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I like mainly military, but some occasional political is good to. so my vote:
Military.
Excellent AAR, by the way.
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What is up with the forum software? My post is showing as 5607, but the main aar page lists 5622 replies? Trying for page 282 for a couple days now.....
Anyone else having this issue or is it something on my end only?
Military.
Excellent AAR, by the way.
**********EDIT**********
What is up with the forum software? My post is showing as 5607, but the main aar page lists 5622 replies? Trying for page 282 for a couple days now.....
Anyone else having this issue or is it something on my end only?
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I also have the same issue; and I think those are because of deleted OT posts, but as for the updates, I'd like a wrap-up on the Italian Campaign first, so we know on a solid footing where things stand in the Alliance, then move to seeing the movements while the battle for Western Europe was on, and finally how things will proceed politically from there.
That and certain people having their accounts and all their posts deleted.
If you want a bad exampled look at Allenby's 'British Interests' AAR, 250 missing posts and 13 ghost pages!
That and certain people having their accounts and all their posts deleted.
If you want a bad exampled look at Allenby's 'British Interests' AAR, 250 missing posts and 13 ghost pages!
Got a link to that so I can take a look?:rofl:
CHAPTER ONE HUNDRED THREE – Part Five
Operation Barclay – The Execution (cont’d)
Since before the war had started, back to the mid-1930’s when the Royal Marines had been grown in size and projected use, Imperial amphibious operations had been in a constant state of development for the optimum force balance to successfully invade a hostile beachhead. Greatly assisted by the cauldron of war the British had found that there were two components that were an absolute necessity for any amphibious operation, one to assist the landing troops and the other coordinate the flow of the actual invasion from the beachhead. The assistance component, the early landing of clandestine forward observation artillery teams (FISTs), had originated in cooperation between the British Army’s Para Regiments and the RAF for close air support and had been exported quite rapidly to both the rest of the British Army and the Royal Marines. The second component, the managing of the invasion at the beachhead, arose from the Royal Navy tradition of having a portion of any landing party remain on the beaches with the ship’s boats if the need for a hasty withdrawal was required. This tradition when married with amphibious operations and lessons learned from amphibious operations from the Great War lead to the birth of the Royal Navy Beach Parties and the control of invasion beaches being placed with those parties.
Thus far in the war, save the initial Imperial invasion of Denmark at the start of the war, both of these components were a key aspect of invasion planning and proved to be extremely successful. The Sicily landings of Barclay were an example of just how necessary both groups had become to Imperial operations. At the same time, thanks in large part to the very successes that they contributed to, the ease in which previous amphibious operations had succeeded gave British operational planners an almost false sense of security in their amphibious operations. While all operational plans have built in contingency options should different aspects of the plan go awry, and Barclay was no different, it is completely understandable that there had grown a tendency for a mastery of those contingencies to fade into the background of both staff planners and forward commanders. As history has shown time and time again, along the same time that such a tendency takes hold of a command staff Fate will reach out and throw a spanner in the works with the corresponding threats of disaster flowing in the wake. For the British the second wave of Operation Barclay, namely the invasion of southern Italy, would be their time within the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations when Fate converged with a vengeance.
Operational orders for Barclay called for FIST teams from both the British Army of South Africa and the British Army of North Africa to land twenty-four hours prior to the arrival of the main invasion force. That was the normal course of action. The difference between Barclay and the previous Imperial amphibious operations, including the invasion of Sicily, were the number of FISTs being sent southern Italy to support the invasion. A full twelve teams were detailed to be sent ashore, each of the two Armies three Corps having two dedicated FIST in addition to the artillery observers going ashore with the first wave of troops. Such a deployment ensured that the British would be able to bury any Italian defense under a flurry of accurate artillery salvoes. Fate chose this aspect of Barclay to be the first to be altered adversely.
During the overnight hours of May 15-16, contact was lost with the Grampus-class submarine HMS Cachalot. Carrying the six FISTs detailed to support General Brooke’s troops, Cachalot had left Malta early in the pre-dawn hours of May 15 and cruised northward on the surface to a point in the Gulf of Taranto that was exactly thirty miles from each invasion beach. Breaking radio silence as was planned Cachalot’s captain, Lt. Hugo R.B. Newton, alerted Malta that he was beginning to make his landing approaches. That was the last that was heard from the submarine as she failed to transmit the signal of completion of the mission and she never returned to port. To this day her remains have yet to be found anywhere within the Gulf of Taranto.
