Empire for Liberty: America in the Long Nineteenth Century

[volksmarschall]

I have an American friend - who read history with me at St Andrews - who has a pet theory that the United States only truly existed as a county after the civil war - between the revolution and the civil war it was merely in a formative state. This update made me think of that.

You know, a lot of historians and writers have said similar things. One writer, whom I'll leave nameless mostly because I have some profound disagreements with his work, nevertheless wrote that American history occurs in stages of "epochal republics," each iteration being a progressive and better reflection and embodiment of American ideals outlined in the Declaration and Constitution. "First Republic" being the foundation but terribly problematic and conflictual, 1789-1865. "Second Republic" forming from 1865-1932. Third Republic, 1932-1964. Fourth Republic, 1964-2008. He remarked that he was unsure if Obama's election marked the beginning of a fifth, or was the last fumes of the fourth.

Then, of course, we have our most famous mainstream CW historian, James McPherson, who recently wrote The War that Changed Forged a Nation, arguing, rightly in my opinion, the CW and aftermath is where "America" (as we know and understand it) comes into form. A myriad of other historians and writers have noted similar things. After the CW, "the good old days of America" (up through the late 60s or early 70s) is definitely a product of the CW and aftermath. The idea of a truly united nation, united (by conformity) to the Anglo-Puritan ideal of America, a restless nation of progress and optimism, urban, bourgeois, pragmatic, reformist, capitalist, strong institutions, etc., is all the result of the CW.

I would agree with your friend.

But now we just told the readership what historiography I'm going to be pulling from in the future!

 

[Specialist290]

There's one historian I'm thinking of -- I forget exactly who, but it may very well have been McPherson, actually -- who made the observation that before the Civil War, people would say "The United States are...", implying that they thought of the United States as a federation of sovereign states united in a mutual and reciprocal arrangement rather than a single state in and of itself, whereas after the Civil War the formula "The United States is..." started to predominate.

 

[AvatarOfKhaine]

There's one historian I'm thinking of -- I forget exactly who, but it may very well have been McPherson, actually -- who made the observation that before the Civil War, people would say "The United States are...", implying that they thought of the United States as a federation of sovereign states united in a mutual and reciprocal arrangement rather than a single state in and of itself, whereas after the Civil War the formula "The United States is..." started to predominate.

I believe many such changes occurred, such as the ubiquitous shift from "These United States" to "The United States"

 

[volksmarschall]

There's one historian I'm thinking of -- I forget exactly who, but it may very well have been McPherson, actually -- who made the observation that before the Civil War, people would say "The United States are...", implying that they thought of the United States as a federation of sovereign states united in a mutual and reciprocal arrangement rather than a single state in and of itself, whereas after the Civil War the formula "The United States is..." started to predominate.

I believe many such changes occurred, such as the ubiquitous shift from "These United States" to "The United States"

Yes. And as we've covered through the earlier chapters, I wanted to make sure that we would highlight the vast plurality and diversity that made up early America. Because, well, after this most momentous and transformation event, we see the federalization and centralization of a "united" United States.

Of course, this leads to the many ironies about American history and culture that most historians, philosophers, sociologists, and the more educated writers, have long observed. America was born in a sea of plurality (we might not associate the plurality of Euro-Americanism: Puritanism, Anglicanism, Scotch-Irish Presbyterian, etc. German Catholic and Lutheran, Irish Catholic, etc. the same way we do today, but I hope we can see just how facile that is. These peoples had a great difference in not only theological outlooks, but understanding of liberty, freedom, their place in America, etc.). The centralization of a formally universal nation has to get rid of all of that. Hence, we meet further ironies today about the defenders/promoters of "pluralism" who don't seem to understand that any philosophy of pluralism necessitates, by logical syllogism, a decentralization and distribution back to the local over and against the universal.

Taken in this light, we might also see how these ancient roots of American society still impact America today.

Once we finish this chapter, we shall enter this transformation. Of course, I had to make sure we got an appropriate CW since, well, one can just as easily defeat the Confederacy in 8 months, and that would kind of be a let down considering how important the CW is for American history.

 

[AvatarOfKhaine]

Yes. And as we've covered through the earlier chapters, I wanted to make sure that we would highlight the vast plurality and diversity that made up early America. Because, well, after this most momentous and transformation event, we see the federalization and centralization of a "united" United States.

Of course, this leads to the many ironies about American history and culture that most historians, philosophers, sociologists, and the more educated writers, have long observed. America was born in a sea of plurality (we might not associate the plurality of Euro-Americanism: Puritanism, Anglicanism, Scotch-Irish Presbyterian, etc. German Catholic and Lutheran, Irish Catholic, etc. the same way we do today, but I hope we can see just how facile that is. These peoples had a great difference in not only theological outlooks, but understanding of liberty, freedom, their place in America, etc.). The centralization of a formally universal nation has to get rid of all of that. Hence, we meet further ironies today about the defenders/promoters of "pluralism" who don't seem to understand that any philosophy of pluralism necessitates, by logical syllogism, a decentralization and distribution back to the local over and against the universal.

Taken in this light, we might also see how these ancient roots of American society still impact America today.

