[Forum Game] Graveyard of Empires

[Bonecracker(NL)]

Comrade Shevardnadze,

From discussions I have had with President Najibullah, General Tanai as most accepted leader of the Khalqi faction of the PDPA, and people surrounding them it seems that both men are well aware of the rifts within their party and have no intention of letting it get the better of them. While there is a small degree of political distrust between the two, this seems to stem from awareness of divisions in the party rather than personal dislike. As far as I can tell, the President has been happy to raise this man to that of his right-hand man. General Tanai meets regularly with the president, an a source who requested anonimity has even suggested that Tanai could be made a Vice-President of Afghanistan. This needs to be viewed in light of recent suspicion directed by both factions of the party directed towards Sultan Ali Keshtmand and his recent move to sack the most notoriously corrupt officials. While both men had agreed on Keshtmand's promotion to Chairman of the Council of Ministers, this has been postponed pending intra-party discussions on the matter.

What is noteworthy that a close relationship has grown between Najibullah and Tanai. The President has shown himself as being adept strategist and is involved in the day-to-day running of the army together with Generals Tanai and Abdul Rashid Dostum, forming a military troika of sorts. It is to be noted that the President's objectives are political and economic in nature, attempting to conquer territory, pacify tribes, and trying to gain economical resources such as copper and precious metals as a collateral for our seemingly bottomless pockets. Furthermore, political interests could explain why the new special forces units remain detached from the regular chain of command as much as their specific duties. For as long as the frequent meetings between the President and his Generals lead to complementing instead of conflicting deployments, however, this does not seem to an acute problem that either party wants to address.

On politics above a party level, President Najibullah is committed to the idea of democracy. He favours a presidential system with an independent judiciary, and a loya jirga (A Pashto tribal council, if you will) to complement the legislative branch. He however stresses that this is an ideal he does not think will be achieved any time soon. He stresses cultural problems and the scars of conflict first and foremost, but also the desirability of a democratic system in a country torn apart by well over a decade of war. He remains of the opinion that a strong central leadership is needed to repair, let alone modernise, Afghanistan. In the way he discusses these issues, such as repairing and developing infrastructure and properly exploiting Afghanistan's natural resources and using those revenues to modernise his country, Najibullah seemingly views himself as an Afghan Atatürk. While this is not an ambition we should be afraid of, many have had this ambition before him - and nobody even came close.

Overall, I recommend we steer clear of inter-PDPA factions and conflicts, as the President and the MinDef seems to have a grip on conflicts within the party. There seems to be no problem in this realm, and favouring either faction over the other could stir the pot of conflict. I do recommend further military support for the Afghan army and, if that time would come, assisting Afghanistan's recovery if this is possible. Our moves towards political freedom at home would be very well complemented by a defeat of Islamism in Afghanistan, as a defeat for our friends there could very well spill over into the Central Asian republics, making investing into the victory of the PDPA government worthwhile.

-Yuli Mikhailovich

 

[XVG]

GM Note: Sorry everyone. Some recent scheduling and technical problems made me realize that I might have unintentionally created a colossus that I might not have enough time and motivation to invest in right now. I made the stats and updates far too detailed, and ended up having far too much to write about. Cross-referencing half a dozen orders and articles to get one paragraph written ends up being rather time-consuming, and with my already tight schedule also exhausting. With my work and studies forcing me to stare a large part of the day at a computer screen, I increasingly lost motivation to spend such a large part of my free time in a similar fashion. No, I will not be ending this. I will just have to tone down the update cycle, quite drastically, at least for now. I am currently aiming for the next weekend, and just wanted to let you know about the reasoning for this and my relative absence. Thanks for understanding.

 

[Kho]

((It's all good. I had no doubt that this was a colossus from day one, and I am personally more than happy to wait as long as is suitable for you ))

 

[XVG]

March-May 1989

Medical faculty of the State University of Kabul in April 1989​

The Ramadan Amnesty

The Islamic holy month of 1989 begun on 7th of April. Dr. Najibullah appeared on national TV, congratulated the Afghan people on the occasion of the holiday and generally attempted to appear as a pious and devout man, quite unlike before. This was indeed a part of the radical shift towards traditionalism on the part of the Kabul government, part of the bid to promote the concept of national unity and reconciliation. But more importantly, the Afghan Ministry of Defence announced a temporary end to ‘strategic’ operations for the duration of the holiday, to bring relief to the badly battered countryside. Temporary truces were in fact negotiated, especially in the south. The government didn’t stop there, as a few days later in mid-April Najibullah again gave a long speech on Kabul TV, showing the signed and official ‘Ramadan Amnesty’ degree. Mujahidin fighters who were to surrender with their arms were to receive a full pardon. This was hugely successful in the region were the rebels had taken the heaviest beating, the provinces of Ghazni, Lowgar and Vardak. In addition pro-government tribal leaders negotiated smaller settlements in Takhar, Helmand and Qandahar.

Kabul

Reinforcements arrived into Kabul from the north over the first weeks of March, as Dostum dispatched the 18th Division to bolster the defences of the capital and to allow the government to send current garrison formations to the offensive towards Jalalabad. Then on March 11, these units along with the Republican Guard and some elements of sarandoy and the 80th Division hardened in repelling the earlier rebel Dowhsi assault began an offensive operation of their own. The target was the Wahhabi stronghold in Paghman. Due to proximity of the target, no extensive aerial support was needed, and the government could rely on extensive artillery preparations using some of the new equipment left behind by the Soviets. For most of March and early April the government fought a fierce attack against the Salafists of Sayyaf, however only gaining limited ground at the loss of many experienced men. With the beginning of Ramadan the assault was called off.

With the declaration of the lull in fighting and the amnesty, Kabul had hoped for a few weeks of peace. But the Wahhabis in the mountains of Paghman would have none of it. The attacks on the capital continued, becoming increasingly bloody and gruesome. The military hospital in Wazir Akhbar was attacked by gunmen posing in WAD uniform, leading to about a dozen deaths. A number of infiltrators were arrested near military bases east of the capital supporting the operations towards Jalalabad, and even the Bagram airbase was attacked, resulting in the loss of two aircraft on the ground. But the kidnapping of a high-ranking PDPA member, and his subsequent execution in the mujahidin camp resulted in Najibullah vowing revenge. The attack on the mountainous area was resumed, with even more zeal than before. In fighting that lasted till late May, the government troops finally managed to overrun several fortified compounds, and air strikes that were actually directed from the ground caused significant losses in the ranks of the Ittehad-e Islami.

Jalalabad

In a quite surprising but not overtly unlikely turn of events, Colonel Abdul Rahim Wardak and his ex-Mahaz-e Milli fighters vacated Asadabad and instead marched to join the ranks of Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami. Providing the HiG with a cadre of well-educated military professionals and yet another boost in credibility, the new janjawid corps, operating with high mobility on horseback, went to battle along the Jalalabad highway. On March 9 the mujahidin began their much anticipated larger operation to cut the Kabul-Jalalabad road for good. The entire segment between Surobi and the Darunta dam came under attack, representing a colossal shelling and infiltration operation along 60 kilometres of road. Quite early it became clear that the Pakistanis had invested heavily in the attack, as howitzers and rocket launchers were used with increasing numbers and accuracy against government checkpoints.

Afghan officers planning the counterattack, Surobi March 1989​

In a few days the sarandoy and the 11th Division elements manning the eastern portion of the road were faltering. Shahidan, about 35 kilometres southeast of Surobi was captured by the HiG on March 15, effectively cutting the road with more than mines and ambushes. Territorial control was slowly being established on large segments of the road, with a government garrison continuing to fight extraordinarily fiercely at the Mehterlam intersection. The critical situation was recognized, and the government rushed a huge number of reinforcements to the theatre. The 15th Armoured, 6th Infantry and elements of the commando battalions started arriving at Surobi and launched a counterattack starting in full force after initial probing already on March 12, largely coinciding with the government offensives elsewhere. This however meant that the local commander could rely only on a fragment of the Afghan Air Force. With the Minister of Defence taking personal command of the Khost offensive, the commander of the 6th and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi of the 11th in Jalalabad simply didn’t get their requests through. Thus the advance was sluggish at best, and the outskirts of Shahidan were reached only in mid-April.

Rebel tactics changed now that the government was regaining ground, and the road was being effectively destroyed and only slowly conceded. As the government troops were about to reach the Mehterlam junction in late April, hoping to rush in and save Mehterlam from falling to Abdul Haq, a gigantic ambush consisting of minefields and mujahidin attacks was launched on the advancing convoy. They had effectively been lured into a trap. Dozens of vehicles were outright abandoned as a huge traffic jam clogged the road, with the bulk of government forces fleeing back to Shahidan. The advance continued only in May, and by then Mehterlam had been lost. The junction area, and the village of Chaharbagh were recaptured, but the government failed to reach the last link separating their relief force and Jalalabad, the tunnel northwest of the Daronta Dam. With heavy fighting again erupting just east of Surobi, the government contingent withdrew to the former Soviet forward operation base at Surkhakan just south of the road intersection, indenting to wait for the arrival of reinforcements and the full clearing of the road section through the mountains east of Surobi. All this time the rebels had been slowly encroaching upon the defences of Jalalabad, without launching any heavy attacks, in a bid to save men. The attrition warfare along the road had been so far very much in their favour.

Mehterlam

Destroyed government tank just outside Mehterlam​

In the past months, Jalalabad had quite much been the focus of the government military in the eastern region. Quite naturally, for it was the third largest city in the country after all. However, due to this, the defence of Mehterlam was quite much neglected, as only a few reinforcements had been dispatched to the city. The city of about thirty thousand was extremely vulnerable as the mujahidin during March managed to secure the hills north of it and brought the siege perimeter even closer. Most government checkpoints in the valley leading to the city had by then fallen into rebel hands. Thus, with heavy fighting still on going all over the Surobi-Jalalabad road, Mehterlam fell to the HiK fighters commanded by Abdul Haq on May 7. The ammo stockpiles were depleted, and most of the equipment in ruins, and only a few dozen men from the destroyed and abandoned town joined rebel ranks. Still, it was an important victory for the HiK given their hardships elsewhere.

Operation Venera

But the most important and anticipated government offensive was again conducted by primarily the 8th Division of the by now extremely experienced General Nabi Azimi. The Minister of Defence himself drafted the plans for the attack, intending to save the city of Khost from an almost certain capture by the mujahidin of Khalis commanded by Haqqani, in coalition with Mahaz-e Milli. General Shahnawaz Tanai ordered most of the offensive capabilities of the entire Afghan military reserved for the operation, including the stockpiles of tactical missiles as well as a larger part of the air force. WAD also assisted heavily, as rebel supply routes from Pakistan had become under heavy harassment by WAD operatives and bribed tribesmen already in late February. Scouting using helicopters and light infantry was conducted from March 1 onwards, and everything was in place to start the offensive when the mujahidin final assault on Khost was set to begin. Haqqani made a demand to the government garrison on March 8, giving them twelve hours to surrender. When the deadline passed, and when the mujahidin begun the shelling, the Afghan military unleashed their entire arsenal on Haqqani and his fighters. At least eight SCUD and LUNA missiles hit the outskirts of Khost in the first few hours of the fighting, scoring direct hits on ammunition stockpiles, artillery positions and rebel hideouts. Afghan bombers dropped thousands of tons of munitions on the rebel camps along the Pakistani border, causing several dozens of casualties in the training camps. The air force acted remarkably more cautiously this time, using high altitudes and impressive amounts of munitions in order to avoid Stinger MANPADS.

