Did officers really stand at the front of the line WHILE taking fire like in empire total war or did they stand behind it during open fire?
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Depends on the officer (what rank they are, what command they hold), but generally yes. Officers at a battalion level and below would lead the men under their command from the front, setting an example for them and directing action from the frontline. NCOs meanwhile tended to be positioned behind the ranks, their job being to make sure men kept formation and obeyed commands.
This highlights the differences in role. An officers job tends to be to lead and give commands, whilst the NCO is there to see them carried out.
This highlights the differences in role. An officers job tends to be to lead and give commands, whilst the NCO is there to see them carried out.
Is there any data on the rate of officer casualties?
Combat still isn't so deadly that it outperforms disease in the Napoleonic wars, but standing in front still seems foolish. . .
Combat still isn't so deadly that it outperforms disease in the Napoleonic wars, but standing in front still seems foolish. . .
There's an old joke that the job of an officer is to die in a manner that inspires his troops.
But as for fatalities, I'd imagine they were quite high (without having a number to hand), but this is nearly always the case with officers at a battalion level and lower. Even during the Second World War, the most dangerous job one could have in most armies was leading an infantry platoon/company. Taking the British 3rd Infantry Division for an example. Off officers leading companies and platoons on D-Day (I estimate around 144 based on purely rifle companies/platoons), only one was still serving unharmed (i.e, had never been hit) by wars end.
It should also be considered that firepower, and in particular accurate firepower, is less on the Napoleonic battlefield than on contemporary battlefields. The muskets of the day (yes, there were some rifles, but even in the British Army these were few in number), are normally said to be accurate up to 70 yards. A good battalion would produce about 3 volleys a minute under battlefield conditions and be pleased with that result (there are suggestions that muskets could reach 4 or even 5 rounds a minute, in a battlefield situation I find this doubtful). Moreover, most soldiers were not taught to aim. The standard tactic was to point in the general direction and unleash a mass volley. Only skirmishers (a minority of troops) tended to deliberately pick targets. Battlefields would also quickly become obscured by smoke, this being the age before smokeless powder. Standing still isn't as suicidal as it would become.
There is some greater danger anyway from standing in the front rank, but there is no alternative. The job of a junior officer is to lead from the front, and if necessary die in front.
Three French Marshals (out of nineteen) were killed or died of wounds received in combat in the Napoleonic wars - Lannes after Aspern-Essling, Bessieres while on a reconnaissance in 1813, Poniatowski at Leipzig. I've seen a figure of over a hundred French generals being killed from somewhere between four and five hundred. And there are certainly memoirs and records of units where most of the officers were killed or wounded in a single engagement. At least some where a regiment was reduced to a couple of officers and NCOs and two hundred men or so. So I think it's fair to say officer casualties could be high.
One of the points of ensigns was to give an immediate pool of trainee officers to replace officer casualties. Junior officers took very heavy casualties. This is partly because the point of junior officers is to inspire their men with their bravery. Holding firm under fire is hard to do and junior officers were partly there to hold the men in place by example.
Particularly on the Napoleonic battlefield there was actually very little for a junior officer to do. The orders were given by the officer leading the unit (usually a colonel) and the control of the men was done by the NCOs. The junior officers of a line infantry unit just stood there in case they were needed.
Particularly on the Napoleonic battlefield there was actually very little for a junior officer to do. The orders were given by the officer leading the unit (usually a colonel) and the control of the men was done by the NCOs. The junior officers of a line infantry unit just stood there in case they were needed.
This is before the Napoleonic wars but one of the myths of the American Revolution is that the clever militiamen would snipe the stodgy British officers and cause great consternation on the their side.
Unlike some other myths of the revolution I think this has some primary source support if I recall correctly, but would they have been shooting the junior officers who were expected to die anyway?
Unlike some other myths of the revolution I think this has some primary source support if I recall correctly, but would they have been shooting the junior officers who were expected to die anyway?
The idea that the British were inexperienced in light infantry tactics is rather ridiculous. Indeed, the British fielded a number of highly effective light units during the SYW and AWI. Whilst the average British regulars would not have fought using such tactics (and it should be noted that the average American wouldn't have either, indeed most major battles were standard line infantry affairs), each battalion would have a company of grenadiers and a company of light infantry (2/10 companies) who were capable of skirmish action if necessary. There were also specialist units (Rangers, Royal Americans, Ferguson's Riflemen) dedicated to performing a skirmish function.