Once we finish this chapter, we shall enter this transformation. Of course, I had to make sure we got an appropriate CW since, well, one can just as easily defeat the Confederacy in 8 months, and that would kind of be a let down considering how important the CW is for American history.

Do you think there is a logical situation in which a ACW could have been over in a year? Or do you think for the Federal Army to be that strong that the Southron states wouldn't dare to secede?

 

[volksmarschall]

Do you think there is a logical situation in which a ACW could have been over in a year? Or do you think for the Federal Army to be that strong that the Southron states wouldn't dare to secede?

A game is a game, and sadly--as much as I do love Victoria 2 (the Vicky series in general)--it's hard for the game mechanics to match an event that is, frankly, the most important event in the time frame set in the game for the United States. The Confederacy seems to be born with rather small military sizes from all my experiences, so that's part of the problem. A U.S. player has, likely, just super sized the starting army for 25 years so it's just too easy to blitz the south when the war fires.

Now, for myself in the game, I handicapped myself to have a prolonged CW for the purposes of this AAR. (Although I'll be honest, I have no problem winning the war in 6 months in a normal and random play thru.) As a historian and writer, I can't do that in a treatment of an AAR.

It's really a bummer since, it cannot be understated as you noted yourself, how transformative the event was historically. And since I'm billing this as a largely historicized AAR based on my GC, I have to do things to keep the CW meaningful, plus I want to dispense with a lot of a-historical nonsense that most Americans believe about the war (hint, the South, if you read the documents of succession, were not defending states' rights, they were accusing the northern states of avoiding federal law by states' rights.)

But I think when we get to it you'll all see how I managed to make a very long and meaningful CW for our sakes.

 

[Ab Ovo]

Whilst I am assuming that the resolution of the War for Southern Independence is predetermined, I nevertheless eagerly await the birth of a free Dixie.

 

[volksmarschall]

Whilst I am assuming that the resolution of the War for Southern Independence is predetermined, I nevertheless eagerly await the birth of a free Dixie.

It's very much been fated!

 

[volksmarschall]

CHAPTER VI: MARCHING TOWARD THE CIVIL WAR

Not About States’ Rights​

As America marched toward disunion, one of the most interesting and misleading characterizations of the war must be dealt with. In 1850 the U.S. Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act. In 1857, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of slave interests in Dred Scott vs. Sanford, a decision widely understood as backing up the Fugitive Slave Act in which Dred Scott, while in the free-state north, sued for his freedom now that he wasn’t in slave-holding territory.

The Fugitive Slave Act stated that runaway slaves living in northern free states, even if granted nominal freedom in the north, were, in fact, still property of their slaveholders. Northern states, law agencies, and governments, were tasked with returning such “fugitives” back to their owners. When Dred Scott was ruled “an enslaved man” that retained his enslaved status even if in free territory. Only the Court Justices Benjamin Robbins Curtis and John Mclean dissented in the 7-2 ruling.

Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1836-1864. Taney was a strong ally of Andrew Jackson in the 1830s, and many see him as having been rewarded with his nomination to the Supreme Court after serving as Attorney General and Secretary of War. Taney presided over the landmark Dred Scott decision. Taney remained on the Court during the Civil War. Historically, Taney was viewed as an ardent strict constructionist of the Constitution. He interpreted the Constitution as defending slave interests, leading to the Dred Scott decision. He was also a staunch opponent of presidential power. He opposed the violation of Habeas Corpus during the war. Taney was a personal enemy, and generally vilified, by abolitionists and Republicans during the late 1850s until his death.​

Despite these rulings, the rise of abolitionism, which we covered already, was making the enforcement of federal law difficult in northern territories. Many governors, local politicians, and Christian ministers, took every measure to bypass federal law. Others even proclaimed states’ rights to defend the runaway slaves and that the federal government in Washington had no right to impose the regional hegemony of the south over the north.[1] This, of course, inflamed the Southern states. In their declaration of secession South Carolina bluntly stated that the northern nullification of federal law was one of the reasons for their cause for secession:

We maintain that in every compact between two or more parties, the obligation is mutual; that the failure of one of the contracting parties to perform a material part of the agreement, entirely releases the obligation of the other; and that where no arbiter is provided, each party is remitted to his own judgment to determine the fact of failure, with all its consequences...The States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin and Iowa, have enacted laws which either nullify the Acts of Congress or render useless any attempt to execute them. In many of these States the fugitive is discharged from service or labor claimed, and in none of them has the State Government complied with the stipulation made in the Constitution.

Almost all of the secessionist documents state the same thing.

Georgia also wrote:

The people of Georgia have ever been willing to stand by this bargain, this contract; they have never sought to evade any of its obligations; they have never hitherto sought to establish any new government; they have struggled to maintain the ancient right of themselves and the human race through and by that Constitution.

And Mississippi:

It ([the federal government]) has nullified the Fugitive Slave Law in almost every free State in the Union, and has utterly broken the compact which our fathers pledged their faith to maintain.

The irony, of course, is the historical amnesia of Civil War consciousness tells us almost the opposite of the actual facts of southern secession.

