France 1940 Review
The France campaign was not the same foregone conclusion as the Polish campaign. A good deployment by the combined Anglo-French armed forces could have made things very difficult for me. The combination of intelligence reports suggested that they (plus Belgium) had about 230 infantry and 30 armoured divisions to oppose me. My entire army is less strong than this giving them the opportunity for an effective defence. Unfortunately they did several things wrong.
1. The British have committed apparently very limited forces. Intelligence reports very little change in their total strength as a result of this campaign. This is a very poor performance on their part and on its own would almost certainly condemn the French to ultimate defeat.
2. Deployment of French forces concentrated around the Maginot line was asking for trouble. The only possible reason to do this would be to make an attack possible. As it is they where obviously never going to attack there and hence should have installed a viable defence force and deployed everything else on the Belgian border.
3. The Allied counter to the invasion of Belgium was extremely piecemeal. My forces encountered the advancing allied forces a few at a time resulting in defeat in detail. The response should have been more coordinated with all the Allied forces arriving simultaneously. This is a persistent AI flaw and originates in the core AI programming and hence cannot be addressed by AI configuration adjustments.
4. After the weight of the German attack fell the allies should have responded by a massive redeployment of forces. This never happened and I would suggest that the AI reaction was extremely poor in the first 5 days over which period it was almost impossible to discern any response whatsoever. After this they began to respond but still in a very limited way.
Ultimately I did not engage the main strength of the enemy army and defeated them by attacking where they were not present. This is a legitimate strategy for achieving a positional advantage but goes against my doctrine for victory in the normal way. In a real fight it is always appropriate to target the enemy armed forces rather than their territory. The effect of high-speed motorised warfare is to make this inessential for some campaigns where it is possible to destroy the support for the enemy armed forces rather than the armed forces themselves. This is sometimes a risky strategy but not very in the confined combat zones of Western Europe. It will not apply elsewhere; in particular it is NOT the path to defeating the Soviet Union.
One last point, I did not form any conventional pockets in this campaign. Not once was there a group of surrounded divisions like we had in the Polish “slice and dice” campaign. This is because I used an overrun approach with my forces advancing across the entire selected front. The consequences are easiest to see by looking at a few images scattered through the campaign showing resisting forces along the front during the advance to Paris and then think about where they went. All of these forces were defeated and put into retreat and then after a bit disappeared. I don’t know exactly how many divisions where effected but there are at least two dozen missing. This is the result of an armoured overrun attack. Not only has the attack broken through and swarmed into the enemy rear areas but it has actually completely eliminated all those defending forces it had to defeat and, most importantly, no unit has had to deviate from the advance to eliminate those forces. You will be seeing a lot more of this sort of thing.