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Great thread!
If I understand the reading I've done on this, the singel biggest problem for GER in russia was logistics.
In the beginning distances was within the grasp of the GER supply-lines. The deeper they got in to russia, the bigger their problems with supplying the formations become.
The motorization of the GER army in WW2 is to some extend a myth created by their own propaganda. They had exelent panzerformations, but lacked the logistic infrastrukture to keep them in action deep inside russia.
They also lacked the resources to have fed such a fuel-monster.
All through the war, the workhorse of the Whermacht was ...... the horse. (and railroad)
In shorter -limited in range- campaigns in 39 and 40, the motorized infrastructure was adequit. In the early part of Barbarossa it was at it's peak. But after some months it was nearly collapsing.
Much has been made of AH's decision not to issue winterequiptment due to the implisit failure of the objective to bring the house of russia down before winter. Other sources state that even the equiptment that was intended for the occupying forces from the start, was downprioritized in favor of food and ammo. The logistical problems of supplying the forces outside Moscow and other distant fronts was overwhelming the Whermacht.
They rebuilded the railroads like madmen and it got better as soon as they could use coaldriven trains to get the supplies closer to the front. Still they lacked the ability to quickly shift troops from one part of the front to another. Trucks where just too few and fuel a rare material...
If I understand the reading I've done on this, the singel biggest problem for GER in russia was logistics.
In the beginning distances was within the grasp of the GER supply-lines. The deeper they got in to russia, the bigger their problems with supplying the formations become.
The motorization of the GER army in WW2 is to some extend a myth created by their own propaganda. They had exelent panzerformations, but lacked the logistic infrastrukture to keep them in action deep inside russia.
They also lacked the resources to have fed such a fuel-monster.
All through the war, the workhorse of the Whermacht was ...... the horse. (and railroad)
In shorter -limited in range- campaigns in 39 and 40, the motorized infrastructure was adequit. In the early part of Barbarossa it was at it's peak. But after some months it was nearly collapsing.
Much has been made of AH's decision not to issue winterequiptment due to the implisit failure of the objective to bring the house of russia down before winter. Other sources state that even the equiptment that was intended for the occupying forces from the start, was downprioritized in favor of food and ammo. The logistical problems of supplying the forces outside Moscow and other distant fronts was overwhelming the Whermacht.
They rebuilded the railroads like madmen and it got better as soon as they could use coaldriven trains to get the supplies closer to the front. Still they lacked the ability to quickly shift troops from one part of the front to another. Trucks where just too few and fuel a rare material...
a very interesting book - "The Blitzkrieg Mtyh" deconstructs the theories and practices of the belligerents in WW2. i believe the author is Mosier.
the main premise is that "blitzkrieg" existed in name only, and was not an actual doctrine employed by any army during the war.
the main premise is that "blitzkrieg" existed in name only, and was not an actual doctrine employed by any army during the war.
El Savior said:
Not the first desert storm, but I would argue that the 2003 campaign called shock and awe would be a modern blitzkrieg. Which is discussed on the same source.
http://www.shockandawe.com/shockch2.html
Since 1) is fairly answered, I will start with
2) + 3) Let me start this with a simple question: Why didn't anybody think of napalm before someone did? Or the ridiculus idea that unbelievable small things called electrons might do anything useful? Both these inventions were the more or less logical conclusion from data, and its litte different with doctrines. One might call the Schlieffenplan of 19errr...12? the first try of blitzkrieg in its litteral mean - come over the enemy fast as lightning and defeat him before he realised what the hell happened. Others could call the preussian-french war of 1870/71 the first blitzkrieg, since it was won by encirceling the french in sedan and their surrender.
The encirlement-destruction was always a major part of the preussian officercorps' way of waging war. Using fast elements (be it cavallery or tanks matters little) is only the next logical step from it.
4)Blitzkrieg, or more the operational maneuver warfare, in essential, IS the doctrine of today. Or at least, it was when a large scale war in middle europe or other parts was still a possibility. After all, tanks have only become faster and all the infantry has been motorized, so blitzkrieg is easier then ever...at least from the technical point.
For the most recent usage look Desert storm and Iraqi freedom.