Following the Lockean principles of John Locke in Two Treatises of Government, the South understood the Covenant Union of states as binding to the eternal laws and obligations of the social contract to which all persons are subject to. As Locke himself wrote, “And to this I say, that every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government.”[2] The South also believed that, in the Constitution, the northern states gave consent to the dictates of whatever the federal government would rule. “Whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to be dissolved; or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it,” Locke wrote.[3]

In the eyes of the southern states, the laws and rulings of the federal government fit Locke’s statement, “This legislative is not only the supreme power of the common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it.”[4] Thus, the northern states, in their blatant and nullifying actions toward that “sacred and unalterable legislative” body, had violated the covenant compact that bound north and south, free and slave, together at the Constitution Convention. This constituted the grievance to which the southern states would be able to secede.

The Lockean Dilemma​

The great dilemma that was leading to the Civil War, here, was the inherent contradictions within Lockean political philosophy. Contrary to what high school students read, Locke did not believe that people had a perpetual right to revolution. One only need to read Two Treatises to understand this. You only get one revolution! Once the revolution occurs, and succeeds, you are bound to the social covenant compact that establishes that sacred and unalterable legislature.

What is often loss in studies of Locke is his Puritanism that influenced his social contract theories. As we already have gone over, the Puritans understood the social covenant as binding and eternal. Once signed up between man and God, one was bound to it like the Jews to Yahweh at Mt. Sinai. This gets secularized into Locke’s political philosophy, for he himself was very conscious of his own Puritan and revolutionary heritage. As Leo Strauss wrote of Locke, “he is the wolf, Hobbes, in sheep's clothing.”[5]

Although generally revered in high school textbooks, most professional scholars of philosophy, history, and political philosophy (especially) do not paint the fictional account of Lockean political theory as high school students generally learn. Far from an advocate of "limited government," Locke's political philosophy of a powerful federal legislature and binding social contract is viewed as one of the great thrusts toward centralized political power. Most scholars see the Civil War as occurring in the shadow of John Locke's complicated and contradictory political philosophy. Many see the cultural dynamics, divisions between north and south, free and slave, and political Lockeanism of Antebellum America as inevitably leading to the disunion of the United States as two sides were driven further and further apart. One scholar described the American Civil War as, "the penultimate Lockean event in American history."​

Thus, we have presented before us the ultimate Lockean dilemma that helped tear the United States apart. On one hand, the north, in refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of secession, was equally interpreting Locke. Locke, after all, said that once the post-revolutionary government is established it is binding over all generations. “And to this I say, that every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government.”[6] Hence, southern secession was always illegal in the Lockean framework and the embedded Puritan contractual theory that undergirded it.

At the same time, the South was constantly proclaiming that the northern states were refusing to obey that same government and law that was binding and eternal and sacred. Hence, the southern states eventually attempted to use the Lockean principle of revolution against “a long train of abuses” as their means to end an already collapsed social contract that was the result of northern nullification. Thanks to the Lockean foundations of the United States, the United States was being dragged into civil war from the contradictory interpretations being rendered to Lockean political philosophy that undergirded the post-1787 American Constitutional political foundation.

Not only was cultural and religious pluralism and antagonism one of the leading reasons for division in the Antebellum republic, so too was the universalized Lockean political theory signed onto in 1787. This, coupled with the different and competing cultures and economies of the U.S., inevitably ensured grievance between north and south. Both of whom would turn to John Locke to justify their position. The north chided the south in reminding them that the covenant compact was binding and eternal. The south proclaimed injustice on the part of the north, and failure of the north to abide by federal statutes and laws.

Contrary to revisionist history, the southern states were not leaving the Union to defend states’ rights. They were leaving because the north was nullifying federal law and statutes through their implementation of states’ rights, which constituted the train of abuses which supposedly, in the eyes of southern secessionists, justified their secession since the north had violated the compact which compelled the south to leave. Thus, the drums and trumpets sounding the siren call of southern secession was never about states’ rights. It was about defending federal law and statutes, which the southern states believed the north had violated—thus leaving them with no other option than to leave to continue to safeguard established federal and constitutional law.


[1] This is historically true if you actually read the Southern Documents of Secession. Southern States opined the lack of Federal enforcement of federal laws and rulings. The idea that the Confederacy “was born of states’ rights” is an utter myth and lie that no serious historian holds to be true.

[2] Two Treatises, 8.119

[3] Ibid., 8.121.

[4] Ibid., 11.134.

[5] Quoted in Christopher Morris, The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, p. 74.

[6] Two Treatises, 8.119.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Christopher Ferrera, Liberty: The God that Failed

Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire

Ed. Christopher Morris, The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau

SUGGESTED QUICK READING FOR THE UNITIATTED:

Eds., “The Myth of States’ Rights,” Amherst College Magazine, A Review of Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire, Fall 2016.

Allan Lichtman, “The Myth of Secession and States’ Rights in the Civil War,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 12 April 2011.

Jared Meyer, “What Many Americans Get Wrong About States’ Rights,” Federalist, 20 July 2015.​

 

[stnylan]

The little I know of Locke leaves me intellectually baffled, I must confess. The idea of only one stab at getting things "right" ...

 

[volksmarschall]

The little I know of Locke leaves me intellectually baffled, I must confess. The idea of only one stab at getting things "right" ...

It is but one of the many ironies and paradoxes when one decides to study Locke in depth, which is why Strauss, the greatest of all political philosophers and historians of the 20th century said Locke was, "the wolf, Hobbes, in sheep's clothing."

