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Rephrase: the gases generally used for most of the war did not kill very many people, and did not permanently disable very many either (in comparison to the other methods used to kill and incapacitate soldiers). Thus it was more of a terror tactic on troops, and by the end of the war, recognised as such.
In game, where the gas can be fired perfectly into trenches and in far greater amounts than otl, I can see it being quite the killer, especially if you can only start researching gas masks after it is developed?
I feel great sympathy for your plight, lieutenant. For you see, where you have lost a platoon’s worth of England’s Finest, I must live with losing divisions of them.
Henry Wavell-Pierce to an officer of the Glosters, August 12th, 1914
The Scheldt was evidently a very bad episode in the war effort, but I still struggle to imagine any approaching a German struggle for world power. At best it feels like they're about to do some violent thrashing around before they die for good. Which is dangerous, of course, and frustrating – but barring catastrophe the war looks like it's only going to go one way.
As Butterfly says, the real kicker is making sure the Germans are down and out – and they know it – before they can collapse in on themselves and declare an unfair fight. The post-war period is going to be bad enough already…
As Butterfly says, the real kicker is making sure the Germans are down and out – and they know it – before they can collapse in on themselves and declare an unfair fight. The post-war period is going to be bad enough already…
Depends how bad the thrashing about was. The Amercians and British may well want the war over and done with; hopefully the French pull them through to the endgame and beyond.
Thing is, I'm not sure what the right move is for endgame. Break up the empire, as will happen somewhat naturally/with views to protectorates as with Austria Hungary and the ottomans? Keep germant intact but in a looser federation? Destroy prussia, as far as is possible? Or merely reperstions, ensure they know they were beaten, and the reasons why they were beaten?
These are not easy questions to answer. Especially depending on what happens to Russia and the east in general.
Ah, gas has reared its ugly head in the war. The German autumn offensive sounds very ominous; despite the relatively static front, I have my fears about Paris.
As nice as the sentiment is, I feel like there's a vast gulf between these two experiences. Kudos for trying, though.
Where are the Americans in all this? I know that in the early years, with limited forces available, they were concentrated on the Mediterranean fronts. But I would have expected, now three years into the war, for the AEF to be making its presence felt in the north.
The beginning of this chapter touches upon the growing Anglo-French frustration with the way the Americans, even when they send troops, avoid the Western Front. The chapter after will talk a little more about it, and the chapter on 'War and Diplomacy' is planned to get into it yet more.
The Last Great German Offensive is fast approaching, it seems. And, presumably, it will also be the final nail in the coffin of the German war effort. They have little food or resource left, the weather is only going to get worse, the allies only going to get stronger...
I suspect that the Germans will cause a great deal of death and chaos before they go down though. Better make damn sure there's no stab in the back myth. Invade Germany or make the armies themselves put their weapons down.
A great deal of death and chaos indeed. Despite the calamities that Michael is about to provide the final push for, the simple fact remains the same; they have not expelled the British and Americans from the continent, so an Entente victory is only a matter of resolve. Not that, as the chapter points out, the German High Command (which at this point is near synonymous with the German government) aren't going to ignore this and let their imaginations get away from them.
I was wondering who had the capability to use gas. Now I'm wondering who has the capability to protect themselves from it.
As awful as the casualties were, both in number and from cause, the offensive seems to have succeeded better than in OTL version.
The creation of new salients isn't necessarily a bad thing; it complicates matters for both sides, requires the defending army to increase its fortifications and so forth. The obvious point for a counter-stroke is from Turcoing to Courtrai... one hopes the Entente generals can see that too and actually make some preparations to receive it.
I would guess that Germany will go down akin to the 'wonderful one-hoss shay', with every part supporting the others until it all crumbles.
As in the war IOTL, the counter-measures were developed quite quickly, particularly against phosgene. The problem is you can only do so much.
Indeed. As the chapter noted, the Scheldt Offensive had a genuine chance of not just succeeding, but even preventing Michael from happening.
In Europe, the focus begins a shi[f]t eastwards with this chapter, as events in Russia change the balance of things quite drastically. Asia Minor will have a short update in the 'World at War' part of Act Two, and its own part in Act Three.
Well, gas was not all that effective at killing people in the war because every front quickly got gas masks that worked pretty well against it. It was also hard to deploy and use properly. Very deadly in the first few months of usage, and forever after a massive morale effect on all sides.
That being said, this is several years into the war. The Germans cannot be able to mass produce loads of gas, and all the shells to fire it, alongside everything else they have to do. We're far enough in that they're running out of everything by now, so producing and perfecting new stuff and taking material away from normal shell production is not going to go down well...
Well, the Germans have not done the most effective thing they did OTL yet, which is build some proper solid concrete and underground defensive lines, with layered defences, and then abandon their current frontline to populate it. This was a huge, secret and very successful operation. The Entente did not know they were doing it, and did not attack them even though they could have utterly bull rushed them during the strategic retreat.
Here, I doubt the German war machine has the stuff left to build the fortifications, let alone the control necessary to then retreat to them.
Once again, I am left to conclude this war is now not so much about who wins but how badly Germany loses, and how much they make everyone hurt in the process?
