Today's South China Morning Post has a review of a new book that apparently calls into questions the standard view of the 'Flying Tigers'.
Peter Gordon:
Book review – A Few Planes for China: The Birth of the Flying Tigers unravels the myth behind legendary fighter pilots
The review was originally published in the Asian Review of Books.
The author has also created an excellent website, which often has a cliff-hanger at the end of the page to encourage you to click further, so I suspect that the book is a page-turner too. The book is a popularization of her PhD research under Richard Overy, so this is not just some crank.
According to the reviews and website, she claims that the decision to authorize the AVG was taken earlier than usually thought. Chennault was brought in much later as the front man. In her account, the driving force behind it was Curtiss-Wright's Asian sales broker. That fits with one of the most solid conclusions from research into Western imperialism in Asia: most intervention was the result of Westerners on the spot pressuring the metropolis for their own reasons, not grand strategies drawn up in imperial capitals. Of course, the UK had bought every fighter the US would sell, but that did not generate commission for the broker in Nanjing. In order to get the sale, they came up with the idea that the aircraft would essentially be used to defend British territories (Burma). The US government was also keen to redirect Japanese airpower away from the South China Sea. The 'America helps China' angle was brought in for logistical and propaganda purposes, but so many people believed it that it spun out of control and has dominated historiography. As this story is still useful whenever the PRC, Taiwan or US need an example of Sino-American co-operation in their propaganda, alternative stories have not gained traction.
The blurbs (by Rana Mitter and other leading historians of the period) suggest that they take Buchan seriously, but are not convinced by her conclusions (yet). I think they're right: it seems to me that she has missed the extent to which the China had persuaded Roosevelt that the US should invest in a democratic China as a very-long-term strategic partner. But it's certainly an interesting take.
@Pyro157, this might be of interest to you.
Peter Gordon:
Book review – A Few Planes for China: The Birth of the Flying Tigers unravels the myth behind legendary fighter pilots
The review was originally published in the Asian Review of Books.
The author has also created an excellent website, which often has a cliff-hanger at the end of the page to encourage you to click further, so I suspect that the book is a page-turner too. The book is a popularization of her PhD research under Richard Overy, so this is not just some crank.
According to the reviews and website, she claims that the decision to authorize the AVG was taken earlier than usually thought. Chennault was brought in much later as the front man. In her account, the driving force behind it was Curtiss-Wright's Asian sales broker. That fits with one of the most solid conclusions from research into Western imperialism in Asia: most intervention was the result of Westerners on the spot pressuring the metropolis for their own reasons, not grand strategies drawn up in imperial capitals. Of course, the UK had bought every fighter the US would sell, but that did not generate commission for the broker in Nanjing. In order to get the sale, they came up with the idea that the aircraft would essentially be used to defend British territories (Burma). The US government was also keen to redirect Japanese airpower away from the South China Sea. The 'America helps China' angle was brought in for logistical and propaganda purposes, but so many people believed it that it spun out of control and has dominated historiography. As this story is still useful whenever the PRC, Taiwan or US need an example of Sino-American co-operation in their propaganda, alternative stories have not gained traction.
The blurbs (by Rana Mitter and other leading historians of the period) suggest that they take Buchan seriously, but are not convinced by her conclusions (yet). I think they're right: it seems to me that she has missed the extent to which the China had persuaded Roosevelt that the US should invest in a democratic China as a very-long-term strategic partner. But it's certainly an interesting take.
@Pyro157, this might be of interest to you.