I remember what my Prof. Steven Smith said here at Yale, although I already received a fuller treatment of the subject as undergrad previously, "Today we begin our study of John Locke. If you think Locke is a proponent of limited government and perpetual revolution, he's not your friend." And all this would have serious ramifications for us when Locke and the Puritan Covenant Contract model was placed into our Constitution.

His own writings are fairly clear, as I highlighted in the proper text.
1) After the revolution and the formation of the post-revolution social contract, it is binding, eternal, and sacred.
2) Everyone who lives under its jurisdiction, as he says, "doth thereby give his tacit consent and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government."
3) You cannot overthrow this new social contract in revolution.

This does not preclude alteration from within the legislature, which is also the proper course of action within our own Constitution. Congress, that binding and sacred legislature, is where changes to the post-revolution social contract society can occur. But no more popular revolution on the part of the people. The Constitution even states that Congress is the only legitimate body that can change the land composition in the U.S. Technically, we can infer from this that had the south attempted to "leave" by Congressional vote, that would be constitutional, but by attempting to secede by state legislature instead of Congress, well, that's not allowed by the Constitution.

Put into his context, it makes sense. After the ECWs, failed commonwealth, Restoration, and Glorious Revolution, Locke is desperately seeking a way to restore the modus vivendi of society and prevent further revolutionary destabilizations. He is a Whig, after all. Revolution and then on the path toward perpetual and unending progress and utopia afterward!

@Specialist290 also noted in our P&H group when he studied Locke and the Lockean interpretation of the Constitution that his prof presented very similar outlines. It's fairly common that Locke is taught this way in political philosophy. 3 courses, 3 different profs, all of whom said essentially the same thing about him.

 

[Tankman987]

You know, this probably won't work. But couldn't you code the mobilization mechanics to make like 50% of the CSA's poor strata able to be mobilized?

 

[Idhrendur]

That the whole 'States Rights' narrative that gets passed around these days is complete hogwash is obvious if you know of the existence of the Fugitive Slave Act. But I hadn't ever known that failures to enforce it were cited as reasons to secede. Thanks for sharing that information.

 

[volksmarschall]

You know, this probably won't work. But couldn't you code the mobilization mechanics to make like 50% of the CSA's poor strata able to be mobilized?

I'll have to look at the scripted texts since I already change so much for the U.S. (especially for the political parties). It would be nice just to have a more impactful CW. I really do love the Victoria series so much, but the CW has always been a letdown for me, just because of how important it is for us and in such a great game, save for playing as the Confederacy, it is generally something that leaves much to be desired.

That the whole 'States Rights' narrative that gets passed around these days is complete hogwash is obvious if you know of the existence of the Fugitive Slave Act. But I hadn't ever known that failures to enforce it were cited as reasons to secede. Thanks for sharing that information.

Sadly there are a lot of myths and lies about the nature of our Civil War. The problem is most people's understanding of the CW is not what the primary documents indicate. Just read the wikipedia page and your high school textbook, and maybe one or two histories that detail the war (instead of the lead up to the war) and then spout off "what the civil war was about." Well, this may be an AAR, and our Civil War may start in 1860, but I'm making sure we gain a fuller appreciation of what the primary documents actually say.

I mean, all the documents of secession are public domain and can be accessed by anyone. When you actually read them, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to see what the cause for secession was really about vs. what most people claim, or think, secession was about. Nothing about states' rights. The irony is, the South is complaining about the Northern states employing states' rights and nullification to circumnavigate federal statutes and law. Since the north was violating the federal enforcement of pro-slavery laws, the southern states decide to leave.

GEORGIA: "A similar provision of the Constitution requires them to surrender fugitives from labor. This provision and the one last referred to were our main inducements for confederating with the Northern States."

MISSISSIPPI: "It has nullified the Fugitive Slave Law in almost every free State in the Union, and has utterly broken the compact which our fathers pledged their faith to maintain."

SOUTH CAROLINA: "In many of these States the fugitive is discharged from service or labor claimed, and in none of them has the State Government complied with the stipulation made in the Constitution."

TEXAS: "The States of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan and Iowa, by solemn legislative enactments, have deliberately, directly or indirectly violated the 3rd clause of the 2nd section of the 4th article of the federal constitution, and laws passed in pursuance thereof; thereby annulling a material provision of the compact, designed by its framers to perpetuate amity between the members of the confederacy and to secure the rights of the slave-holding States."

All the Ordinances of Secession say the same thing over and over again. They're all complaining northern states have nullified the slavery and pro-slavery provisions and laws established by federal statute. In doing so, the north has now broken the compact/covenant, which allows the Southern states to leave the union. The problem is no one reads the primary documents. The texts are quite clear as to why the South is leaving, and it has nothing to do with "defending states' rights," not a single one of them proclaim a "defense of states' rights" as a reason for leaving.