For suspension of disbelief, it is best to assume that, ITTL, the German war machine is just that bit more efficient and the German population just that bit more committed (and larger) than IOTL. We can imagine that the prospect of an Anglo-American world order, which caused a violent backlash when it appeared towards the end of OTL's WWI, is just that much more of an animating factor in a world where it has already seemed to be half-real since 1900.
German defeat is still, once the initial gambit at the opening of the war failed, inevitable. The amount of damage they can do on the way down is very much the question. The answer is; an incredible amount.
I also wonder what the food situation among the warring powers bears among them. I know that the Central Powers had it badly, though they made some creative substitutes: The Iron Ration.
Well it won't be great for the Entente powers, so I imagine the situation in Germany is similar to 1917 or 18 OTL. I e. They are at breakpoint domestically and starting to have food shortages on the front lines as well. No Romanian harvest to bail them out for a few more months either. Its just been 3 years of constant blockades.
Then again, the Federation can't lean too hard on its various bread basket constituents either (at least compared to otl) if it wants to keep everyone happy and in the project going forward...
The food situation in Germany and its satellites isn't great, to put it mildly. However, this chapter sees the Pact achieve through conquest what, IOTL, was one of the motivating factors for getting a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks, instead of going with Trotsky's 'No War, No Peace' idea.
Every chapter on the front in Belgium makes me a bit more depressed, especially because of how bad it has gotten but also knowing how bad it will get, especially because the war isn't at her greatest extent yet. Belgium is interesting compared to IRL, because the occupation isn't as complete, Ghent and Brugge are still unoccupied. As I'm currently reading his war diary, Joris van Severen would at least be able to visit his family whilst at the front instead of when Brugge was liberated.
Anyways, this whole situation has gotten me anticipating the end of the war, a vengeful final offensive and enforced peace, for which the final stanza of The Flemish Lion comes to mind:
Revenge hath come, tired of their bait;
Amidst his rage, he pounceth the foe in spite
Which he teareth, crusheth, killeth, covereth in blood and mud,
And in victory sneereth o’er his foe’s fallen corpse.
the stanza quoted is almost never played, but this is one of the strongest versions of the anthem I know of
Rephrase: the gases generally used for most of the war did not kill very many people, and did not permanently disable very many either (in comparison to the other methods used to kill and incapacitate soldiers). Thus it was more of a terror tactic on troops, and by the end of the war, recognised as such.
In game, where the gas can be fired perfectly into trenches and in far greater amounts than otl, I can see it being quite the killer, especially if you can only start researching gas masks after it is developed?
The Scheldt was evidently a very bad episode in the war effort, but I still struggle to imagine any approaching a German struggle for world power. At best it feels like they're about to do some violent thrashing around before they die for good. Which is dangerous, of course, and frustrating – but barring catastrophe the war looks like it's only going to go one way.
As Butterfly says, the real kicker is making sure the Germans are down and out – and they know it – before they can collapse in on themselves and declare an unfair fight. The post-war period is going to be bad enough already…
Depends how bad the thrashing about was. The Amercians and British may well want the war over and done with; hopefully the French pull them through to the endgame and beyond.
Thing is, I'm not sure what the right move is for endgame. Break up the empire, as will happen somewhat naturally/with views to protectorates as with Austria Hungary and the ottomans? Keep germant intact but in a looser federation? Destroy prussia, as far as is possible? Or merely reperstions, ensure they know they were beaten, and the reasons why they were beaten?
These are not easy questions to answer. Especially depending on what happens to Russia and the east in general.
Especially with the coming events in Russia, the Entente are likely to find themselves in a similar conundrum to that IOTL, where they have put great stock in self-determination, and so can't realistically break up a German nation-state. Of course, the damage they will have done is much worse, so the arguments for European security overriding German sovereignty will be stronger.
Ah, gas has reared its ugly head in the war. The German autumn offensive sounds very ominous; despite the relatively static front, I have my fears about Paris.
We now are face-to-face with what may yet become the greatest military disaster of this war, and perhaps every British war since the Battle of Yorktown.
David Lloyd George, December 15th, 1914
For the Entente, September was dominated by recriminations from the battles of the summer. The French felt that there had not been enough co-ordination of the offensives at the beginning, while the British were convinced that, if French pressure had been renewed more vigorously during the week-long pause after Waregem, the German Army would not have had time to regroup. Both were becoming increasingly impatient with the Americans, whose contribution to the Western Front so far was a pair of divisions near the Ypres-Tourcoing Salient.
With the Marine Corps engaged alongside them in Italy, British annoyance with their cousins across the Atlantic was not quite as pronounced. However, as British battles (and so casualties) began to look more like French ones, voices in Parliament began to demand the Foreign Secretary and PM explain what they were doing to bring the Americans into ‘the war proper’. Just as French politicians had been asked where the British were, if their leaders were so sure that French defeat would be a British defeat, British politicians began to hear their constituents wondering about the gap between Roosevelt’s statements that victory was vital to Anglo-American civilisation, that the war was America’s chance to confirm its rank of Great Power alongside the European ones, and the lack of American men in France and Flanders.
It was on 24 September that Lloyd George and Chamberlain decided on launching a charm offensive in the United States, to convince Americans to vote for a continuation of the pro-war Congress that Roosevelt said he needed to expand American involvement to the killing fields of the Western Front. Within two weeks, the offensive had been put on hold by three near-simultaneous offensives from the Germans and their allies. The first, Operation Frederick, launched on 28 September on the Eastern Front, in the Baltics and Galicia, driving for St Petersburg and the grain stores of the Ukraine [1].
