failures turned into thriumps

[demanvanwezel]

If I ever went to study history then this would be my research subject

in 1453 constantinople fell to the muslims
this was a giant blow to christianity as a whole because the trade routes towards the east were blocked
christianity managed around this by a) moving around africa to trade directly with india (which would lead to bristish domination of SE asia)
and b) to search for other ways to the indies, which lead to the discovery of america and the continuation of the hegemony of european culture after it itself had waned

after napoleon destroyed the prussians changes were made into the army which lead to prussian victories at waterloo, sedan and made it so that Germany got massive victories in both world wars

japan which had learned it's share of gunboat diplomacy from perry and later used the same trick on korea, thus gaining a price without bloodshed for which their ancestors spilled their blood for

what else can the people here think up of lessons learned out of defeat that later turned into victory?

 

[The Super Pope]

Germany got massive victories in both world wars?

 

[demanvanwezel]

Germany got massive victories in both world wars?

germany bested russia in the first and france in the 2nd, regardless of how you think about them, that's impressive

 

[Sarmatia1871]

Is a thriump like a heffalump?

 

[demanvanwezel]

Is a thriump like a heffalump?

and a woezhel, yes I know the stories, just answer the bloody question, you know what I mean without turning into a grammar nazi

 

[nuarbnellaffej]

A huge one for your list would be Columbus discovering America. Scientists at the time had used mathematics to accurately calculate the size of the Earth, and had predicted any attempts to sail west from Europe to Asia would meet ruin in the middle of the ocean, due to lack of supplies for such a long journey.

Columbus was convinced they were wrong, and thought he could make it. Had North America not been present, Columbus' expedition would have failed, and he would have been barely remembered as a fool in the footnotes of history, who sailed himself and his crew to their deaths.

 

[demanvanwezel]

A huge one for your list would be Columbus discovering America. Scientists at the time had used mathematics to accurately calculate the size of the Earth, and had predicted any attempts to sail west from Europe to Asia would meet ruin in the middle of the ocean, due to lack of supplies for such a long journey.

Columbus was convinced they were wrong, and thought he could make it. Had North America not been present, Columbus' expedition would have failed, and he would have been barely remembered as a fool in the footnotes of history, who sailed himself and his crew to their deaths.

that's a really good one, also portugal won the initial race to the indies but overall lost to spain in the end, who not only managed to get most of a continent but also a route to the indies

but yes had there not been a continent to bump into then Columbus would have been dead (his men were already rebelling for a few days when they hit land, had the caribean been slightly farther away then Columbus had been hanging from the mast of the santa anna on the way back)

 

[The Super Pope]

germany bested russia in the first and france in the 2nd, regardless of how you think about them, that's impressive

These things aren't really a consequence of Prussia's post Napoleonic reforms (probably the win over Austria better illustrates that). WWI Russia was a giant with feet of clay, while WWII France was faced by a larger country that had spent ten years preparing for war.

With regard to your topic, how about the Tet Offensive? It was militarily a disaster for the Communists, the Viet Cong was totally annihilated, but they convinced the American public that the war was lost, and was decisive for North Vietnamese victory

 

[demanvanwezel]

These things aren't really a consequence of Prussia's post Napoleonic reforms (probably the win over Austria better illustrates that). WWI Russia was a giant with feet of clay, while WWII France was faced by a larger country that had spent ten years preparing for war.

With regard to your topic, how about the Tet Offensive? It was militarily a disaster for the Communists, the Viet Cong was totally annihilated, but they convinced the American public that the war was lost, and was decisive for North Vietnamese victory

I have to give you some way here

WWI Russia was indeed the rotten house that hitler mistook soviet Russia for but tannenberg happened because of german generals following the lessons that prussia had learned from napoleon, thinking obediance, they saw how the situation changed and thought about how that oppurtunity could shape and fit into their superiors plans and acted according
of course this also had downsides, officers often refused to throw their men away and thus offensives suffered


this same "thinking obediance" we can find back in the "ghost battalion" of WW2, brittain nearly lost it's whole expeditionary force to these attacks, it's not for nothing that they called it the miracle of dunkirk, german panzers encountered an australian division in marching formation, that's how total the surprise was
in the invasion of france the germans were masters because of their decentralised structure, it was only when a direct order from hitler came through that it stopped, some few kilometres from dunkirk which allowed for the evacuation