 

[volksmarschall]

CHAPTER VI: MARCHING TOWARD THE CIVIL WAR

The “Election of 1859”​

When Jefferson Davis won the presidency in 1852, it was the high watermark of “this vast southern empire” of cotton, slavery, and expansionist militarism. Although growing anti-slavery consciousness, the fall of the “Cotton Whigs”[1], and the rapprochement of Republicans, anti-slavery Democrats, and anti-slavery Know Nothings helped curtail federal policies of pro-slavery expansionism during the Davis Administration—inevitably leading to the de facto split of the Democratic Party between the pro-Jacksonian and nominally anti-slavery wing led by President Stephen Douglas, and the nominally pro-Jacksonian and ardently pro-slavery expansionist Fire-Easters—pro-slavery politics still carried the day in many instances.

Laws were passed that entrenched the system. William Walker and his Filibuster Army had achieved their “Five or None” campaign in the United States of Central America, and many abolitionists and anti-slavery activists feared the entry of, if not one, up to five new slave-holding states. The hysteria that swept Douglas into the White House in 1856 was the same hysteria, now inverted, that was leading the calls of southern secession from the Union.

The Democratic Party was in poor shape. The party, as mentioned, was essentially ruptured between the pro-Douglas Democrats and the pro-slavery Democrats (nominally headed by former President Jefferson Davis). A few “neutral” Democrats, sympathetic to Unionism, like Sam Houston, also remained visible faces as “middle of the road” options. On the other hand, militant anti-slavery and abolitionist politics were growing in the Republican Party. John C. Fremont was leading the “Radical” Republican wing. Illinois congressman Abraham Lincoln was viewed as the more likely “moderate” candidate, nevertheless, a moderate anti-slavery (anti-expansionist, not necessarily abolitionist) candidate of an increasingly militantly abolitionist party.

Jefferson Davis, President of the United States from 1853-1857, was the leading voice of the pro-slavery expansionists, and a leading advocate of Southern secession from the Union. He personally began a long feud with Stephen Douglas from 1857-1860. Davis, in a letter to John C. Breckinridge, wrote, "Douglas is a small man in stature, and an even smaller man in intellect." This runs counter to what many historians claim, that--despite many faults to be sure--Douglas was among the most intellectual politicians in Antebellum America leading up to the Civil War.​

The American Party was, by contrast, experiencing its own rupture. The party put on a prominent showing in 1856, but allied with the Republicans and anti-slavery Democrats to prevent the reelection of Jefferson Davis. As mentioned, the American Party opposed slavery, de jure, in its party platform. However, immigration, slavery, and the northernization of the party was becoming a problem. Know Nothings in the South were generally pro-slavery, and worried of the anti-slavery drift of its northern leadership. Immigration was a major issue in many coastal New England states, especially Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts, but urban New England was sharply dividing itself between anti-immigration activists (the middle-class of New England) and anti-slavery activists (the upper classes and intellectuals). Rural New England was also trending more ardently anti-slavery, generally being untouched by the phenomenon of Catholic immigration.[2]

Southern states were increasingly worried about the likelihood of either Fremont or Lincoln winning the prospective Republican nomination and sweeping the north. The American Party was weakening with its division between anti-slavery and anti-immigrant politics. Governor Nathaniel Prentiss Banks of Massachusetts, the sitting Know Nothing governor, was viewed as a moderate voice in the party who was generally shunned by the anti-slavery wing. By contrast, New York Congressman Thomas Whitney, who we visited earlier in noting his support for progressive social causes, including women’s suffrage, was the face of the anti-slavery wing of the party. Many southern Democrats feared that, if he would advocate a Republican vote over the issue of anti-slavery, and help tip the electoral balance in favor the Republican Party.

The Democrats were trapped between a rock and hard place. Nominally united, sitting President Stephen Douglas was sure to be the party’s nominee. But Fire-Eaters within the party, Davis especially, despised him. So they anticipated a pro-slavery challenge, but also feared formal dissolution with northern Democrats who were not entirely sympathetic to the issue of secession and slavery. As such, pro-slavery Democrats were in a bind. How should they proceed? Running a pro-slavery candidate would surely only lead to further alienation and conflict. Allowing Douglas to run on the Democratic Party ticket unchallenged would ensure, at best, an administration that wasn’t interested in vigorously promoted slavery’s expansion. At worst, it could lead to a Republican victory. With Fremont, disaster. With Lincoln, still a disaster. Southern Democrats moved to the only course of action they felt appropriate given the severity of the situation they played out in their minds.

In November of 1859, Jefferson Davis convened the “Second Nashville Convention” among prominent southern Democratic politicians. The debate mostly surrounded whether the pro-slavery forces in the Democratic Party should attempt to oust Stephen Douglas at the Convention nomination process, or outright advocate immediate secession from the Union. Fear among the attendees was rampant. Most were certain that a Douglas candidacy would spell doom for the party in the north, and hand the Republican Party the presidency as a result. They had two choices, either attempt to run a pro-slavery hardliner that would all but certainly alienate the north, or attempt to secede the Union.

On December 11, 1859, 73 signatories (out of 101 invited members) signed “The Nashville Declaration of Secession,” which stated the intention of 8 states (South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee—where the 73 signatories were from) planned to secede peacefully from the Union. Mississippi Senator Albert G. Brown, one of the signatories, wrapped the document in a letter with a lettermark and took it back to his Washington D.C. residence as Senator with the intent to inform Congress of the eight states intending to withdraw from the Union.