HiK mujahidin posing with an unexploded cluster munition canister in Paktia province​

With the colossal aerial and missile preparations rendering an immediate fall of the garrison in Khost extremely unlikely, the government offensive began in earnest. Haqqani had had plenty of time to mine the Gardeyz-Khost road and prepare ambushes, but the government’s new mountain battalions were able to overcome these obstacles. The hills surrounding the road were captured first, followed by a scouting of the road itself by the mountain troops and engineering units. Only then did the mechanized troops advance. This new tactic worked quite efficiently, and the government advance was extremely rapid, mostly thanks to the dedication of almost the entire Afghan Air Force and missile arsenal to it. It was quite clear to Haqqani that he had become the government’s priority target and that he was receiving a more than uneven share of its firepower. Thus, the HiK mujahidin started to slowly give in their positions, instead of holding ground shifting towards launching ambushes and night time special operations. More arms and supplies continued to flow from Pakistan despite of the government’s best efforts to intercept them from the air or on the ground.

The mountain troops managed to reach the final obstacle, the mountains around the villages of Geshah and Malway on April 11, and broke through to the Kurram river plateau on April 15. The tanks of the 8th Division and elements of the 4th Armoured Brigade finally reached Khost on April 19, ending Operation Venera in a large and decisive government victory. After a long series of offensive operations in the south of the capital, the 8th Division had really proven itself to be an effective offensive formation and General Nabi Azimi recovered his lost prestige for his earlier failure to lift the siege during the Second Battle of Zhawar back in 1986. He was now credited as one of the leading military commanders in the government ranks. For the mujahidin of Hezb Islami Khalis the failure of the almost certain capture of Khost was a shock and caused a few desertions initially. But soon Haqqani recovered control of the situation and was back at the city’s outskirts, shelling the small airport so much that it became useless almost instantly after the return of a government helicopter detachment there. With the massive commitment of resources the government had been able to gain yet another important victory in this area, and it remained to be seen if the concessions elsewhere had been worth it. And more importantly, where and how these resources would be used during the summer.

Herat

Jamiat-e Islami fighters, veteran mujahidin of Mohammad Ismail Khan, presenting their still reliable Soviet submachine guns after battle.​

As government reinforcements kept arriving by air from the north, the mujahidin drastically increased their operations in and around Herat. In early April, local WAD and sarandoy launched a pre-emptive arrest campaign against large mujahidin cells of Jamiat-e Islami operating within the city. Heavy gunfights lasted for weeks, and many of the cells were again operational by May. The amount of checkpoints and security measures in the city was dramatically increased. During Ramadan the rebels conducted heavy attacks along the roads leading to the Iranian and Soviet borders, and after a week of fighting managed to cut the former and severely limited movement of crucial goods along the latter. With government airpower needed elsewhere, and with Mohammad Ismail Khan more than familiar with the terrain of the province, these efforts by Rabbani and Massoud were quite effective.

Other Regions

To provide a distraction against the government counter-offensives in the east and southeast, the Salafists of Ittehad-e Islami conducted several heavy raids on the Kabul-Ghazni road, and against the cities of Maidan Shahr and Kowt-e Ashrow. Significant government resources, most importantly in terms of planes, were required to assist in repelling the offensives. The attacks on the latter two cities, with a significant pro-government and Hazara minority population in fact resulted in the growth of the ranks of government militia. Some Hazara elders even made a request to Sultan Ali Kesthmand over the creation of a new regular division to guard the towns. Meanwhile the relative success of the operations enabled Sayyaf to gain further support from the regional tribes that had formerly backed Mahaz-e Milli.

Fighters of Mohammadi’s Harakat-e-Inqilab mujahidin continued their attack on the Spin Boldak border crossing. HiG mujahidin also scouted in the region, in advance, but failed to find any opening for major advance or defection. With no significant aid coming from other groups, or more importantly from just across the border from Pakistan, the attack slowly tuned down, with the tribal militia of the Pashtun Achakzai clan continuing to hold their positions. Ismatullah Muslim rallied further men to the cause in Qandahar and along with the government’s other offensives in the area, and the Ramadan truce, managed to in fact solidify his position. However, as his men were allowed to increasingly operate with impunity by government political and military leadership, discontent towards him from within the provincial PDPA bureaucracy surged.

In Zaranj the rebels were far more successful, as the numbers and equipment of the garrison became increasingly depleted. There had been plans to conduct a relief operation, but the airpower needed to back it simply didn’t materialize due to the fierce and far more crucial battles fought in the East. The use of cargo planes to drop improvised munitions to target mujahidin around garrison towns had also been called off, due to heavy losses suffered by the Afghan transport squadrons. Thus, after a March of ferocious attacks, the garrison of Zaranj surrendered on April 2. A tiny contingent escaped to government lines with the help of tribal mediators, and far more fled to Iran. They had, however, enough time to destroy most of the heavy equipment and ammunition stockpiles, and before their demise had dealt quite gruelling casualties to the local Mahaz-e Milli commander Vali Farah Yousef. Nevertheless, with Zaranj firmly in their hands, the Pir Gailani finally had at least some sort of a victory in his record.

Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi launched Operation Al Badr in early March all over the provinces of Zabol, Kandahar, Helmand and Farah. The pre-emptive attack on government checkpoints, supply routes and roadside garrisons severely restricted government plans and logistics in the whole southern sector, allowing Vali Farah Yousef to capture Zaranj due to the government’s inability to conduct a relief operation. The attacks however were rather costly to Mohammadi, but at least provided the Harakat-e Inqilab something to boast about after the failed venture at Spin Boldak. Mullah Naqib of the Jamiat also conducted several operations simultaneously, for example an act of sabotage targeting the Kandahar airport, even further damaging the government’s ability to provide extensive air support in the southwest.

With Colonel Wardak abandoning him for Hekmatyar, Mojaddedi once again stood alone in Asadabad. The Salafists of Mawlawi al-Rahman increased their operations in the Kunar province during the spring, and several Salafist cells were spotted in the city of Asadabad. Mawlawi Rahman also met a number of times with Mawlawi Awzal of Nuristan, and a deeper Salafist alliance was quite clearly in the works. New benefactors willing to sponsor such a deal were found from the Gulf countries, even though the ISI was now becoming wary of the rapid expansion of influence by these groups that they didn’t have complete authority over.

Following the victorious rescue of Taloqan, the units of the newly formed 6th Corps took a more defensive stance, starting to fortify their positions. The only major operation conducted by General Dostum was the limited clearing of segments of the Kholm-Kunduz road over March and April by the 53rd Division. Meanwhile the newly formed divisions, especially the 70th, were intensively trained and supplied with more advanced weaponry. In the north, the Ramadan truce and amnesty seemed to work quite effectively, and stability reigned in the areas protected by General Dostum, earning him much praise and affection. Meanwhile minor offensives were launched against Feyzabad, but government planes kept the garrison suitably supplied from high altitudes for most of them to fail. Similarly, Massoud’s reported attempts to find support from the ranks of Uzbek elders failed, as with Dostum presiding over the amnesty in the north, many of the ones residing in rebel-held territories were starting to become responsive to government outreach.

Not much happened in the Hazarajat, as the absence and inactivity of Abdul Ali Mazari resulted in the complete end of the unity talks, much to the anger of the Iranians. Government WAD greatly increased their operations in the region, encouraging small scale clashes between tribal and militant groups. In addition HiG envoys and spies were captured in worrying numbers. Attempts at courting the wider Hazara populace to the ranks of a Sunni organization obviously failed, but Hekmatyar managed to find some potential allies in minorities, and in the ranks of the lesser Shiite mujahidin groups. Meanwhile Sheikh Anwari’s Islamic Movement mujahidin dug in around the Chaghcharan airport, while Massoud and Jamiat rushed more reinforcements to the contested town. A tiniest brawl or spark could potentially ignite a brutal conflict as tensions ran extremely high in the city and countryside.

The Afghan diplomatic corps were ordered by Sultan Ali Keshtmand to conduct increased diplomatic overtures towards Western European countries, in a bid to provide proof of the radical nature of the opposition to the Kabul government. These attempts were nothing sort of a complete failure, as additional Afghan emissaries were outright refused entry. In Belgrade, Budapest and East Berlin there were attempts to hold attacks behind the scenes, so to say, but these resulted in nigh nothing as the whole socialist world order was seemingly on the verge of collapse. However, a number of Western journalists visited Kabul over the spring, and painted a slightly more positive image of the country than during the Soviet intervention.

Sultan Ali Keshtmand on Afghan state TV during the Ramadan of 1989​

Citing his inability to further help the policy of national reconciliation, in early March Mohammad Hasan Sharq, a non-PDPA member and Chairman of the Council of Ministers resigned, with Sultan Ali Keshtmand following him in the role. The Council of Ministers also silently shelved the anti-corruption initiatives in order to restore balance in the government. The WAD released the confessions from two, Khalqi, bureaucrat, concerning their attempted bribery and coercion to the ranks of the mujahidin. This was announced as a warning and in hopes of solidifying the PDPA further against an outlying thread. To placate the Khalqis, and in order to bring the Ramadan reconciliation to play in a bid to heal the wounds and rifts of the PDPA, President Najibullah appointed Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, a known Khalqi, as Minister of Interior. There was some opposition to the general idea of the Ramadan amnesty from Khalqi ranks, but with heavy fighting erupting in the East, most silently agreed to it following the example of the Minister of Defence Tanai. WAD activity in the capital was quite heavy during the Ramadan in general, but nobody really knew what exactly was going on.

Events from around the world
​

Pakistan

While at first hopeful due to the rapid advances of the HiK and HiG along the Surobi-Jalalabad road, the Inter-Services Intelligence were dealt a grave defeat by the unexpected success of the government’s operation to relieve Khost. Many leading Army and ISI officers were extremely distraught, as the ISI leader General Hamid Gul had been pretending that the DRA military had been effectively rendered incapable of meaningful offensive operations. Prime Minister Bhutto and the Chief of Staff Mirza Aslam Beg gave the general a last chance to prove the worth of his policy of further intervention. Jalalabad had to be captured, simply to protect the prestige and interests of Pakistan. A renewed presence of the Afghan government on the Pakistani border so close to Peshawar was a very worrying prospect in Islamabad, and military reinforcements were in fact dispatched to the region. Similarly the Pakistani Army started to deploy regular troops along the borders of Paktia province, officially to safeguard against infiltrators and to aid refugees, but in reality in order to further ease the logistics of the battered mujahidin contingent under Haqqani.

