Effectiveness of the Ottoman military, especially compared to Italians?

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1) Numbers
There is no doubt the size of Ottoman armies were sistematically exaggerated by their foes, as usual, but as we don´t have the detailed musters and payment documents (at least available to western scholars)that we have for western armie from the second half of XVI century we can´t exactly tell what the real figures were.

2) weaknesses of Ottoman armies

They are comparative to western armies, they were not really evident until late in the XVI century and they were not evident at all against non European foes.

a) Outdated siege techniques againnst the trace italianne, so that Ottoman sieging forces had to rely mainly on mining.

b) Ottoman armies never adopted the pike, so that infantry remained very vulnerable to enemy cavalry, and exception for the janissaries before the end of XVI century, Ottoman infantry lacked discipline

c) Ottoman timariot cavalry was also indisciplined and was unavailable for winter campaigning

d) Fire weapons were slow to replace bow, still the basic weapon at the end of the XVI century.

In general all those weaknesses revealed as Western armies become better disciplined and organized, but in the XV century Ottoman armies were on a pair with the best of Western armies, they just didn´t keep the pace of change, and here culture could be probably the main reason

 

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Wido, I think your pride in your nation is blinding your judgement.

The Italians caught an exhausted and outnumbered French army out at Fornovo, but the Italians failed to take advantage of their position and were repulsed. The failure of Italian arms became more evident as the Italian wars dragged on for the next 30 years. It was Frenchman vs. Spaniard battling across the length of the peninsula, with Spain eventually mastering all. What happened to the Italians? They disappeared as a military force, becoming nothing more than a manpower pool for their invaders.

These posts are also underestimating the power of the Turkish Army. Anyone who's played the boardgame EU (from which the computer game was inspired) knows the power of the Ottomans in this era. The Sultans personally crushed armies of mounted Western knights routinely; the French at Nicopolis in 1396, the Serbs at Kosovo in 1379, the Germans at Varna in 1444, and the Hungarians at Mohacs in 1526. Given the degeneracy of Italian arms in 1480, there's no reason to expect that the condottori would have accomplished what the French gendarmerie failed to do. As for siege ability, the fall of Constantinople, Belgrade, and Rhodes prove the Turks knew how to take fortresses. All fell as much to guns as to mines, because the Turks had the best artillery in the world until Charles VIII developed his horse-drawn seige train in 1494.

The Turks left Otranto because Mehmed the Conquerer died in 1480, and his son Bayazid II was a man of peace. When Bayazid was overthrown by his son Selim the Grim in 1517, the Ottomans resumed their march of conquest. Selim preferred to war against Egypt and Persia, and his son Sulieman the Magnificent focused on Rhodes and Hungary. Italy was spared only because other conquests made more sense.

 

[Faeelin]

Originally posted by crooktooth
Wido, I think your pride in your nation is blinding your judgement.

Hey now, I'm an american, and I agree with most of his poitns. .

Originally posted by crooktooth
The Italians caught an exhausted and outnumbered French army out at Fornovo, but the Italians failed to take advantage of their position and were repulsed. The failure of Italian arms became more evident as the Italian wars dragged on for the next 30 years. It was Frenchman vs. Spaniard battling across the length of the peninsula, with Spain eventually mastering all. What happened to the Italians? They disappeared as a military force, becoming nothing more than a manpower pool for their invaders.

I think you're ignoring the fact that France and Spain had immensely greater resources than the individual italian states. Venice put on a good showing during the wars (See Norwich's History of Byzantium).

Originally posted by crooktooth
These posts are also underestimating the power of the Turkish Army. Anyone who's played the boardgame EU (from which the computer game was inspired) knows the power of the Ottomans in this era. The Sultans personally crushed armies of mounted Western knights routinely; the French at Nicopolis in 1396, the Serbs at Kosovo in 1379, the Germans at Varna in 1444, and the Hungarians at Mohacs in 1526.

Nicopolis involved one of the most poorly led and foolish armies in history, so I don't think it's that accurate. Kosovo we know little about, and there is a good deal of belief in the theory that one of the Serbian nobles betrayed the king.