At the time that communication with Cachalot was lost, miles to the southeast her sister ship, HMS Porpoise, was offshore Calabria landing the six FISTs tasked with supporting General Smuts’ British Army of South Africa. Thanks in large part to the masterful seamanship of Porpoise’s captain, Lt. Cmdr. Jack G. Hopkins, she failed to succumb to any of the normal dangers facing a submarine working close inshore, however, conditions were less than ideal for the FISTs to be offloaded. Weighing the risks versus the need, the six teams all turned Hopkins’ offer to delay their landing and set out for their appointed landing spots. Fate once more stepped in as the teams began closing with the beaches the high surf overturned two of the boats, drowning a significant number of the men, and wildly dispersed the remaining teams. As unsettling as that occurrence was, Fate was not yet done dealing her hand for the FISTs. In two separate locations two teams stumbled upon Italian shore parties as they attempted to exit the beach, one team being wiped out after a short but intense exchange of gunfire that while the other team was scattered as they attempted to flee from the Italians. That left two FISTs to support the entire British Army of South Africa and no FIST support for the British Army of North Africa. Suddenly, and completely unknowingly, the invading troops of Operation Barclay were faced with the reality of landing on hostile shores without the benefit of advanced support parties and the probability of the enemy being forewarned of their impending arrival.
As grim a prospect that was for the landing troops, a far grimmer prospect loomed when the first men ashore, the Royal Navy Beach Parties, faced a series of difficulties that had not been planned for, even with the contingency plans provided by the planners in Malta. These impediments, provided the Italians the opportunity to turn the invasion into exactly what was needed by Rome, namely the British Army’s invasion to be turned into a bloody disaster. Yet Fate was not yet finished with her tinkering of Operation Barclay.
The Royal Navy Beach Parties, known as the Beachmasters, were basically Royal Navy commandos, and the very first troops onto the invasion beaches and the last to leave once the invasion was complete. Their responsibilities were to control the arrival and departure of vessels coming to the beaches, facilitate the landing, assembly and onward dispatch of personnel, stores and equipment across the invasion beaches off the beaches and into the interior. The loss of a RNBP could seriously hamper the success of a landing so each party was a fairly large enterprise that had been highly trained in commando tactics. Labeled as lettered commandos (i.e. Commando G), each RNBP was divided into a Headquarters squad, three beach parties, a Boat Repair and Recovery section and a Signals Section. The overall commanding officer, usually a Commander, was in charge as Principal Beachmaster with a Lieutenant Commander as Deputy Principal Beachmaster and comprised the Headquarters squad with four ratings as messengers and security. The three separate beach parties were commanded by a Lieutenant Commander or senior Lieutenant as Beachmaster, each squad having two Assistant Beachmasters (usually a Lieutenant or Sub-Lieutenant), two Petty Officers and twenty ratings. The Beach Party also contained a Boat Repair and Recovery Section led by a Boatswain (Royal Navy warrant officer), divided into two boat crews comprised of a Petty officer and seven ratings and a repair crew made up of twelve ratings of different specialties. The Signals Section, which was divided to work with each of the Beachmasters, was under the command of a Sub-Lieutenant, and was made up of a Yeoman of signals, a Petty Officer Telegraphist, and twenty-four signals ratings. The Beach Party as a whole was tasked with the running of a section of the invasion beach, with the individual beach parties were responsible for establishing marshalling areas for supplies and the exit lanes that invading troops would use to move off the beach, the Boat Repair and Recovery sections were used to keep the beach cleared of damaged landing craft and other water hazards so that the flow of men and material to the beach was not disrupted and the Signals Section to maintain the flow of communication between the beach and the invasion fleet.
An Assistant Beachmaster of RNBP Commando D training with a signal lamp prior to Operation Barclay.
Due to the importance of an organized landing beach toward a successful invasion, beachmasters were allowed a great deal of authority, being placed in charge of all activities from the three fathom mark (generally a water depth of twenty feet and/or a distance of one hundred yards) to the high-water mark on the beach. Each Principal Beachmaster had the final word on landing operations on his beach once the landings had begun and his authority allowed him to outrank any officer who crossed his beach up to and including general officers.
The RNBPs were highly skilled, highly competent and highly motivated men with a reputation within the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines and the British Army for ruling the invasion beaches with an iron fist, making full use of the title of Beachmaster. Operation Barclay would prove to be a fire of unanticipated severity that would test the RNBPs abilities to great extremes.
