CHAPTER ONE HUNDRED THREE – Part Two
Pre-Operation Barclay
Despite the fall of the capital of Italian Libya to the Imperial South African Army and the British Army of North Africa not taking place until April 6, 1941, the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet, which had since the outset of the Imperial offensives across North Africa been conducting straightforward naval interdiction patrols in the Sea of Sicily and the Libyan Sea, had in the weeks prior to the surrender of Tripoli slowly turned the focus of operations to other pursuits. By April 6 Admiral Cunningham’s ships had been conducting shore bombardment missions all along the coasts of the Ligurian, Tyrrhenian, Ionian and Adriatic Seas with particular attention being paid to the coastal positions of the Italian
Garibaldi Line. While such assistance to the French was unasked for by French commanders, a point that the Mediterranean Fleet took great pleasure in ignoring when signaled as such by French forces, the shore bombardment missions were in fact simple excuses for the Royal Navy to scout potential landing sites for Operation
Husky
HMS London
of Force K
firing upon Italian positions somewhere along the Italian coast, April 1941.
From the mission planers who had recently moved from Alexandria to Malta to the staffers of the Imperial General Staff in London the strategic goal of
Husky was to remove Italy from the war by way of assisting the French in breaching the
Garibaldi Line. Despite the actions of General Legentilhomme in reaction to the assistance of the Canadian divisions at the conclusion of the siege of Venice, the plan as prepared by General Brooke’s Theatre Command staff in Malta proposed that both the Imperial South African Army and the British Army of North Africa invade Italy south of the
Garibaldi Line on both the Mediterranean and Adriatic coasts with secondary invasions in the south near Taranto and in Calabria to sow confusion as to the actual focal point of the Imperial invasion. With very little adjustment, the Imperial General Staff approved
Husky and forwarded the general outline of the operation to the French as protocol required. It was at this point that the hard work of the planning staff of the Mediterranean Theatre Command struck a hard and fast wall and necessitated drastic changes to be made to the operation due to several factors both political and militarily.
Politically, the strains that had been placed upon Anglo-French relations over the last several months of the war were even further driven toward the breaking point following the actions of High Commissioner Alibert. Voices from both within and without the Government assailed the Crown to abort the proposed operation, the members within the Parliament of Great Britain and the Parliaments of the Dominions that were in the inner circle of the Crown made it clear in no uncertain terms that many members of the Parliaments would take it amiss to find the British Army working in conjunction with the French officials responsible for the horrendous activities that had and were still occurring in Lombardy-Venetia. Congruently with the objections being raised within the Empire Paris coldly advised the Imperial General Staff members that briefed the French High Command on
Husky that the assistance of the British Army was unwanted and unneeded in Italy and there would be no liaison staffs allowed to be created for the prevention of friendly fire incidents. This decision by Paris only fueled the anti-French fires burning in the Empire.
While the political issues were quite daunting, the Imperial General Staff could and would have gone forward with Operation
Husky had it not been for the logistical issues that quite soon began to plague the plan. While from the outset it had been known that
Husky was an ambitious and somewhat risky plan that hinged upon a good deal many variables not only all clicking correctly but doing so at the correct time, as preparations began several of those variables began to fail. The lack of sufficient supplies in the form of food stuffs and medical supplies soon gave way to the more important fact that despite the robust ship building programme undertaken by the Royal Navy in the late 1930’s, there was simply not enough Imperial transport tonnage available within the Mediterranean Theatre to conduct the four simultaneous landings for which
Husky called and even with a wholesale redirecting of the Royal Navy’s global convoy system such tonnage would not be available for another eighteen to twenty-four months.
Faced with both internal and external dissension to
Husky and having inadequate logistical support for the operation, the planed Imperial invasion of Italy appeared to be impossible for the foreseeable future. However, the Empire was still in need of reaching the strategic goal of knocking Italy out of the war in order to make available troops for the upcoming campaign against the Soviet Union as well as the reinforcement of the Far East. Given these facts it was no surprise when operational planners in both London and on Malta raced to formulate a new plan for the invasion of Italy, albeit one that did not support the French and one that could be launched with sixty to ninety days following the fall of Tripoli.
As no action or planning for an action takes place within a vacuum, so to did the second round of planning for the invasion of Italy by Imperial forces find itself in a near constant state of change. Changing the focal point of the invasion from both the north and the south to a combined invasion of Sicily and southern Italy along the coast of the Gulf of Taranto, the staffers in Malta were forced to discard those plans on April 12 when
Commando Supremo Badoglio pulled all forces out of Sicily and moved them to mainland Italy to bolster both the
Garibaldi Line and reinforce Italy’s southern defenses.