In the following week, the Western Entente attempted to cobble together offensive ideas to take pressure off their Russian allies. These were all dashed by the beginning of the western prong of the offensive on 3 October. Its two parts were known collectively as Operation Michael. The first, Bismarck, was directed at the French, and drove straight for Paris. As in the east, its progress was terrifyingly fast compared to the battles since winter 1912-13. With such a clear and present threat, the British were able to immediately authorise an offensive to be launched as close to the north wing of the new German advance as possible.
However, mere days before Wavell-Pierce’s effort, which had cobbled together nearly every battalion that could be considered inessential on its front, was meant to begin on a wide line from the Salient to the Scheldt, the final part of the Autumn Offensives, Blücher, began. There was not only a renewed effort stretching from Courtrai to Ghent that back-footed British troops in offensive positions or working at minimal strengths. Further to the North-East, the long deterioration of Dutch-German relations over the war reached its brutal conclusion, and the German Army invaded the Netherlands.
The three offensives within Operation Michael
The invasion of the Netherlands seems, at first glance, an entirely illogical action for a nation already throwing, as High Command acknowledged ‘everything or nothing’ into the mix just with simultaneous major offensives in east and west. However, it was exactly this acknowledgment that drove the logic of the invasion. With the collapse of Spain, the invasion of Italy, and the increasing demands being placed on Germany itself by the war, there was a fear that the Dutch would take the opportunity to throw their lot in with the Entente and secure a share of the gains of an increasingly inevitable victory. The gamble of the offensive, if it failed to win Germany the war then and there, would put it in a place where the only option would arguably be to inflict so brutal a cost on the following Entente counter-drive that a negotiated peace could be achieved.
Should the Netherlands join, Germany was almost certain to lose the war then and there if Entente troops could use the long border as a staging ground. Having finally rejected the option of suing for peace when the pressure at the Scheldt abated, and thrown their faith on an offensive that was truly the apotheosis of Weltmacht oder Niedergang, the logical option in the minds of High Command was to eliminate the staging ground. The Dutch, by all accounts, were not preparing to join the war yet [2], and so would be easy pickings for experienced German troops.
It was also the apocalyptic nature of what High Command saw as their future that allowed them to throw the kind of resources and have the kind of audacious experimentation in tactics that made Michael such a success. Had they not believed this was their last chance to win outright, they may not have made such consistent use of stormtrooper tactics, extremely targeted artillery concentrations, and early bomber planes. The result was assaults that achieved surprise, depth, disruption of Entente counterattacks, and the closest thing to real breakthroughs since the beginning of the war.
If the sudden progress of the German Army on the St Quentin-Laon Axis heading towards Paris caused worry in heart palpitations in Paris and disquiet in London, its combination with progress in Flanders and the apparent total collapse of the Dutch army in the first days of their entry into the war elicited a wave of outright panic. If the offensive in Flanders reached Ostend on the coast, the French would genuinely be facing the Germans alone. If the Netherlands also fell as quickly and comprehensively as they seemed to be doing, the BEF would be trapped in Flanders, and without a major port.
British dead in a trench near Ghent, roughly three weeks into Michael
As the BEF fought to maintain its land connection to France in October, the British government hastily negotiated with a Dutch government that was facing exile within a matter of weeks. These were less negotiations of an alliance than the terms on which the remnants of the Dutch military would be placed under British command. The army, though much expanded from its pre-war strength, would barely have been able to match the equipment and expertise of a German invasion of this size in 1911, but in 1914 the gap between the capability of the two armies was beyond imagining. On 4 November, the going-into-exile of the Dutch government finally had to happen, with German troops reaching the outskirts of the Hague.
For the French government, the negotiations with the Dutch might have been a development they would have insisted upon a far larger role in, had it not been during Michael. By 4 November, they were no longer holding a line on the St Quentin-Laon axis, they were fortifying Paris in anticipation of the German forward divisions that were now on a line running from Compiegne to Chateau-Thierry. The next month saw some of the most brutal and desperate Franco-German fighting of the war as the fate of the French capital hung in the balance. By the time the German advance finally ran out of steam in mid-December, a member of the German Sixth Army could be able, on a clear day, to catch a sight of the remaining tower of the Basilica of Saint-Denis from the forward trench in what is today the Courneuve Park.
If the failure to capture Paris marked the de facto failure of Michael, its success in the east was such that it changed the complexion of the whole war. Not only had the drive for Ukrainian grain been an unqualified success, but the German Army also genuinely looked to be threatening St Petersburg. The unmitigated disaster for Russia was such that rumours had begun circulating Nicholas II was looking to flee the country, which in turn caused a political crisis. In December, the Czar conceded to demands for significant constitutional liberalisation, convinced by his ministers that it was the only way to raise the flagging spirits of the Russian people. A defeat to Germany would now mean not just national humiliation, but a mutilated empire and an autocratic puppet regime beholden to Germany, not unlike what had come to happen between 1894 and 1913 in what was once Austria-Hungary. To maintain the promise of a liberal constitution, Germany had to be stopped.
