The Year of Strategic Crisis
Part 13: Littoral Expeditions I, June 15 – August 31, 1941
With the fronts against the Soviets holding, and with little in the way of Soviet attempts to break through except in Anatolia, Mussolini looked elsewhere for offensive action against his enemies. He wished to keep them off balance and prevent them from effectively marshalling forces against the borders of his empire. While, as seen previously, he had begun a process of reinforcing the fronts against the Soviet armies, this was primarily seen as a defensive measure, at least for the moment. It was to prevent the Soviets from achieving success, but not to achieve Italian offensive victories in turn. Not yet, certainly.
In Mid-June, Mussolini thus turned to events in Africa. In his mind, he was already renewing the assault upon his main enemy: the maritime power of the British Empire. The British were beginning to nibble at the edges of his domain in Africa, particularly the borders of his client state of Abyssinia. In the absence of a greater front with Britain, he determined that Italy would pursue a strategy of limited liability in Africa. Drawing from the writings of Basil Liddell Hart and his invention of the so-called ‘British way of warfare,’ Mussolini deemed that dedicating a handful of formations and Da Zara’s fleet to the struggle in Africa would either tie up inordinately large amounts of British resources or allow for the destruction of discrete British formations. The first step toward this goal was reactivating Dall’Ora’s corps as an offensive force, albeit with a limited goal. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it had left Khartoum in British hands. This is significant as Khartoum had Sudan’s only airfield, and was the only one in the region save for a minor Italian airfield in Eritrea at Ed. Taking it would prevent the British from flying warplanes over the skies of the theater. Once the city was captured, it only made sense to push the defensive front up further to create a coherent front again.
Dall’Ora advancing to a new defensive line in Sudan, one that included Khartoum.
This minor push was succeeded in early July by the next mission for the marine corps: the conquest of British Somaliland. Its conquest by marines would accomplish a number of results. Firstly, it would deny the British an African port whose future significance logistically may be considerable. Secondly, it would deny the British a base for future operations, both on land and on sea. Thirdly, the British had two formations in the region to strike at Abyssinia from the northeast, even as other British forces attacked from the west and southwest. The British were stretching Abyssinia’s defensive forces and confusing them as to where the main British effort was. Successful invasion would remove this northeastern threat and also lead to the destruction of minor British formations. Thus, by the 6th of July, the Italian marines under Re and Lisi landed at the undefended city of Berbera, covered by Da Zara’s fleet. At Berbera was Britain’s only port in Somaliland. This one landing cut British logistics into the region and effectively doomed their efforts.
The marines landing in Somaliland.
And then, Lisi and Re waited. They waited for most of the month of July, purely for logistical reasons. A month gave the marines a large stockpile of supplies in Berbera, and ravaged the two British divisions which were not receiving supplies of any sort during this period. This was a canny move, given that the British formations both contained armored formations which could no doubt under normal circumstances outmaneuver and outfight marine regiments in a stand-up fight. However, by the 29th Lisi deemed that it was time to finally go onto the offensive, and perhaps he did not wish to strain Mussolini’s patience too long. His plan was simple: he would send his headquarters into the undefended deserts, while Re would attack the British in Hargeysa. This would isolate one British division in conquered Abyssinian territory where it could be picked apart by the Abyssinian formations around it, and hopefully would force the other to retreat in that direction as well. If not, the marines would chase the British until there was nothing left of their unit but a trail of wrecked armor.
The first step of Lisi’s plan to take Somaliland.
The British could not stand up against the Italians without supplies. Disorganized by a near month of strict rationing of food, ammunition and fuel Hargeysa could not be defended even though the British front was twice as wide as that of the marines and, in normal circumstances, could have easily boxed the Italians in a tactical encirclement. In the event, the British resisted for a week and a half and inflicted more casualties than they took. The British also failed to retreat into Abyssinia, but instead opted for withdrawal into the southern tracts of Somaliland. In a normal situation this would have been sensible, but instead they were merely prolonging their own agony. The marines thus had to chase them all the way through the deserts of Somaliland until they reached the far eastern coast, where finally the British were trapped against the sea and definitively destroyed. By this time, the Abyssinians had also dealt with the British formation in their territory.
The final battle of the Somaliland campaign.
The campaign was a success in Mussolini’s application of Liddell Hart’s concepts, which in any event ran largely parallel to his own. It resulted in the British loss of a port, in the loss of two British divisions, both of which included armored formations, and also resulted in Da Zara preying upon some minor British shipping that happened to blunder into the war zone, perhaps to extract the British armor. Two flotillas of transport ships were sunk. This was hardly as great wound on the British, but it kept Italian sailors and aviators sharp. Mussolini was pleased enough with this operation to authorize more, and to aid in this endeavor he was sending the newly completed second Italian marine division southward through the Red Sea to Berbera.