China

Gorbachev toasting with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, May 16 1989​

Hu Yaobang, a high-ranking member of the CPC who had fallen to disgrace due to an allegedly overtly soft stance towards reformists, died suddenly on April 15. On April 22, 1989, 50,000 students marched to Tiananmen Square to participate in Hu's memorial service. On April 26, the party's official newspaper People's Daily issued a front-page editorial titled "It is necessary to take a clear-cut stand against disturbances." The demonstrations just kept growing, and unrest started to slowly spread to the neighbourhoods and even other cities, as students flocked to the streets in thousands. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev landed in Beijing on May 14, the welcome ceremonies held at the airport instead of the Tiananmen. The subsequent Sino-Soviet summit, the first of its kind in some thirty years, marked the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, and was seen as a breakthrough of tremendous historical significance for China's leaders. On May 19, protests, albeit seemingly unrelated, erupted in Ürümqi in Xinjiang. Hui and Uyghur Muslims took to the streets to demonstrate against a pamphlet issued by the government, allegedly insulting the religious feelings of the Muslim minority. The demonstrators set fire on a CPC HQ in the city, and the government responded ruthlessly, with thousands of armed police and soldiers rolling into the city in trucks and armoured personnel carriers. Hundreds were seriously wounded, and a substantial amount of property was destroyed. However, most importantly, certain members of the Politburo blamed the violence on the ill-advised attempt at direct intervention in Afghanistan. Along with the sudden improvement in ties with the USSR following the rare visit by Gorbachev, Beijing gave its policy towards Afghanistan a second thought. Mujahidin fighters were expelled from Xinjiang’s rugged border regions, the few camps run by the Chinese were ordered to be vacated, and the People’s Liberation Army starting to heavily patrol the Wakhan corridor. Weapon sales via Pakistan however continued. Meanwhile on May 20th Beijing declared martial law and started to mobilize troops, some 30 divisions, into the capital. By late May the situation in the Chinese capital became increasingly confusing and intimidating.

Assorted newsflashes

March 7 – Tehran. Iran cuts diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom over Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses.
March 14 – Beirut. General Michel Aoun declares a “War of Liberation” against Syria and its proxies.
March 28 – Belgrade. The Socialist Republic of Serbia passes constitutional changes revoking the autonomy of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo.
April 7 – Moscow. Soviet submarine K-278 Komsomolets sinks in the Barents Sea.
May 2 – Budapest. Hungary dismantles 240 km of barbed wire fencing along the border with Austria.
May 11 – Washington D.C./Panama City. President Bush orders an additional 1,900 U.S. troops to Panama Canal Zone garrison.

 

[XVG]

Turn 4 – June 1989

​

General Secretary of PDPA, President of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah (Bonecracker(NL)/Dutchbag)
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sultan Ali Keshtmand (jeeshadow)
Minister of State Security, Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi (Terraferma)
Minister of Interior, Mohammad Aslam Watanjar (LatinKaiser)

​

Chief of Army Staff, Minister of Defense, Shahnawaz Tanai (Julius Maximus)
Commander of Afghan Air Force, Abdul Qadir Aqa (Shynka)
Commander of 53rd Jowjani Infantry Division, Abdul Rashid Dostum (King50000)
Commander of 4th Herati Corps, Abdul Wahid Baba Jan (Korona)
Commander of Jalalabad elements of 11th Infantry Division, Nur ul-Haq Ulumi (OPEN)
Commander of 8th Infantry Division, Central Corps, Mohammad Nabi Azimi (KF25)
Commander of Bagram Garrison, Mohammed Zafar Khan (OPEN)
Commander of Baghlan Ismaili Sarandoy, Sayed Jafar Naderi (OPEN)
Commander of Hairatan Sarandoy, Abdul Momim (OPEN)
Commander of pro-government Achakzai tribal militia in Kandahar, Ismatullah Muslim (OPEN)

​

Leader of Gulbuddinist faction, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Noco19)
Leader of Khalist faction, Mohammad Yunus Khalis (Kho)
Khalist Mujahedin commander in Kabul, Abdul Haq (BlackCrown)
Khalist Mujahedin commander in Paktia, Jalaluddin Haqqani (OPEN)

​

Leader of Jamiat e-Islami, Burhanuddin Rabbani (aedan777)
Party Mujahidin Commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud (baboushreturns)
Mujahedin Commander in Herat, Mohammad Ismail Khan (OPEN)
Mujahedin Commander in Northern Afganistan, Atta Muhammad Nur (OPEN)
Mujahedin Commander in Southern Afganistan, Mullah Naqib (OPEN)

Minor Mujahedin Groups

Leader of Harakat e-Inghilab, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi (Shebedaone)
Leader of Mahaz-e Milli, Sayyid Ahmed Gailani (Rolman99)
Commander of Mahaz-e Milli Mujahedin, Abdul Rahim Wardak (Dadarian)
Commander of Mahaz-e Milli Mujahedin near Shindand, Vali Farah Yousef (Mikkel Glahder)
Leader of Ittihad-e Islami, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Cleeque)

Shiite Mujahedin Groups

Co-leader of Al-Nasr, Abdul Ali Mazari (OPEN)
Leader of Revolutionary Council of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan, Sayyid Ali Beheshti (OPEN)
Leader of Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, Muhammad Asif Mohseni (OPEN)
Commander of Islamic Movement of Afghanistan Mujahedin, Sayed Hussein Anwari (tyriet)

Other Resistance Groups

Leader of Society for the Call to the Quran, Jamil al-Rahman (Maxwell500)

GM: Orders tentatively due on Thursday 6th of July.​

 

[Dadarian]

Sha'ban, 1410

"By Allah, I wish we had camels. Hardier, less need for watering, can carry heavier equipment. Blessed be these beasts, but horses are delicate creatures, ever too fragile for the stresses of warfare. They also scream far too loud.

Far too loud.

I suspect I missed Laylat al-Bara’at, however I paid no heed. There is no forgiveness for me. Allah may hold the heart and minds of many of my fellow mujaheddin and janjawid, but I hold no doubt. I shall meet my place as with other killers. The other day I chased down a runner, a man working for the Party. He was a young fellow, from Qandahar, I suspect conscripted. He wished for his mother, so I delivered him to her. In time anyways, the women always die in numbers in wars such as these.

I miss my artillery, it would be nice to knock on our enemy's doors with a 105 instead of a simple mortar.

I hear there is a growing death pool in the Corps. I suspect I will join. Good humour is needed in times like this, and who knows, maybe I will get rich.

What a joke.

Wardak"​

 

[Bonecracker(NL)]

Due to diplomatic ties with Iran being cut off, President Najibullah had to MacGyver an Afghan post service to Iran. A letter was written, sealed, and handed to WAD. Subsequently, a meeting was arranged between a WAD operator and a local IRGC contact, who took posession of this sealed letter from the presidency of Afghanistan first to his commander, and it then entered up a chain of superiors until it reached the Commander of the Quds Force, general Ahmad Vahidi.

"General Vahidi,

The town of Zaranj has recently fallen into terrorist hands. Most of the garrison had subsequently fled into Iranian territory. It is to the best of our knowledge that they have been interned and are treated as prisoners at the moment, and it is our intention for them to be returned to us, preferably to the city of Herat. I would like to enquire into the readiness and willingness of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to enter in such a deal.

This brings me to a wider issue at hand. The last ten years have not been kind to either Iran or Afghanistan, and it is in the interest of both our countries to once again rise to our feet as friends. It is the view of the entire government of Afghanistan that the attitude of Iran vis à vis Afghanistan is not productive towards achieving such a situation. Furthermore, viewing through the lense of realpolitik, I would like to enquire what the goals of Iran in Afghanistan are. Our perception is that your interest is first to secure the wellbeing of the Shia Hazara in Afghanistan, and subsequently using them as a springboard to influence Afghanistan from.

Not that there's anything wrong with either, and I can't blame you for pursuing such a policy. However, you base both of your objectives on very big assumptions. If you want to use the Hazara to leave a mark on Afghan politics, you have to compete with the Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and all non-Shia groups of Afghanistan backed by Pakistan and the Arab Gulf States. I struggle to see why you could ever compete with them. However, for this you need a more or less democratic state in Afghanistan in cooperation with the likes of Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and Mohammadi. To these people, democracy is merely a tyranny of the majority in which they have a democratic mandate to pursue those who they perceive to be heretics and make their lives miserable.

General, if you wish to secure Hazarajat and its people then I find your best chance of doing that is through supporting the legitimate government of the Republic of Afghanistan. We are already committing ourselves to full religious freedom in Afghanistan, and we do our best to protect Shia celebrations. While democracy may take a while to achieve, you can rest assured that the Hazara will be well-represented at any Loya Jirga and representative organs, that their grievances will be redressed, and that they may live and worship in the way they intend to if I have anything to say about it. I do not think I need to explain why it's harder to get such a commitment from Gulbuddin or Mohammadi.

Furthermore, we do not have any quarrel with the militia groups currently operating in Hazarajat, nor do we have any appetite for quarrel. If you would consider it appropriate, I am more than willing to send representatives to negotiate with the groups you support in order to achieve a truce, on the conditions that Chaghcharan and its airbase are returned and we are allowed to use the roads through Hazarajat. You can also rest assured that after the war, the Hazara will be treated as equals and have their say in how they wish to be governed.

Finally, I would greatly appreciate it if some sort of official direct way of contacting you or your civilian superiors could be established either directly or through a third power. A liaison office at our embassy in Moscow or at the consulate in Tashkent would suffice.

With my best regards,

Dr. Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai, President of the Republic.

 

[XVG]

Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, Commander of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution – Qods Force
​

A response to the letter of President Najibullah arrives via an intermediary in the diplomatic service of the USSR.

Glory be to God most Great and Worthy of Praise,

Mr President, let me first assure you that the interred Afghan military personnel are receiving the most conformable and generous treatment in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sadly the same cannot be said for the hundreds of thousands, maybe millions, of poor civilians who have been forced to flee this futile war of barbarity. The burden placed upon us is heavy, even though we do our best to fulfill the pious task, no obligation, of providing for the needy. While we do not in principle agree with the actions of your government, or those conducted by the government of the Soviet Union against an Islamic population aspiring simply for basic human rights, respect of their religious feelings and working democracy, I must say that I am quite understanding of the position you have been forced into. On one hand you fight a scheme fostered by the United States, certainly no friend of the Islamic Republic, but on the other your rifles are pointed at the Hazara ethnic group of ancient descent and proud spirits. Due to their religious affiliation the Islamic Republic naturally feels closeness towards them, and thus has offered to aid them in their holy struggle. The fact that your government has recently ended its active military operations against these holy groups of self-defence is certainly a positive sign for the development of our mutual relations. However, much more has to be done.