Enmity in the Union​

When the 36th Congress convened after Winter recess, Senator Brown delivered his prepared remarks in the Senate and left the Nashville Declaration of Secession on the main Senate pulpit for all to read. Needless to say, the Senate descended into chaos. Senator John Bell, a pro-slavery Unionist, spat on Brown’s face for “treason.” Senator William Seward of New York walked angrily to Brown and tore his speech proclaiming the “peaceful withdrawal of these eight states from the Union” from his hands.

News of the intent did not go over well in the House of Representatives either. South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks, who had earlier attacked Senator Charles Sumner with his cane, once again violently assaulted “that devil possessed” Abraham Lincoln when Lincoln was giving a speech on the necessity of halting the expansion of slavery. Brooks pulled out a pocket pistol and attempted to shoot Lincoln, but the gun misfired. He then leapt at Lincoln, instigating a brawl between the two men before fellow Representatives pulled them apart. The Sergeant at Arms of the House, Henry William Hoffman, was hailed a hero by Republicans when he rushed into the fight and whisked Brooks away, placing him “under arrest for attempted murder.”

By 3 o’clock on what historians remember as “The Civil War in Congress,” 121 Democratic Congressional members had left the Capitol Building. They never returned. It was a miracle that no one was killed in the raucous and violent atmosphere that overtook both chambers that morning of January 15. President Stephen Douglas even made a trip over to the “burning Capitol” to try and calm tension between all parties. When he arrived he was presented with the copy of the Nashville Declaration of the intention of eight states and the 73 signatory members to secede from the Union.

A depiction of the fight in the U.S. Senate when Senator Brown gave his speech and let known to the rest of the Senate of the intent of the eight states and signatories of the Nashville Declaration to secede from the Union. The brawl that broke out was said by one historian to be "the greatest political brawl in American history." Fights in Congress were fairly common in 19th century America.​

The next day, while absent 121 members of Congress, President Douglas gave an emergency speech proclaiming secession to be illegal and that the eight states listed and the members intending to secede could not. He proclaimed:

“In these great states of ours that comprise these United States of America, we have sworn to the Altar of the Most High an unfailing, unflinching, and sacred covenant of union that—regardless of the enmity within this union we feel, must never come apart…It is therefore my solemn duty, as President of these United States of America, to accept the responsibility given unto the presidency, to heal the wounds of division and proclaim liberty throughout the land…I shall make forth very clear, as hitherto stated, that the decision of our fellow countrymen to leave this sacred covenant is a betrayal, and wound, that shall be felt for ten generations over.”

Although the speech was supposedly well-received, it did not have the effect of landing on the absent ears of the Democrats who were already decided in their intent to leave the Union. On February 3, South Carolina’s state legislature passed its ordinance of secession—becoming the first state to officially, and illegally, declare its separation from the Union of the United States of America. On February 11 Georgia followed suit. On February 19 and 20, Arkansas and Louisiana also passed ordinances of secession. Alabama and Mississippi both declared their withdrawal from the Union on February 23. Tennessee declared her secession on the 26th. Florida rounded out the “original eight” to secede on March 5.

On February 22, President Douglas called for 50,000 volunteers to join the Federal Army to “help persuade the abandonment of the illegal ordinances” that had thus far been declared. The news was shocking to the southern states. The call for 50,000 volunteers was, in their minds, a clear act of militancy and aggression on part of the presidency against the peaceful withdrawal established by the ordinances. On February 24, 500 South Carolina militiamen “stormed” an armory in Charleston. In reality, the armory guards simply joined with the nominal Confederacy.

Confusion griped the south, as much as it did the north. General William Coburn, commanding officer of the “Army of the South,” with its principal garrison in New Orleans, was unsure how to respond to Louisiana’s ordinance of secession. He gave orders to his commanders scattered through the New Orleans area to fortify the forts and armories. However, not all commanders obeyed their orders as they held southern and secessionist sympathies. Coburn wrote a letter on February 27 to William Clayton, who had retired to become Secretary of War how he should proceed with the situation. The letter never reached Clayton, or if it did, we do not know how the esteemed general and secretary of war responded.

The newly inaugurated Confederacy, March 19, 1860, was hopeful that Texas, North Carolina, and Virginia would also join. On April 18, 1860, secessionist forces fired on General Coburn’s troops in New Orleans. The American Civil War had begun.

And so it begins!
​

[1] The Cotton Whigs were a faction of Whigs, primarily in Massachusetts and Connecticut, tied to the textile industries of New England. As the Whig Party minimized the issue of slavery, the Cotton Whigs were strong defenders of the “peculiar institution” for economic reasons.

[2] In this timeline for my game, I have scripted the American Party not to disappear on the whole.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Charles Dew, Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War

I highly recommend this book, it is short, and to the point, and highlights many of the primary documents leading up to Southern secession that dispels most of the “Myths of the Lost Cause” that we addressed in the last chapter post.

SUGGESTED READING:

Stephen Berry, A House Dividing

Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s

David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis: American Before the Civil War, 1848-1861

Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom’s Cabin​

 

[AvatarOfKhaine]

I'm betting on the war either being a year shorter, or a year longer than OTL.

 

[stnylan]

Time for the union to be tempered.