5)It worked absolutly stunning in russia, at least initially. 1,5 Million POWs would have brought any western power to the negotiation table ASAP. The russians instead did what they always did when invaded and lead by someone halfway competent - change space for time, haul in reserves from the vast siberian space and wait. Eventually, everyone runs dry. Napoleon did, the germans would have if it hadn't been for the revolution, and the germans did it again 1941. The country is just to vast to be controlled, and they know it. If they can keep fighting for an extended period of time, any enemy is done for.
6)Manstein, Guderian, Rommel, Patton.
7)It is one, big game of vabaque. It has been designed to fight with inferior forces and win. as someone in this board nicely put it, it requieres your enemy to cooperate to work. A smart enemy will cut of the trusts at the start, encirle the advancing fast elements (essentialy the best troops the enemy has) and then crushes them. So, Blitzkrieg can backfire bigtime.
2) + 3) Let me start this with a simple question: Why didn't anybody think of napalm before someone did? Or the ridiculus idea that unbelievable small things called electrons might do anything useful? Both these inventions were the more or less logical conclusion from data, and its litte different with doctrines. One might call the Schlieffenplan of 19errr...12? the first try of blitzkrieg in its litteral mean - come over the enemy fast as lightning and defeat him before he realised what the hell happened. Others could call the preussian-french war of 1870/71 the first blitzkrieg, since it was won by encirceling the french in sedan and their surrender.
The encirlement-destruction was always a major part of the preussian officercorps' way of waging war. Using fast elements (be it cavallery or tanks matters little) is only the next logical step from it.
4)Blitzkrieg, or more the operational maneuver warfare, in essential, IS the doctrine of today. Or at least, it was when a large scale war in middle europe or other parts was still a possibility. After all, tanks have only become faster and all the infantry has been motorized, so blitzkrieg is easier then ever...at least from the technical point.
For the most recent usage look Desert storm and Iraqi freedom.
5)It worked absolutly stunning in russia, at least initially. 1,5 Million POWs would have brought any western power to the negotiation table ASAP. The russians instead did what they always did when invaded and lead by someone halfway competent - change space for time, haul in reserves from the vast siberian space and wait. Eventually, everyone runs dry. Napoleon did, the germans would have if it hadn't been for the revolution, and the germans did it again 1941. The country is just to vast to be controlled, and they know it. If they can keep fighting for an extended period of time, any enemy is done for.
6)Manstein, Guderian, Rommel, Patton.
7)It is one, big game of vabaque. It has been designed to fight with inferior forces and win. as someone in this board nicely put it, it requieres your enemy to cooperate to work. A smart enemy will cut of the trusts at the start, encirle the advancing fast elements (essentialy the best troops the enemy has) and then crushes them. So, Blitzkrieg can backfire bigtime.
Gen. Patton being the most famous U.S. general to use it, although it was
http://www.achtungpanzer.com/blitz.htm
Although this source sites desert storm as being a blitzkrieg, as I stated above, I don't think it was due to suttle differences such as advancing on the entire front.
http://www.achtungpanzer.com/blitz.htm
Although this source sites desert storm as being a blitzkrieg, as I stated above, I don't think it was due to suttle differences such as advancing on the entire front.
BandKanon
Cheers. I always considered Op Citadel a more significant blunder than Stalingrad.
Hortlund wrote:
Cheers. I always considered Op Citadel a more significant blunder than Stalingrad.
Hortlund wrote:
Fair point, I satnd corrected. However, from my very limited knowledge I read that US generals read more from German theorists than Russian.
What actually happened
Theory is fine, but what if you don't have the kind of army that can utilize it?
My understanding of what the Russians actually did was: plaster a section of the front with artillery and then drive their mobile units through it more or less straight forward until halted by lack of supply or opposition.
Hortlund said:
Theory is fine, but what if you don't have the kind of army that can utilize it?