I wouldn't count the tet offensive though because as it's tactical objectives failed, it's strategic objective was a massive victory

this topic is more about victories born from a defeat, I'd argue that the US has won more from the tet offensive then the vietnamese have, rather they learned that in modern war you need to have control of the story that reaches back home
do you think it's a coincidence that the major newsnetworks reported about the recent wars as long strings of victory?, the media had to sign an agreement to be granted acces to the warzone unlike Vietnam, thus they gained control over the story, if something like the tet offensive were to happen today then the headlines would read: commies throw themselves against bullwark, vietnamese launch desperate attack: end is near or something like that

 

[DoomBunny]

These things aren't really a consequence of Prussia's post Napoleonic reforms (probably the win over Austria better illustrates that). WWI Russia was a giant with feet of clay, while WWII France was faced by a larger country that had spent ten years preparing for war.

Actually I'd suggest that there is a direct link between Prussia's post-Napoleonic reform and the military thinking of the Prussian (and later German, as much as that is an inaccurate term) armies in both World Wars and before.

Throughout one sees the development and institution of emphasis on efficient staff work and command organisation, the belief in decisive battle manifest in envelopment, and (seen best during the World Wars) an astounding ignorance of political and strategic reality in favour of military chess. The ironic thing is that as the Prussian mindset became more and more entrenched it contributed more and more to Germany's eventual defeats.

Certainly it would be a mistake to ignore the other reasons for the course of the World Wars, yet the root of German military thinking is remarkably evident, especially compared to the conflict inherent in some other nations thinking (Britain and France for example had far less unified thinking on the role of the army and its needs, Italy meanwhile was unified in simply not thinking until 1917 and after that was still rather poor).

 

[Avernite]

Actually I'd suggest that there is a direct link between Prussia's post-Napoleonic reform and the military thinking of the Prussian (and later German, as much as that is an inaccurate term) armies in both World Wars and before.

Throughout one sees the development and institution of emphasis on efficient staff work and command organisation, the belief in decisive battle manifest in envelopment, and (seen best during the World Wars) an astounding ignorance of political and strategic reality in favour of military chess. The ironic thing is that as the Prussian mindset became more and more entrenched it contributed more and more to Germany's eventual defeats.

Certainly it would be a mistake to ignore the other reasons for the course of the World Wars, yet the root of German military thinking is remarkably evident, especially compared to the conflict inherent in some other nations thinking (Britain and France for example had far less unified thinking on the role of the army and its needs, Italy meanwhile was unified in simply not thinking until 1917 and after that was still rather poor).

While that seems to describe the WW1/2 German army to some extent it's not fitting my understanding of, say, the 1860's Prussian army. Three wars won in decisive victories coupled with excellent strategic thinking.

Of course strategic victories aren't won by the army alone, but by the state - yet I would think the German army at least in that era managed to be so good at 'decisive battle' that it didn't matter. And beating all the German opponents opposing them leading up to Königgratz with only the Saxons and Austrians uniting into an effective multinational force seems a fairly decent strategy.

 

[DoomBunny]

While that seems to describe the WW1/2 German army to some extent it's not fitting my understanding of, say, the 1860's Prussian army. Three wars won in decisive victories coupled with excellent strategic thinking.

Of course strategic victories aren't won by the army alone, but by the state - yet I would think the German army at least in that era managed to be so good at 'decisive battle' that it didn't matter. And beating all the German opponents opposing them leading up to Königgratz with only the Saxons and Austrians uniting into an effective multinational force seems a fairly decent strategy.

The lack of wider awareness was, I think, very much the result of two things. First, victory in itself leading to a greater confidence. Second, repeated impressive victories leading to a vindication of method. Essentially, winning too much created an idea that war could indeed be conducted as a game of real life military chess, with decisive actions and tactical manoeuvre taking precedence over strategic and political concerns. Or in other words, the Schlieffen Plan (debates over whether it actually existed aside).

So yes, it is I'd suggest largely a later development, post Moltke elder.