The Czar had attempted to stop the wheel set in motion by Frederick, but only managed to spin it faster, as demands grew that liberalisation come immediately, rather than once the victory was won. Seeing a further opportunity to disrupt the Russian Empire, the Germans also turned the rhetoric about Bohemia and Galicia as part of a ‘mutilated empire’ on its head; even if these were German vassal states – which the Germans disputed despite it being clear that they were – they were still national states. Victory for the Czar’s ‘Democratic Russia’ would see the empire’s minorities dominated by a Russian majority that was no longer constrained by the balancing hand of autocracy. By January, the political crisis in Russia was deepening ever more swiftly, and the Germans were considering the possibility of such a comprehensive victory in the East that, were it exploited properly, the failure of Michael might not yet mark the end of their hopes in the West.
The Western Front, 14 December 1914
In the West, the conquest of the Netherlands was complete by 12 November. This allowed much of the German force engaged there to turn south, and reinforce the assault on an increasingly precariously positioned BEF. Throughout late-October and early-November, the Germans had been steadily advancing towards the seaside town of Nieuwpoort, which would leave part of the BEF stranded with only Ostend to supply them. As it became clear that the German advance was likely going to succeed, Wavell-Pierce began to hurry men through the remaining stretch of Entente-held land.
On 14 December though, the same day the German advance stalled at St Denis, their guns came close enough to Nieuwpoort that what was once the passage to safety became a killing ground. The 115th Brigade, part of the 38th (Welsh) Division, was due to cross on that day. What occurred instead was a slaughter. Part of the brigade made it to safety, part was trapped on the eastern side of the town, and of some 2,500 men that had been ready to cross that morning, 682 were dead or dying in the shell-ridden land between.
The 115th’s day of terror marked the moment at which Britain came face to face with the nightmare that Wavell-Pierce had been trying to get ahead of since 12 November, and feared since the first reports of a massive German offensive a little over a month earlier. In the space between Nieuwpoort and Bruges, served only by sea, and only by the port at Ostend, was an army’s worth of British soldiers, and almost the entirety of what remained of the Belgian and Dutch armies. The German Army, exhausted and battered though it was by two and a half of the deadliest months in human history, seemed poised to inflict possibly the biggest blow of the entire Autumn Offensives. As far as any observer could reasonably conclude, some 160,000 Entente men were now trapped in Flanders.
[1] – The timing at the mid-point of the harvest was no coincidence. A full harvest would have largely been transported out of Ukraine before German troops got to it, while one that had not begun was far more likely to tempt their enemy to practice outright scorched earth tactics close to the front. One that was only half-way done would mean that plans had already been made with the assumption it would finish, and so could not be burned as easily. Perhaps even more importantly, there would be stores waiting for transport that could be immediately commandeered to alleviate rationing in Germany.
[2] – That this seemed to argue against their own paranoia about a sudden Dutch move to gain a share of the spoils seems to have occurred to very few in the German military and political establishment, or become one of those ideas that was kept silent in the pressure cooker of a group already dedicated to a near-apocalyptic vision of the war Germany found itself in.
In Europe, the focus begins a shit eastwards with this chapter, as events in Russia change the balance of things quite drastically. Asia Minor will have a short update in the 'World at War' part of Act Two, and its own part in Act Three.
I believe there may be a missing F in the 7th word. Otherwise the author is preoccupied with, um, personal matters. I will go on record as saying I do not have a preference for which direction he, um, sits.
Every great military mind knows that if you are in danger of losing a war the best solution is to add another front and another enemy, yes? Success in the Netherlands is all very well and good, but I don't think it is a war-winner or even a peace-winner. I think the reports of atrocities (real or manufactured or both) coming out of the Netherlands and occupied France and Belgium are going to harden the Entente resolve.
Launching offensives in the West while still occupied i n the East is either really bad, desperate strategy or cunning, desperate genius. I suppose we shall have to see.
Bad news from Russia - so just an average day after all.
Good god, this is going to make the germans look properly evil. Randomly attacking a neutral nation for little reason? And a western European one at that? Not cricket.
This is going to affect the post war peace terms immensely, I think.
Russia may be able to cling on, but their empire in Eastern Europe may well be going independent after the war. Which is actually pretty good news for everyone else, cos it means Germany got defeated and so did Russia, leaving the Anglo-Amercian alliance to continue to dominante.
I think the germans are close to collapse. They just expended a lot of their remaining resources taking a random target that did not contribute to any war goals (the Netherlands) and are fighting expanded fronts everywhere else against enemies defending their very capitals. I guess they might have some hope if the UK can't get out of the pocket...but I'm sure at least the troops will, if the equipment doesn't.
So, Dunkirk a generation early? I don't think that given the level of engineering of the British civilian fleets and certainly the Royal Navy the success of the OTL 1940 Dunkirk can be repeated. Then again, the major threat from airpower of the Luftwaffe is (maybe?) non-existent, so maybe there is still hope yet.
Yeah, Britain has either got to get a land connection to mainland France or evacuate that army. But I would not underestimate the resilience of the British bulldog nor the professionalism of the Royal Navy.
If you bite it off and can't swallow it, you can choke on it...
So, Dunkirk a generation early? I don't think that given the level of engineering of the British civilian fleets and certainly the Royal Navy the success of the OTL 1940 Dunkirk can be repeated. Then again, the major threat from airpower of the Luftwaffe is (maybe?) non-existent, so maybe there is still hope yet.
