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driftwood

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That's a very inaccurate analysis of the Battle of Adrianople. The Goths did not settle where they were, but instead meandered across the Balkans, unable to secure any permanent settlement by force. The portion of the empire whose army had been destroyed, the eastern, was exactly that half which survived. The other German tribes which invaded waited over two decades to do so and invaded at the far other end of the empire. In fact, by 395, it looked like the empire had weathered the storm and that the west was the stronger half of the empire.

The Battle of Adrianople was important, but it did not absolutely determine the fate of the empire. It was important because it put a strain on the resources of the wealthier part of the empire at a time when future events would not allow a period of peaceful recovery. This stress led Gratian and Theodosius to consider the new federate status for the Goths, which had longterm problems but in the shortterm offered a reasonable hope that the Goths could be civilized and assimilated.

Also, the Tervingi and Greuthingi Goths would go through a long, difficult, 30 year process of redivision into Visigoths and Ostrogoths. You cannot draw any straight lines between the earlier and later groups.

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Originally posted by Phillip V
The Battle Of Adrianople of 378 decided the fate of the Roman Empire. It was the worst defeat the Romans had since 9 AD in the forests of Germany. It allowed the victorious Goths to remain where they had settled with their weapons and encouraged other German tribes to settle within the Empire. Also, the main Roman army in the East was now destroyed. The Goths (later known as Visigoths) revolted later agian and sacked Rome in 410.
Let us not forget the fact that the Rhine froze over in the winter of 403 and damn near all of Germania fled across. This little fact is often left out but is still crucial. If the Rhine had not frozen over, the numbers of invaders wouldn't have been as substantial I would argue.
 

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THE BATTLE OF ADRIANOPLE
Introduction

On August 9, 378 AD, the Eastern Roman Emperor Valens marched out of the city of Adrianople with an army of about 25,000 troops determined to destroy the forces of the Gothic rebel Fritigern ( in Gothic =*Frithugairns). By the evening of the same day he lay dead on the field of battle along with up to one third of his army - a defeat the historian Ammianus Marcellinus declared the worst since Cannae. How did Gothic refugees from over the Danube, who up to that point had been on the defensive against the Romans, inflict such a crushing defeat on the Empire? And was this surprise Gothic victory the beginning of the end of the Roman Empire?

Movements on the Steppes

The events of that day actually began with some movements of nomadic tribes far from the borders of the Empire a few years before. In the early 370s the Huns successfully conquered the Alans, a nomadic Iranian tribe who lived east of the Don. Then the Huns and Alans began to put increasing pressure on the kingdom of the Greuthungian Gothic ruler Ermanaric (*Airmanareiks).

Ermanaric had been a powerful ruler, whose sphere of influence had extended well beyond the Ukrainian steppes on which his people had settled. There's evidence that his power was acknowledged as far away as the Baltic region - the area from which the Goths had migrated 200 years before. The Greuthungian Goths, who later formed the core of the people known as the Ostrogoths, had adopted many of the practices of their Alanic and Sarmatian neighbours once they settled on the plains. They had taken up more extensive use of cavalry, including some heavy cavalry armed with the two-handed kontos lance, and they adopted many Sarmatian styles of dress and decoration. Despite this, they remained a Germanic people and remembered their kinship with the Tervingian Goths who lived in the forests to their west (who later became known as the Visigoths).

By the mid-370s, however, Ermanaric was old and the pressure from the Alans and Huns was starting to be harder to resist. Eventually the Greuthungian Goths suffered a crushing defeat and King Ermanaric, possibly in a pagan rite of self-sacrifice, commited suicide. He was succeeded by King Vithimer (*Winithamers) who made several attempts to stem the advance of the Huns. He seems to have successfully allied himself with some bands of Huns and Alans against their fellow tribesmen and managed to resist the invaders for a while.

By this time the Tervingian Goths were aware of the threat from the east and their leader Athanaric (*Athanareiks) sent a force to his eastern border to guard against the Huns and prevent the retreating Greuthungians from entering his territory. Around this time Vithimer was killed in battle and the majority of his people began a century of submission to the Huns. His infant son Videric was taken into care by two of his warband leaders, Altheus and Saphrax (who were possibly Sarmatian and Alanic, or even Hunnic, respectively), and they then led a fragment of the Greuthungian people and what was left of Vithimer's army westward to seem asylum in the Empire.

Now it was the Tervingians' turn to try to fight off the Huns. In the summer of 376 Athanaric had led a Tervingian Gothic army to the River Dneister and set up a fortified position there. He then sent two of his chiefs, Munderic (*Mundareiks) and Lagariman, eastward over the river to scout for the Hunnic armies. The Huns, however, crossed the river themselves in a surprise night advance and drove Athanaric's army back west, forcing them into the Bessarabian forests. Athanaric had proved himself the master of the tactical retreat during a defensive campaign against the Romans not long before, and his army remained largely intact. He then proceeded to build a series of static defensive fortifications to guard against further Hunnic advances, possibly by rebuilding the old Roman Limes Transalutanus north of the Danube.

This strategy also failed - the Huns circumvented Athanaric's defences and ravaged the Tervingians' food supplies. Completely out-manoevered, Athanaric began to lose political support. An opposition party of influential Tervingian chiefs, led by Fritigern and Alaviv, began to talk of seeking refuge from the highly mobile invaders within the Empire. Athanaric retreated into the mountains of Transylvania with those followers who were still loyal to him, while Alaviv and Fritigern led the bulk of the Tervingian people to the border with the Empire - the River Danube.