Still working on the basis of a two pronged invasion, Theatre Command staffers then formulated a plan to have simultaneous landings along the coast of the Gulf of Taranto and in Campania near Naples. This plan was also forced to be scrapped when Force
K (HMS
Devonshire, HMS
London, HMS
York, HMS
Deli, and HMS
Durban) under the command of Rear Admiral Mansfield (principal British officer of the
Trieste Incident) encountered the last
Regia Marina’s battle group near Naples on April 25. The Italian ships, four destroyers and the
Condottieri-class light cruiser
Alberico da Barbiano screening the modernized Great War battleship
Andrea Doria, engaged the British ships in a vain attempt to draw Force
K away from Naples. After a brief yet heavy exchange of shell fire the
Andrea Doria was reduced to a burning hulk, all four destroyers were sunk or sinking, the damaged
Alberico da Barbiano was secured as a prize and Admiral Mansfield was able determine the reason for the sacrifice of the Italian mariners, namely the sabotage of the Neapolitan harbour. Once again the General Brooke’s staffers in Malta were forced to retool their invasion plans.
With the availability of the port of Naples for rapid use nullified by the Italians self-destruction, and the movement of small groups of militia and
Regia Maria motor-torpedo boats back into Sicily, the staff planners of Theatre Command should have thrown up their hands in despair, especially considering the resurgence of the threat from Sicily to any mainland invasion. Instead the staff officers started anew and came up with yet another operational plan, one that took advantage of new resources available to the British. These new resources, namely the availability of the newly formed Third Royal Marine Expeditionary Unit (the Royal Halifax Marine, the Royal Australian Marine, the Royal County Cork Marine, the King’s Auckland Marine, the Royal Trincomalee Marine and the King’s Own Rangoon Marine Regiments and three artillery brigades under the command of General Robert E. Laycock) which had completed fitting out in Portsmouth in the beginning of April, 1941, allowed the Mediterranean staff officers to completely re-address the problems of invading Italy despite the Third RMEU having been designated for use in the Far East.
Royal Marines of the Royal Trincomalee Marine Regiment joined by a wishful boy enroute to the transports that will take them the Mediterranean Theatre
While logistically unable to land forces on both sides of the Italian peninsula as well as the southern extremity simultaneously, the Royal Navy was in possession of sufficient ships to launch a two wave landing in separate locations providing the landing beaches were within sufficient proximity to each other. As such, the staff officers on Malta devised Operation
Barclay. To be launched from Malta, the first wave of
Barclay would find the Royal Marines invading the southeastern and eastern portions of Sicily with the second wave would taking place two days later with the British Army of North Africa making an amphibious assault upon the Italian mainland in Apulia and the British Army of South Africa in the mountainous region of Calabria.
The Royal Marine portion of
Barclay was considered the riskiest portion of the entire operation with General Laycock’s Third RMEU being landed with the bare minimum of supplies (five days worth of ammunition, food and medical supplies) in order to allow for the transports to return to Malta to embark the
Barclay’s second wave of troops. While a risky position to take, Theatre Command’s confidence was based upon the cadre’s of the Third RMEU’s regiments being combat veterans pulled from the First and Second RMEU’s and the ability to divert portions of the second wave to land in Sicily if assistance was needed by the Royal Marines. Tasked with quickly securing the east coast of Sicily to insure the least amount of likelihood of any threat to the invasion fleet that would be heading toward the mainland, General Laycock and his staff worked hand in hand with Theatre Command and determined that the King's Auckland Marines and the Royal Halifax Marines would land in the Gulf of Gela, in south-central Sicily, the Royal Australian Marines would land on either side of Cape Passero, at the very southeastern corner of Sicily, the Royal County Cork Marines and the Royal Trincomalee Marines would land in the Gulf of Noto, around the town of Avola, and the King's Own Rangoon Marines would land in the Gulf of Catania between Cape Campolato to the south and Cape Molini to the north on the east coast of Sicily. The regiments on the western side of Cape Passero would secure the towns of Gela, Scoglitti and Ragusa before driving northward toward the Plain of Catania while the regiments to the east of the Cape would drive inland to secure the towns of Avola, Catania and most importantly the port of Syracuse. The Royal Marines were then to drive northward to Messina to seal the western half of the island from the coast.