Well, there they certainly didn't have to contend with a western army that (possibly) sees the writing on the wall and is clearly willing to go to any lengths to thrash about in the death throes. Given that the two naval powers of TTLs Central Powers (Spain and Italy) are out of the fight, that frees up significant numbers of dreadnoughts to provide battlefield support. Hard to push up when you're within range of lots of big ass cannon.
Well, there they certainly didn't have to contend with a western army that (possibly) sees the writing on the wall and is clearly willing to go to any lengths to thrash about in the death throes. Given that the two naval powers of TTLs Central Powers (Spain and Italy) are out of the fight, that frees up significant numbers of dreadnoughts to provide battlefield support. Hard to push up when you're within range of lots of big ass cannon.
No mines or sea defences to fend off a fleet either. The battleships can just park offshore and shoot. And that would help either escape plan (running and gunning back into France or retreat by sea).
Honestly, if (big if) they can keep the troops supplied, they may even decide to keep them there, and just keep the pressure on the germans. One more front for them is really bad news, after all.
It's terrifying to see how much Germany can do on its own even at this stage in the war. I expect that this timeline will also have a great deal of chaos in Eastern Europe even when peace will have officially come.
As for France, I hope that the Americans decide to finally show up and help out.
It's terrifying to see how much Germany can do on its own even at this stage in the war. I expect that this timeline will also have a great deal of chaos in Eastern Europe even when peace will have officially come.
As for France, I hope that the Americans decide to finally show up and help out.
They've already lost the war, which I shall why they are going into 1918 mode and storming every single front they can, while they still can. Initially good results, followed by complete collapse, is on the cards. At least in the west.
I don't think the British will be popular in Ireland for a long time, though the federation might be (if they invest in Ireland and try to make up for all the horrible things they've done Tim Ireland over the years). It's going to be a trouble spot, though hopefully not as much as South Africa is going to be (I say hopefully because there is a federation member that really does need to be almost compeltly torn down and rebuilt from the bottom up).
I believe there may be a missing F in the 7th word. Otherwise the author is preoccupied with, um, personal matters. I will go on record as saying I do not have a preference for which direction he, um, sits.
Every great military mind knows that if you are in danger of losing a war the best solution is to add another front and another enemy, yes? Success in the Netherlands is all very well and good, but I don't think it is a war-winner or even a peace-winner. I think the reports of atrocities (real or manufactured or both) coming out of the Netherlands and occupied France and Belgium are going to harden the Entente resolve.
Launching offensives in the West while still occupied i n the East is either really bad, desperate strategy or cunning, desperate genius. I suppose we shall have to see.
Bad news from Russia - so just an average day after all.
Thank you for the spot. I haven't laughed as hard in a while as I did at this.
As noted in the chapter, invading the Netherlands is an entirely irrational decision, unless you think you're engaged in an apocalyptic struggle where everybody nto explicitly with you is just waiting to tear you apart.
Good god, this is going to make the germans look properly evil. Randomly attacking a neutral nation for little reason? And a western European one at that? Not cricket.
This is going to affect the post war peace terms immensely, I think.
Russia may be able to cling on, but their empire in Eastern Europe may well be going independent after the war. Which is actually pretty good news for everyone else, cos it means Germany got defeated and so did Russia, leaving the Anglo-Amercian alliance to continue to dominante.
I think the germans are close to collapse. They just expended a lot of their remaining resources taking a random target that did not contribute to any war goals (the Netherlands) and are fighting expanded fronts everywhere else against enemies defending their very capitals. I guess they might have some hope if the UK can't get out of the pocket...but I'm sure at least the troops will, if the equipment doesn't.
Two and a half years still to go. Much as IOTL's WWII, Germany's thrashing has put it in a place where defeat is inevitable, but much blood will have to be shed before it becomes evident.
So, Dunkirk a generation early? I don't think that given the level of engineering of the British civilian fleets and certainly the Royal Navy the success of the OTL 1940 Dunkirk can be repeated. Then again, the major threat from airpower of the Luftwaffe is (maybe?) non-existent, so maybe there is still hope yet.
Yeah, Britain has either got to get a land connection to mainland France or evacuate that army. But I would not underestimate the resilience of the British bulldog nor the professionalism of the Royal Navy.
If you bite it off and can't swallow it, you can choke on it...
Well, there they certainly didn't have to contend with a western army that (possibly) sees the writing on the wall and is clearly willing to go to any lengths to thrash about in the death throes. Given that the two naval powers of TTLs Central Powers (Spain and Italy) are out of the fight, that frees up significant numbers of dreadnoughts to provide battlefield support. Hard to push up when you're within range of lots of big ass cannon.
There's an odd equilibrium ITTL, between the willingness of the German Army to finish the job and the slow pace of Great War offensives, that allows for this chapter's miracle.
No mines or sea defences to fend off a fleet either. The battleships can just park offshore and shoot. And that would help either escape plan (running and gunning back into France or retreat by sea).
Honestly, if (big if) they can keep the troops supplied, they may even decide to keep them there, and just keep the pressure on the germans. One more front for them is really bad news, after all.
