CHAPTER ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR – Part Three
American Coup d'arrêt
The war between the Empire of Japan, the United States of American and the British Empire was hardly hours old when first counter blows were landed against the Japanese. These counterattacks would be farm from the last and they would do nothing to prevent the Japanese from landing continuing to wage war against the West. However, for the American public that was completely surprised by the attacks and to a lesser extent the British public that was stunned by the treatment of the Imperial ambassadors at the hands of the Japanese, the counterattacks would prove to be both a moral boost as well as vindication.
In the western Pacific a U.S. Navy Consolidated PBY-5 Catalina flying boat of VP-23 flown by Lt. Cmdr. Milford “Chick” Hubbell had been on patrol for an hour when the he and his aircrew received the open air message from Patrol Wing Two Headquarters on Ford Island,
“Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill…”
Lt. Cmdr. “Chick” Hubbell’s PBY-5 Catalina
Three hours later Hubbell was radioed by one of the three other PBYs from his squadron that were covering the northwest approaches to Hawaii, flown by a Lieut. Harry E Sears, that a large convoy of ships had been spotted. Taking the initiative, Hubbell ordered Sears to shadow the convoy while he and the other PBYs rendezvoused with him in order to launch an attack. One hour later, four hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor and five hours after the start of their patrol, the four PBYs made their rendezvous and the convoy was identified as the Imperial Japanese Navy’s
Kido Butai. Hubbell immediately had all four aircraft signal the coordinates of the Japanese fleet as well as the current and projected course, just to insure that the information was received by CINC-PAC, and then the four PBYs launched their attack.
The decision to attack appeared to be a suicidal attempt at revenge at first glance with only four PBYs against the combined might of six aircraft carriers, three battleships, two cruisers, twelve destroyers and eight supply ships. Yet the Americans had in their favor a Japanese command staff that was secure in their belief that any attempt by the Americans in searching for the Kido Butai would be hours away. Loaded with four torpedoes each (two under each wing), Hubbell descended to attack followed by Sears and the other two PBYs flow by Lieutenant j.g. Charles F. “Whiskey” Willis and Ensign George F. “Blackie” Poulos. Dropping to an altitude of only fifty feet above the waves, the four PBYs raced in on the unsuspecting Japanese ships. Hubbell had made it clear to the three other pilots that their task was not to sink any one ship but to cause enough damage that would allow the American’s carriers to come into range and deliver a death blow. Five miles from the outermost Japanese screening destroyers the four American maritime bombers separated to hunt for their individual targets. It was not until the Hubbell himself crossed the bows of the
Kagero-class destroyer
Hamakaze that the Japanese became aware of the American presence. By then the four PBYs were within the midst o the
Kido Butai.
Reacting immediately to the threat, Admiral Chuichi Nagumo ordered his carriers to launch their surviving A6M fighters. In a rare display of a lack of discipline, the ships within the
Kido Butai began to fire indiscriminately at the attacking PBYs, causing a good bit of damage amongst themselves as the Americans were nearly at sea level. The first A6Ms were just lifting off from the flight deck of the flagship Akagi when Hubbell launched all four of his torpedoes at the carrier
Sōryū from a distance of one half mile. As Japanese anti-aircraft fire enveloped his PBY and he maneuvered violently to evade, Hubbell watched as “Blackie” Poulos launched his two of his four torpedoes at the fleet oiler
Kyokuto Maru from a distance of six hundred yards. At nearly the same time the six torpedoes struck their intended targets. The
Kyokuto Maru erupted into a large ball of flame as her fuel bunkers exploded from the violent detonation of the American torpedoes.
Sōryū shuddered under the impact of at least two torpedo hits, large geysers of water cascading up from her after sections and a sudden decrease of speed being witnessed.