Wave two of
Barclay would be a harder punch against the Italians and would pitch the fifteen regiments of the British Army of North Africa and the British Army of South Africa along the rocky beaches of southern Italy from the Gulf of Squillace along the Calabrian coast to the Gulf of Taranto from the Cape Santa Maria di Leuca in the east to Cape Colonna, the ancient Cape Lacinium, in the west. The South Africans would disembark upon the beaches of the Gulf of Squillace covering an area reaching from the village of Monasterace, located about fifty miles northeast of the city of Reggio Calabria and thirty miles of the city of Catanzaro, to Cape Rizzuto and the town of Isola di Capo Rizzuto, located about thirty miles east of Catanzaro. The British Army of North Africa, landing to the east of Cape Rizzuto within the Gulf of Taranto, would land troops in three separate locations, on the west coast of the Salentina Peninsula near the town of Gallipoli, located about fifty miles southeast of the city of Taranto, on the northwest corner of the Gulf near the town of Rocca Imperiale, located about sixty miles west of Taranto, and finally at the port city and main Regia Maria naval base of Taranto. General Brooke’s troops were tasked with securing the Salentina Peninsula and the very import highway and railway lines running northward along the Adriatic coast, the city of Taranto and then marching into the
Tavoliere delle Puglie, a tableland at the foot of the Gargano promontory that is one of the largest and agriculturally most productive plains in Italy, to secure the ancient cities of Bari, Brindisi and Foggia. The troops under General Smuts’ command were to march from the beaches of the Gulf of Squillace to secure the cities of Catanzaro, capital of the Calabria region, and Reggio di Calabria on the Straits of Messina before marching northward to the Monte Pollino massif to break out of the Calabria peninsula, into the and Tyrrhenian Sea coast of Italy and on toward Naples two hundred miles to the north.
Providing that all went as planned with the first wave of
Barclay, two days later would find General Smuts dividing his regiments into three corps. IX Corps, consisting of the Royal Capetown Light Infantry and the Royal Mafeking Rifles Regiments, would move off the beaches and strike toward Reggio di Calabria, while the Royal Durban Guards and Royal Walvis Bay Fusiliers Regiments, which made up Smuts’ X Corps, were tasked to secure Catanzaro and secure the flanks of IX Corps. The remaining regiments, the Royal South African Guards, the King's Own South African Rifles, the King's South Africans and the Johannesburg Highlanders, formed XI Corps and were ordered to marching toward the Monte Pollino massif and the top of the Calabria peninsula. Also being split into three separate corps, dealing with a small amount of mountainous terrain within their area of operations and needing to cover a great deal of distance as quickly as possible, the troops of the British Army of North Africa were spread widely and positioned to maximize the advantages they possessed over the Italian defenders. Needing to secure the southern portion of the Basilicata region, prevent any
Regio Esercito troops in the mountains separating Basilicata from Calabria from disrupting the invasion as well link up with the South Africans marching up from Calabria, Operation
Barclay called for the Durham Light Infantry and the Royal Ulster Rifles Regiments along with their attached artillery brigades to form General Brooke’s III Corps and land upon the beaches at Rocca Imperiale before marching toward Calabria. On the eastern side of the Gulf of Taranto II Corps, the Welsh Guards, the Irish Foot Guards Regiments and their artillery brigades, would be landed on the Salentina Peninsula to the north and south of the town of Gallipoli. The Lancashire Fusiliers, the Light Dragoons and the Royal Dragoon Guards Regiments, grouped into I Corps, would land just to the west of the port of Taranto with the Lancashire Fusiliers moving to secure the city while the two armoured regiments began driving to the northeast to secure the Tavoliere delle Puglie.
Thanks in large part to the sheer scale of shore bombardment missions conducted by Admiral Cunningham’s Mediterranean Fleet and the range all along the Italian coast,
Commando Supremo Badoglio and the
Regio Esercito General Staff in Rome were uncertain as to where the Imperial invasion would land. The “when” had weeks previously no longer been a viable question and effort was put into defending as much of southern Italy with as little as possible. Realizing that the evacuation of Sicily had more than likely encouraged the British to strike directly upon the Italian mainland, the
Regio Esercito worked in conjunction with the
Regia Marina and to fortify Sicily.
Amounting to an under strength division under the command of General Giulio Porcinari, the
Regio Esercito formed the
Guardia di Sicilia from several militia battalions and tasked Porcinari with orders to defend Sicily and to encourage Imperial intelligence and the British Army’s Int Corps’ (Intelligence Corps) 3 Battalion in Malta that Sicily was more strongly defended than it was in truth.