The humiliation of the Entente armies being crushed would be more of a setback than the strategic value of keeping them there as a thorn in Germany's side, even if we don't consider the terrible optics of sending men to die in a Flanders pocket purely to keep the Germans occupied. Even by Great War standards, that's a bad look.
It's terrifying to see how much Germany can do on its own even at this stage in the war. I expect that this timeline will also have a great deal of chaos in Eastern Europe even when peace will have officially come.
As for France, I hope that the Americans decide to finally show up and help out.
There are reasons why the Germans were so feared as a great power before the war...
Given that Germany is even more obviously the war monger and sole antagonist than in otl, the peace terms are going to be harsh indeed.
They've already lost the war, which I shall why they are going into 1918 mode and storming every single front they can, while they still can. Initially good results, followed by complete collapse, is on the cards. At least in the west.
I don't think the British will be popular in Ireland for a long time, though the federation might be (if they invest in Ireland and try to make up for all the horrible things they've done Tim Ireland over the years). It's going to be a trouble spot, though hopefully not as much as South Africa is going to be (I say hopefully because there is a federation member that really does need to be almost compeltly torn down and rebuilt from the bottom up).
In what is hopefully not too much of a spoiler, the wider and more destructive war of TTL means that the mis-match between the level of chaos that needs to be sorted post-war and the ability (both in capacity and will) of the victorious powers to sort it is just that much bigger.
Who's Tim Ireland?
I kid. Yes, the federation working is really the last chance to avoid Ireland detaching itself completely the way it did IOTL. South Africa, as an Imperial Commonwealth, was already struggling with the gap between ideals and reality. As the justification for war moves ever further into the realm of a battle for democracy, liberty, and (prototypical) human rights, that gap is just going to get wider and more obvious.
Deliverance, unexpected and miraculous though it has been, must not blind us to the fact that what has happened in France and Belgium is a colossal military disaster.
David Lloyd George, January 1st, 1915
On 16 December, while Wavell-Pierce and General Bernard Greville-Jones (in command of the Second Army that faced the western side of the German position) were debating whether a sustained assault would provide enough breathing space to reopen the Nieuwpoort lifeline, the decision was made for them. Late that afternoon, poorly sighted German artillery fire overshot its target on the outskirts of the town and fundamentally compromised the integrity of the sluice gate that held back the River Yser. The resulting flooding drowned thousands of their own men and forced a retreat from the western bank of the river.
The upshot was that, just as the western side was denied to a German offensive, the necessary land to provide a buffer against German artillery on the eastern side was denied to the British. When the Germans compensated by pushing further up the coast to the east of Nieuwpoort, the idea of reopening the route out was dead. There were now only two even theoretically achievable options available; the abandonment of a 160,000-man fighting force, or the massive gamble of attempting to evacuate as many as possible via Ostend before German artillery came in range to deny that too. The first was unconscionable, and so Wavell-Pierce called the Prime Minister directly through newly installed phone lines between his HQ and Whitehall to recommend the second.
Operation Hush, soon to become known as ‘The Ostend Miracle’, officially began on 19 December, when the RMS Aquitania hove into view near the town. When Mauretania, Lusitania, and Olympic joined the operation on the 20th, total transport capacity numbered 25,000 men. Men were to be unloaded alternatingly at Ramsgate in England and Dunkirk, France, just on the other side of German-controlled territory. The Admiralty and Army assumed that, in ideal conditions, it would take two hours for loading, two for unloading, and six and eight hours of time at sea for the round-trip to Dunkirk and Ramsgate, respectively. Of course, these were not ideal conditions, but with wastage, delays, and other unexpected events, the military chiefs figured that, given two weeks, the majority could be evacuated.
Some 28,000 had been brought out of the fire by the 24th, when the German assault on the stranded units was renewed. Major-General Gort, the most senior officer in the area, telegrammed from the Ostend office the next day that, by the New Year at the latest, Ostend would be in the hands of the German Army. Either evacuations picked up the pace, or the hopes of getting a majority out were already gone. In response, warships were pulled from blockade duty to take men directly off the beaches around the town.
The Royal Navy and British Army have rightly been afforded much credit for the speed and efficiency of the operation they ran in almost as imperfect a circumstance as possible. Not enough credit, until recently, has been given to the efforts of the Belgian and Dutch armies to prevent it from becoming as imperfect as possible. 60,000 of the men set for evacuation were Dutch or Belgian. Whereas the British got out eight in ten men, only a third of their allies made it on a ship. This was because their commanders had volunteered to be in the frontline of the diminishing cordon, and their men had taken up that promise with vigour. Of the 21,000 or so that made it to Dunkirk and Ramsgate, half were only on a ship because they were wounded.
RMS Aquitania approaching Ramsgate, 28 December 1914
The last ship to take men out of the pocket was the HMS Ramillies, on the morning of 31 December. Two hours later, the returning Mauretania was waved off by naval flags flown from the town hall. For just over an hour, pot-shots from German artillery had been landing in the town. One had even hit the pier directly, killing 34 waiting troops instantly and rendering it unusable. By the time it was expected to be fixed, the beach would undoubtedly be a killing ground. Even without a hit on the pier, the arrival of artillery meant that a lucky shot could sink a transport ship loading men in port. The evacuation was over.
Major-General Gort surrendered the remaining men in the pocket at 4PM that day. The final telegraph message out of Ostend read:
Must meet German Commander. Trust will see you all again shortly.