 

[volksmarschall]

PART III

WHEN JOHNNY COMES MARCHING HOME

CHAPTER VII: THE RED SPRING

Mine eyes have seen the glory of the Coming of the Lord; He is trampling out the vintage where the grapes of Wrath are stored; He hath loosed the faithful lightning of His terrible swift sword: His truth is marching on. Glory! Glory! Hallelujah! … In the beauty of the lilies Christ was born across the sea, with a glory in His bosom that transfigures you and me. As He died to make men holy let us die to make free! While God is marching on!

~ Julia Ward Howe, “Battle Hymn of the Republic”



A Call for 50,000
​

As the southern states declared their ordinances of secession, President Douglas regarded such declarations as illegal, unconstitutional, and non-reflective of the eternal covenant of the Constitution. In response, he called for 50,000 volunteers to join the federal army to help, through the display of force, to convince the southern states to end this experiment of theirs and remain part of the Union. Of course, southern states—especially those original eight—saw the actions of Douglas as a militant and aggressive response to their supposed peaceful secession.

The idea of a peaceful secession is also something that must be addressed. Federal property: post offices, forts, and armories, were all seized by the southern secessionist states. It was southern secessionist forces that fired the first shots of the American Civil War. No matter how one wants to spin it, the fact is that it was the young Confederacy that aggrieved whatever peace there was between Unionist and secessionist forces. The seizure of federal property was a clear act of aggression, as was the attack on American troops stationed in New Orleans. ​

The Confederate States of America, April 18, 1860.
​

On April 18, 1860, Confederate forces fired upon the main American forts that housed the New Orleans garrison: Forts Macomb and Pike. The two forts housed some 3,000 men under the command of General William Coburn, commanding officer of the “Army of the South,” the nominal garrison of the Southern United States. As Louisiana seceded, there was widespread confusion from among the officer corps as to how to respond. Coburn did little to prevent the dominoes to fall as they did. He was confused and largely inept, unsure of what to do. He even wrote a letter to William Clayton, now Secretary of War, as to how he should act. Instead of the taking the initiative, he simply fortified the two forts and wrote to Colonel Robert Morris in the New Orleans barracks to stand firm. Morris, however, joined the Confederacy—and with him the entire city garrison. Tensions were brewing in the first two weeks of April.

Pierre G.T. Beauregard, a French-American native of Louisiana, was superintendent of arms and munitions in New Orleans when Louisiana seceded. A post he had just recently been appointed to. He immediately joined the secessionist cause, and was the first appointed general of the Confederacy. On April 17 he sent emissaries to both Forts Macomb and Pike, requested the peaceful surrender of the forts and the turnover of federal munitions to the state of Louisiana. His ultimatum was clear, and the same in both letters sent to Major Jonathan Allen (commander of Fort Macomb) and General William Coburn (present commander at Fort Pike):

It is with a solemn and heavy heart that I write to you, dear brothers, that I have but no other course of action than to ask your peaceful dissolution and surrender to the militia of the sovereign state of Louisiana. I implore thee to lower the flag as a sign of acceptance and submission; presently there is no avenue of escape outside …We have procured safe passage to those men with families outside of these Confederate States of America, but ask that any native citizen of Louisiana, or of any of the newly inaugurated states of these Confederate States of America, to join your brothers in arms upon your dissolution from the federal army of Washington. I regret to inform you that if you don’t submit to this request by 8 o’clock tomorrow morning, you will be considered enemies of Louisiana and be forced into surrender by force of arms.
~ G.T. Beauregard, April 17, 1860.

We remain unsure how Allen or Coburn responded, other than both refused to accept the ultimatum. As the church bells in New Orleans rung to signal the turn of the hour, they were suddenly drowned out by a roar of artillery fire from the battlements outside of both forts. Eye witnesses described the bristling of roaring cannon, like Zeus throwing thunderbolts to drive the giants from Olympia. The sound of cracking and roaring pierced the skies. One resident said, “It was the most awful yet beautiful, sound and sight my eyes and ears have ever seen and heard.”​

​

The so-called “Battle of New Orleans” ended by nightfall with the surrender of the forts. There was, as one Louisiana officer recalled, “a still sadness in the eyes and hearts of the men who rose the white flag of submission.” Brigadier General William Coburn became the first high ranking prisoner of war.

The attacks on Union forces in New Orleans disintegrated the Union army of the South, which was headquartered in New Orleans. The painting depicts the assault on Fort Pike. The attacks on Fort Macomb and Pike constituted what historians have since called, in unity, the "Battle of New Orleans." One newspaper reporter said that when the first cannon fired, it was "the second shot heard round Washington." (The first, of course, being secession.)
​

News of the attack in New Orleans spread like wildfire. Throughout the sunny south, church bells rung and sang hymns of victory. In Washington, there was a sour note of sadness and gloom. Throughout the north, churches inaugurated days of prayer and fasting upon the news of the defeat. Whatever hope for peace seemed to be dashed from the window. Douglas, for his part, also took the news very hard. 1860 was still an election year and war had just erupted between the states that he was, nominally at least by this point, the government figurehead of. Two of his cabinet members resigned their posts as native Southerners.