 

[Jos de trol]

there are I believe a number of accounts of victorious armies succesfully routing the enemy whose drive and cohesion then falters as they start looting the enemy's encampment, and subsequently get curbstomped by a rallied enemy. I can't really think of any specific examples but they are there

 

[Avernite]

The lack of wider awareness was, I think, very much the result of two things. First, victory in itself leading to a greater confidence. Second, repeated impressive victories leading to a vindication of method. Essentially, winning too much created an idea that war could indeed be conducted as a game of real life military chess, with decisive actions and tactical manoeuvre taking precedence over strategic and political concerns. Or in other words, the Schlieffen Plan (debates over whether it actually existed aside).

So yes, it is I'd suggest largely a later development, post Moltke elder.

I seem to recall the initial 'Schlieffen plan' included some troops marching through Dutch Limburg to get to Belgium and France. So it seems that as late as the 1910's strategic-diplomatic concerns were relevant, given they didn't actually violate Dutch borders.

I would like to suggest the 1672 war between the Netherlands and France+England+German allies. It cost the Netherlands a government and a defeat, but was necessary to allow the Glorious Revolution. Which was a victory that may have turned into a lesser victory over time, but was pretty cool all the same.

 

[DoomBunny]

I seem to recall the initial 'Schlieffen plan' included some troops marching through Dutch Limburg to get to Belgium and France. So it seems that as late as the 1910's strategic-diplomatic concerns were relevant, given they didn't actually violate Dutch borders.

Well, that raises the whole "Was the Schlieffen plan actually real?" debate. However, I'd note that on the whole the Schlieffen Plan as it manifested was incredibly divorced from reality. It ignored the dangerous political consequences from invading Belgium, assumed the Belgians themselves would be only a minor issue, expected a speed of advance well beyond the capabilities of an army reliant on foot and hoof, even before enemy resistance was considered, and failed to account for any French reaction to German manoeuvres.

I don't know of anything concrete on the evolution of the Schlieffen Plan (it's a while since I went into the whole Holmes-Zuber nonsense and not a lot sunk in due to the dullness and general nitpicky nature of it), but I'd also note that a lot of the time Schlieffen was planning with more troops than he actually had (i.e., accounting for a 25% increase in the army that he advocated or counting the Italian's who were supposed to deploy a largeish force to the Rhineland in the event of war).

Certainly though, I'm not suggesting that Prussian/German thought was totally without strategic or political concern. Rather than there was a strong tendency towards playing military chess without regards to several crucial factors.

 

[cpreston5]

Well, in 1941 the USSR suffered several of the worst operational defeats ever inflicted in military history; in 1945 they had conquered Eastern Europe.

Of course it can be argued that surviving Barbarossa was not hugely impressive considering the inherently unrealistic prospects of the invasion, and that Barbarossa was Germany's best chance of beating the USSR, and so after that the USSR's victory was near-inevitable, so I'll offer a more specific case:

Soviet forces are sent reeling by Fall Blau, Army Group A is able to advance freely to pretty much its breaking point in the South, by the time B runs out of steam the RKKA is clinging on to a fraction of Stalingrad. The Soviets manage to hold on, regroup, and score a stunning run of victories with Uranus and Little Saturn, using the Germans' geographical gains against them.

And after that Manstein's victory at 3rd Kharkov was a smaller-scale case of failure-to-triumph, using the momentum of the Soviet advance post-Little Saturn to score a fairly unlikely win.

 

[Avernite]

Well, that raises the whole "Was the Schlieffen plan actually real?" debate. However, I'd note that on the whole the Schlieffen Plan as it manifested was incredibly divorced from reality. It ignored the dangerous political consequences from invading Belgium, assumed the Belgians themselves would be only a minor issue, expected a speed of advance well beyond the capabilities of an army reliant on foot and hoof, even before enemy resistance was considered, and failed to account for any French reaction to German manoeuvres.

I don't know of anything concrete on the evolution of the Schlieffen Plan (it's a while since I went into the whole Holmes-Zuber nonsense and not a lot sunk in due to the dullness and general nitpicky nature of it), but I'd also note that a lot of the time Schlieffen was planning with more troops than he actually had (i.e., accounting for a 25% increase in the army that he advocated or counting the Italian's who were supposed to deploy a largeish force to the Rhineland in the event of war).