Supermarina (Italian Naval Headquarters) in Rome, having suffered even more atrocious losses than
Regio Esercito, was reduced only a handful of the
Spica-class torpedo boats (referred to as torpedo boats the
Spica-class were more similar in design to the Royal Navy’s
Flower-class corvette than motor torpedo boats used by the Royal Navy and
Kriegsmarine) and three dozen
Motoscafo Armato Silurante, Torpedo Armed Motorboat and commonly abbreviated as
MAS, (essentially motorboats with displacements of 20-30 tonnes
MAS boats had a 10 man crew, were armed with two 450 mm torpedoes, machine guns or occasionally a light gun and were capable of reaching speeds of near 45 knots) available for action. Knowing that Italy was truly in a do or die situation
Supermarina ordered the
Spica-class torpedo boats
Spica and
Pallade to rendezvous with twenty
MAS boats and form
Flotilla di Sicilia under the command of
Capitano di vascello Francesco Mimbelli. Given orders to defend the Italian coast and if, the opportunity presented itself, to attack any Imperial invasion fleet, Mimbelli, his officers and men were resigned to die while attempting to inflict the maximum amount of damage upon the Royal Navy.
An anti-tank team of the Guardia di Sicilia
training after arriving back in Sicily.
MAS 204
cruising outside the Gulf of Catania sometime prior to the launch of Operation Barclay
Not as well defended as the
Garibaldi Line in the north, southern Italy was better defended than Sicily by having General Alfredo Guzzoni’s 6th Army in defensive positions across the bottom of the Italian peninsula. Headquartered in Naples, Guzzoni found himself in a more difficult position than his counterparts in the north as while it was known from where the French would be attacking most of the time in the south it was an unknown with several possibilities available, each one providing a good deal of advantages to the Italians but only if those advantages were able to be used before being overwhelmed by the superior Imperial forces. In order to maximize those advantages Guzzoni separated his army from the normal two corps (XII Corps commanded by
Generale di Corpo d'Armata (Lieutenant General) Mario Arisio and XVI Corps commanded by
Generale di Corpo d'Armata Carlo Rossi) into four separate corps. Arisio retained command of XII Corps (comprised of the 26th "Assietta" Mountain Division and 28th "Aosta" Infantry Divisions) and Rossi maintained command of XVI Corps (4th "Livorno" Motorized Infantry Division and 54th "Napoli" Infantry Divisions) with the newly formed XXV Corps (consisting of the 202nd, 207th and 208th Coastal Divisions) commanded by North African veteran
Generale di divisione (Major-General) Armando Pescatori and XXI Corps ( 206th, 213th Coastal Divisions, XVIII and XIX Coastal Brigades) reporting to
Generale di divisione Umberto Utili, while the naval infantry regiments that formed the
Regia Marina Garissons and guarded the major harbours would report directly to General Guzzoni. While sounding impressive on paper Guzzoni and his corps commanders all knew that with the reality of XXI, XXV Corps and the
Garissons each having sufficient manpower to equal the strength of a single Imperial Regiment and neither XII nor XVI Corps being a full strength pushing the invading British off the beaches would be nigh impossible. However, if handled properly, 6th Army could keep the British Army bottled upon the beaches and possible recreate the Great War disaster of Gallipoli.
To affect that desire, Guzzoni positioned XXI and XXV Corps along likely invasion sites in Calabria and Apulia and kept the Garissons in their port fortresses. Arisio’s XII Corps garrisoned the mountainous area of southern Campania to cover Naples while Rossi and XVI Corps bivouacked in the highlands bordering
Tavoliere delle Puglie. Upon word of any Imperial landing the impacted Corps would hold their positions to allow the other Corps to march into supporting positions and pin the British upon the beaches. With the mountainous terrain that made up the majority of 6th Army’s area of operations, the Italians had a good deal of confidence that their plan would work.
A 47mm gun crew of the XIX Coastal Brigade preparing a defensive position somewhere in Calabria.
And with that confidence there was born the hope that a possible negotiated peace would come into existence and save Italy from complete destruction. However, before that could hope be reached, Italy would need to survive the coming storm that would be the Imperial invasion. In both Naples and Rome, Guzzoni, his officers, and
Commando Supremo Badoglio, all knew that it prove to be of the utmost difficulty to achieve their goal. The British were not of the same caliber as the French and there was very little chance that they were going to make the very many operational mistakes that would simply allow a recreation of the Great War Gallipoli disaster nor would they attack as the Italians expected or wished and they would fight as tenaciously as they did across North Africa. It was also taken as an expected that with the guest that arrived in Malta in the beginning of May that the invading British troops would fight with even a higher amount of morale and resolve. Once again, things looked dark for the future of Italy.
His Majesty, King George VI, reviewing members of 3rd Battalion, the Royal Dragoon Guards on Malta prior to their embarkation for Operation Barclay.
**
Up Next: The execution of
Barclay!
Stay tuned!