Thus at the end of the summer of 376 AD, with the Emperor Valens away in Antioch, word came to Constantinople that several hundred thousand refugees - Tervingian Goths along with Greuthungian Goths, Sarmatians, Alans and Taifalians - were seeking permission to cross the Danube and enter Roman territory. The decision to let them cross was to have grave consequences for both Valens and the Empire.

The Gothic Revolt

Sometime in the autumn of 376 word came from Constantinople that the Tervingian Goths were allowed to cross the Danube. The settlement of 'barbarians' within the Empire was not new, and there was much to recommend this option to the Emperor Valens. Firstly, the Tervingians of Fritigern and Alaviv were Christians - unlike the followers of the pagan Athanaaric who they'd left behind north of th river. Secondly, they were (loosely speaking) Arian Christians, as was Valens himself. Thirdly, they were seeking land on which they could live, and Valens had vacant estates to give them in Thrace. Finally, they were a warrior people who would willingly furnish troops for Valens' armies. He was in the process of gearing up for a war with Persia over Armenia and had already taken on a number of Gothic warriors as troops. He saw Fritgern and Alaviv's people as a solution to several problems.

So the Tervingians were allowed to cross and to enter the Empire as dediticii - supplicants on the Emperor's mercy seeking to be settled as colonii. It's unclear whether they were disarmed as they crossed the river, but earlier examples of dediticii seem to indicate that they would have been. But while the entry of the Tervingians solved some problems for Valens, it created some others.

To begin with, the sheer numbers of people involved were daunting and a resettlement on this scale had not been attempted before. Additionally, Fritigern and Alaviv's people were not the only refugees seeking sanctuary in the Empire - the Greuthungian Goths led by Alatheus and Saphrax had now arrived on the Danube and were also petitioning to cross. Another group of Greuthungian refugees from Ermanaric's kingdom, this one led by Farnobius, and a band of Germanic Taifalians and their Hunnic allies also appeared on the northern bank of the Danube. Valens could not admit all these people at once, so he chose the largest group, Fritigern's, and ordered the troops in Thrace to keep the others out.

Dealing with Fritigern's Tervingians was difficult enough. The terms of the agreement between Valens and the two Gothic chiefs was that they were to be given land to cultivate and beyond that they were not to be a drain on Imperial resources. The problem was how the Goths were to feed themselves in the meantime, and Ammianus Marcellinus tells pitiful stories of Goths selling their own children into slavery to buy food in the crowded refugee camps south of the Danube. Valens also needed to find a way to break up the large and potentially dangerous confederation of Tervingian Goths the two leaders had brought over the river. It was, perhaps, with this in mind that Lupicinus, the Roman commander in Thrace, was ordered to kidnap a group of Gothic nobles, including Fritigern and Alaviv, after having invited them to a banquet at his headquarters in Marcianople.

Whatever Lupicinus' plan, it failed dismally. A fight broke out, Lupicinus had the chiefs' escorting warriors cut down and then the situation got completely out of control. Fritigern fought his way out of the trap, but Alaviv seems to have been killed in the fracas. News spread to the Tervingian warriors outside the city and they, already distrustful of the Romans and plagued by hunger, rose in open revolt. With Fritigern at their head, now the undisputed chief of the Tervingian Goths, they began to plunder and burn the area around Marcianople.

Lupicinus struggled to get the situation under control. Many troops had already been recalled from the Danube frontier, which had allowed the Greuthungian bands under Altheus, Saphrax and Farnobius to force a passage and enter Thrace. But Lupicinus' main problem was Fritigern. The Tervingians outnumbered his forces, but they were poorly armed and the Roman commander knew that a quick victory over the rebel dediticii would soon bring them to heel. But despite gathering all the available forces in Thrace and confronting Fritigern a mere nine miles from his headquarters, Lupicinus was completely defeated and his army massacred.

Now, with Valens still engaged with the bulk of the Eastern Roman Army in Armenia, Thrace was wide open to the army of the Tervingians, and other smaller forces of Greuthungians, Taiflai, Alans, Sarmatians and Huns. The defeat of the army in Thrace gave a signal to others and Thracian gold miners, Gothic slaves, dispossessed peasants and some Gothic units in the Roman Army now rallied to Fritigern and his tribesmen. Humbled by their defeat at the hands of the Huns and humiliated by their treatment by the Romans, the Goths went on the rampage and soon all Thrace was in flames.

The War in Thrace

The Eastern Emperor Valens seems to have initially underestimated the danger posed by the Gothic revolt in Thrace. He was still in action in the east and his attention was on his war with the Persians, so early actions against the Goths were piecemeal and uncoordinated. He had campaigned against the Tervingians north of the frontier in his Gothic War (367-369 AD), when the wily Tervingian chief Athanaric had consistently retreated before him, and he had a low regard for the Goths' capacity for war as a result. Confident they would be rounded up and destroyed quickly, he left the war against Fritigern to his subordinate commanders, with the infantry under Traianus and cavalry units under Profuturus being dispatched to deal with the rebels.