At the same time Douglas was still not beyond the usual partisan politics that characterized nineteenth century America. The loss of the southern states was a huge detriment to the Democratic Party. Northern Democrats were generally more business-friendly than the agrarians in the South. Northern Democrats also oscillated between its own Protestant nativism and Catholic accommodation—mostly for purely political reasons: to weaken the grip of Northern political control from both the Republicans (who had quickly come to dominate much of the Midwest), and the American Party (still the hegemonic party of New England, though more of the staunchly abolitionist and anti-slavery Know Nothings were gravitating to the Republican Party).

Since the days of Jefferson, the Democratic lineage had always been strongest the South. Although it had strong enclaves in Pennsylvania and New York, and by now, Illinois, the party was being pressured in by all fronts. For his part, Douglas figured a quick and decisive victory would benefit the Democratic Party. At this time in the Civil War, northern Democrats—with one of their own in the White House—were staunchly pro-war and pro-Unionist. In fact, all the parties were. Though each of the parties were equally drifting away with how to handle the war and what the war aims would be. Democrats, and moderates in the Republican and American parties were calling just for a reunification of the Union. The “Radicals” in the Republican and American parties were calling for abolition, emancipation, and “a new birth of freedom.”
​

“This Republic of Suffering”​

The Union loss of New Orleans was a major concern for William Clayton, the Secretary of War. As Union forces were assembling outside of Washington for how to conduct the war, Clayton had hoped that the strong Union presence in the forts around New Orleans would remain in control of General Coburn. News of the defeat did not alter his overall plan to conduct the war, but he knew it would make it harder. Furthermore, news of Kentucky’s secession was also a major problem that would have to be dealt with—for the Union planners had expected Kentucky, with its strong unionist Democrats, would keep the state from seceding.

Clayton called for a two-prong offensive up and down the Mississippi to cut the Confederacy in half, while two other offensives would be launched down the Atlantic coast and toward Richmond, the newly established capital of the Confederacy. The problem was, however, few of the ranking Union commanders had much military and battle experience. Clayton, himself the most experienced of officers, had most recently retired to take up the post of Secretary of War. Confederate officers, many of them veterans of the Second Mexican War, joined the Confederacy. Nevertheless, Clayton was confidence that superior arms and men would be able to carry the day.

For the next month, small skirmishes broke out between both sides; small engagements of no more than 10,000 men with few casualties on either side.

No one was exactly sure how the war would proceed or how terrible it would become. While the news of the loss of New Orleans was shocking, relatively few men were killed. The sporadic fighting at Manassas and Pillow’s Creek re-confirmed the small-scale, low casualty, reports that were coming out throughout April and early May. That all changed when the Union “Army of Ohio,” commanded by Francis Wilson, was giving marching orders to march on Kentucky and attempt to force the state back into the Union.

Wilson was recently promoted from colonel due to the shortage of well-qualified officers to lead the Union armies. With over 20,000 men under his command, he expected a quick and decisive campaign victory. As was President Douglas. News of a large “demon-possessed Yankee army” marching through Kentucky quickly spread. The Kentucky volunteers and militia assembled with one regiment of former federal troops, led by Colonel Thomas J. Jackson—who became affectionately nicknamed “Stonewall Jackson” after the battle.

At Lexington, Colonel Jackson assumed command of the ragtag mobilization of the “Army of Kentucky” and stood his ground outside of Lexington. The presence of Confederate forces shocked Wilson. For two days, May 19 and 20, Wilson attempted to negotiate a surrender of the city and the Confederate forces. Many historians see this as a mistake, as it allowed Confederate forces to dig in and position their troops on many of the local hills and ridges. When communications broke down, Wilson ordered a hasty general advance against the Confederate forces, who blisteringly pushed back three assaults from the Union army. Over the course of five hours of intense and cloudy combat, some 14,000 Union soldiers were killed, wounded, or missing. Wilson fled the field ahead of his men.​

The Battle of Lexington was an unmitigated disaster for the Union. It marked the end of the naive hope that there would be a quick and decisive end to the war. The magnitude of the defeat helped propel Confederate confidence against what they perceived as northern aggression. Despite the major setback, Union forces were still assembling for war. Democrats, Republicans, and Know Nothings all resolved in their 1860
​

News of the defeat, and magnitude of it, caused even greater shock waves throughout the Union. Jubilation overtook the Confederacy. When Douglas heard the news, it is said that he broke down crying and remarked, “God, have mercy on this republic of suffering.” The hope for a quick and decisive victory ended on the blood drenched fields of Lexington on May 21. And to add insult to injury, the Union army of Missouri was routed on May 25. In the span of a single week, nearly 20,000 Union soldiers had poured out their blood on the green soil and fields of spring.

Despite the initial and terrible Union setbacks, the Union was adamant about continuing the war to the very end. When the Democrats, Republicans, and Know Nothings all assembled for their conventions in the summer, each party explicitly re-iterated their commitments to “a total victory” in this war. Blood for blood was the only way the war would come to an end.

 

[stnylan]

Ahh, so in this timeline Thomas Jackson does it again. Truly one of the most inscrutable, yet fascinating, characters amongst the military men of the war.

Yet if the Union can out-stubborn the South, if they have the stomach for it.

 

[Specialist290]

I'm a little surprised by Tennessee's prominent role as one of the "Original Eight," given that in our TL they were the last state to officially secede -- and IIRC, the vote was fairly heavily contested even then.