An artist’s rendition of Ensign “Blackie” Poulos’ attack upon Kyokuto Maru
On the other side of the
Kido Butai, Lt. Sears launched his four torpedoes at the battleship
Kirishima despite the intensity of the anti-aircraft fire directed at his PBY and a mile away “Whiskey” Willis launched his torpedoes at the carrier
Shōkaku. As his aircraft was literally torn into pieces by the concentrated fire of
Kirishima and the nearby destroyers
Sazanami, Kasumi and
Isokaze, all four of the torpedoes launched by Sears made contact with the large battleship, three detonating with one failing to detonate. Lt. Willis, also taking a great deal of fire, had the dubious honor of launching a perfect textbook attack only to have all four of his torpedoes fail to detonate upon impact with
Shōkaku’s hull.
With the level of anti-aircraft fire beginning to increase and the more lethal threat of Japanese fighters now growing, Hubbell ordered Willis and Poulos to withdraw and head back for Pearl Harbor. Having two torpedoes still available, Ensign Poulos made a final attack run upon what would be his second victim, the fleet oiler
Tōhō Maru, as he raced out of the confines of the
Kido Butai’s sailing formation. The second tanker exploded with just as large an explosion as the first, the violence actually peppering the rear of Poulos’ PBY with fragments as the young officer attempted to evade the accusatory fire from the rest of the Japanese ships.
Racing away as fast as they were able the three PBYs left the Japanese fleet in disorder and more importantly facing a significant loss of fuel with the destruction of two oilers. The Japanese were able to extract a shred of revenge when the fighters launched from Akagi caught up with Hubbell’s PBY and shot the American plane down, however, Willis and Poulos were able to escape and signaling Pearl Harbor not only the results of their attack but also the current location of the Japanese fleet.
The Americans were not yet through with the attacking Japanese. Two days later the submarine USS
Nautilus, commanded by Lieutenant Commander William H. Brockman, Jr., was approaching the northern boundary of her patrol area near Midway Island when at 8:55 a.m. she sighted masts on the eastern horizon heading in her direction. As she began to cruise toward the masts, Japanese planes sighted the submarine at the same time and dove upon her and began strafing. Diving down to one hundred feet, Brockman waited five minutes and then up to periscope depth and began observing the approaching Japanese ships. Four ships were immediately sighted, the battleship
Kirishima, the cruiser
Nagara, and two destroyers in company. As they often would be in the next few months, the destroyers were misidentified as light cruisers.
Noticing the list and slow movement of
Kirishima, Brockman adjusted his course to target the wounded battleship, however, within a few minutes
Nautilus was again sighted by air and bombs began to fall upon her. Crashing diving as the two destroyers closed for the kill,
Nautilus was subjected to a depth charge attack of nine charges dropped at a distance of one thousand yards. When the attack had ceased, Brockman brought his submarine back up to periscope depth and found himself surrounded by Japanese ships. Sighting
Kirishima, Nautilus fired two torpedoes from her bow tubes, one that misfired while the other one missed close abeam the wounded battleship. An attending destroyer immediately headed for the boat, which dove to one hundred fifty feet to wait out the depth charge attack. After a fifteen minute bombardment periscope depth was again ordered and Brockman’s scan of the seas found that the battleship and cruiser were no longer in range but the echo ranging of the two destroyers was far to accurate for comfort so he once more dove
Nautilus to a depth of one hundred fifty feet.
Nautilus was once more brought to periscope depth at 10:00 a.m. ship’s time and Brockman sighted an aircraft carrier. He immediately ordered another change of course to intercept the carrier. A few minutes later the submarine was again detected by the Japanese destroyers screening the capital ships and at 10:18 she was attacked with a salvo of salvo of six depth charges that caused minor damages. By 10:55 the sonar pinging by the destroyers had ceased for a sufficient length of time that Brockman once again raised
Nautilus to a depth that allowed her periscope to scan the area. To the submarine crew’s disappointment the carrier, her escorts, and the attacking destroyer had disappeared. Surfacing the boat, Brockman signaled his report to Pearl Harbor and requested information for any other enemy vessels that might be within his patrol area.