Certainly though, I'm not suggesting that Prussian/German thought was totally without strategic or political concern. Rather than there was a strong tendency towards playing military chess without regards to several crucial factors.

Well, then a different point might be that using your way of thought, the Prussian/German army came scary close to winning control of Europe.

So perhaps they were actually right to think that way. It sure didn't serve them much worse than any other method they could've used (at least power-wise; in terms of dead people I'm sure there were better options).

 

[DoomBunny]

Well, then a different point might be that using your way of thought, the Prussian/German army came scary close to winning control of Europe.

So perhaps they were actually right to think that way. It sure didn't serve them much worse than any other method they could've used (at least power-wise; in terms of dead people I'm sure there were better options).

I don't think I'd suggest the Germans ever looked massively like succeeding in the First World War. Certainly, at points they came within reach of what might have been the decisive victory, but ultimately they were denied by entirely logical and foreseeable limitations which could not be surpassed. Again the pattern repeats in the Second World War, Barbarossa and Rommel's North African campaigns being the obvious examples of a great disregard for the back/high-end of military thinking.

There's also the point that the Germans achieved much of what they did in the Second World War (and partly in the First), simply because their opponents really weren't up to much. The Nazi conquest of Europe is a lot less impressive when you realise that the only comparable nation they managed to conquer was France, and even that was at a substantial disadvantage in almost every regard.

Again, I'm not saying that the Prussian/German military was unimpressive, many aspects of it were. But I'd argue it was very much fixated on the battlefield at the expense of strategic, political, logistical, and other wider realities (such as partisan warfare for example, part of the reason for German brutality in 1870 and both World Wars was that partisan warfare simply didn't fit into the German mindset).

Well, in 1941 the USSR suffered several of the worst operational defeats ever inflicted in military history; in 1945 they had conquered Eastern Europe.

Of course it can be argued that surviving Barbarossa was not hugely impressive considering the inherently unrealistic prospects of the invasion, and that Barbarossa was Germany's best chance of beating the USSR, and so after that the USSR's victory was near-inevitable, so I'll offer a more specific case:

Soviet forces are sent reeling by Fall Blau, Army Group A is able to advance freely to pretty much its breaking point in the South, by the time B runs out of steam the RKKA is clinging on to a fraction of Stalingrad. The Soviets manage to hold on, regroup, and score a stunning run of victories with Uranus and Little Saturn, using the German's geographical gains against them.

And after that Manstein's victory at 3rd Kharkov was a smaller-scale case of failure-to-triumph, using the momentum of the Soviet advance post-Little Saturn to score a fairly unlikely win.

I'd say those are both incredibly impressive comebacks.

 

[Avernite]

I don't think I'd suggest the Germans ever looked massively like succeeding in the First World War. Certainly, at points they came within reach of what might have been the decisive victory, but ultimately they were denied by entirely logical and foreseeable limitations which could not be surpassed. Again the pattern repeats in the Second World War, Barbarossa and Rommel's North African campaigns being the obvious examples of a great disregard for the back/high-end of military thinking.

I'd say Barbarossa was one of the most succesful military campaigns in history, over enormous distances. You don't get that without looking out strategically and logistically. Sure they didn't manage to topple the Russian/Soviet state with it, so it didn't end up a victory, and so that was a failure - but they launched an invasion while controlling directly or diplomatically nearly all of mainland Europe, which was a success strategically (thanks to tactically).

At some point I wonder what kind of thinking you require to consider something good high-end. Good enough for Warsaw to Stalingrad apparently doesn't cut it, nor Bremen to Narvik, nor actually beating Russia while invading it. Is it victory alone?

 

[keynes2.0]

The Germany "victories" against Imperial Russia in 1917 and France in 1940 both left Germany in a far worse off position. Really they are examples of triumphs that were failures in disguise.

Germany before Russia collapsed wasn't taking much pressure from Russia anyway. Thanks to the Russian collapse the polish people threw off German rule along with Russian rule.

Germany before the French surrender was in a limited war that they might have had some hope of a negotiated peace and the Soviets saw no harm in giving them the resources they needed to stave off the economic collapse. The French collapse lead to Germany being reduced to rubble and poverty and divided among the victors because of what the French collapse meant for the US and Soviets.