degree historically accurate to their specific nations and still the developers said that you can even change to another doctrine if you want too.

check out the dev diary all about this
https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/foru...iv-development-diary-4-land-doctrines.769073/

 

[Duritz]

I disagree with your assessment.
Based on 'Seeds of Disaster' by Robert Doughty the bataille conduit was not mainly about defense or limiting offensive.
The obsession of the French in the interwar was the attaque brusque a sudden attack by Germany with little warning through Belgium against Northern France were most of France population, ressources and industry were concentrated.
While the Germans saw their chance at victory by attacking and breaking through the French saw theirs in blunting this first attack and then advancing methodically, 'conducted' like an orchestra, in the offense.
The main idea was the superiority of the defense over the offense.
Control was centralized (just like the British did) and a huge premium was put on artillery superiority and the importance of artillery support.
Attacks were not necessary limited or only local although they would be in the defense were only counterattacks would be launched. In the offense they would be grand, extreme grand indeed, with the whole frontline being advanced by five kilometers at a time, then bringing the artillery up (because the infantry would then risk outrunning the artillery) and repeating the process.

Why i would argue that France does not belong to the Superior (American) firepower doctrine is that while the Americans decentralized their artillery bringing artillery support dwon from the corps to the division (each division or even lower level formations having their own individual artillery support with the option of getting more assets from higher up the chain) the French centralized the artillery with support being bestowed by higher command.
Americans also favored the 'on-call' deployment and 'opportunistic' artillery fire and developed the capabilities to make that feasible.
The French still preferred timetables and rigid control.

Wow, sure you don't want to discuss the Russian Front in this thread?!?

I kid...

I understand what you're saying, sure they were worried about a quick German attack but they also realised that once that attack was blunted they were in no position to launch an offensive. If you're going to suggest grand battle plan represents a strategic view then every nation had grand battle plans. Tactically and Operationally, I feel I'm right in my initial assessment.

The French planned to launch their own first major offensive in year three of the war and even then only if the conditions were right (blockade was biting and material superiority had been gained).

Your comment about advancing the whole front line at once, I disagree with. They were to launch limited actions (perhaps corps size but definitely not across the whole front at once) and support forces such as artillery, armour, aircraft, engineers etc would be dolled out from High Command to the local command for the operation before being returned and assigned to the next offensive. Check out 'Paths of Glory' by Anthony Clayton for how this worked in 1917 and 1918 in WWI.

The aim was local superiority of firepower and the advance of the infantry was limited to the ability of the support services (principally artillery) to provide covering fire and support. The introduction of tanks into the methodical battle led to an increase in the required number of artillery pieces per kilometer because of the need to cover them as well as the infantry. Their concept of offense was not grand but limited and based on fire control.

I'd also point out that 1940 was hardly a proper test of how their theory would have worked or evolved. Who knows how it would have developed if France has held the line but given the performance of the Free French and the late war French forces, and their integration with US forces, I'll stick by my original theory.

Thanks for your comment.

Cheers,
Duritz.

 

[Sir Garnet]

I ordered, received, and am reading Kiesling's "Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning" and it is interesting not least for the perceived similarities and parallelism in doctrinal thinking among the the former allies and Germany leading up to the war and the evidence for the soundness of methodical battle as a doctrinal concept in juxtaposition to the limitations of French material and political resources for defense in the face of a growing mortal threat. I can tell there are some good lessons for military planners and policy-makers. Will be interested to complete the book.

 

[Fawr]

First part of the Grand Battleplan is basically WW1 trench warfare, which is what the French were trying to use in WW2.
Superior firepower on the other hand is a quite agressive doctrine(I assume), with shock and awe or airland battle.
I don't think the current system can simulate every historical doctrine, but I think France is fine with Grand Battleplan.

I think this is the key point.

It doesn't matter what the bottom half of the French tree looks like (as its all guesswork anyway) - but I'd like the start (say until 1940) to be historical.

 

[Duritz]

I ordered, received, and am reading Kiesling's "Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning" and it is interesting not least for the perceived similarities and parallelism in doctrinal thinking among the the former allies and Germany leading up to the war and the evidence for the soundness of methodical battle as a doctrinal concept in juxtaposition to the limitations of French material and political resources for defense in the face of a growing mortal threat. I can tell there are some good lessons for military planners and policy-makers. Will be interested to complete the book.

I also suggest "The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941" Ed. Winton and Mets.

It has 5 case studies for the period from different nations - the French one is Kiesling's and where I first 'met' her. If you appreciate the evolution of ideas and how nations deal with change then you'll love this book.

What strikes me is the view of the lay person that there is a correct theory that nations should have been moving towards - it's just utter nonsense.

Just because you won, doesn't mean you handled the situation well. Sometimes you're just lucky, other times the deck is just stacked in your favour. Obviously, neither of these instances relates to France. Ce la vie!