Even though the leader Khomeini and our leading revolutionary staff have largely invested the Afghanistan file in my skilled yet humble hands, I do not hold as much leverage regarding Iranian activities towards your country as I would wish to. Your tone of understanding and conciliation is however most respected and welcomed. I will do my best to convey this message forward to all associated personnel here in Tehran. I cannot promise you much, as of now, Mr. President. But if you were to continue upholding an unwritten truce towards the region of Hazarajat, the Iranian opinion of your government would certainly improve. However, be aware, that a full restoration of ties is nigh impossible. We cannot and will not forgive the crimes conducted against the believers. But we share your anxiety, and frustration, towards the ever radicalizing nature of the groups affiliated with Pakistan, certain Arab states and ultimately the United States. We would never wish for Kabul to fall into the hands of such men, men of falsehood and pretentiousness.

I have forwarded your request regarding a diplomatic backchannel through the Tashkent consulate of the Republic of Afghanistan. It has been approved. A military attaché from our embassy in Moscow will start negotiations regarding the interred Afghan military personnel over the next week. Of course, quite naturally, we expect an act of kindness and forgiveness in return. Your jails hold a good number of prisoners, including absolutely innocent civilians. Their release could potentially be seen as the required act of goodwill. But I shall leave diplomacy to diplomats. Maybe we will exchange letters again at a later date, Mr. President.

Peace be upon you

Vahidi​

​

 

[Shebedaone]

Mohammadi Gives a Speech to the Mujahideen of the Harakat e-Inghilab after the success of Operation Al Badr

" Assalamualaykum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh. My Brothers !!! after countless raids and battles with the forces of the Kuffar Communist forces we have succeeded in weakening their resolve to the point where our brothers in Mahaz e-Milli Mujahedin to capture the city of Zaranj ! " The Crowd of Mujahideens shout out a Takbir gunshots are fired into the air and the women of the Harakat ululate " Allahuakbar !!! my brothers though we may not have succeeded in capturing the government outpost of Spin Boldak the tribal forces will soon surrender once they hear of our victory and if not we shall starve the kuffar zindiqa tribesmen into submission.Submission to Allah of course !!! " The Crowd once again explodes into excitement Gunshots,Ululating Women and Fireworks drowning out any other sound.​

 

[Bonecracker(NL)]

President Gorbachev,

It is with a feeling of near-embarrasment that I write to you, asking for aid despite your army's withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Afghan National Army is fending well for itself, and the succesful operation in Khost has done wonders for the morale of our soldiers across the country. However, our spirits sadly can't make up for the material shortages we face. In particular, our air forces are being stretched numerically and logistically and it is here where my request for help is prioritised. We hope that the USSR could provide us with 15 more Su-17/22 attack aircraft, as well as Kh-25/29 missiles, 15 Mi-8/17 transport helicopters, and 10 Mi-24 attack helicopters. More importantly, we ask for spare parts and maintenance and repair crews to be provided. The safety of these men will be guaranteed in the airfields of Bagram, Kabul, and Kandahar.

Furthermore, we ask for a moderate amount of armoured vehicles to be prepared in Turkmenistan to strengthen ANA troops in Herat. It is difficult for us to redeploy heavy equipment to Herat from other parts of the country, thus we would like to either acquire some from you or be allowed to redeploy some of our equipment in the north to the west through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

Finally, I have been informed that your army has recently adopted new artillery platforms, the BM-30 and 2S19 Msta. If you wish to field test these units, we would be happy to provide for such an environment.

With warm greetings,

Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai, President of the Republic of Afghanistan.

---------

Excerpt from a cable from the US Ambassador in Pakistan to President Bush.

....Prime Minister Bhutto has told me of the difficulties faced by the freedom fighters in the East of Afghanistan. While the Jalalabad sector is slowly but surely tilting in our favour, the spirit of the Afghan Army has been invigorated after our recent setbacks in Khost. Clausewitz said that three men behind the enemy are worth more than fifty in front of him, and the Afghan brass seems to have taken note. The assault on Khost had been infiltrated and subverted effectively, and this intelligence work was followed up by widespread sabotage and short, high-intensity raids on command posts, assassinating ISI contacts and rebel leaders. The manner in which these raids were conducted leads me to share the opinion of many Pakistani generals that Russian troops are, in fact, still operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area.....

XVG approved btw tbh​

 

[Kho]

Hezb-e Islami Khalis

'Be sure we shall test you with something of fear and hunger, some loss in goods or lives or the fruits (of your toil), but give glad tidings to those who patiently persevere, Who say, when afflicted with calamity: "To Allah We belong, and to Him is our return".' - Qur'an [2:155-6]​

Bismillah al-Rahman al-Raheem [In the Name of Allah, the Beneficient, the Merciful]

From Mawlawi Jalal al-Din Haqqani to 'Abd Allah Yusuf 'Azzam of Maktab al-Khadamat,

Al-Salamu 'Ala Man Itaba'a al-Huda [Peace be Upon Him Who Follows the Right Guidance]
Ama Ba'd:

Brother 'Abd Allah, we have been dealt a most painful, but ultimately minor, setback in Khost. For nine years we have maintained our siege and pushed back every attempt to relieve the city. Even when they broke through in 1987, it was not long before once more regained our positions. The shurawi are, by God's grace, besieged everywhere and it will not be long before Allah's warriors break through and put an end forever to their taint. As you once told me: Do you think that glory is a mere date for you to pick? You shan't achieve glory until you swallow of the cactus tree. And it was most certainly a truth that you spoke and which sticks with me yet.

However, my brother, it is clear to any intelligent observer - and even more clear to us on the ground - that the Soviets are still supplying and aiding the regime. Now, when the world is turning its eyes away from us on the erroneous presumption that the war is won,we have everything to lose. I have received word that even you, brother, are making plans to begin operations elsewhere. I must beseech you, in God's name, to do no such thing. We require more heavy weaponry than the Pakistanis are supplying us with, and we need more zealous warriors willing to fight in God's cause.

Brother 'Abd Allah, I ask you to bring all your efforts to bear in these critical moments of our war against the shurawis. You must reignite the passion for jihad in the hearts of our Arab brethren, and you must send us your men who are busy doing nothing with the Pakistanis. It is here, and not killing shi'is in the Pakistan, that paradise is to be gained. Brother 'Abd Allah, even as I write this to you I have Khost in my sights, I have but to reach out and pluck her. With Allah's support first and foremost, and by the strength of my loyal mujahideen, and by your support, victory will not be denied us long.

Send us money. Send us weapons. Send us men. We will deliver God's victory.

Wal-Salam 'Alaykum wa-Rahmat Allah wa-Barakatuhu
​

___
​

Bismillah al-Rahman al-Raheem [In the Name of Allah, the Beneficient, the Merciful]

From Mawlawi Jalal al-Din Haqqani to Mawlawi Mohammad Yunus Khalis,

Al-Salamu 'Ala Man Itaba'a al-Huda [Peace be Upon Him Who Follows the Right Guidance]
Ama Ba'd:

Brother Mohammad, I had expected to be writing to you with news sweeter to the ear than this. We had most certainly expected that Khost would be in our hands now, but indeed humans can but earnestly strive, for it is God, Most High, who commands and wills. The shurawis foolishly brought all their men to Paktia. Now Mehterlam is ours, and by God's will their neglect of [REDACTED] will ensure that it's fall, along with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED], will be soon. It is quite clear that the shurawis are trying to re-establish themselves in the south-east after we wiped out their presence again and again over the previous years. Insha'Allah, we will wipe out their presence once more.

But my brother, the flow of weaponry from the Pakistanis has been subpar in recent months. Our inability to counter the regime's aircraft proved deadly to our efforts in repelling their relief operation. We need heavier weaponry. We need weaponry that can target planes out of the range of what we currently have. Even one such weapon that can help us reach jets and helicopters flying at higher altitudes will be a boon to us - we will be able to bring their aircraft down, and they will think a thousand times over to send them in the first place. Brother Mohammad, you must secure these weapons for us. I refuse to send anymore of my men to die beneath aircraft fire without having something with which to fight back. God, Most Glorious, does indeed command us saying: 'Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly.' [Q8:60]

They have prepared for us their power, and their steed is the plane. We now must prepare for them our power, and our steed is heavy anti-aircraft weaponry. Secure them for us, brother Mohammad, and Khost is ours.

Wal-Salam 'Alaykum wa-Rahmat Allah wa-Barakatuhu
​

___

​

Bismillah al-Rahman al-Raheem [In the Name of Allah, the Beneficient, the Merciful]

From Mawlawi Mohammad Yunus Khalis to Brother Col. Sultan Amir Tarar of the Special Services Group,

Al-Salamu 'Ala Man Itaba'a al-Huda [Peace be Upon Him Who Follows the Right Guidance]
Ama Ba'd:

Brother, I attach to this communication a dispatch received recently from Mawlawi Jalal al-Din in Paktia. He is understandably frustrated and confused at the, if you would pardon me, unenthusiastic nature of Pakistani support in the Khost offensive. He requests, at the very least, heavier anti-aircraft weaponry that would make another offensive on Khost worthy pursuing in the near future. If Pakistan is unable to secure such weaponry for us, I regret that I stand with the Mawlawi in his refusal to send any more men to certain doom beneath shurawi bombardment. It is my utmost hope that the situation can be rectified swiftly and we can return to serving God, Most Glorious, in our jihad to cleanse Afghanistan of the atheists.

Wal-Salam 'Alaykum wa-Rahmat Allah wa-Barakatuhu

​

 

[Bonecracker(NL)]

In the hills west of Kabul lay en idyllic town called Paghman, with modern landmarks, well-known gardens, and western architecture from the time of King Amanullah. Little remained of that resort town after Islamic hardliners had taken over the town and used it as a base from which they could attack the capital city. This had been a thorn in the side of the government, which had iedentified this presence as a major threat. Subsequently, it had been shelled by everything the Republican Guard and other divisions in Kabul had to offer - D-30 howitzers, BM-21 Grad and BM-27 Smerch MLRS, and the two TOS-1 systems used by the Afghan Army were also present, assisted by frequent bombing runs by the Afghan Air Force. In response, numerous attacks against civilian targets took place in Kabul, intensifying government efforts to recapture the town by using some of the best units available to it. To lift spirits before another series of assaults, President Najibullah headed to the front to address men of the Republican Guard.

​

In the name of God, most Gracious, most Merciful,

Honourable Soldiers and officers, defenders and true sons of Afghanistan and all her people, bringers and keepers of peace and justice to every corner of this pained land, may the peace and blessings of Almighty God be upon you.