The coming of dawn on May 17 saw Commandos D, I and M rushing ashore slightly ahead of the first wave of troops from General Smut’s British Army of South Africa and Commandos K, T and V doing the same with General Brooke’s British Army of North Africa. As with the FISTs it seemed as if Fate had decided to frown upon the RNBPs, with all the disastrous results that came along with that frown.
The landing craft of Commando D, landing near the village of Catanzaro Lido to support X Corps, came under heavy fire as they reached the beaches, significant casualties being inflicted including the deaths of the Principal Beachmaster, the Deputy Principal Beachmaster and half of the party’s Assistant Beachmasters. Commando I’s landing craft, racing inland between the Sixteenth Century fortification in the frazione of Le Castella and Cape Rizzuto south of Isola di Capo Rizzuto and having the important task of getting the largest of General Smuts’ three corps, XI Corps, ashore to begin the march up the Calabria peninsula, were fired upon by concealed shore batteries well before they reached the beaches, with only one beach party squad out of the entire group making it to shore. Commando M, alone of the three to reach the beach without taking any fire from the Italian defenders, reached shore to find that the entire landing beach had been heavily sowed with both anti-personal and anti-vehicle mines, rendering the beach unusable until the cleared.
To the northeast, in the Gulf of Taranto, the RNBPs supporting the British Army of North Africa suffered difficulties similar to their brethren in the Gulf of Squillace. Commando V reached the beaches just outside the village of Rocca Imperiale Marina to find that the entire landing zone had been not only sowed heavily with mines but liberally cluttered with barded wire and landing obstacles extending from the high water mark out ten yards out into the suf. Several of the landing obstacles fouled the landing craft of the approaching beach party, the mined tipped arms of the obstacles explosively gutting the three craft and wiping out a good portion of Commando V’s Signal Section and one of the beach party squads in its entirety. Commando T, divided in half to handling the landing beaches at the village of Baia Verde one mile south of Gallipoli and the village of Rivabella two miles north of Gallipoli, came under heavy fire from Regio Esercito artillery batteries emplaced on the island of Isola di Sant’Andrea one mile offshore of Gallipoli. While not as significantly as mauled as Commando I, Commando T suffered heavy casualties, including the Principal Beachmaster and a significant segment of the group’s Boat Repair and Recovery Section. The last RNBP, Commando K, spearheading the landings of General Brooke’s I Corps near Taranto found itself not only under heavy small arms fire as it approached the beach but once ashore found that instead of landing on the beaches outside the village of Lido Gandoli they had instead landed nearly a mile to the southeast on the beaches outside the village of Marina di Leporano. Thus all of the detailed landing charts that had been memorized and around which the landings had been planned were of no assistance.
In less than fifteen minutes following the start of the landings the entire invasion risked a serious breakdown of the operational plan. While that in of itself would not create a disaster, it would cause a higher amount of both casualties and lost material. Coupled, however, with a fierce defense put forth by the Italians, the invasion could turn into a disaster. The only thing that stood between disaster, near disaster and a successful invasion was what reaction the survivors of the RNBPs on the beaches took to their individual and collective situation.
Scene of the landing of Commando D
In the tradition of the Empire’s Senior Service the RNBPs collectively persevered under their contact with the enemy and went about their duties in saving the landings from disaster.
On the landing beaches of Catanzaro Lido Lt. Edward T.L. “Dusty” Dunsterville, signals officer of Commando D, as senior surviving officer rallied the remaining members of his shore party while still under fire and, tasking a portion of the party arrange the beach for the landings, took a group of ratings to attack an Italian defensive position that threatened the beach. Successfully neutralizing the position Lt. Dunsterville then had his men train the 47mm gun upon other Italian positions while he himself returned to the beaches to take command of the operation.
The decimated Commando I, caught on the beaches between Le Castella and Cape Rizzuto, was rallied by the senior surviving officer, Assistant Beachmaster Sub. Lt. Christopher H. Fothergill, a second generation naval officer as his father was Capt. Henry M. Fothergill. Despite suffering wounds to his left arm and right leg, Fothergill refused to allow the survivors of Commando I to make a withdrawal attempt and instead pushed up to the high water mark on the beach and began making preparations for the following landing craft. Finding survivors of one of the FISTs that had likewise been decimated by the Italian defenders at the high water mark, Fothergill made contact with the destroyer HMS Hotspur that was cruising offshore and directed the destroyer’s guns into silencing several of the shore batteries that had earlier punished Commando I. Fothergill then was forced to hold off an Italian infantry attack upon the beach was the first wave of landing craft crashed upon the beach, suffering another wound to his left arm. He again refused to leave the beach, as the first wave had not yet been completed, but after losing consciousness, the dedicated officer was moved to the hospital ship HMS Nightingale.