My understanding of what the Russians actually did was: plaster a section of the front with artillery and then drive their mobile units through it more or less straight forward until halted by lack of supply or opposition.
fabius said:
I believe you are correct, although I cannot speak for ALL of the generals
Most young officers study Claus and Sun. More Senior get into WW2 German and US (Rommel and Patton primarily). Most Senior I assume study their potential opponents and favorites. I assume that there are relevant Russian Doctrines, but in WW2 it was merely a delaying action until logistics, superior firepower, and manpower were brought to the front. Doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure this one out. However..... why couldn't the Germans?
cop115 said:I believe you are correct, although I cannot speak for ALL of the generals
Most young officers study Claus and Sun. More Senior get into WW2 German and US (Rommel and Patton primarily). Most Senior I assume study their potential opponents and favorites. I assume that there are relevant Russian Doctrines, but in WW2 it was merely a delaying action until logistics, superior firepower, and manpower were brought to the front. Doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure this one out. However..... why couldn't the Germans?
Actually, I think several top tier German military and civilian officials had their doubts of victory after the offensive of 1941. Certainly by the end of Operation Citadel I think a significant number of Wehrmacht officers knew deep down that the war was lost. They were just trying to fight and stave off the Russians from destroying Germany.
Gonna add this... as it appears there actually IS a history folder.
How does this knowledge you get from this thread actually make you understand how to play this game better?
How does this knowledge you get from this thread actually make you understand how to play this game better?
1. Mass tank usage was firstly considered by the British but fell to impress the British General Staff. Heinz Guderian used these basic principles and developed Blitzkrieg
2. Technical restrictions as well as tank design and limited logistical capability prohibited such a doctrine.
3. First tested during the Spanish Civil War
4. Most (if not all) conventional doctrines of today are based on blitzkrieg
5. Logistical and equipment restrictions. With the equipment of the day it was not possible to use the blitz for an indefinite period as well as vast distances of Russia.
6. Guderian, Rommel, Manstein, Patton, Zhukov, Konev
7. Too much depend on surprise, equipment, terrain and most importantly weather. Furthermore the resource drain is immense if used on a grand scale.
8. Blitz-krieg (lightling war). Describes the rapid breakthrough of an enemy's defense line by means of combined arms and exploiting the breakthrough to rapidly advance through the enemy's territory by fast moving troops thus either enveloping-encircling large enemy formations or acquiring large territorial gains within the minimal possible time.
2. Technical restrictions as well as tank design and limited logistical capability prohibited such a doctrine.
3. First tested during the Spanish Civil War
4. Most (if not all) conventional doctrines of today are based on blitzkrieg
5. Logistical and equipment restrictions. With the equipment of the day it was not possible to use the blitz for an indefinite period as well as vast distances of Russia.
6. Guderian, Rommel, Manstein, Patton, Zhukov, Konev
7. Too much depend on surprise, equipment, terrain and most importantly weather. Furthermore the resource drain is immense if used on a grand scale.
8. Blitz-krieg (lightling war). Describes the rapid breakthrough of an enemy's defense line by means of combined arms and exploiting the breakthrough to rapidly advance through the enemy's territory by fast moving troops thus either enveloping-encircling large enemy formations or acquiring large territorial gains within the minimal possible time.
about Russia.
i think that they failed there because several reasons.
- climate+terrain+long supplies lines+supply problems
- the mobilization of the russian east army, it was the elite of their army and was moved to defend moscu and counter attack. as the japanese threat dissapeared for them.
- the new T34 tanks that beated the german panzer III, they took to much time to send in the tigers or the 4F tanks and they were too few.
- the russian production and men resources were much higher.
the germans also had a war with USA and England....
actually i don't know how they hold so much time.
i think that they failed there because several reasons.
- climate+terrain+long supplies lines+supply problems
- the mobilization of the russian east army, it was the elite of their army and was moved to defend moscu and counter attack. as the japanese threat dissapeared for them.
- the new T34 tanks that beated the german panzer III, they took to much time to send in the tigers or the 4F tanks and they were too few.
- the russian production and men resources were much higher.
the germans also had a war with USA and England....
actually i don't know how they hold so much time.
Actually.... as there is a history folder (much to my dismay) I should make this discussion at least relevent to HOI2, despite enjoying the discussion purely as a historical thread. I am editing the intro accordingly
Some quotes from J. Keegan 'The face of the battle' which is by the way a 'must-read' book for wargamers
"For though it is certainly true that the great battles of WWII in France and the Desert were characterized by the employment of tanks ... the fighting elsewhere was, for the great majority of combatants and for much of the time, as earth-bound, snail-paced and soft-skinned a business as it had been for the 200 preceding years.