With respect to Varna, I think it is important to point out several things. Ladislas of Poland, with his support Hunaydi, began advancing into OTtoman territories. They captured NIsh in 1443, occupied Sofia, and reached the Thracian plateau. Murad, at this point, negotiated a truce which freed Serbia and Wallachia from the Ottoman Empire, and the Hungarians agreed not to press claims to Bulgaria. (Source: Ottoman Centuries). These are not the terms of a defeated nation. And at Varna, Murad outnumbered the "germans" (What makes you acll them German? My source makes them Hungarian/Poles) three to one.

Originally posted by crooktooth
Given the degeneracy of Italian arms in 1480, there's no reason to expect that the condottori would have accomplished what the French gendarmerie failed to do. As for siege ability, the fall of Constantinople, Belgrade, and Rhodes prove the Turks knew how to take fortresses. All fell as much to guns as to mines, because the Turks had the best artillery in the world until Charles VIII developed his horse-drawn seige train in 1494.

I disagree. For one thing, the French army was,as I stated, incompetently led. They were also outnumbered.

Note that Belgrade did not fall initially, and in that campaign Hunaydi not only saved the city, but beat the sultan in battle. The Sultan also failed at Rhodes in 1480.

Note that the Ottomans would have very few men compared to their normal armies. They simply lack the capability to send fifty thousand men to Italy.

Originally posted by crooktooth
The Turks left Otranto because Mehmed the Conquerer died in 1480, and his son Bayazid II was a man of peace.

Relatively. He also recognized that it was too far to take.

Originally posted by crooktooth
When Bayazid was overthrown by his son Selim the Grim in 1517, the Ottomans resumed their march of conquest. Selim preferred to war against Egypt and Persia, and his son Sulieman the Magnificent focused on Rhodes and Hungary. Italy was spared only because other conquests made more sense.

Because Italy was too difficult to take.

 

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I'm sorry, but in these weeks I'm terribly busy (today I've an exam, another on Friday and another on Thursday 22 May). I'd like to write something about Italian military history in the Modern Age, but I've no time (certainly not today, probably I may write something tomorrow). Meanwhile, I've a book to suggest you: The Twilight of a Military Tradition. I've not read it, but it is often quoted in a book that I'm reading, and there are (at least according to the reviews that I've read and to the book that I'm reading) many interesting facts about Italian military leaders and Italian troops used in foreign armies (the definition "nothing more than a manpower pool" is a bit reductive).

 

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Faelin that was really funny
Btw I don't think you are an american, you sound more like greek-nationalists to me.

 

[Dibo]

I think you shouldn't generalize about the Ottoman military. They were certainly one of the largest armies in Europe in XIV-XVIII centuries, but their quality was mixed. When concerning Italy bear in mind that it was initially part of the Charles V Empire, a foe of equal, if not of greater calibre than the Ottoman empire. The answer of the question why turks never captured Italy is purely logistical. Apart from the border skirmishes, every major ottoman war effort originated from Istanbul (the Sultan must always take the leadership), and it generally took the behemoth ottoman army three months to reach Hungary and its fortifications from there. For more details look at the F. Braudel book, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, one of the best historical books I have ever read.

 

[Faeelin]

Originally posted by Yunus
Faelin that was really funny
Btw I don't think you are an american, you sound more like greek-nationalists to me.

I can't tell if it's a joke. What make you say that?

 

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A good source about Janissaries.

About Kosovo: It is fair to say it was a draw, both armies left the field without they commander.
However there were other battles with Serbia who were much more decisive in natur, like 1373 when the Turks attacked at night and destroyed a formidable force...

The Ottoman military was probably more efficient then any other up to Suleymans death, when it started to decline.

 

[Dibo]

Originally posted by madner
A good source about Janissaries.

About Kosovo: It is fair to say it was a draw, both armies left the field without they commander.
However there were other battles with Serbia who were much more decisive in natur, like 1373 when the Turks attacked at night and destroyed a formidable force...