You who are here are conducting one of the most important fights in the current war. It is important for us to regain control over the areas around our capital, Kabul, and restore peace, order, and dignity, and safety. Between those beautiful hills lies a little town that in days past was the abode of kings and rich men but is now occupied and looted by the destruction-bent claws of the so-called Islamic Freedom Fighters, the "Mujahideen", who do not govern it but use it to make the lives of their fellow Muslims miserable. They don't want children going to school or flying kites, they don't want people to buy and sell goods in the markets, they don't want fathers to work and provide for their wives and children, they want nothing that even looks like peaceful life. They want the two million people of Kabul to live in agony, fear, going to sleep not knowing whether they'll wake up or not, waking up not knowing whether they'll see the sunset or not.

Soldiers, this is the life that you and your loved ones, and all those around you will be doomed to if you lose this war. What we are fighting for is not a few nice seats for party members, political ideology, and especially allegiance to a foreign power such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or America. Many men, misguided as well as ill-intentioned, fight for this. We are different, because we fight for Afghanistan. We fight for all Afghans, of all religions persuasions and persuasions, and for the glory and freedom of Afghanistan and for the right of us, as a people, to walk the path we choose with our heads held high, not dragged along on a Pakistani leash.

We fight because we have to, not because we want to. We fight groups of men who call themselves Muslim, but one has to wonder who steps in the path of God. For his satisfaction, I always try to walk in His path. And Allah, whose glory is great, indicates in the exalted Qur'an that we keep peace and goodness. And this is why He says us that all Muslims are indeed brothers, and He orders that we must keep peace between our brothers. And His wish is my command. My goal here is peace, and if I could have it in the next second I would do everything to have it. But it is not just about taking peace now, it is about establishing one to last. Peace can only come to Afghanistan if stable and responsible leadership accompanies it, and not the infighting so-called Shura councils of the terrorists come with it.

Brave warriors, the Quran mentions peace 160 times in its verses. And those verses were not sent exclusively for Najib, or for the leaders of men and countries. They were sent for every Muslim, everyone, because peace is a collective effort of good-willing men. You must remember this. If you are to fall in battle, you have to remember this as well. Because each one of us is answerable to the Almighty for his deeds on earth. Our good and bad deeds are recorded, and we must answer to the Lord of the Worlds as to what we have done to implement the verses in His Qur'an. And when you are asked that, you can all answer that you fought so that the children would never have to.

The coming times will be difficult. You are faced with a daunting task: to smoke the terrorists out from their fortifications in difficult terrain. But I have no doubt that you are capable of it. Remember that you have shown your capability in the north, south of Kabul, and more recently in Khost. God willing, Paghman will be another great victory for our forces. And we will show our comrades in Herat, Jalalabad, Khost, Qalat, Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, Shindand, Feyzabad, Taloqan, Kunduz, and elsewhere that there is no task too great for our forces!


------------------------------

0156, XX June 1989,
Khost sector


The operation that saw Khost relieved and the HiK removed from the mountains was a hard-fought victory for the Afghan Army, but one precarious indeed. Khost was hanging on by a thread; a badly-damaged road surrounded by mountains infested by the battered troops of Yunus Khalis, one of the most hated men in Kabul's corridors. The objective now was to keep the road open and to condolidate gains around Khost. It didn't take a genius to realise this, and accordingly Khalis's men laid many ambushes, basing themselves out of a number of small villages just in the hills and mountains surrounding the Gardez-Khost road. Bigger villages, away from government airplanes, tanks, and artillery. Najib and General Tanai had less to say about how things went in these parts than Pakistan and America.

In these dark hours when most slept and few stood guard, a troop of ten men, accompanied by pack mules, descended to a larger unnamed village in the mountains. They were clad in face-covering Pashtun turbans, Perahans and tunbans, and modern army boots. Under the shrouds accompanying their garb they carried Russian Kalashnikov machine guns, with the exception one carrying a PKM, two men with PPSh-41s, and another with a Dragunov sniper rifle. They were noticed by two Khalist militiamen standing guard and greeting them.

"Assalamu alaikum, brothers", one said.

"Alaikum salam" replied the man leading the donkey troop. "It is good to see you my brother. We have come bearing necessities. Food, water, and weapons. But we are tired from the journey. Tell us, brother, where can we rest? And where is the commander? We must report to him."

"The commander is in the small building near the river bank. Next to it is the building with the two men on guard outside. It is where our mujahideen sleep. Please, don't talk too much, there are civilians here too. They are asleep"

The convoy master thanked them and lead his party further to the village the last two following with a distance and approached the two sentries. "Hey buddy, got a cigarette for me?" one of the men asked. The sentries checked their pockets, prompting the two nicotine-needy men to pull out a silenced Makarov pistol each, each disposing of one of the sentries each. "Alright, get back!" they said to the rest of the troop who ran back up the hill, taking cover behind the trees and tying up their mules to some of them. In turn, the men went to the mules and traded their shrouds and waistcoats for Poyas-A chest rigs and Russian-made belts to carry flasks and other equipment on. In one of those bags wasn't military equipment but a long range radio, which the convoy master was using the communicate to other groups in the area with.

"Two, this is one, our approach is clear. Ready to strike the western cluster, over."

"One, two, at your command, over."

"Set a timer for three minutes, over and out.", the 'convoy master' finished His squad took up position and identified targets, preparing their weapons for action. They weren't the usual banged-up AKMs, but mint-condition AK-74 variants, one with a GP-25 grenade launcher, with magazines taped together with the distinctively blue Soviet electrical tape. Two men brandishing PPSh-41s accompanied by two men slowly moved and took cover behind a house opposite the larger house where the terrorists were supposedly sleeping, trying to not alert a sentry. A few seconds later, the four moved forward; two men checking the house they took cover in and two walking into the dorm where the Khalists were sleeping. A few bursts of PPSh-41 fire coming from the dorm told of a short fight, but one that commandeered the attention of every sentry in the village who came to investigate. At that point, gunfire erupted from the other side of the village - single shots or short bursts of 5.45mm fire, as well as long bursts of PKM fire.

The eyes of group one then fell on the HQ building. The PKM opened up on it as the men in the village reloaded, and five moved to enter it. Inside they found a number of men in Pashto garb, of which the one holding a weapon was promtly disarmed and all tied up, blindfolded, put in a corner and guarded as they were being searched for weapons and identity papers. "Captain", one of the men said. "This one has Pakistani ID". The convoy master took the badge and compared the picture on it to the man pointed out.

"Then he's under arrest for espionage and he'll be treated as such." was the ominous reply by the convoy master. Searching the building led to the acquisition of a few maps and logbooks, one of which confirmed intel that a convoy was due to arrive today. "Stingers? We're gonna hold up.". The trap was set, and the twenty operators set about clearing out every building and hiding the mess they had made. Then, some slept, but most stood guard.


-------
0427

During the lull in the fighting, the men had cleared up the mess, reloaded their magazines, collected the captured weapons and ammo and brought them to the pack mules together with the intel gathered, as well as the Khalist prisoners and the Pakistani man and put them under guard. The men, posing as Khalist sentries again, observed the arrival of a heavily guarded convoy with horses. "Greetings!", the sentry shouted "Come! Let me take you to the commander!" The sentry took them to the HQ building and invited the commanders in. "We heard you come bringing a special guest?"

"A special guest, that's all I can possibly say I'm afraid.", the Khalist straw boss said before leading a number of men inside. Inside were the convoy master, five of his men, and now the sentry to accompany the Khalist heads. The sentry lead them in and slammed the door rather violently, without good reason.

"Anyone care for some tea?", the convoy master said as he sat the Khalists down. "Excuse him, he's rather hard-handed in things such as these. Please, sit." The convoy master's men did not sit down, and instead pulled out weapons on those who went inside. The bewilderment of the Khalists was cleared up as the thirty-second ambush took place outside, with the dying noises of men and horses protruding the fire of Russian machineguns. "In case you still need to have it explicitly told, you are under arrest on the suspicion of terrorism, armed rebellion, and carrying arms on behalf of a foreign power. Your special guest, if he's actually here, is hereby suspected of espionage. Hands behind your backs, please.". The men were, just as before, cuffed and blindfolded and marched outside to the pack mules and tied to them. Later, they were joined by all the operators including from group two, who joined together on an arduous march over the mountain. For these mysterious men with shiny weapons, the march ended as soon as they had reached their horses. However, for the prisoners it wasn't over for the next three days of slow advance, until they finally reached the city of Ghazni where they presented WAD men in suits with their loot. They would take care of the rest.

In the mountains of Afghanistan, infested with anti-air, the eyes in the sky and their wrath had been replaced by LRRP operations and short, high-intensity assaults. Without them, Khost would be the abode of Yunus Khalis, Jalalabad would be Hekmatyar's, and Massoud would have Salang. But in their small numbers, they proved a great force multiplier for the Afghan Army and Air Force. Najibullah once told Tanai they are the heroes of the invisible front. The Americans and Pakistanis insist they are Russian. The mujahideen on the ground refer to them as the Ghosts. Professionally, however, this unit whose size is only known by the WAD and that reports directly to the president is knowns as the "Spetsnaz".

 

[XVG]

June-August 1989

Shiite Ashura festival in Afshar district of Kabul, August 1989
​

Kabul

The government outreach to the Hazara Shia, and their Iranian sponsors, continued over the summer. Political prisoners, and mujahedin fighters, were offered an amnesty and released from the infamous Pul-e-Charki prison. Celebrations of Ashura were held in August, under government protection and endorsement in Afshar district of Kabul, as well as in Maidan Shahr, Kowt-e-Nashrow and other Shiite cities. PDPA officials even attended such celebrations, while Najibullah in an interview with Western journalists wished to underline and stress the importance of these events, by claiming that victorious mujahedin would never allow such a thing. The enemy were the illegal armed groups destabilizing the state, not religiously devout people, as long as they did not hold an AKM in their left hand while still cherishing the holy quran in the right.

The attacks on the capital by Sayyaf’s group continued, as the WAD intensified its purge, also arresting infiltrators of the Jamiat in the capital. New checkpoints were erected, and Kabul was more and more a capital at war, the previous image of peace slowly shattering again. But this time, the anger was increasingly directed towards the foreign-backed Wahhabists and their violent attacks, instead of the PDPA government. Only a few of the attackers striking the capital were from Kabul, and quite a number were not even Afghan to begin with. This, coupled with government propaganda overplaying their crimes and numbers helped in recruiting hundreds of new pro-government fighters, regular army, militiamen and special forces, only in Kabul over the summer, making up for desertions and lack of volunteers in other areas of the country. A full new infantry division, the 81st, was set up in the capital, aimed to reach full combat capacity in the autumn.

Paghman

Officers of the Republican Guard and Mountain Battalions on the outskirts of Paghman, July 1989​

The government attack continued with even further resolve. In the sweaty summer months, artillery and bombs kept falling on the beautiful ridges of Paghman, destroying cave and entrenchment one after another. The 80th Division and the Republican Guard attacked again in July, seizing ground even faster and finally securing the urban area of Paghman by early August, as the badly beaten Wahhabists of Sayyaf were forced to abandon their positions in the lowlands in favour of the mountains. An immediate threat to the capital from the west was now, at least temporarily, checked. The TOS-1 flamethrower system, as well as new heavier Soviet rocket launchers, models BM-27 and BM-30 were used more extensively than ever before, and claims that Soviet advisers were leading the attacks spread around Kabul and soon in the outside world. The US State Department decried the Soviet Union, and later some of these new pieces of equipment were seen travelling north through the Salang tunnel, only weeks after they had been sent south through it.