The Western Emperor, Valens' nephew Gratian was also asked for help, and he sent Frigeridus with a substantial part of the army of Pannonia Valeria. At first these commanders had some success and the Goths were contained in the Dobrudja region, where it was hoped that a lack of opportunity to forage for the huge amount of food required to sustain his large army would break Fritigern's hold on his warriors, causing rival chiefs to break the large Gothic army up. The Romans were then joined by Gallic units led by the Western Imperial comes domesticorum Richomeres (another Roman commander with a Germanic name). It was now late in the summer of 377, and the Roman generals, though still outnumbered by the Goths, thought the time had come to strike and destroy the Gothic army.

The Roman troops who faced Fritigern's warriors were a far cry from the legionaries of the old Empire. The extensive armour of Augustus or Trajan's times had long since proved too expensive to produce and maintain for the stretched economy of the late Empire. The elaborate Gallic or Italic style helmet - had been replaced by a much simpler and cheaper 'ridge-helm' - two beaten half-hemispheres joined by a central ridge piece with simple cheek and neck guards. The lorica segmentata cuirass worn by the old legionaries had also gone. The later Imperial soldiers either wore simple mail shirts or no body armour at all. The short stabbing gladius sword and long, curved scutum shield had likewise been replaced by the longer, slashing spatha and a flat oval or round shield.

Since Roman fashions, decoration and military equipment styles had long been filtering north into Germania, and since the recruitment of many ethnically Germanic troops had been going on for over two centuries, the dress, equipment, tactics and behaviour of the Roman army and their Germanic opponents had moved closer and closer together. Before one battle against Fritigern the Roman troops are said to have raised the barritus, the ancient war song of the Germans, which shows that this force was possibly almost as Germanic as they Goths they faced. And with the Goths stripping the Roman dead and raiding other sources of Roman arms, it was not long before they were comparatively well equipped with large quantities of helmets, armour and swords. In many ways the two sides would have resembled each other greatly.

That said, the average Tervingian Gothic warrior would have been a footman, armed with a couple of spears and protected solely by a shield. Despite the Goths' newfound weapons and their superior numbers, the Romans still had a well-trained and disciplined military force and they were confident that the Goths were about to face a crushing defeat.

Frigeridus and Richomeres found Fritigern's army encamped ad Salices ('at the Willows' - the exact battle site is unknown). The Tervingians were now on the defensive and they were drawn up within the circle of their wagon laager, so the Roman commanders decided to starve them out. Fritigern realised their plan and began to call in his foraging units to reinforce the besieged army, forcing the Romans to press their attack. The Goths counter attacked strongly, but after some hard fighting and many casualties neither side won the day. Both armies withdrew after taking heavy losses, but this meant Fritigern's force remained intact and at large. Changing tack, the Romans blocked the Balkan passes and gathered their food supplies in cities that the Goths could not take. Once again, they then waited to starve the Goths out.

Still confident of eventual victory, Valens stayed in the east, sending his vice-commander of cavalry, Saturninus to reinforce the army in Thrace. But at this point Fritigern managed something of a coup. He had been in contact with Alatheus and Safrax, the chiefs of the Greuthungian Gothic refugees and their Hunnic, Sarmatian, Alan and Taifalian allies since these cavalrymen had forced a passage over the Danube the year before. Now he managed to convince them to join the Tervingian rebels against the Romans. The entry of the Greuthungians into the war soon turned the tables and Saturninus was forced to abandon his blocking of the passes. The Goths broke out into Thrace once more and soon took their revenge on the Romans, burning and looting their way across the province with great savagery.

Traditionally the Tervingians fought on foot, but they had forged a strong alliance with their steppe-dwelling neighbours the Taifali who had generally provided a cavalry arm to their forces back in their homelands north of the Danube. Now Alatheus and Saphrax reinforced the Tervingian infantry in a similar manner, bringing a large force of mixed cavalry to bear on Fritigern's enemies. Their collection of eastern warbands included both the heavy lancers of the Greuthungians, Taifali and Sarmatians and the lighter horse archers of the Hun bands who accompanied them. Together with the Fritigern's large army of well-armed Tervingian Goths, Valens now had an even more serious military problem on his hands.

In response to these new setbacks, Gratian once again sent Frigeridus with Western Imperial troops to aid the Eastern Empire, but he soon found his defensive strategies were no match for the newly mobile and versatile Gothic force. In danger of attack from all sides, Frigeridus was forced to withdraw into the West again. As he retreated he encountered yet another force of Germanic refugees - the large force of Greuthungians and Taifalians led by the chief Farnobius. The Western general inflicted a crushing defeat on this warband and settled the survivors, mainly Taifali, in northern Italy where several towns still bear their name.

The winter of 377/78 AD brought more frustrations for the Romans. The Western Emperor Gratian was prevented from coming to the aid of the East in person by a sudden invasion by the Alamanni, to which Gratian responded with a massive counterattack. This was coupled by another defeat of the junior Roman generals in Thrace and Valens was soon arranging a peace with the Persians and hurrying back to Constantinople to deal with the Gothic threat once and for all.