While not facing the same dire immediate threats as faced by the other RNBPs, Commando M’s threat was a known hidden danger, that of landmines peppering the landing beach. Lt. Cmdr. Neville A.J.W.E. Napier, 13th Lord Napier and Principal Beachmaster, was well aware that moving the landing zone to another beach could be done but would difficult and near impossible to accomplish before untold casualties were inflicted upon the men of the first wave. Thinking quickly, Lord Napier had his men place red smoke pots on the outer boundaries of the landing beach while making contact with the shore bombardment task force offshore. As the entire beach party moved offshore and Lord Napier held up the entire first wave of landing craft the heavy cruisers HMS York and HMS Exeter and the light cruiser HMS Delhi proceeded to switch their fire from inland targets and unleash a withering barrage upon the beach itself. Following a devastating cascade of 8, 5 and 4-inch artillery salvos that lasted a full ten minutes, Lord Napier led the drive back to the beach and was the first man ashore to ascertain the results of his impromptu mine clearing operation. Despite turning the once clean beach into a wasteland that promised to make moving vehicles off the beach difficult, Napier’s plan worked as hoped and the majority of the mines were cleared sufficiently to allow the landings to proceed.
Commando V’s Principal Beachmaster, Lt. Cmdr. Christopher R. Havergal, having lost the majority of his Signals party and due to a error by several transport captains facing the imminent arrival of the first wave of landing troops, and under heavy fire from several Italian machine gun nests and Italian mortars, grimly carried out his orders. While detailing his beach squads to use signal flares to direct the incoming infantry landing craft, Havergal himself placed himself on the beach with a signal lamp in an attempt to reach the destroyer HMS Intrepid which was cruising close inshore looking for targets. As the first wave hit the beaches and began taking heavy casualties from the Italian machine guns and Havergal himself being wounded by shrapnel from an exploding mortar shell, Intrepid caught his signal and swung through the milling landing craft to come even closer inshore. Ignoring his serious wounds, Havergal directed the firing of signal flares toward the offending Italian positions. Intrepid’s captain, Cmdr. Charles Arthur de Winton Kitcat, dropped his guns to provide direct fire at the marked positions. While strongly built, the Italian pillboxes were not designed to take direct fire from QF 4.7 inch naval artillery and were quickly taken out. With the machine gun nests neutralized, the infantry trapped upon the beach were able to move inland and Havergal’s party was able to work on bringing in the following waves while moving the casualties of the first wave, including Havergal himself, off the beach and to transport to HMS Nightingale.
At the Gallipoli landings Commando T’s Deputy Beachmaster, Lt. Richard M. Yorke, took the unorthodox approach to commanding to separate commands by taking the headquarters squad out into the waters midway between both invasion beaches and directing operations from that position. Under constant and accurate fire from the Italian batteries on Isola di Sant’Andrea, Yorke kept his motor launch scurrying across the waves while keeping in constant communication with both separate beach parties, several times the Italian fire coming close enough to nearly swamp the launch. As the first wave of landing craft drew closer the Italians switched their fire away from Yorke and not only began dueling with the light cruiser HMS Durban and the destroyers HMS Hyperion and HMS Hesperus but also shelling the incoming landing craft. Lt. Yorke, realizing the advantage the Italian batteries had in their hidden encasements upon the small island, raced ashore, formed an assault squad from his Boat and Recovery Section, and commandeering a MGB that had been closing in to assist in finding the Italian batteries landed his party upon on Isola di Sant’Andrea. Quickly overtaking one battery’s crew, Yorke and his shore party combed the island to find five more, silencing two more on their own before running out of small arms ammunition, the Beachmaster and his men marked the positions of the remaining three with smoke and allowed Durban, Hyperion and Hesperus to pound the Italians into silence
Barclay’s final RNBP, Commando K commanded by Lt. Cmdr. Colin Maud, was faced with either moving back out offshore to sail up to the correct beach or attempt to facilitate the landing on the wrong beaches. Maud, standing erect in the middle of the beach calmly puff upon his pipe, shillelagh tucked under his arm, his bulldog at his feet, ignored the concentrated small arms fire that the Italians were raking across the beach, eyed the quickly approaching first wave of landing craft and decided to land the invasion upon the beaches his men were already upon. As he sent his Boat Section back into the water to begin charting the immediate area and search for obstacles Maud signaled for the landing craft, which had slowed when several of the coxswains realized that they were approaching the wrong beach, to come ashore. As the Italians began to shift their fire from the RNBP to the loitering landing craft Maud grabbed a megaphone from his Signals Section and bellowed across the waves, “Get those landing craft on this beach! What are ye waitin’ for, a bloomin’ invitation from His Majesty?” While reality would like to think that the coxswains responded more to the intensifying fire coming from the Italians than from the Beachmaster, many personal accounts and Royal Navy tradition support that it was the sight of the Beachmaster and his bellicose command that forced the positive response that landed the first wave of the Welsh Guard and Irish Foot Guard Regiments upon the beaches at Marina di Leporano.