Operation Cobalt

The operation to retake the Jalalabad highway was now the top priority of the DRA government. The Ministry of Defence and General Staff drafted a complex plan for the operation, relying on General Nabi Azimi’s 8th Division once more. Supporting units included the 15th Armored Brigade, local sarandoy and remnants of the 6th Infantry Division, as well as a new brigade raised in Kabul and merged to the 11th Division. Beginning in mid-June, the offensive initially started well, as the commando battalions and 8th spearheaded the government assault to retake crucial positions around the Mehterlam intersection, allowing the government a relatively safe area to build up equipment and troops for an offensive further east. By the beginning of July, the 8th under Nabi Azimi had fully secured Chaharbagh and its surroundings, starting to move towards Jalalabad on both banks of the Kabul river. However, General Tanai demanded that the 6th immediately continue its assault northwards and retake Mehterlam. The division was however far too depleted for the task, and the assault withered to a standstill, greatly hampering efforts to reach Jalalabad because air power and missiles were reserved for the futile and repeated assaults, that were finally called off in August. Not even heavy shelling with GRADs and bombardment with the MiG-23 and Su-22 jets constantly taking off from Bagram could break the positions held by Abdul Haq in the valley leading to the city, immensely frustrating General Tanai. Artillery sent by JaI originally to aid in Jalalabad was redirected to the valley with crushing success, as the Alishang riverbanks were littered with destroyed tanks. The fast moving raiding units of Wardak also helped considerably in slowing down the government assault here, but found their match in the commando battalions and mountain troops accompanying the 8th.

Jalalabad

SCUD missiles hitting the outskirts of Jalalabad to support the defensive efforts of the 11th Division
​

As the government counteroffensive slowly started to gain speed and ground, the mujahiden of Hekmatyar intensified their attacks on Jalalabad, along with men of Khalis’s faction. The government positions near Daronta Dam were further seized, and defenders cornered into the city on multiple flanks. The roads were mined and ambushes prepared for the arrival of the relief forces, by now taking extremely heavy attrition due to the rebels’ successful strategy of ceding ground slowly and only after dealing heavy casualties on a select section of the road. At one point mujahidin of HiK managed to infiltrate the city in dozens, causing heavy damage to government checkpoints and destroying an ammunition stockpile. Later in July a detachment of HiG fighters, including members of Colonel Wardak’s mobile groups, managed to seize parts of the airport before being driven off by a counterattack using tanks and attack helicopters. The 8th Division under Nabi Azimi managed to fully secure the northern coast of the Daronta artificial lake by late July, but attempts to secure the southern bank largely failed due to extraordinarily well defended positions held by experienced mujahidin of the HiG and HiK. Thus, the 8th Division began an alternative assault, seizing the initiative on the heights north of Jalalabad, clearing them by mid-August. Contact with the garrison under General Nur ul-Haq Ulumi was technically restored by August 17th, but the fact that the main highway was still held by the mujahidin and largely destroyed greatly hampered efforts of reinforcement. Unless the road could be captured, the 8th would have to be forced to relinquish the hilltops by winter, and roads over the mountains were thought to turn inaccessible with the first autumn rains and later by snow. The situation was still quite shaky, and government losses in attack helicopters, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were some of the heaviest so far.

Khost

After securing a good deal of more sophisticate anti-aircraft weapons from Pakistan and bankrolled by Gulf backers, the HiK mujahedin under Haqqani resume offensive operations around Khost, having waited for the government to pull out their heaviest elements used for breaking the siege. With the 8th Division gone, Haqqani managed to reclaim some positions and reapply pressure on the Gardeyz-Khost road. However, while the anti-aircraft weapons deterred helicopters and jet fighters, they offered no cover against GRAD launchers, howitzers and SCUD missiles extensively employed by the government in the region. Nevertheless, the HiK fighters, despite of being depleted in numbers and demoralized by the successful government offensive regularly managed to ambush convoys and occasionally cut the road, showing astonishing resolve. Later on, the government was forced to send the 4th Armoured Brigade to bolster the defences of Khost, as the burden placed on the mountain battalions had become increasingly heavy. In a show of force the Afghan army also conducted a heavy and concentrated SCUD missile attack on Zareh Sharan on July the 23rd, causing heavy losses to mujahidin – and to local civilian population. WAD operations against rebel supply lines seemingly decreased, either due to increased Pakistani military and intelligence presence – or due to a shift in priorities.

Kunduz, Takhar & Badakshan.

Fighters of Dostum’s corps with local civilians somewhere near Kunduz.​

During the summer, the 53rd Division of Dostum’s corps managed to fully secure the Kholm-Kunduz road, after negotiating a safe passage with some local tribal leaders. Meanwhile elements of the 70th were refitted as a more irregular and specialized formation, receiving training from both WAD and the officers of the commando battalions. In general Dostum started to sponsor a more aggressive policy of subversion against the rebels of Massoud, and WAD operatives, Uzbek militiamen and Tajik infiltrators were caught all over the rebel-held regions of the north. The likelihood of Uzbek elders passing information to Dostum was a very distinct and dangerous possibility to Jamiat fighters. This theory was manifested by the dismantling of a Jamiat cell in Kunduz and by the very accurate targeting of mujahedin stockpiles and positions near Taloqan and Feyzabad. Nevertheless, by August the rebels had managed to seize parts of the outer perimeter of government checkpoints and strongpoints surrounding the besieged city of Feyzabad.

Herat

Fighting continued in Herat near the borderpost with Iran, local Jamiat fighters under Mohammad Ismail Khan quickly realizing that the government forces were well entrenched and had enough ammunition and tanks to repel any mujahidin attacks. Thus the mujahidin waited and intensified their siege, while increasing attacks along the highway leading to the Soviet border. The government responded with offensives of its own, attacking along the highways leading out of Herat, managing to evacuate the stranded troops in Ghowr and linking with Qala-i-Naw by the end of the summer. Herat airbase was attacked by the JaI mujahidin in July, and the rebels managed to destroy two cargo planes on the ground, slowing down the flow of reinforcements from Bagram airbase.

Chaghcharan

Young woman fleeing the violence in the capital of Ghowr province with her child​

After a JaI leader was ambushed and killed just outside of Chaghcharan in Ghowr, fighting finally erupted in the region, pitting HiG and JaI militia against each other. With superior manpower and equipment arriving from Oruzgan, the HiG managed to expel JaI from the few neighbourhoods of the city held by them. JaI responded by shelling the city with mortars and GRADs, resulting in Shia groups mobilizing at the airport. After a few weeks of fighting an extremely tenuous truce was agreed to, yet both sides kept a sizeable number of fighters in constant readiness in and around the town. HiG set up a shura to govern the city, guaranteeing representation to the Hazara factions, Aimaq people and even to a number of ex-PDPA officials and officers. The new stability promised by Hekmatyar seemed to be quite a lucrative deal.

Other Regions

In the southwest heavy mujahidin movement was reported close to Farah, and a few outlying checkpoints were briefly lost and later reclaimed with the heavy and intense use of artillery and mechanized forces. Certainly, the MeM fighters of Vali Farah Yousef were responsible for this following their victory at Zaranj, but quickly realized that Farah was in entirely different league than the small isolated garrison town. Meanwhile the government deployed an increasing number of attack aircraft to Kandahar airbase, striking rebel positions of MeM south of Laskhar Gah. In August, a ground offensive resumed, driving the Mahaz-e Milli away from the outskirts of the city and further securing the road network.

Ahmad Shah Massoud with his men in the Panjsher valley, raising spirits in the aftermath of the gruelling Shomali plains offensive.​

An attack out of the Panjsher valley to the Shomali plains was launched by a huge number of Massoud’s mujahidin in the heat of July. They advanced fast, seizing checkpoint after checkpoint, before government formations from the Salang highway and Kabul arrived for a counterattack. Backed by airpower and massive rocket artillery strikes from Bagram, the government forces heavily beat the rebels in the open ground, managing to reclaim almost all lost areas in a few weeks and encircling a large number of rebel fighters. Seemingly, no clear battleplan or even goals had been issued to the mujahidin, just a directive to advance to the plains to distract the government from the fighting waged by brothers along the Jalalabad highway. If the sacrifice was worth it remained to be seen.

The 70th and 54th Divisions of Dostum conducted a limited offensive along the highway linking the northern part of Afghanistan with the north-western, attacking along the Sheberghan-Maymanah road in a bid to eventually allow the transport of goods, and heavier military equipment, between Kabul and Herat. Mechanized attacks and use of artillery slowly seized positions from Massoud’s Shura-e Nazar, but without air power to properly support the offensive, it ended up falling short of its initial goals.

Mujahidin groups attempted a new outreach for foreign aid and assistance, seeing that dislodging the socialist regime from Kabul had turned out to be far harder than anticipated. Jamiat-e Islami tried to gather support from the British and French, as Rabbani met with British envoys in Peshawar, hoping that the recent improvement in British-Pakistani ties could result in additional support for his group. However, with Soviet involvement seemingly ended, and with the government of Najibullah taking allegedly honest steps of reconciliation, the British and the French weren’t exactly overtly enthusiastic about re-escalating the crisis. Limited medical support, as well as money for civil services, was however offered. Saudis, however, were less reluctant and just provided Jamiat-e Islami with a nice lump sum to be used on whatever and whenever. Attempts by the HiG to negotiate with the Americans went about as well, as the CIA was in no way interested to become directly involved with the quite radical group.

The PDPA government sought to restore some mining and other important economic activities in the ‘triangle’ captured south of the capital. Sapper units removed mines and unexploded ordnance from the countryside, and newly recruited tribal fighters of the sarandoy manned checkpoints. Stability, economic and social, has returned, declared the President on a visit to his hometown of Gardeyz. Normalcy was indeed returning, and in Pul-e-Alam, Gardeyz and Ghazni the PDPA was maybe at the height of its popularity, after effectively ending previous hardships and driving away the fighting to the mountains. Heavy presence of the WAD also effectively prevented any espionage and infiltration attacks by the rebel forces.