Really the difference is that certain American units used rifles (So did some British, who even used the Ferguson Rifle, an early attempt at a breach loading weapon). The popular view of the war capitalises on the idea of a band of untrained but tough, independent, and patriotic local militia outsmarting imbecilic redcoats with no sense of initiative. In reality the American army began as a militia (though not necessarily a skirmish based militia as is often implied) and then evolved into a largely professional force recognisable as a European army.
As for the effectiveness, yes it was still effective to shoot officers. Even though your average lieutenant might only be there to inspire, he is still encouraging his men and passing on orders. Moreover, shooting him will probably demoralise them. This is an age where most armies look to their officers as natural superiors in the same manner the peasants look to the aristocracy. Moreover the level of initiative given to NCOs is very little. By shooting enemy officers, you dislocate command and control and demoralise the troops. If you shoot a higher ranking officer (say, a battalion commander) the effect will become even greater.
To put some numbers on it, in the British army at Waterloo:
29% of the officers became casualties (950 out of 3300)
23% of the other ranks became casualties (16,200 out of 69,700)
There are no comparable figures for the French - only rough estimates - because they didn't stop to count how many men were left in the army until a week after the battle, by which time many men had deserted.
So officers did suffer higher casualties than their men, but the difference wasn't a huge one.
Bear in mind that when a battalion is in line, the officers won't be standing in front of their men - they'd get shot! A British company commander normally stood in the front rank of his company, on the far right of the line. His lieutenants stood just behind the company. The battalion commander stood at the centre of the line, with the flags.
Similarly, when a French battalion formed a column of attack, the company commanders would likewise walk in the front rank of their companies, while the battalion commander would normally walk alongside the column, to the right, and about halfway down its length.
29% of the officers became casualties (950 out of 3300)
23% of the other ranks became casualties (16,200 out of 69,700)
There are no comparable figures for the French - only rough estimates - because they didn't stop to count how many men were left in the army until a week after the battle, by which time many men had deserted.
So officers did suffer higher casualties than their men, but the difference wasn't a huge one.
Bear in mind that when a battalion is in line, the officers won't be standing in front of their men - they'd get shot! A British company commander normally stood in the front rank of his company, on the far right of the line. His lieutenants stood just behind the company. The battalion commander stood at the centre of the line, with the flags.
Similarly, when a French battalion formed a column of attack, the company commanders would likewise walk in the front rank of their companies, while the battalion commander would normally walk alongside the column, to the right, and about halfway down its length.
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Someone's gotta be in front. In a time when things had to be visual, and commands were transmitted by shouting and waving a flag, well... the guy in charge should be up there. You can't have your men looking backwards for orders, can you?
It depends on the situation. If a unit is charging, then yes, the commander needs to be in front so he can shout 'follow me!' On the other hand, given that all orders had to be transmitted by shouting, it makes sense for the commander to be positioned in the middle of his unit, so his voice can be heard by the largest number of men. (Though I assume junior officers and NCOs would transmit the orders by repeating them, especially during a noisy battle.)
As for looking backwards for orders, let me quote Kipling at you.
An’ now the hugly bullets come peckin’ through the dust,
An’ no one wants to face ’em, but every beggar must;
So, like a man in irons, which isn’t glad to go,
They moves ’em off by companies uncommon stiff an’ slow.
Of all ’is five years’ schoolin’ they don’t remember much
Excep’ the not retreatin’, the step an’ keepin’ touch.
It looks like teachin’ wasted when they duck an’ spread an’ ’op—
But if ’e ’adn’t learned ’em they’d be all about the shop.
An’ now it’s “’Oo goes backward?” an’ now it’s “’Oo comes on?”
And now it’s “Get the doolies,” an’ now the Captain’s gone;
An’ now it’s bloody murder, but all the while they ’ear
’Is voice, the same as barrick-drill, a-shepherdin’ the rear.
’E’s just as sick as they are, ’is ’eart is like to split,
But ’e works ’em, works ’em, works ’em till he feels ’em take the bit;
The rest is ’oldin’ steady till the watchful bugles play,
An’ ’e lifts ’em, lifts ’em, lifts ’em through the charge that wins the day!
And now the ugly bullets come pecking through the dust,
And no one wants to face them, but every beggar must;
So, like a man in irons, which isn’t glad to go,
They move them off by companies uncommon stiff and slow.
Of all his five years’ schooling they don’t remember much
Except the not retreating, the step and keeping touch.
It looks like teaching wasted when they duck and spread and hop—
But if he hadn’t learned them they’d be all about the shop.
