Epilogue: Chapter 3
The fact that, on paper, Germany seemed to have lost the American War was a thorn in the side of many Germans. But none so much as the veterans of that war, who knew that they had conducted themselves well, and that they deserved a more fitting peace than to be made to look like losers.
The pre-armistice warnings of Chancellor Gerhard Niemann to his Kaiser bore fruit when public opinion – after a post-war hiatus – turned sharply against him and “his lost war.” Faced with political repercussions, Niemann and the Konservatives came to a crossroads. They could choose to remain with the Kaiser, and share the burning heat being cast his direction. Or they could break with the Kaiser and bear the consequences of that.
The peace had been approved by the Reichstag without the support of most Konservatives, who wished to hold out for better terms. LiberalDems and Katholic Zentrums generally supported the peace. The Konservatives had also finally gotten the Empire’s fiscal house in order, and lowered tax rates to where the people did not consider them so onerous. They did not wish to risk their accomplishments by losing power, but how to preserve their power was the question…
Niemann chose to break with the Kaiser and pursue a Konservative electoral victory in opposition to the peace. This was accomplished in August of 1920, when the Konservatives garnered 47% of the Reichstag seats, to 29% Zentrum and 24% Liberal.
But, faced with a loss of his power base, Kaiser Waldemar turned to the parties who had stuck with him before and after the war – the Liberal Democrats and Center-Catholics – whose philosophies often seemed more aligned with Waldemar’s in any case. Jakob Dempewolf, leader of the Zentrums, became Chancellor at the head of a Liberal-Catholic coalition – the first ever to have held the Chancellory in the German Empire. Krysz Skiedweza became Foreign Minister, though he soon was appointed President of the new Republic of Poland.
As part of the new openness recommended by Dempewolf, socialist parties were allowed to organize for the first time. This ended a long period of socialist opposition to the Kaiser and the government. Generally, socialists chose to support the monarch who had allowed them to finally have the vote. Several parties of socialist character came into being, including a small party called the DeutscheArbeitPartei (German Worker’s Party) which was to ultimately have greater impact than any of the others.
Kaiser Waldemar, for many reasons, was able to become much more popular during the years 1920-23. In 1921, with the change in parliament looking more to the Dutch liking, a mutual desire for more interaction resulted in the Hague Treaty of 1921, which traded various colonies in the East Indies region. It recognized Prussia’s control of Brunei, and her other existing colonies, but otherwise granted the rest of Borneo to the Netherlands.
It was generally a good thing for Waldemar when he decided to intervene in the Near East at the collapse of the Ottoman Empire – to “exert influence on the situation, and guide its resolution on our terms.” The operations resulted in a vast expansion of Prussian power, in an improvement of Germany’s security situation, it was believed, and involved little real fighting. It showed Germany in control of events in the world.
Similarly, the public fright at having a regicidal communist revolution next door in Russia provided popular support for the Kaiser’s anti-Bolshevist military operations, which ranged far and wide through Russia. They reached as far as Moscow at some points, but were turned back by resistance from armed and organized peasants who supported the communists. Only when a larger war threatened, in 1923, did Waldemar’s resolve falter in Russia, and pressure let off the Bolsheviks.
In 1923, as will be treated elsewhere, Germany dispatched a limited number of troops to try to keep the internecine fighting in the Balkans from getting out of hand. However, the problem proved beyond the best efforts of an earnest power to solve (which left the solution to a not-so-earnest power).
The real primary test of Germany’s intentions as a world power, and Kaiser Waldemar’s ability as a leader, started in 1922, but came to fruition in 1923. Much of German history over the next several years was driven, increasingly, by the actions of, and reactions against, one man – Adolf Hitler.
As a politician, Hitler combined the appealing populist philosophy of socialism with the motivating visionary elements of nationalism. True socialists were appalled at this compromise of their beliefs, but from 1922 on, Hitler could point to the success of Premier Benito Mussolini, in Sardinia-Piedmont, whose very similar “fascist” policies seemed to have greatly improved that government’s performance.
Hitler supported Kaiser Waldemar in 1921-22, when Germany was fighting “the good fight” against Bolshevism in Russia. This brought this “little man” closer to significance for two reasons. Hitler became regarded as a friend to the Konservatives, despite irreconcilable philosophical differences (Hitler was, after all, a socialist, not a conservative). The Konservatives had made a rapproachment with the Kaiser over the Russian Civil War, and Hitler brought his small but passionate base of support along in that sentiment. The Kaiser and his cadre were glad for any party’s support, no matter how marginal its standing, and no matter how off base its rhetoric. Hitler was “brought inside” to a small degree – not enough to convey legitimacy. Only to equate it in Hitler’s mind.
But Hitler was a politician, and therefore could have it both ways. He broke with the Kaiser, taking a good deal of public opinion with him, when the situation in South Africa came to the fore. He and his friend and mentor, General Erich Ludendorff, joined forces to speak in support of the Boers.
The Kaiser remained at first aloof and not wishing to embroil Germany in what he regarded as a distant and unimportant distraction from the main concern – Bolshevik Russia. But the German people were very concerned over the plight of the Dutch Boers – of a kin with the Germans – in their struggle with Prussia’s recent bitter enemy, Britain.
Merely from Hitler’s support of the Boers, and from Ludendorff’s association with him, he gained recognition and support. Ludendorff also added to Hitler’s support (his party, by now, referred to as the Nationalist Socialist German Worker’s Party, or NaSDAP), and discrediting Kaiser Waldemar, through a story that Waldemar had intentionally sold him out to the British and caused his capture, along with that of all the other generals whose efforts floundered and failed in the first stages of the Second Anglo-Prussian War.
Further, Hitler used his brilliant and motivational speaking style to amplify upon Ludendorff’s point, and to add that Waldemar had also sold the Germans out to the United States – the “stab in the back” – because of the influence of his American education, his prior “friendly” relationship with President Wilson, and, obviously, the Kaiserin’s undying loyalty to her homeland.
These seeds of lies found fertile ground among those who already felt they had reason to distrust or resent Kaiser Waldemar. The Second Boer War was, to many people, that reason to distrust their Kaiser, whose position on the war fit finely into the picture Hitler and Ludendorff were painting of a “collaborationist Kaiser” whose loyalties were pledged to powers outside of the German Fatherland.
Kaiser Waldemar remained the respected monarch of the German Empire in the eyes of the vast majority. But a growing number of Germans began to question his leadership. The situation was to grow more dire, over a succession of years.