Events from around the world
​

U. S. S. R.

The new heads of the two most important SSRs of Soviet Central Asia.​

Ethnic clashes that erupted in the Caucasus spread further to Central Asia, as fighting between Kyrgyz and Uzbek mobs erupted in the Fergana valley. In the Uzbek SSR proper tensions rose between ethnic Uzbek and various peoples settled into the SSR from other parts of the Soviet Union. To curb the violence and in order to prevent the spread of influences of Islamic factions operating across the Afghan border, the Soviet military and Interior Ministry sent additional forces to the Uzbek SSR and the Gorno-Badakhshan AO. After riots also erupted in the Kazakh SSR, Moscow saw the necessity of a change, at least cosmetic. On June 22, 1989, Gorbachev removed Gennady Kolbin as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR for his poor handling of the June events, and replaced him with Nursultan Nazarbayev. The next day, Gorbachev removed Rafiq Nishonov as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR and replaced him with Islam Karimov. The rise of tensions and economic crisis in the Soviet Central Asia also spilled over to Afghanistan, as trade with the Soviets took a slight hit. In addition, several fuel convoys were delayed causing a short fuel shortage even in Mazar-i-Sharif. Certainly, many PDPA officials as well as civilians living in government-held areas feared that this was to be just the beginning, as the Soviet Union was on its way to a deepening economic and social crisis.

June 3 – Tehran. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini dies.
June 4 – Beijing. The Tiananmen Square crackdown takes place in Beijing on the army's approach to the square, and the final stand-off in the square is covered live on television.
June 19 – Alma-Ata. Young men carrying guns, firebombs, iron bars and stones riot in Zhanaozen, Kazakh SSR, causing a number of deaths. Riots later spread to Yeraliev, Shepke, Fort Shevchenko and Kulsary.
June 30 – Khartoum. A military coup led by Omar al-Bashir ousts the civilian government of Prime Minister of Sudan Sadiq al-Mahdi.
July 21 – Baku, Yerevan. A total blockade of Armenian SSR and NKAO by Azerbaijani SSR begins.
July 28 – Tehran. Iranian presidential election: electors overwhelmingly elect Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as President of Iran and endorse changes to the constitution, increasing the powers of the president.
August 2 – Islamabad. Pakistan rejoins the Commonwealth of Nations.
August 23 – Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius. Singing Revolution: Two million residents of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian SSRs join hands to demand freedom and independence from Soviet Union, forming an uninterrupted 600 km human chain.

 

[XVG]

Turn 5 – September 1989

​

General Secretary of PDPA, President of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah (Bonecracker(NL)/Dutchbag)
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sultan Ali Keshtmand (jeeshadow)
Minister of State Security, Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi (Terraferma)
Minister of Interior, Mohammad Aslam Watanjar (LatinKaiser)

​

Chief of Army Staff, Minister of Defense, Shahnawaz Tanai (Julius Maximus)
Commander of Afghan Air Force, Abdul Qadir Aqa (Shynka)
Commander of 6th Mazar-i-Sharifi Corps, Abdul Rashid Dostum (King50000)
Commander of 4th Herati Corps, Abdul Wahid Baba Jan (Korona)
Commander of 11th Infantry Division, Nur ul-Haq Ulumi (Harpsichord)
Commander of 8th Infantry Division, Central Corps, Mohammad Nabi Azimi (KF25)
Commander of Bagram Garrison, Mohammed Zafar Khan (OPEN)
Commander of Baghlan Ismaili Sarandoy, Sayed Jafar Naderi (OPEN)
Commander of Hairatan Sarandoy, Abdul Momim (OPEN)
Commander of pro-government Achakzai tribal militia in Kandahar, Ismatullah Muslim (OPEN)

​

Leader of Gulbuddinist faction, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Noco19)
Leader of Khalist faction, Mohammad Yunus Khalis (Kho)
Khalist Mujahedin commander in Kabul, Abdul Haq (BlackCrown)
Khalist Mujahedin commander in Paktia, Jalaluddin Haqqani (OPEN)
Gulbuddinist Mujahedin commander of the Janjawid Corps, Abdul Rahim Wardak (Dadarian)

​

Leader of Jamiat e-Islami, Burhanuddin Rabbani (aedan777)
Party Mujahidin Commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud (baboushreturns)
Mujahedin Commander in Herat, Mohammad Ismail Khan (OPEN)
Mujahedin Commander in Northern Afganistan, Atta Muhammad Nur (OPEN)
Mujahedin Commander in Southern Afganistan, Mullah Naqib (OPEN)

Minor Mujahedin Groups

Leader of Harakat e-Inghilab, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi (Shebedaone)
Leader of Mahaz-e Milli, Sayyid Ahmed Gailani (OPEN)
Commander of Mahaz-e Milli Mujahedin near Shindand, Vali Farah Yousef (Mikkel Glahder)
Leader of Ittihad-e Islami, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Cleeque)

Shiite Mujahedin Groups

Co-leader of Al-Nasr, Abdul Ali Mazari (OPEN)
Leader of Revolutionary Council of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan, Sayyid Ali Beheshti (OPEN)
Leader of Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, Muhammad Asif Mohseni (OPEN)
Commander of Islamic Movement of Afghanistan Mujahedin, Sayed Hussein Anwari (tyriet)

Other Resistance Groups

Leader of Society for the Call to the Quran, Jamil al-Rahman (Maxwell500)




Orders will be due next Wednesday!

 

[Bonecracker(NL)]

CLASSIFIED
Non-military strategy: Hearts and Minds at home and abroad​

Recipients: All members Politburo of PDPA, General Staff of Armed Forces. Individual recipients include Cde. Tanai, Cde. Keshtmand, Cde. Yaqubi, and Cde. Dostum. Further dissemination only by direct approval of President.

Comrades,

It has been less than a year since the USSR started its withdrawal and slightly over half a year since the last Soviet soldier officially left our country. On the international stage, the idea that the terrorists from Pakistan and Hazarajat were close to finishing their efforts of overthrowing us has long since dissipated. Consequently, a lot of us have since unpacked our suitcases. What this has shown is that we are not directly dependent on Russian support as it has been relegated to roles supporting Afghan Air and Ground forces. I think that, on the whole, we have done a good job since February of taking over Soviet combat operations and have done so yielding great successes, with the offensives south of Kabul and on the Gardez-Khost road working miracles for morale among the ranks. Similarly, I expect the upcoming relief of Jalalabad to be a further confidence boost for our army and curbs desertion.

This is not going to be a reason to celebrate. While we are not longer burdened with the image of a sinking ship that one either goes down with or jumps off of, nor fundamentally challenged in our presence in a certain part of the country, we have a long way to go before we can fully utilise our strategic initiative post-Jalalabad. While those who support us can very well find themselves enervated by the events of the last 6-12 months, it is important to consider that our enemies consider us Soviet leftovers who only have institutional and military power. Worse yet, they can effectively paint us as such for those on the fence to see and be persuaded. In my view, now that the transition from Soviet to Afghan operations is essentially complete, we have to sort ourselves out.

What we can't get around is that since the Soviet withdrawal started we have been managing this war in a very reactive way, planning battles as others conclude and setting short-term goals only. In my view we need to start setting strategic goals and suit our means to achieve those. Put differently, we need to ask ourselves to questions. First, what do we want to achieve? And secondly, how do we achieve that?

Our previous strategy has been one that revolved around taking land and holding it and seeking to militarily destroy large concentrations of mujahideen as they attempted to adapt to a more conventional style of fighting. There should be no doubt that this has worked brilliantly so far, but one has to wonder whether or not this approach will be fruitful in the long term. As the conventional experiment by the Mujahideen will come to an end, we need to adapt to this. No more bombing out villages in inconvenient places, as has been done repeatedly around Khost in particular. The shift in our thinking should be from a purely military style to a civilian and counter-insurgency style in which the military plays second fiddle to the civilian government's aims of winning over hearts and minds of the population in the provinces.

This should more or less answer the first question. We want to achieve a situation in which the Afghan population at large sees the PDPA as a preferable alternative to the terrorist groups from abroad. The question that follows is how we would seek to achieve this. The way to this should be to work on creating a brand for our government to contrast it with the terrorist forces on multiple points. It is important to realise that our audience consists mostly of feudal peasants in the countryside, who do not care for little except religion and their material circumstances. Thus, political concessions should not be a priority.

The priority should, as said, lie within contrasting. This contrast should not be one of vision and ideology, but one of our capabilities and actions. We should highlight that despite our internal differences, the PDPA government is capable of setting those differences aside for the good of the nation. Furthermore, this unity results in progress and safety for the people, and military victory. This should contrast with the division of the terrorists. A plethora of groups and factions with little to no organisation, full of rivalries, usurpation, and even open conflict. From this situation, we can bring the argument of "PDPA versus Mujahideen" back from what is preferable to what is possible, simply by stating that they can't even govern, let alone govern well.

We are also speaking to a war-weary populace; both in the towns and on the countryside. We have been at war with ourselves for a decade, and this country and its people cry out for peace. This is perhaps one of our most powerful angles, if we can show that peace comes from the PDPA. We must show that the areas under our control are peaceful, calm, and that there is development. People there have work and live normally, and their children's future have a prospect of something else than war. We also have to build schools in villages and restore public services to the best of our ability so that this narrative gains traction. Furthermore, we have to tie this in to the inability of the terrorist groups to come together and govern, would they have the opportunity.

Through such showcases, we expect to further our policy of national reconciliation. We can win the allegiance of tribes and regions by showing that while we might not see eye to eye on many issues, we can at least provide for an environment in which they can go about their daily lives and practice their faith in peace. This should in the short term be geared towards gaining stature amongst the Shia tribes of Hazarajat. With the apparent collapse of Shia anti-government forces paired with our newfound Shia allies in Kabul and Maidan Shahr, we should aggressively make inroads in Hazarajat to see if localities and tribes can be persuaded to play ball with us. Such programmes could be expanded to other regions.

It is of critical importance that we can make good on our narrative. As such, any administrations that are restored or set up anew should grow out of the state or party apparatus, and not out of the army. Interim administrations are one thing, but by no means should permanent, parallel administrations be set up that are beholden to local leaders and interests. For long term governance goals, too, it is undesirable to set up parellel administrations not beholden to the official governors and the central government in Kabul.

Finally, it is important to combine internal developments with an outward charm offensive. We should strive to show a human face to the outside world, and highlight human suffering. To this end, we should invite foreign (mostly western) television programmes to make films about the war in our country and how our government tries to improve the lives and lot of its citizens. The development programmes mentioned above, as well as using well-known western NGOs to help us with food aid, education aid, vaccination programmes, and so forth could very well help to turn the public mood and, indirectly, political mood against supporting the terrorists and in favour of supporting us.

I hope that you will all take these policy objectives to heart. Attached to the copies headed for Comrades Tanai, Dostum, Keshtmand, and Yaqubi are military directives. If requested, these can be forwarded.

-Najib.

 

[XVG]

Democracy, Salafi Style
​

For any Afghan ruler the eastern border province of Kunar is seperated from the capital Kabul by the Hindu Kush mountains and accessible only from Jalalabad down the Pech river. However, a couple of relatively low-altitude and gentle passes make it relatively easy to access from Pakistan. It should be no surprise that when the PDPA took over the government of Afghanistan the first uprisings against it took place in Kunar province. The Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were the dominant force in the Kunar insurgency, led by Jamil al-Rahman. Rahman, a native of Kunar, was educated in a Saudi-funded Salafist Madrassa in Pakistan and had been active in Hekmatyar’s Muslim Youth since the early 1970s. Although Rahman and Hekmatyar had been comrades in fighting the Khalqists since the days of the monarchy the two rifted over the course over the 1980s, culminating in Rahman founding the Society for the Call to the Quran and the Sunnah, or JDQS.