Yet having overcome the difficulties of the initial landings, the outcome was far from certain as the Italians responded with a few surprises that caught the invading British completely off guard.
**
Up Next: The Finale.
And after that... the readAARs have spoken! It'll time to delve once more dangerous waters of Imperial politics!
A fine update Draco. Very interesting to read about the RNBP and the FIST units. I am guessing they are based on reality? Sounds like a very smart system. I have to say I especially like your description of Maud. I mean can you get any more British than this: Maud, standing erect in the middle of the beach calmly puff upon his pipe, shillelagh tucked under his arm, his bulldog at his feet
Wonderful work!
Wonderful work!
I find it much more fascinating how professionals respond to adversity than how they planned it to go in the first place. Excellent update.
Vann
Vann
The mark of a true professional - responding calmly and effectively, and knowing EXACTLY what to do despite the fact the entire plan has gone tits-up.
The mark of a living legend - doing same with pipe and bulldog in the middle of a sodding battle.
I like this guy.
The mark of a living legend - doing same with pipe and bulldog in the middle of a sodding battle.
I like this guy.
Having finally caught up I must say that this is all shaping up wonderfully, and you have me begging for more. Keep up the great work!
Just a quick note. All of the gentlemen mentioned in the previous post were true life RN officers. The sub commanders were actually the skippers of the respective ships and so on... although only Maud was truly a Beachmaster. And the scene with him standing on the beach with his bulldog and his shillelagh is true (except for the pipe) only it took place in Normandy. Hey, can you blame me for not being able to pass that scene up??
Hey, can you blame me for not being able to pass that scene up??
Having seen the B&W version of The Longest Day, no I cant.
Just a quick note. All of the gentlemen mentioned in the previous post were true life RN officers. The sub commanders were actually the skippers of the respective ships and so on... although only Maud was truly a Beachmaster. And the scene with him standing on the beach with his bulldog and his shillelagh is true (except for the pipe) only it took place in Normandy. Hey, can you blame me for not being able to pass that scene up??
I had the honour some years ago to be introduced to a man who had landed at Juno and could remember that epic scene. The gentleman who introduced me landed at Omaha. They were brave men, who landed that day 65 years ago to the day. (The gentleman from Omaha still is, I see him quite regularly. I should ask how his friend is but I'm afraid of the answer.
)Edit
Wonderful addition old man, I forgot to write that when I should have started with it.
DW
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Draco Rexus: ...Yet having overcome the difficulties of the initial landings, the outcome was far from certain as the Italians responded with a few surprises that caught the invading British completely off guard.
better here than against a more dangerous opponent ! !
Draco Rexus: ...And after that... the readAARs have spoken! It's time to delve once more (into the) dangerous waters of Imperial politics!
jk
magnificent updates ! !
caught up.
better here than against a more dangerous opponent ! !
Draco Rexus: ...And after that... the readAARs have spoken! It's time to delve once more (into the) dangerous waters of Imperial politics!
jkmagnificent updates ! !
caught up.
A fine update, and can I add my voice to those declaring that Lt. Cmdr. Colin Maud was indeed the shizzle.
A fine update, and can I add my voice to those declaring that Lt. Cmdr. Colin Maud was indeed the shizzle.
Agreed. Now, there is another AAR that needs your comments!
o