The Ottoman military was probably more efficient then any other up to Suleymans death, when it started to decline.

Kosovo pole (1389) was a total otoman victory, although the Serbians put quite a stand there. The serbian victory was at Plochnik in 1387. The night battle was in 1371 near Maritsa, where the ottomans destoryed the army of Vulkashin and Uglesha, two nobles having huge possessions in nowadays Macedonia...
Don't forget that Suleiman suffered embarassing defeats too - Viena for example. All in all even during his reign the ottomans fared poorly in sieges...

 

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Kosovo was certanly not a total victory for the ottomans, for example the Bosnian king congratulated the Serbian for such a large victory.
The aftermath was decisive, as the Serbs couldn't pay the price for they victory, and were conquered later.

Actually, it wasn't Suleyman but the grand vizir who led the army to Viena and was defeated embarsingly. (the quesation is why, but it seems the mean lacked forsight and didn't had any reserve to commit versus the approching Poles)
The Turks very actually masters of sieges, but at Viena they had no heavy cannons as the army was so large that it wasn't possible to bring them from Istanbul/Constantiopel. Still they managed to mine the city and were close to conquer it.

While it was a large defeat, the sultan put a larger army for the next year, and went to conquer Vieana once and for all. However he died on the move and the campaign was canceled.

 

[Dibo]

Originally posted by madner
Kosovo was certanly not a total victory for the ottomans, for example the Bosnian king congratulated the Serbian for such a large victory.
The aftermath was decisive, as the Serbs couldn't pay the price for they victory, and were conquered later.

Actually, it wasn't Suleyman but the grand vizir who led the army to Viena and was defeated embarsingly. (the quesation is why, but it seems the mean lacked forsight and didn't had any reserve to commit versus the approching Poles)
The Turks very actually masters of sieges, but at Viena they had no heavy cannons as the army was so large that it wasn't possible to bring them from Istanbul/Constantiopel. Still they managed to mine the city and were close to conquer it.

While it was a large defeat, the sultan put a larger army for the next year, and went to conquer Vieana once and for all. However he died on the move and the campaign was canceled.

Yeah, I know there is a different theory about the result of Kosovo polje battle. It can be find well decribed here:
http://www.deremilitari.org/emmert.htm
However most of the history books still claim it was an ottoman victory.
I disagree about Sulejman: The siege of Vienna took place in 1529, the sultan himself died in 1566. For description of the siege see:
http://europeanhistory.about.com/library/prm/blsiegeofthemoles1.htm
Also have in mind that Ottomans were almost never successful in taking on modern fortifications (I mean the italian style appearing in the 16th century). Apart from the logistics this was the main reason why they never penetrated deeply (apart from 1529 and 1683) the austrian defense line in Hungary.

 

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Originally posted by Dibo

Also have in mind that Ottomans were almost never successful in taking on modern fortifications (I mean the italian style appearing in the 16th century). Apart from the logistics this was the main reason why they never penetrated deeply (apart from 1529 and 1683) the austrian defense line in Hungary.

The Ottomans had no trouble taking Italian designed fortifications. Even after Sulieman's death, they proved experts. The siege of Nicosia in Cyprus in 1570 took on the most modern and expensive fortress in all of Venice's empire, and reduced it to rubble in six weeks. One hundred years later, they repeated the feat at Candia in Crete (though that siege took much longer, at 22 years!)

What the Ottomans required to successfully invade Italy was a first rate navy; attacking by land was too tenuous and too far from Constantinople. The Turks did have a first rate navy under Barbarossa; he even wintered it in Toulon twice during Turkey's alliance with Francis I of France. But their attention was still focused on Persia and Hungary, and the navy went into decline after its defeat in Lepanto.

During the Ottoman military peak (1420-1560) no one could stop them. A disunified Italy would have been no more able to resist than the disunified states in the Balkans and North Africa.

 

[Dibo]

Originally posted by crooktooth
The Ottomans had no trouble taking Italian designed fortifications. Even after Sulieman's death, they proved experts. The siege of Nicosia in Cyprus in 1570 took on the most modern and expensive fortress in all of Venice's empire, and reduced it to rubble in six weeks. One hundred years later, they repeated the feat at Candia in Crete (though that siege took much longer, at 22 years!)