He arrived in the strongly fortified city of Adrianople in mid-July, 378 AD with an estimated force of 20-25,000 troops and was greeted with several pieces of good news. Firstly, his infantry commander Sebastianus had just destroyed a large Gothic column returning from plundering the southern Thracian province of Rhodope. Secondly, word came from his nephew Gratian that he had concluded his war against the Alamanni and had already reached northwestern Bulgaria with a large reinforcing army of Western Imperial troops. Valens was strongly advised not to underestimate the Goths - indeed, Gratian's army had just been suddenly attacked by some of the Alanic horsemen from Alatheus and Saphrax's cavalry forces and taken surprisingly heavy losses. But Valens was eager to move in for the kill after Sebastianus' recent victory and was perhaps keen to win a victory over the Goths to match his nephew's defeat of the Alamanni.

Around August 8 Valens' scouts reported that Fritigern was heading towards Nike with only 10,000 warriors. Valens decided that this was his chance for a decisive victory over the Tervingian leader and prepared his forces to march out and crush the Gothic army while it was on the march. He was confident that he could win a decisive victory without his nephew's aid, but that was a decision that was to prove a costly and deadly mistake.

The Battle of Adrianople

Sometime in the morning of August 9, 378 AD, the Emperor Valens marched out of his camp outside the city of Adrianople with around 20,000 troops to find and destroy Fritigern and his Gothic army. According to his scouts, the Goth chieftain was encamped about eleven miles away with only 10,000 men, but the going was hard since the road was in poor condition and it was early afternoon before the Roman advance elements encountered the Goths, encamped behind their circled wagons.

Fritigern had sent an embassy to Valens the day before, but the sudden appearance of the Emperor with his entire army seems to have caught the Tervingian Goth by surprise. The most mobile part of his army, the Greuthungian cavalry and their allies, had been dispatched to forage for supplies - they had probably only been sent out that very morning. Now, as the Goths watched the cavalry of the Roman right wing form a screen behind which the rest of the army could deploy in battle array, Fritigern sent fast riders to recall his mounted troops at once.

Fritigern was not the only one to be surprised. As the Gothic laager came into view it became apparent to Valens that his scouts had been wrong. Far from approaching Nike with only 10,000 warriors, it was clear that this was the main Gothic force. Estimates of how many men Fritigern commanded that day vary widely, with some modern authorities claiming there were as many as 150,000 Goths, but its unlikely that the Roman scouts could have underestimated the Gothic force by a factor of fifteen. It is likely that the two armies were relatively evenly matched in number, with the Romans slightly outnumbered.

The large Roman army took some time to deploy, but Fritigern knew he had to buy more time. While the Imperial infantry formed up in the middle of the Roman line, he sent some emissaries to negotiate with Valens, but the Emperor rejected them, demanding that higher ranking Goths come forward to speak with him. The Goths in turn suspected a trap, so they demanded a high ranking Roman hostage come over to their side to ensure their envoys' safety. Then there was a debate amongst the Roman high command as to who would go, with Richomer, the Western Imperial general, finally volunteering. But as he prepared to cross the field to the Gothic laager word reached Valens' position that the battle had already begun.

While the negotiations and deployment had dragged on, the Romans had stood waiting in the hot sun. It was now mid-afternoon and they had been marching and then standing in scorching heat - it gets to 40 degrees Celcius in that region in August - for hours without food or water. To add to their discomfort and impatience, the Goths had set fire to the tinder-dry grass and scrub around them, so the Romans were plagued by heat, smoke and clouds of dust. By this stage, the cavalry right wing had formed up on the army's right flank and the infantry were more or less in postion. Skirmishing units, the Scutarii and their accompanying archers, were harassing the Goths while the straggling cavalry left wing was still taking position. Precisely what happened is unknown, but the Scutarii commander Bacurius seems to have pressed his attacks too strongly, some Goths counter attacked from the laager and soon the Roman infantry were fully engaged. Startled by this turn of events, the Roman commanders broke off negotiations and the battle proper began - with the Romans already in some disorder.

What happened next effectively won the day for Fritigern, though it was as much good luck as good planning. As the battle began in confusion, with both sides surrounded by thick smoke and choking summer dust, the Gothic allied cavalry led by Alatheus and Saphrax suddenly appeared as if from nowhere and fell immediately on the Roman right flank, turning it and then attacking it from behind. The cavalry on the right were swept away by the sudden assault, with Ammianus describing the charging barbarian cavalry as 'descending from the mountains like a thunderbolt'. While the mass of Tervingian warriors descended from the circle of wagons to fully engage the Roman infantry centre, a section of the cavalry then wheeled behind the laager and attacked the Roman left in a similar manner. It is possible that the cavalry there were still only partially deployed and they were driven from the field by Saphrax and Alatheus' horsemen. With their cavalry gone and now assaulted by the Goths from almost all sides, the Roman infantry stood their ground and fought for survival rather than victory.

The significance of the Gothic cavalry in the battle has been much debated. Sir Charles Oman chose to begin his influential The Art of War in the Middle Ages with the Battle of Adrianople, depicting it as a victory of Gothic heavy cavalry over anachronistic Roman legionaries on foot - a victory which ushered in the reign of the medieval knight. More recent historians no longer accept this view. While the timely arrival of the Alatheus and Saphrax effectively won the day, it is unlikely the cavalry formed a very large portion of Fritigern's army. They were versatile, effective and skilled, but they were far outnumbered by the Tervingian warriors on foot. And while the cavalry's sudden assault drove off the Roman horse and exposed their infantry, the hard fighting was done by the Gothic footmen who fought hand to hand with the Roman foot soldiers for hours in the hot sun and blinding dust and eventually defeated them. Far from being a medieval heavy cavalry battle, this was largely a victory of infantry over infantry.