.......
It is startling, moreover, when one dissects any of the great tank battles themselves, to discover how little of the fighting took the form of the tank versus tank combat ...
......
But if many battles of the WWII resemble, at the level of human experiece, those of the First, what then was the function and achievement of all those thousands of tanks - about a quarter of a million were built in WWII ...
......
The <tanks> could, at rare moment of opportunity, transform the character of a whole campaign. They could not do it often , nor could they do it to order, for it required the concurrence of conditions and circumstances beyond the mere concentration of a superiority of armour. But when this transformation occurred, the focus of fighting could be shifted 100 miles in a week ... How this transformation was achieved was not a function of the tanks' speed, nor of their capacity to overcome the resistance of the enemy lying in their paths. For tanks ... have short life-expectancy.
...
for it is possible to argue that while the mecanization of armies has produced a revolution in warfare, the real consequence, its effective potential for change, is not material but psychological; that tanks, in short, should be thought of not so much as weapons but as theatrical devices, ....by the manoeuvring of which a general is enabled ... so to stimulate the responses of his army that its resistance to movement is overcome ...
...
There is, then as much psychological trickery to the consummation of a break-through as there is material preparation and rational control."
"For though it is certainly true that the great battles of WWII in France and the Desert were characterized by the employment of tanks ... the fighting elsewhere was, for the great majority of combatants and for much of the time, as earth-bound, snail-paced and soft-skinned a business as it had been for the 200 preceding years.
.......
It is startling, moreover, when one dissects any of the great tank battles themselves, to discover how little of the fighting took the form of the tank versus tank combat ...
......
But if many battles of the WWII resemble, at the level of human experiece, those of the First, what then was the function and achievement of all those thousands of tanks - about a quarter of a million were built in WWII ...
......
The <tanks> could, at rare moment of opportunity, transform the character of a whole campaign. They could not do it often , nor could they do it to order, for it required the concurrence of conditions and circumstances beyond the mere concentration of a superiority of armour. But when this transformation occurred, the focus of fighting could be shifted 100 miles in a week ... How this transformation was achieved was not a function of the tanks' speed, nor of their capacity to overcome the resistance of the enemy lying in their paths. For tanks ... have short life-expectancy.
...
for it is possible to argue that while the mecanization of armies has produced a revolution in warfare, the real consequence, its effective potential for change, is not material but psychological; that tanks, in short, should be thought of not so much as weapons but as theatrical devices, ....by the manoeuvring of which a general is enabled ... so to stimulate the responses of his army that its resistance to movement is overcome ...
...
There is, then as much psychological trickery to the consummation of a break-through as there is material preparation and rational control."
I think this only works when you have an un-motivated (in Baghdad almost non-existant) infantry enemy.
Russian tactics consisted of two stages:
1. achieving a breach in the enemy front by inf/art attack
2. rushing cav/armour troops through the breach to wreack havoc on enemy logistics
They pulled off very few true envelopements/encirclements. More than once, their troops have been cut off by the counterattack at the base of the breach (Vyazma, for instance) making their armour sitting ducks. Russians never really used large scale mixed armour/mot. inf. units. Their Tank corpses were on a scale of about 4000 troops/200 tanks.
1. achieving a breach in the enemy front by inf/art attack
2. rushing cav/armour troops through the breach to wreack havoc on enemy logistics
They pulled off very few true envelopements/encirclements. More than once, their troops have been cut off by the counterattack at the base of the breach (Vyazma, for instance) making their armour sitting ducks. Russians never really used large scale mixed armour/mot. inf. units. Their Tank corpses were on a scale of about 4000 troops/200 tanks.
1) Who "invented" blitzkrieg?
Plan 1919 by the allies for a heavy-medium tank lead break through, followed up by a light-tank exploitation, with motorised infantry for deep operations, and supplemented by tactical level paradrops is arguably a blue print for tank-motor mobility penetrative operations.
Hart-Fuller expanded this to some extent, but expected states to provide full motor capacity to all divisions.