The final total was that 103,222 men were saved from the Ostend Pocket. Of these, roughly a third were wounded, as Gort, de Vries (Dutch), and Tillens (Belgian) had early on decided to give them priority in evacuations. The decision was informed by their shared personal sense of honour, as well as by rumours of German atrocities that, if true, would make the abandonment of the wounded a particularly cruel prioritisation. Finding out the fates of the estimated 60,000 who were in the pocket on 14 December, but not on a ship by midday on the 31st, is more difficult. The German Army estimated that they took some 40,000 men prisoner from the pocket, which would imply that 20,000 men had died in Flanders during the evacuation.
All in all, the final act of Operation Michael was an unexpected piece of good news in the most terrible Entente setback of the entire war. Even then, though men had been saved, unimaginable amounts of ammunition and equipment had been lost to the enemy. The Netherlands was completely occupied, and free Belgium was reduced to a tiny crescent on the west bank of the Yser. British dead numbered 123,812 in the three months from the beginning of Michael to 1 January 1915, bringing the total on all fronts to 562,138.
The French had lost nearly twice that number in their feverish defence against the German drive to Paris. Over the course of the war so far, their dead now numbered over 800,000. Patriotic fervour, the real threat to the country, and the knowledge they were not alone were what was keeping the French from outright collapse. The Russians, who were arguably already in a collapsed state, had suffered over a million dead.
On the other side of the trenches, German war dead on all fronts stood at over 1.5 million. Their Central European allies had lost roughly half a million. The ability of the Spanish state to even count its losses amongst the upheaval of the 1910s makes 200,000 the best guess for the military toll of its participation in the war between 1911 and 1914. Italy had suffered only 120,000 or so deaths by January 1915, but the worst there was yet to come. As in Spain, the consequences of the war for the Ottoman state make a full accounting, much less one for mid-way through the war, impossible.
If there were two Great Powers that could be considered untouched, they were the United States of America and the Empire of Japan. The latter was the only one not officially involved in the war on one side or the other, though it had ambitions to take advantage of its effects. The former had lost some 50,000 men in various naval actions, Italy, and Spain. It had barely even begun to bring the full force of its arms to bear. The effect of Michael on American internal politics was to polarise opinion as it became clear that American blood was almost certainly needed to win the war in the West.
President Theodore Roosevelt, 1916
On the one side was the President, Theodore Roosevelt, and the side of the Republican Party loyal to him. Their opinion was that the US should do absolutely everything it could to support the Entente war effort. Roosevelt had been pushing for increased involvement on the Western Front privately since the beginning of the war, even if publicly he maintained that the US would involve itself in the killing fields of France and Flanders only to the extent that it was ‘absolutely necessary’. This was a result of the opinion of the majority of Congress and the American people, which felt that the war was largely a European affair, but was happy to accept Roosevelt’s argument that failing to join would be an abdication of the US’ moral duties. Not only would failure to honour the Entente Cordiale be wrong, but so great was this war that to fail to choose a side was to support the worse.
On the other end of the spectrum were the anti-war lobby, composed of isolationists, the very rare pro-German, and the Woodrow Wilson school of thought. Wilson, who had become the figurehead of the anti-war movement since 1912, argued for American disengagement from essentially the same angle as Roosevelt, the moral duties of the United States. However, for Wilson, American Exceptionalism placed that moral duty as being one of standing above the entire fray. In Wilson’s view, the US’ destiny was to become the moral and economic centre of the world, and it had been well on that way through the natural development of its economy and population in the years before the war. By joining the Entente Cordiale, the US had momentarily signed away its moral high ground. The only way to regain it was to extricate the country from the war, and force, through economic pressure, the two sides to come to the table. A peace forced upon the world’s belligerent powers by the US would not only end the war, but affirm to the world the rightful place of the US as the centre of that world.
It was the middle ground that relatively uncritically accepted Roosevelt’s argument, but had little interest in joining the war in full, that was obliterated by Michael. The 1914 Congressional elections, which happened one month into the offensive, demonstrated this in relatively simple terms. The Democratic Party now rallied around Wilson and his promise to ‘get us out of the war’. The Republican Party took up the President’s argument that it was ‘Americans in France or Germans the World Over’. In the House of Representatives, the Republicans maintained a slim majority, but the Senatorial seats up for election were distributed in a manner to give the Democrats a slim majority. Wilson himself became the de facto leader of the Democratic Senate majority [1].
The result was pro-Roosevelt enough that he could feel confident in promising more American troops for the Western Front, but not so strong that it did not put doubt in the minds of American allies about the amount of commitment they could realistically expect. Following Michael, the last illusions of a ‘short war’ had evaporated. These had been sustained by the idea that the German Army and population’s will were on the verge of imminent collapse; the war may have been long, but its end could be quick. Now, British and French commands, and popular understanding, all assumed that 1916 was the absolute earliest the war could end. If it did not end by November that year, the Americans could well be out under a Wilson Presidency.
Woodrow Wilson, 1914
For the British Cabinet, American ambivalence posed another issue. To maintain a peaceful order in the world following the cataclysm of the war, the victorious powers would have to provide a united front to contain any would-be revisionists. The French would be spent by the war, and capable of providing aid in watching Germany at absolute most. Russia now seemed to barely be containing itself. The onus would therefore be on the United States and United Kingdom. With the myriad commitments it had even before the war, a Britain that had lost hundreds of thousands of men and gone into billions of Pounds of debt could hardly take on the role of sole policeman for this new world order.