Before ComSubPac (Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet) at Pearl provided a reply, lookout aboard
Nautilus sighted masts once again and the submarine dove beneath the waves once more and began hunting. A damaged aircraft carrier with two escorts was sighted at 11:53, the carrier being identified as
Sōryū. An hour later,
Nautilus had moved into attack position and launched four torpedoes at the carrier from less than 3,000 yards. One to run, sinking as soon as it was launched from the forward tube, two ran erratically before sinking while the fourth torpedo hit
Sōryū under the bridge on the starboard side and stopped the carrier dead in the water. Gaining the ire of the attending destroyers,
Nautilus went dove to her maximum depth of 300 feet and endured a prolonged depth charge attack. At 13:48 Brockman once more rose to periscope depth and fired a pair of torpedoes from twenty-five hundred yards. Due to damage to her forward tubes the second torpedo was launched a full two minutes after the primary, so when Brockman risked raising his periscope after the detonation of the first torpedo he caught sight of
Sōryū burning along her entire length. As the crew of the stricken carrier battled the fire that started when the aviation fuel stored in the lower deck hanger was ignited, the second torpedo struck under the forward elevator and set off ammunition in the forward magazine.
The death of Sōryū
as seen from the periscope camera of USS Nautilus
Diving deep once more as the Japanese escorts charged for her position, the crew of
Nautilus was quite pleased with the knowledge that at least one of the Japanese aircraft carriers that had attacked Pearl Harbor would soon be on the bottom of the Pacific. Aboard
Sōryū the survivors struggled to first save their ship but then to save themselves when the holds of the carrier began to flood and a thirty degree list quickly developed.
Sōryū’s captain, Ryūsaku Yanagimoto, senior officer of the small squadron following the death of Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi and the majority of his staff in
Nautilus’ initial attack, ordered his carrier to be abandoned when the list grew to thirty five degrees and small secondary explosions began erupting within the ship.
Unfortunately, Yanagimoto waited to long to give the order for the carrier’s list quickly grew as the secondary explosions damaged more of
Sōryū’s internal water-tight integrity. In less than seven minutes, the list grew from thirty-five degrees to ninety degrees and then the carrier violently slipped beneath the waves, taking the majority of her crew to a watery grave.
Able to hear the death throes of
Sōryū by way of sonar,
Nautilus and her crew waited ten minutes before climbing once more to periscope depth on the way to the surface. Peering out of his periscope Brockman witnessed a single
Shiratsuyu-class destroyer, identified as
Yamakaze, stationary upon the waves a short twelve hundred yards away, apparently looking for survivors of
Sōryū. The sighting was mutual and the crew of
Yamakaze began firing their deck guns at
Nautilus’ periscope while the destroyer began to surge in the water and turn to get within depth charge range of the American submarine.
Crashing diving as the first shells began to crash around his submerged conning tower, Brockman calculated a firing solution from his last glance of
Yamakaze’s course and launched two torpedoes. As
Nautilus reached a depth of one hundred feet and her crew prepared for yet another depth charge attack, two explosions from the surface could be heard through the hull followed by an immediate ceasing of the destroyer’s sonar pinging. The sounds of a ship breaking up could quickly be heard by the American’s own sonar and Brockman cautiously brought
Nautilus back from her dive. At periscope depth the surroundings were searched and the captain of
Nautilus was rewarded with the sight of another sinking Japanese warship.
The demise of
Nautilus’ second victim of the day.
Quickly surfacing his submarine, Brockman began heading toward the sinking destroyer to search for survivors. However, the sighting of aircraft racing toward his position forced him to abandon those plans and once more drop below the surface of the waves and head for the safety of Pearl Harbor.
On the far side of the Pacific, the Japanese were running face first into the reality of the old adage that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. It would be far from the last time that reality presented itself to the leadership in Tokyo.
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Up Next:
Pray tell, does any one recall General Homma and the 14th Imperial Japanese Army?