The achievement of the cavalry at Adrianople was impressive, however. The Greuthungians had lived alongside their steppe neighbours for many generations and had learned their mixed cavalry tactics well. The bulk of the Greuthungian Gothic force would have been lightly armoured horsemen wielding their spears overhand with a shield, or casting them at the enemy like javelins as they charged before closing to fight with the slashing spatha-style sword. Alongside them would have been the heavier armoured Alans and their Sarmatian cousins who, along with the Greuthungian and Taifalian nobles and their retinues, wore mail and lammellar cuirasses and probably fought with the two-handed heavy kontos lance. They were supported by the fast moving and deadly light horse archers of the Huns - a troop type which the Romans were to learn to respect in the wars against Attila in the coming century and were later to adopt themselves en masse.

But it was the Tervingian Gothic warriors who won the day. The battle had begun in the mid-afternoon and it raged for several long hours until sunset approached. Ammianus Marcellinus, himself a retired soldier, describes the fighting vividly:

“But when the barbarians, rushing on with their enormous host, beat down our horses and men, and left no spot to which our ranks could fall back to deploy, while they were so closely packed that it was impossible to escape by forcing a way through them, our men at last began to despise death, and again took to their swords and slew all they encountered, while with mutual blows of battle-axes, helmets and breastplates were dashed in pieces. Then you might see the barbarian towering in his fierceness, hissing or shouting, fall with his legs pierced through, or his right hand cut off, sword and all, or his side transfixed, and still, in the last gasp of life, casting round him defiant glances. The plain was covered with carcasses, strewing the mutual ruin of the combatants; while the groans of the dying, or of men fearfully wounded, were intense, and caused great dismay all around.”

Fritigern knew this was his chance to win the decisive victory he needed and the Roman troops knew they had to fight simply to get off the battlefield alive. Their cavalry was either destroyed or in full flight and the reserve unit, the Batavii had also fled before they were even committed. Crushed and hemmed in by the Gothic warriors around them, the Roman infantry fell in their thousands, with Ammianus describing 'one black pool of blood' and 'piled up heaps of the dead.'

Finally, in the approaching twilight, Valens withdrew and he and several of the surviving Roman commanders fled the field. The Roman troops who could disengage were then thrown into complete rout as they retreated and it was only when the moonless night darkened the battlefield that the killing finally stopped. Sources indicate up to a third of the Roman army died that hot afternoon and modern estimates indicate that about 10-15,000 Roman troops were killed, including several high ranking commanders and a great many senior officers. Somewhere amongst the dead, probably killed in the last chaotic retreat, was the Emperor Valens himself. One later story says the wounded Emperor took shelter in a house near the battlefield, to which the pursuing Goths set fire, burning Valens inside. Later Roman historians blamed the Arian heretic Emperor for the crushing defeat and felt this was a fitting end for him.

The Aftermath

The Gothic victory at Adrianople was a terrible blow, both logistically and psychologically for both halves of the Empire, but the Romans recovered relatively quickly. To begin with, Fritigern was actually defeated by his own victory. While the Goths were under threat from several powerful Roman armies the Tervingian was able to hold together his alliance of Gothic refugees. After the victory over Valens, however, the united Gothic army began to break up as different chiefs went their separate ways. The need for food was paramount and Alatheus and Saphrax parted company from their Tervingian allies, making their way west, where they may have been settled in Pannonia or were possibly defeated and scattered by the Western Emperor Gratian. The war dragged on, with the new Eastern Emperor Theodosius suffering a major defeat at the hands of the Tervingians in 380 and was almost himself captured by Fritigern's warriors. For two more years the campaign against the Goths bogged down into stalemate and finally, on October 3, 382 AD, Theodosius accepted the inevitable.

Realising that he simply could not defeat the Tervingians, he entered into a treaty with them. They became foederatii of the Eastern Empire - allies who could be called upon for military service and who were granted land to settle within the Empire in return. They settled as an autonomous Gothic 'state within a state' in the northern dioceses of Dacia and Thrace, along the Danube frontier and they were to become the people later known as the Visigoths. It was these people who later rebelled once more against the Romans under Alaric and eventually marched on the Western Empire, sacked Rome itself and established a long lasting kingdom in Gaul and Spain, setting a precedent for their Greuthungian/Ostrogothic cousins who later established an even more powerful kingdom in Italy.

In many ways the victory at Adrianople in 378 and the subsequent foedus treaty of 382 were significant turning points in the end of the Roman Empire. From this point on the security of the frontiers was breached and the Romans were forced to deal with the Germanic invaders within their territory and on the 'barbarians' terms. The Empire in the east survived for centuries, of course, and even the West was to endure for another hundred years, but Fritigern's Goths, in effect, had won.

Contents copyright © Tim O'Neill 2000-2001.
 

driftwood

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Please don't post long excerpts from texts. A hyperlink will do just fine.

That looked like a pretty good account to me. I'm not sure if you were posting it for general reading or in response to points I or other people made, but I'll just tack on a few remarks.

First, despite the author's comments, the Tervingi did not just become the Visigoths. Alaric drew bands of both Tervingi and Greuthingi about him, first as a senior commander for Theodosius, and then in open revolt. It was after his successes as a warleader, in the early 5th century, that his followers began to identify themselves as Visigoths. Similarly, it was after Theoderic the Amal's victories, particularly over Theoderic Strabo, several decades later that his followers began to call themselves Ostrogoths.