Being focused on the entirety of Afghanistan rather than a small border province, Hekmatyar let Rahman’s moves towards independence slide for the most part to avoid open conflict with high risks and little reward. This attitude was returned by Rahman, who did not seek to encroach on Hekmatyar’s efforts around the country. This did not stop Rahman and the JDQS, left out from the Peshawar Seven bloc, from soliciting for and receiving aid from the Arab Gulf States and private Salafist and Wahabbi financiers and organisations in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and volunteers from across the Arab and Islamic world. These developments and the parallel nature of Rahman’s network coupled with growing frictions between JDQS and HIG in the battle for Jalalabad led to him expanding his own power inside Afghanistan as well, and by the autumn of 1989 he controlled virtually all of Kunar except for the part south of Pashad, with a lot of HiG military activity due to the battle for Jalalabad, and the city of Asadabad which was still held by Mojaddedi’s Afghan National Liberation Front.

Knowing that any unilateral declaration of a government would probably be challenged by Mojaddedi and Hekmatyar, Rahman proposed to call a jirga consisting of representatives of the JDQS, HIG, ANLF, as well as warlords, chieftains, and elders of Kunar province. To prevent a deadlock, Rahman and the JDQS proposed something no Salafist leader would have dreamed of; elections. The JDSQ, HIG, and ANLF were to contest an election about who would take power in the province. The HIG was, to Rahman’s surprise, supportive of this move and even pressured the ANLF in Asadabad to acquiesce to the elections. The news was spread throughout Kunar province and made its way to Kabul, Riyadh, Islamabad and throughout global Salafist movement who looked on with genuine interest. By late 1989, the ANLF mujahidin in Asadabad were effectively demoralized due to Mojaddedi's decision to stay out of combat in Jalalabad, and desertions and defections were a daily nuisance to local commanders. Thus, especially after Hekmatyar's influencing and certain promises, Mojaddedi decided to accept the elections.

The date for the election was set to be 20th Rabi al-Awwal 1410, corresponding to Friday 20th October 1989. Campaigning was lackluster and allegiances were already known, and after Friday prayers on election day imams and chieftains across Kunar gently reminded their flock and villagers to cast their votes, and more often than not who for. With observers from all three major factions, as well as from international Islamists, the voting was as fair as it could be and produced a predictable result; a large majority of males in Kunar age 15 and over voted for Jamil al-Rahman and the JDQS. A statement by the JDQS thanked the ANLF and HIG and expressed hope for future cooperation in liberating Afghanistan and made clear that Hekmatyar’s troops would in no way be hindered by Rahman in the battle for Jalalabad. Seven days later, another Jirga convened in Asadabad where the former HIG administrators in Kunar, together with the notables of the province and the obnoxious absence of ANLF representatives and fighters swore allegiance to the newly-installed Mawlawi Rahman as the first Emir of the Islamic Emirate of Kunar. Also present was Mawlawi Mohammad Afzal from Nuristan, but he did not pledge his allegiance to Emir Rahman. Mojaddedi and a core group of supporters had by then moved to Peshawar. He remained in favour of the Pakistanis, and close to Hekmatyar, and was certainly hoping for a political position in the interim government, if one was to be formed on Afghan ground. Indeed, after vacating Asadabad and Kunar the remaining ANLF mujahidin arrived to the Jalalabad front waving the flags of HIG.

A view of Asadabad, the capital of the new Islamic Emirate of Kunar (KIA) ​

The Emir took up HIG figures into his administration to establish shuras across Kunar, establish official foreign delegations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and encouraged refugees in Pakistan to settle in Kunar which some, enticed by the seemingly peaceful transition of power, did. Normalcy and calm came to Kunar together with congratulatory messages from the Saudi religious establishment and their spiritual kin across the world, donations from the Arab Gulf states, and fighters and their families from the Arab Gulf, Egypt, Pakistan, and East Turkestan joined refugees returning from Pakistan. Emir Jamil al-Rahman now found himself the legitimate and unchallenged ruler over his mountain fiefdom and with a greatly enhanced stature and prestige. How he would use it, however, remained to be seen.

GM NOTE: Reminder that orders are due tomorrow! Also thanks to those who helped in the creation of this piece.

 

[Julius Maximus]

Defense Minster, Chief of Army Staff, Shahnawaz Tanai
​

To Lt. General Mohammad Nabi Azimi, Commander of the 8th Infantry Division,

Comrade Azimi, your courageous efforts with the 8th Infantry Division has made you a national hero of Afghanistan, the destruction and retreat of the terrorists before you is one I admire very much. You have been the vanguard of our offensives to retake territory and reestablish law and order where you are sent. It is due to this that the General Staff and myself have decided to elevate your position to the commander of the 4th Corps in the place of Abdul Wahid Baba Jan who shall take command of the 8th Infantry Division in your place.

I expect great results from the 4th Corps moving forward, as your reputation is well-respected within Afghanistan and the ANA. I wish you the best of luck in defeating the terrorist scum who still infest our most beloved country.

Best of luck Comrade Lt. General Azimi.

 

[Mikkel Glahder]

Vali: "Bismillah, we survived the communist dogs counteroffensive."

Liwal: "Yes, but now we are stuck here."

Vali: "You must not lose hope Liwal. Allah watched over us. If we just stay true to the words of Allah's Prophet Muhammed, peace be upon him, we will achieve victory over the Communist dogs."

Liwal: "Will we ever obtain victory?"

Vali: "Inshallah, my young Liwal. Now let us recite the shahada."

Both: "Lā ʾilāha ʾillā llāh muḥammadun rasūlu llāh"

 

[Noco19]

Gulbuddin Hekmatayar
Excerpts From A Press Conference​

"Look! - I ask you to look at the Islamic Emirate of Kunar, that land which has turned away from Kabul, much like many places in Afghanistan which wave that flag of Jihad. And then look at the center of this Communist regime, Kabul which is whipped into panic and mayhem for its rejection of Allah and His Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him.

In one, we have selected leadership which stands for morality and for our own people, and in the other, the leadership are those who gnaw at the bones left out by their masters in the Soviet Union, standing meekly for a program which has no basis in our traditions and our laws and our very character. The Sharia which stands tested and beloved is exercised in the land which boasts prosperity; does this not say enough that only the pillars of our people can support this nation?

But no says those of the Communist regime, and so it is that they flail against the coming tides of our Jihad, giving the death-rattle of one who has come to realize their apparent death. It stands poised to lose Jalalabad and thus would come the complete unraveling of its remaining hold over our nation, and it is of my mind that many that suffer under the Communist banner will soon see that they must surrender themselves to save their souls for the defeat of their sinful masters is nigh.

Across the nation, we come with naked sword, and I say that it shall be wielded in Jalalabad, in Kandahar, in Kabul, against the devils who pray to Marx and not Allah! Under the Black Banner stands many who have seen the inevitable decline of the Communist regime, of many tribes, of many affiliations, all bound in opposition to the damnation of Afghanistan.

The Shuras of our Hizb-e Islami have been those which have allowed stability, and so it shall be that with the coming-about of an Islamic Government for Afghanistan, that the very same boon will be afforded across our nation, allowing for the virtous livings of our people in the manners according to our methods, not the methods of Communist devils!"

 

[Bonecracker(NL)]

It had been slightly over a year since Nasrat had been press-ganged into the Afghan Army, and he had been besieged in Jalalabad for slightly over ten months now. He had been living off what the Air Force dropped into the town on massive pellets since the spring. That made him a veteran, apparently. And veterans in the ANA were hard to come by. What actually made him a veteran, Nasrat thought, was that he was exempted from shaving every day, did not have to help fortify the buildings with sandbags, and nobody asked where he got that KZS camouflage suit from. Being besieged for so long did come with its benefits and a promotion to Sergeant. This, in turn, came with an increase in the wages he would be paid at some point when he returned to Kabul. Allegedly.

There was no point complaining about that now - there were other concerns. A few months earlier, the siege was on the Daronta dam and Nangarhar university, and the town of Jalalabad. Now, it was reduced to the small terminal building of the airport. The airport was a glorified airstrip surrounded by plains and farms, offering no protection for any attacked coming in. But this also made defending anything aside from the buildings a bad idea. The glass was already shot out long ago, and sandbags and heavy weapons turned the terminal building, which included the ATC tower, into a strong obstacle. Plenty of ammunition was stashed in there, as well as in the neighbouring barracks area. This was still ANA, and so was the road as long as the occasional truck could still drive from city limits. However, everything else was no man's land. And the only thing preventing the Gulbuddinist militia from taking the airport was the vigilance of the guys still in the defendable area of the airport.

As an NCO, your benefits did come with some other tasks. This included doing the rounds in the building and checking if everyone was at their posts. Right now, at around 3 in the morning, that wasn't many. Aside from a few sentries most guys were still sleeping, a difficult mission with all the gunfire around. But not too difficult for one of the sentries, who had fallen asleep on his chair. This sent Nasrat into a fit, dragging the young conscript off his chair and onto the ground, and striking him with the butt of his rifle. "The lives of every single man in here depends on you taking your mission as night watch seriously! If those horsemen come back on your watch, they'll slit everyone's throat! Do you understand that? You'll get us all killed!"

There was no real coherent response from the 17-year old kid, but Nasrat was convinced he got his point across. "You're relieved from your post". The shouting of Nasrat and the pleas of mercy from the conscript boy woke most of the garrison up with a feeling of sadness that they missed that little bit of entertainment. Nasrat watched the boy walk back and then looked outside. The night was moonless, but it wasn't as quite as it normally would be. The rumbling of trucks and the creaking of a tank became louder. Nasrat ran inside looking for a flare gun and yelled at the men inside to grab or crew their weapons and take up their positions. A short and frenzied search later, a flare went up over the airfield and another over the northern fields.

Dushman. A line of Gulbuddinists was crawling from the north trying to remain undetected, and on the south the tank had breached the barbed wire and fences seperating the airfield compound from the fields outside, and a number of trucks carrying fighters had already driven in. One of the trucks with a Zu-23-2 in the back opened fire at the terminal building, and the T-55 flying a Hezb-e Islami flag and colourful tape fired its gun at the building. The answer was the SPG-9 crew slamming a shell into the side of it. For a second it looked like it had no effect, perhaps it had bounced, but then an explosion sent the turret flying and illuminated the area together with the flare. Machine guns started spitting 12.7 fire at the trucks and infantry on the tarmac and the infantry coming from the north, soon joined by the hailstorm of 7.62 fire from all sorts of Soviet weapons.

But judging from the amount of men coming their way, this would come down to knuckles, nails and teeth.