What the Ottomans required to successfully invade Italy was a first rate navy; attacking by land was too tenuous and too far from Constantinople. The Turks did have a first rate navy under Barbarossa; he even wintered it in Toulon twice during Turkey's alliance with Francis I of France. But their attention was still focused on Persia and Hungary, and the navy went into decline after its defeat in Lepanto.

During the Ottoman military peak (1420-1560) no one could stop them. A disunified Italy would have been no more able to resist than the disunified states in the Balkans and North Africa.

The relationship between Venice and the Ottomans is a very interesting topic. Venice had much at stake in maintaining the trade with the Ottomans uninterrupted, so they always regarded with caution any actions that might have pissed the Ottomans. Also they were aware that their long line of possessions stretching from Dalmatia to Cyprus were very vulnerable to an Ottoman attack. And the Ottomans regarded with suspicion any attempt by the Venetians to reinforce the fortifications there. Also Venice never actually adequately manned these fortifications or upgraded them to latest standards.
I agree about the navy - the ottomans had it and it was first rate in the 16th century, but in the long run it was not stronger than the combined navy of the Christian Mediterranean states. Yes, the Christians were never able to stop the Ottomans from raiding their shores, but they were strong enough to deny the Ottomans the sea superiority, needed in order for Italy to be invaded and the army there supplied. Lepanto, apart from the symbolics was not so decisive after all - it is not the defeat, but the line of weak sultans after Suleiman that proved decisive for the decline of the Ottoman navy you are talking about.
And once again about the fortifications - yes, the Ottomans sometimes captured modern fortresses, they used western engineers and were aware of the modern siege methods. But if the Ottoman army was unstoppable at this period in open space (here I totally agree with you), it always run into trouble when faced with fortifications. And it is the line in Hungary, defended by the Habsburgs, who had the resources to maintain it in the long run, that prevented (combined with the logistical problems the ottomans faced) the Ottoman army from penetrating into Italy.
The disunified states in Italy in the 15th and the 16th centuries had two advantages over the states in the Balkans in the 14th century. First the Italians were richer and could afford to pay to hire more mercenaries, to attract allies, to build forts, etc. ; and second the geography was on their side.

 

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Originally posted by crooktooth
The Ottomans had no trouble taking Italian designed fortifications. Even after Sulieman's death, they proved experts. The siege of Nicosia in Cyprus in 1570 took on the most modern and expensive fortress in all of Venice's empire, and reduced it to rubble in six weeks.

Probably you have chosen the one of the worst examples: the fortification of Nicosia started only in 1567, and in 1570 the walls were still incomplete, the base of the wall was constructed in stone, but the upper part of the wall was a little more than earthworks. A planned moat was also abandoned, the replacement trench was not deep enough and the walls also lacked essential internal support. Moreover the garrison was of only 3,000 men.
Instead there are dozens of examples of Italian fortresses (that, by the way, were among the best in Europe: not surprisingly the fortifications of Sedan and Le Havre, the bastions of Anversa, the fortresses of Kustrin and Spandau, etc. had been projected by Italian engineers) that were not conquered (like Padua, sieged by the Emperor in 1509, or Scutari, sieged by the Turks in the 1470's) or were conquered after many years (Candia, as you told, but also Croia in Albania in the 1470's) or after many months (Famagosta in 1571, even though its garrison was of only 4,000 men and its fortifications were not completed; Florence in 1530, with its bastions designed by Michelangelo; etc.).
The conquest of Italy would has been an endless series of sieges, some probably very succesfull, but also other ones long and difficult, made by an army far from Turkey, constantly attacked not by large armies (it wasn't the usual Italian warfare), but by small units, probably of light cavalry, like the Bande Nere of Giovanni de' Medici (those bands of knights were called nere = black, because their flags were black for the mourning for the death of pope Leo X and, more interesting, because the armours of the knights were black to attack the enemy also during night ).
It is important to analize the tactic used by Prospero Colonna in 1521-1523 agaist the French: he didn't attack them, instead he exahusted their forces in a war of attrition (the Swiss historian de Sismondi compared him with Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator).