Second, I believe that there was a full delay of several days while Valens attempted to negotiate with Fritigern and while the other Gothic contingents approached. From the author's text, it kind of sounded like it all happened during one day (instead of several). Also, Gratian was sending messengers reminding Valens that he was only days away with the entire western army. But Valens wasn't really the brightest fellow. We can blame Valentinian for that.

Finally, I agree with the author that the Battle of Adrianople was a major victory for the Goths. But it did not seal the fate of the Empire. Roman historians gave it greater signficance in light of what followed, but was it really any worse than the defeat of 251, when the Emperor Decius was killed by the Goths (prior to their division into Tervingi and Greuthingi), with the entire western and eastern thirds of the empire separating into independent states?

The Empire had been able to recover from the 3rd century disasters, and still had ~2/3 of its army and great economic resources in the late 4th century. IMO, better leadership in the early 5th century would have enabled the western half of the empire to survive along with the eastern half (where the settlement of Goths for a full century did not impede its survival).

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The Roman Empire "fell" because the Empire as an administrative structure was just the logistic tail of the army. The Principate collapsed in the 3rd Century because its centralized command stucture could not deal with a multi-front war. Diocletian succeded in creating a decentralized structure of command and control. But in so doing he opened for the permanent partition of the Empire except as an ideological entity. As usurpation by military coup d'etat was a legitimate means of assuming the purple instability and civil war was built into the political system in the first place and the creation of four command positions exacerbated this tendency.
Beyond fighting the Barbarians and enforcing religious dogma there was precious little the Emperors of the Dominate did that had any relevance in the localities (except collecting taxes and bestowing privileges, of course). Things were no different during the Principate either, come to think of it.
The difference between east and west is that Constantinople has a strategic location that made it a natural metropolis. It was close to the frontier. The city of Rome was so distant from the frontier, where the Emperor had to be to fight the barbarians, to be a backwater. The core of the 4th adn 5th Century Western Empire was in fact Northern Gaul, with Trier as the main Imperial residence.
The superfluity of the Emperor to his subjects is best witnessed by the ease with which the Visigoths "conquered" Hispania. As long as the Barbarians were willing to abide by the rules of federate status the local magnates did not care whetherthe taxes his cloni paid were collected on behalf of a Roman emperor or a Visigoth king enjoying a formal imperial proconsular mandate.
The ability of provincial Roman society to fight is proven by the fact that the Anglosaxons needed a century to conquer Britain and only succeeded in pacifying the "Welsh" when they themselves converted to Christianity. If the provincials on the Continent had seen any point in resisting, any point in being direct subjects of a distant Emperor, they could have pout up an equal or even greater resistance.
The break-up of the Western Empire was really only the logical consequence of the military policies of Diocletian. It found its logical end when the []magister militum[/i] of Belgica Secundus commanding the Roman Army in Northern Gaul beat his opposite number controlling the dioscese of Lugdunensis in Central Gaul in 486.
 

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Is anyone here prepared to consider that there was no single reason for the fall of the Roman empire...?

I know it may _seem_ like the easy answer. But I always cringe when I see a statement that says, "The Roman Empire Fell because of X." (Or even X & Y.)

There are just soooo many elements of this structure to consider.
 

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Originally posted by Petrus
Is anyone here prepared to consider that there was no single reason for the fall of the Roman empire...?

I know it may _seem_ like the easy answer. But I always cringe when I see a statement that says, "The Roman Empire Fell because of X." (Or even X & Y.)

There are just soooo many elements of this structure to consider.

I believe that there were many factors that led to the fall, but since there were so many stages of decline (splitting of empire, moving western capital to Ravenna, invasions, etc.) historians and people feel the need to quantify why the empire fell, and give a specific date when the empire fell.

I pose this question as well: By the end of the Empire, Rome was basically a deserted city, since the government had fled to the protection of the swamps of Ravenna, and the population was fearful of constant attacks from roving tribes, or from Roman armies looking for loot. However, in the glory days of Rome, it is estimated that anywhere from 50%-80% of the population of the city was unemployed, and thus on the grain dole. They basically lived a life of leisure, and were given free food to subsist on at a certain point in the month. Does anyone think that this reliance on government handouts was a cause of the decline of the famed Roman discipline and was a cause of the decline of the city, and maybe a cause of the decline of the empire??
 

driftwood

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A few remarks. I would say that the late empire was MUCH more centralized than the early empire, which was basically government on the cheap. Even if you consider just the military, 4-5 major field armies and a large (relatively) border force is much more centralized than 2-3 legions scattered in every important province.

Administratively, the center of the Prefecture of Gaul was Trier. But the entire Prefecture of Gaul was a backwater, whose major wealthy portion was Narbonensis and Provence, i.e. the parts of Gaul most connected to Italy. Italy and Africa remained by far the economic center of the western empire.

The grain dole goes back a long time in the history of the city of Rome, but the welfare state as it developed (just for inhabitants of the city of Rome) didn't reach its final state until the mid/late empire. Some of it in fact came about due to the reforms of Diocletian. I think most of the people arguing for Rome's decline (an idea which I think is a dangerous misnomer) would say it had fatally set in by that point, so it couldn't be a cause of decline.