And now it’s “Who goes backward?” and now it’s “Who comes on?”
And now it’s “Get the doolies,” and now the Captain’s gone;
And now it’s bloody murder, but all the while they hear
His voice, the same as barrack-drill, a-shepherding the rear.
He’s just as sick as they are, his heart is like to split,
But he works them, works them, works them till he feels them take the bit;
The rest is holding steady till the watchful bugles play,
And he lifts them, lifts them, lifts them through the charge that wins the day!
And no one wants to face them, but every beggar must;
So, like a man in irons, which isn’t glad to go,
They move them off by companies uncommon stiff and slow.
Of all his five years’ schooling they don’t remember much
Except the not retreating, the step and keeping touch.
It looks like teaching wasted when they duck and spread and hop—
But if he hadn’t learned them they’d be all about the shop.
And now it’s “Who goes backward?” and now it’s “Who comes on?”
And now it’s “Get the doolies,” and now the Captain’s gone;
And now it’s bloody murder, but all the while they hear
His voice, the same as barrack-drill, a-shepherding the rear.
He’s just as sick as they are, his heart is like to split,
But he works them, works them, works them till he feels them take the bit;
The rest is holding steady till the watchful bugles play,
And he lifts them, lifts them, lifts them through the charge that wins the day!
well.... some of the orders are transmitted by shouting.It depends on the situation. If a unit is charging, then yes, the commander needs to be in front so he can shout 'follow me!' On the other hand, given that all orders had to be transmitted by shouting, it makes sense for the commander to be positioned in the middle of his unit, so his voice can be heard by the largest number of men. (Though I assume junior officers and NCOs would transmit the orders by repeating them, especially during a noisy battle.)
As for looking backwards for orders, let me quote Kipling at you.
An’ now the hugly bullets come peckin’ through the dust,
An’ no one wants to face ’em, but every beggar must;
So, like a man in irons, which isn’t glad to go,
They moves ’em off by companies uncommon stiff an’ slow.
Of all ’is five years’ schoolin’ they don’t remember much
Excep’ the not retreatin’, the step an’ keepin’ touch.
It looks like teachin’ wasted when they duck an’ spread an’ ’op—
But if ’e ’adn’t learned ’em they’d be all about the shop.
An’ now it’s “’Oo goes backward?” an’ now it’s “’Oo comes on?”
And now it’s “Get the doolies,” an’ now the Captain’s gone;
An’ now it’s bloody murder, but all the while they ’ear
’Is voice, the same as barrick-drill, a-shepherdin’ the rear.
’E’s just as sick as they are, ’is ’eart is like to split,
But ’e works ’em, works ’em, works ’em till he feels ’em take the bit;
The rest is ’oldin’ steady till the watchful bugles play,
An’ ’e lifts ’em, lifts ’em, lifts ’em through the charge that wins the day!
And now the ugly bullets come pecking through the dust,
And no one wants to face them, but every beggar must;
So, like a man in irons, which isn’t glad to go,
They move them off by companies uncommon stiff and slow.
Of all his five years’ schooling they don’t remember much
Except the not retreating, the step and keeping touch.
It looks like teaching wasted when they duck and spread and hop—
But if he hadn’t learned them they’d be all about the shop.
And now it’s “Who goes backward?” and now it’s “Who comes on?”
And now it’s “Get the doolies,” and now the Captain’s gone;
And now it’s bloody murder, but all the while they hear
His voice, the same as barrack-drill, a-shepherding the rear.
He’s just as sick as they are, his heart is like to split,
But he works them, works them, works them till he feels them take the bit;
The rest is holding steady till the watchful bugles play,
And he lifts them, lifts them, lifts them through the charge that wins the day!
battlefields are loud. people are screaming, cannons are shooting, guns are going off, etc.
so... big battle flags. colorful uniforms. visual communication was used to fill the void that audible communication fell so obviously short.
and as mentioned, the NCO was in the middle. the officer was in the front with the drummer and the standard bearer, and the NCOs were there to make sure that the orders were interpreted properly. but the decision making has to come from the front, unless you want your men looking backwards for their orders (not a good idea).
As I understand it a lot of the orders were conveyed by the drummers / musicians. They weren't just for playing merry tunes. Marching orders, charge, retreat, make ready, etc all had unique drum or bugle calls. Which of course made "looking backwards" unnecessary. I think shouting orders when there are dying men everywhere wouldn't have worked very well.