Guderian worked on a penetrative motor-mobility doctrine with limited mobility resources. This later, due to its unexpected success, became known as blitzkrieg. Break, encircle, reduce, exploit. Force mobility.
At a strategic level, blitzkrieg implied short, decisive warfare: the capacity of the German state was limited to this.
Tuchachevsky, as noted, developed a different doctrine of deep operations. However, the implications of Tuchachevsky's doctrine (professional standing army) contradicted party requirements. Break, penetrate, eliminate in deep battle. Force destruction.
2) Why had no one thought of this before?
People had. Mobility warfare (strategic, operational, tactical) is a common and recurring theme. People had thought of it before in relation to motor-mobility. However, the capacity of states to implement this, against the opposition of their own staff, was a limiting factor in the 1920s and 1930s.
3) What was the first use of this doctine?
Mobility doctrine? The German mobility doctrine known as Blitzkrieg? Modern motor-mobility doctrines?
I expect that unforunately the first use of modern motor mobility doctrines would have been in an internal police action inside the Soviet Union. Draw your conclusions off list, I won't state them in order not to breach the forum rules.
5) Why did this not continue working in russia OR why were the Germans defeated in Russia if their armies were so successfull elsewhere?
The German war in the Soviet Union was not a short war. Soviet industrial and political centres were not within the strategic striking range of the "blitzkrieg" doctrine.
7) name some of the flaws of using this strategy?
Fragility of the state economy, supply chain length, feebleness of motor elements out of foot support, emphasis on ground-attack-support airforce, danger in coming up against well-developed mobile defences.
Plan 1919 by the allies for a heavy-medium tank lead break through, followed up by a light-tank exploitation, with motorised infantry for deep operations, and supplemented by tactical level paradrops is arguably a blue print for tank-motor mobility penetrative operations.
Hart-Fuller expanded this to some extent, but expected states to provide full motor capacity to all divisions.
Guderian worked on a penetrative motor-mobility doctrine with limited mobility resources. This later, due to its unexpected success, became known as blitzkrieg. Break, encircle, reduce, exploit. Force mobility.
At a strategic level, blitzkrieg implied short, decisive warfare: the capacity of the German state was limited to this.
Tuchachevsky, as noted, developed a different doctrine of deep operations. However, the implications of Tuchachevsky's doctrine (professional standing army) contradicted party requirements. Break, penetrate, eliminate in deep battle. Force destruction.
2) Why had no one thought of this before?
People had. Mobility warfare (strategic, operational, tactical) is a common and recurring theme. People had thought of it before in relation to motor-mobility. However, the capacity of states to implement this, against the opposition of their own staff, was a limiting factor in the 1920s and 1930s.
3) What was the first use of this doctine?
Mobility doctrine? The German mobility doctrine known as Blitzkrieg? Modern motor-mobility doctrines?
I expect that unforunately the first use of modern motor mobility doctrines would have been in an internal police action inside the Soviet Union. Draw your conclusions off list, I won't state them in order not to breach the forum rules.
5) Why did this not continue working in russia OR why were the Germans defeated in Russia if their armies were so successfull elsewhere?
The German war in the Soviet Union was not a short war. Soviet industrial and political centres were not within the strategic striking range of the "blitzkrieg" doctrine.
7) name some of the flaws of using this strategy?
Fragility of the state economy, supply chain length, feebleness of motor elements out of foot support, emphasis on ground-attack-support airforce, danger in coming up against well-developed mobile defences.
cop115 said:
Well, first off. I am a firm believer that blitzkreig as a method of new warfare is plain and simply a myth and thus I will offer some 'radical' answers here that people will love to debate.
1) This is a difficult question to answer for me without explaining alot. Blitzkreig really is simply extension of encirclement-destruction doctrine which Prussia had been practicing for years. One could go back to Frederick the Great if one really wanted to but I would instead go to somewhat more modern people. Von Moltke the Elder is a fine example of a grandfather of 'Blitzkreig' as is von Schieffen.