Besides, the urban proletariat of Rome had not played a major role in imperial policy. They formed the early army, influenced the Republic's political culture, and so on, but I think the only role they played during the late empire was to form a massive liability for any emperor trying to keep the grain flowing to Rome. The later emperors did their best to avoid the city entirely.

The move to Ravenna wasn't exactly inspiring, but it wasn't a cause of decline either. Believing that the swamps around the city protected the empire, now that was a cause of decline. :)

For the record, in my studies I haven't seen much evidence of a "decline" in the late empire, through the end of the 4th century. In the early-mid 5th century, there was a series of military and political crises, which the East overcame but to which the West succumbed in a pretty pathetic fashion. But the fact that Roman civilization, as it existed in the 4th and 5th centuries, continued largely undisturbed in the 5th and 6th centuries in the West implies that the fall of Rome was merely what it seems: a military and political snafu, not the sudden collapse of a civilization.

driftwood
 

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Originally posted by Petrus
Is anyone here prepared to consider that there was no single reason for the fall of the Roman empire...?

I know it may _seem_ like the easy answer. But I always cringe when I see a statement that says, "The Roman Empire Fell because of X." (Or even X & Y.)

There are just soooo many elements of this structure to consider.

Of course.

The time horizon of late Antiquity is nebulous. A.H.M. Jones considers it to cover the period 284 (accession of Diolectian) to 569 (death of Justinian). Romanists argue that the date of the "Fall" could be set to the demise of the Principate after the Marcomannic Wars (193 or 235 are equally good dates). OTOH valid arguments can be made for Antiquity not ending until 622 (the Hegira and rise of Islam) or even 732 (the rise of Pippinids in Gaul). The extreme dates makes the "fall" into a period lasting five hundred years - a stretch of time that would be considered an epoch in its own right. Even the most conservative dating has the "fall" lasting 250+ years, 8-9 generations - which makes it an epoch with the Visigoth sack of Rome at its chronological centre..

But,
given my basic academic training (science, then political sociology with a mathematical bent, then political history)and my fascintaion with historical simulations (wargames - best tool for teaching social science methods there is) I am of course fascinated by the challenge of making multivariate models. A model of the Fall of Rome is such a challenge:D.

Otherwise I'm in total agreement with Driftwood.

With one qualification, possibly due to different operationalization of centralization. As I understand the late Roman military command structure the subordinate levels in the chain of command possessed regional command authority independently of the emperor. The praefecti, magistri and duces could move armies on their own authority. This was not the case under the Principate where armies only could move at the Emperor's specific order. This, to my mind, indicates decentralization, not centralization.

To me the best proof of this decentralization is the rapid turnover of Western Emperors in the 5th Century. If the Emperor had been militarily or politically relevant - not just a symbol heavy figurehead - I don't think the Imperial office would have gone into abeyance.
 
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driftwood

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Minor clarification of semantics with Hardu:

It's possible to centralize the system overall, then decentralize the system within the centralized confines previously established.

So, for example, in the Principate the military was relatively decentralized. Within the Dominate, the military was relatively centralized. However, within the centralized system of the Dominate, certain regional commanders had autonomy devolved upon them. The net result is to create a great degree of flexibility within a centralized framework.

The reason I make a fuss about it is because decentralization within a centralized framework is very different from decentralization within a decentralized framework.

Please excuse any typos. I've been drinking beer all night now.

driftwoood
 

driftwood

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A good summary. I haven't yet read Hugh Elton, although I'm familiar with some of his works. But how could I argue with a man who came to the same conclusion as I did in his last line? :D

An interesting and well-written book that covers alot of those topics in their critical, embryonic phase is Theodosius: The Empire at Bay, by Stephen Williams and Gerard Friell. In almost all interpretations of the "fall" of Rome, Theodosius I is the pivotal figure, either because of his Gothic settlement of 382, his civil wars against the western emperors/strongmen, his use of Alaric, or his partition of the Empire between his sons. It's worth noting that he's called "the Great" because of his imposition of Catholic Orthodoxy, not because of his military/political track record.

And, in contrast, check out the apt-ly named Alaric Watson's Aurelian and the Third Century. Things were so much darker in the 250s than in the 380s, and it's interesting to see how vigorous, competent leadership could cause a different result.

driftwood
 

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Theodosius, always had his knee on the pulse of the empire , rather than a finger. h Elton has a bucket load to say, and fourtunatly its mostly online.:), love thos US univirsatys, everything is online.
For instance:
http://www.roman-emperors.org/Battdesi.htm


http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/asbook10.html#Modern Perspectives on the End of Antiquity
Halsall is another good place to wander through, although from your posts it will not contain much new to you. But for me its good as its a little later than i like my Roman history.

Hanny
 

driftwood

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Bowersock, Brown, and someone else recently edited a nice hardcover book called Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World. The first third or so is some topical essays, by people such as Averil Cameron and Patrick Geary, the rest is a mini-encyclopedia of sorts. Very nicely written, great color plates, research up through just a year or two ago, etc.

Anyway, they've apparently taken just the essays and republished them as a standalone paperback, called something like Interpreting Late Antiquity. A very good read, I recommend it. Easy reading, too. Geary's discussion of barbarians ranges from the 3rd to the 7th centuries, for example, without presupposing much (if any) knowledge.