During the Ottoman military peak (1420-1560) no one could stop them. A disunified Italy would have been no more able to resist than the disunified states in the Balkans and North Africa.

Well, the Turks didn't show a terrible military superiority when they fought against Venice, and the Balkans and North Africa were not separated from the Turks by the sea like Italy. Moreover the lack of political unity of Italy probably would has disappeared in front of an enemy of all the Italian states like the Turks. It's true that during the Wars of Italy all the Italian states were not united: some were with France and others with Spain-HRE, but it wasn't a war for survival. The few examples of unity given by Italy during the Modern Age were because of the fear of a Turk attack (not only in 1570, but also in the wars of Venice there were troops and ships of other Italian states, like the Papal State, Florence or Savoy). Moreover the political importance of a crusade proclaimed by the Pope would has united the Italians and almost certainly would has involved other powers like Spain (that controlled Southern Italy) and the Empire.
And, as pointed out by Dibo, Italian states had enough money to pay large mercenary armies.

Now another aspect of Italian military system in the early Modern Age: artillery.
As already told in other posts, in 1494 the artillery of France was more advanced than those of the Italian states, but that backwardness didn't last forever. In fact already in 1512 the first-rate artillery of Alfonso d'Este duke of Ferrara was of decisive importance in the battle of Ravenna fought by his French ally and the Saint League, and again in 1526/27 the artillery needed by the Imperial army was given by the duke of Ferrara.

 

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If you read The Prince you would come to the conclusion that most italian armies were uterly unreliable, and that the Ottomans were very tough.

 

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Originally posted by CoolElephant
If you read The Prince you would come to the conclusion that most italian armies were uterly unreliable, and that the Ottomans were very tough.

Excuse me, and do you think I've not read it?

 

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Originally posted by Wido
Excuse me, and do you think I've not read it?

do you have a point?

 

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Originally posted by CoolElephant
do you have a point?

Machiavelli's book is based on his very own military doctrine, based partly on a obscure passage of Titus Livius. His doctrine was at least "strange": he tried to use it in an excercitation in summer 1526 and it failed.
He denigrates the armies of condottieri because he wants the creation of an army based people (like the Roman army), forgetting that Roman citizens had more rights than the average Italian farmer of the XVI century. And why does he prefer a national army? Because he feared the political strenght of condottieri, but he didn't understand that also a national army would has a political power (as shown perfectly also in the Roman times).
He is against mercenaries, but not only Italian states used them, of course. And he criticizes even countries like Venice that didn't use many mercenaries: this time he tells that Italian leaders were not good, but he fails to explain why also foreign armies used Italian leaders during the Wars of Italy (the Trivulzio family, Colonna, etc.) and after (Spinola, Farnese, Montecuccoli, Piccolomini, Eugenio di Savoia, etc.).
And he doesn't explain why most of the men fighting those wars were Italian (both mercenaries and of Italian armies): it was since the Roman Empire that Italy hadn't so many soldiers, but this time fighting each other, thus helping more foreign countries than Italian states.
Machiavelli's critics are sometimes clearly wrong: he tells that some condottieri had far more knights than infantrymen (by the way in his military doctrine knights had a marginal importance), but he doesn't tell that it happened 50 years before his book, and that already Braccio da Montone and Muzio Attendolo had started using more infantry, armed also with arquebus. And, in his politically biased "analisis" he doesn't tell that Venice had already started replacing crossbows with arquebuses in 1508 (the first country in Europe) and that Venice had already a kind of militia based on common people (the cernite).
He also criticizes the lack of good artillery in 1494, but he doesn't tell that the artillery of the duke of Ferrara was excellent, even though Machiavelli writes about the battle of Ravenna (using it, of course, only as an example of the mistakes of Julius II).
Frankly I don't think that Machiavelli's military analisis is right, while his political considerations are excellent.