What was learned in WWI was that armies had become so large that encirclement-destruction on a grand scale was impossible so Germany shifted it's efforts to firepower. von Murda pioneered these methods in 1915 and made relatively large gains for those times. Firepower was expanded throughout the German Army (at a much more vast rate than the Allies) thus allowing them to do more with less (and leading the Allies to conclude that the German Army was cannibalizing units and was on the ropes, so to speak). Rifles were replaced by the machine gun, the flamethrower and the reintroduction of the hand grenade. The Germans also pioneered the elastic defense at this time and were quite ok with trading land for fewer casualties and then counterattacking the exhausted Allied attackers to push them back to or behind their starting lines.
What were the lessons of WW1? Classic encirclement-destruction was impossible so a shift in ideas was needed if the German Army was to achieve similar results. The theories of Hart and Fuller were helpful but unfortunately for the Allies they did not take into account realities of modern combat like antitank guns and mines and traps (the French armored thrust into Germany was proof of the failure of the theorist's ideas). Guderian would study them and pick and choose what worked but Poland in 1939 would prove that Blitzkreig really didn't work. The armored thrust that was SO stressed upon was just as fast as the infantry walking. In fact, a German Infantry division advanced furthest in Poland on day one. The problem was that the armored advance was limited by it's fuel supplies and tada, this limited the rate of advance to that of supply and thus to the rate of the infantryman and would be throughout the war.
The way that Germany employed its air force is really the true success of the German offenses. They realized that victory is achieved by the taking of strategic areas and not by strategic warfare and for the most part the air force was subordinated to the ground support role. The Stuka was a great CS weapon as it could deliver its payload in a precision manner (level bombing was terribly inaccurate). Also, because of the manner in which the Germans used their airforce they lavishly supplied their army with antiaircraft weapons. The Allies could not make the same claim.
Of course, some people look at the Low Countries and France in 1940 as proof of the success of armored attacks. The truth of the matter is that those armies advances through the essentially undefended Ardennes could have been infantry divisions (please don't make me laugh by talking about superior German armor or tactics, the French had good armor and knew how to use armor. See accounts of Gembloux Gap and other such battles) and achieved the same success. Honestly, the Allies were hit at a point they decided not to defend and then Allied leadership paniced, the BEF was withdrawn, the Belgians surrendered because of it and Germans riding bicycles and other such crap filled this gap and when it was over the Allies had lost half of their military strength and almost all of their armor and heavy weapons. That France was overrun after such a loss is not surprising.
As for other cases of German so called 'blitzkreig', rolling obselete militaries with no land to trade for time hardly count (and I do consider the Soviet military of 1941 to be somewhat obsolete, especially on the tactical level). The Soviet Union survived because of the vast area involved, the late start (the Balkan campaign) and the diverting of forces to non-critical fronts (Kiev). The German advance in some ways tried to do too much at once and thus failed to accomplish much of anything.
2) They had. Even some Allied commanders practiced it in WWI. Allenby and Pershing come to mind but tanks of the era were so damned frail and slow that armored thrusts were honestly impossible. Plan 1919 would never had worked btw as artillery, anti-tank rifles and even machine guns were often capable of destroying tanks with ease. Hell, WW2 would prove that.
3) Hannibal maybe? :rofl:
4) It took the Allies the most of the war to realize that technology of the time did not allow useful startegic bombing so more and more air power was used in ground support missions especially with Allied command of the air. The change in Allied doctrines is easy to see in Korea, Vietnam and in our current times. But as I said, it was a natural progression of warfare and not some super new style of warfare. I blame British and French war spin-doctors for the wrong lessons in WWI being learned.
5) Mostly because it really didn't work to begin with and war was fought at the same rate as WWI. Also, time was ever in the favor of the defender and the vast supply distances hampered further German operations. In the USSR, the war was very like the first and the German Army was very much tried down by it's reliance on the railroad.
6) I named a few already. You can toss in a few others like Manstein and Patton and even Monty.
7) Anti-tank defenses and anti-air defenses and generally any well-prepared position, lack of air supremacy, long supply lines and strong enemy mobile reserves. Honestly, Blitzkreig as people define it doesn't work in conditions one would expect to find on the battlefield by a competent foe.
8) 'Lightning War' but almost everyone knows this thanks to the British press and propogandists of the time and directly after the war.