I'll have to check out those links.

driftwood
 

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Originally posted by BRYCON316

However, in the glory days of Rome, it is estimated that anywhere from 50%-80% of the population of the city was unemployed, and thus on the grain dole. They basically lived a life of leisure, and were given free food to subsist on at a certain point in the month. Does anyone think that this reliance on government handouts was a cause of the decline of the famed Roman discipline and was a cause of the decline of the city, and maybe a cause of the decline of the empire??

Hmm, unemployment figures looks astronomical. What was the rational of having such a over-inflated city? Surely there were plenty of jobs in the provinces, or on the border in the army?
 

driftwood

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Originally posted by Sputnik


Hmm, unemployment figures looks astronomical. What was the rational of having such a over-inflated city? Surely there were plenty of jobs in the provinces, or on the border in the army?

Of course no one intended Rome to be so top-heavy (or bottom-heavy?). The jobs were originally in Rome, so as the Republic expanded everyone went to Rome to make their fortune. Unlike an post-industrial economy, you're going to have a large degree of inefficiency in the matching of labor and employers, so once a source of jobs dries up, there's no guarantee that people will know where to look next.

Then this welfare system incrementally developed over 500 years, from the Gracchi (roughly ... I believe the public grain management is much older, but that's when universal grain subsidies became regular and substantial) to Diocletian-Constantine. By the Late Empire, everyone was theoretically locked into their father's job, but also got free bread, meat, tools of the trade, and a host of other things, if you lived in the city of Rome.

As difficult and expensive as such a system is to maintain, it really wasn't that big a deal as long as the emperors considered it a priority. Once the city of Rome became politically and strategically irrelevant, resources started to dry up. But the grain dole continued until the city was depopulated in the 6th century. Its Constantinopolitan cousin continued for quite a long time ... until the loss of Egypt to the Persians/Arabs, I believe, meaning early-mid 7th century.

driftwood
 

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Small pox and measles epidemics, during the 2nd and 3rd centuries. Each epidemic was on the scale of the 14th century Black Death. Then it was finished off by the bubonic plague in the 6th century.
 

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I still think Gibbon is best on the decline and fall of Roman Empire. I haven't read those above though. How are they in comparison (apart from brevity)?
 

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You can't blame one event for the fall of the Roman Empire, that's like watching a single leaf fall on a horses back weighed down with so much stuff that that one little leaf finally did it in, and saying "wow, that leaf just broke that horse's back!"

The fall of the western Roman Empire was the culmination of over a millenia of cumulative mismanagement, curruption, inertia, and stupidity.

Yes the Roman Army lost at Adrianople, but by then their army was a pitiful, pathetic shadow of the glory days of yore. The independant farmer-soldier of the Republic was long gone, replaced by a half-civilized barbarian recruited from non-roman lands for money, with no loyalty to Rome or Romans. The mighty legions covering every province were reduced to a handful of 'legions' required to defend an undefendably ridiculously large empire from the seething hordes from which they recruited their own soldiers from.

The free men of the republic were long gone as well. The Senate was a joke, and the people of the Empire had no illusions that they had any say in anything whatsoever, and the line between citizen and slave was somewhat blurred by the 5th century, as most people were little better than slaves to the army or the magnates out in the countryside. They had little in the way of loyalty to the Empire, which treated the average Roman slightly better than a pile of dung. The army by then WAS the barbarians, and the magnates couldn't care less what happened to the empire. The only people who seemed to want the Empire by the end were the barbarians.

You can't say "well if this was different.." or "what if this didn't happen?" because it wasn't just one thing, almost nothing was RIGHT in the Roman Empire by the 5th century. Their mortal enemies ran their own military, their people preferred being invaded by Barbarians than living under Roman rule, the upper class didn't give a shit about anything other than their own damn selves, and the Senate was a bloody rubber stamp for the Emperor, who was raised and deposed (usually through murder) by his own Praetorian guard and military (who were Barbarians.)

So it could be argued that the Roman Empire was already gone, it just didn't know it yet.
 

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Aetius - Gibbon was brilliant, but many of his ideas have been discredited by modern scholarship. So it's dangerous to read him, because you'll be completely convinced by incorrect arguments. :)

Ramo - I wouldn't say epidemics alone caused the fall, but they greatly strained the socio-economic system of the empire, requiring rapid adaptation. Generally, the empire did pretty well, since it survived the 2nd-3rd century epidemics intact, and even the 6th century epidemic didn't do more than throw a brick wall in the face of Justinian's expansion projects.

MKJ - I think you're exagerrating the types of feelings people had vis-a-vis the empire. It had no mortal enemies. The barbarian generals showed a great deal more loyalty to the empire than to their tribes across the frontiers. The barbarian invaders generally professed a desire to take over or extract wealth from the empire, rather than destroy it. The army showed itself to be more than capable of routing invaders along the length of the frontier as long as it was competently (not brilliantly) led and had regular funding.

It is true that the people were treated like shit, but that was nothing new. It was also true that the local magnates cared more about avoiding taxes and central rule than about the health of the empire, but that was nothing new. Ultimately the division between the nobles and the humiliores ended up just like the earlier division between citizens and non-citizens, so that turned out to be nothing new.

So we're left with a situation where a few things went wrong and, instead of being fixed, were allowed to slowly get worse until it was impossible to save the western provinces without a leader of brilliance on the scale of Aurelian. The 5th century was not a period of brilliant leaders, sadly.

driftwood