This, however, was still largely a concern for Chamberlain in January 1915. It was his security architecture that had failed to prevent war. How a broken world could replace it with something stronger was the subject of daily thought. For the rest of the nation, and almost all of Whitehall, the concern in the immediate aftermath of Michael was how to get from a situation where Germany controlled much of the continent to one where the Entente could begin to fashion a victorious peace.
The first, and clearest, conclusion was that the bill that had first been drafted in September – immediately after the cost of failure at the Scheldt became clear – but only been debated in Cabinet, had to be pushed through Parliament. The Military Service Bill was introduced on 9 October, and received Royal Assent on 2 November. Conscription was coming to Britain and, controversially, the Commonwealths. The Act’s extension to the whole of the Imperial Federation was, in some ways, the logical conclusion of how previous War Acts had confirmed the Westminster Parliament’s supremacy and reach. The way it confirmed this, though, fundamentally changed the popular understanding of the Federation and the debate on it.
Conscripts at muster, London, 1916
The other was what government would get them there. By the time Nieuwpoort was closed as an escape route, it seemed that their position was as untenable as that of the men in the pocket’s. Churchill had provided a scalp for both Italy and the Scheldt, of sorts, but this was much, much bigger. Ever the wily political operator, Lloyd George played for time, arguing that the time for resignations and reshuffles was when the initial crisis was over. As he would later admit in his memoirs, he was well aware that the opinion of Cabinet was that the PM who presided over such a disaster was a dead man walking. It was the Ostend Miracle that allowed him to survive.
Speaking to the House on New Year’s Day, 1915, the PM managed to paint himself as the indispensable man in the operation. As the world fell to pieces around them, it was David Lloyd George that held the nerves of Cabinet and British generals together. It was he who had authorised everything necessary to be done and whipped the Army and Navy into the necessary co-operation. It was he who now soothed the nation’s soul with the heroic story of deliverance from the German Devil.
A reshuffle though, was necessary. In January 1915, though he could not move Courtenay, Lloyd George sacked Seely as War Secretary and initiated a wholesale clear-out. Importantly, Seely’s replacement, James Covington, was more than happy to go with the French idea for a unified command on the Western Front and more autonomy for generals. The need for War Cabinet approval on too many things, especially if it involved a French request, was not an insignificant factor in the lethargic response to, and success of, Michael.
In recognition of the sacrifices the French had so far made, and were set yet further to make now that the war was almost entirely on their soil, the man picked as the first Supreme Allied Commander on 12 February 1915 was the French Chief of Staff, General Albert Cadieux. As with its predecessor, Arles HQ, the Americans did not officially join, but Roosevelt again gave Funston, now set to move his troops to the Western Front, the order to act, as far as possible, as if he were part of the command. On the British side, Wavell-Pierce resigned after the evacuation at Ostend was complete, emotionally exhausted and aware he was jumping before he was pushed.
His replacement, Field Marshal Edmund Allenby would be tasked with not only adjusting British commanders on the Western Front to the new joint command, but somehow leading them to victory over a German Army that now occupied more new soil than the British had managed to liberate from them all war. He was still getting the feel of the job and the new face of the war in April 1915, when that face changed entire again.
[1] – Though born in Virginia, and having served as Governor of New Jersey, Wilson was elected in North Carolina due to neither of the former states having a Senate seat up for election in 1914.
The war is starting to hurt both sides enough that onlookers have gone through the stage of staying well clear and are now back round to judging when to join for their own best advantages...
Deliverance, unexpected and miraculous though it has been, must not blind us to the fact that what has happened in France and Belgium is a colossal military disaster.
The Royal Navy and British Army have rightly been afforded much credit for the speed and efficiency of the operation they ran in almost as imperfect a circumstance as possible. Not enough credit, until recently, has been given to the efforts of the Belgian and Dutch armies to prevent it from becoming as imperfect as possible. 60,000 of the men set for evacuation were Dutch or Belgian. Whereas the British got out eight in ten men, only a third of their allies made it on a ship. This was because their commanders had volunteered to be in the frontline of the diminishing cordon, and their men had taken up that promise with vigour. Of the 21,000 or so that made it to Dunkirk and Ramsgate, half were only on a ship because they were wounded.
The first, and clearest, conclusion was that the bill that had first been drafted in September – immediately after the cost of failure at the Scheldt became clear – but only been debated in Cabinet, had to be pushed through Parliament. The Military Service Act 1915 was introduced on 9 October, and received Royal Assent on 2 November. Conscription was coming to Britain and, controversially, the Commonwealths. The Act’s extension to the whole of the Imperial Federation was, in some ways, the logical conclusion of how previous War Acts had confirmed the Westminster Parliament’s supremacy and reach. The way it confirmed this, though, fundamentally changed the popular understanding of the Federation and the debate on it.
It's obvious that the Federation is wishing to assert her authority, and it's not going to make itself popular among sections of the overseas, and even in Britain itself as it will surely suffer the hardest from the post-war blues and it finds itself not really fully sovereign over herself anymore.
