Urr. Good point. But Dunkirk wasn't a gamble, it was being overcautious, so technically I'm not wrong.
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Urr. Good point. But Dunkirk wasn't a gamble, it was being overcautious, so technically I'm not wrong.
He gambled on the Luftwaffe of 1940, with all of it's level bombers and Stukas, being able to take out the BEF, and that his fighters could handle the RAF. Of course, the level bombers weren't really well suited for precision strikes, and the Stukas were fantastically vulnerable. Dunkirk would be the last time that they would see any significant action on the Western Front. It was also the first time that the Luftwaffe had faced a large, modern airforce, since France's was so backwards. All the RAF had to do was tie up the fighters long enough for the Stukas to get shot down, and the BEF would stand a good chance of escaping. Had he rolled in with everything he had, the BEF, unable to maneuver and unable to withdraw, would have been slaughtered. Trust me, using the Luftwaffe was a gamble.Originally posted by King of Men
Urr. Good point. But Dunkirk wasn't a gamble, it was being overcautious, so technically I'm not wrong.
Atomic Bomb
Could Germany have built an atomic bomb during World War II? The short answer is, no.
Before the war, Germany started and took the lead of nuclear research when Otto Hahn and Friedrich Strassman demonstrated the fission of uranium U.235 in December 1938. The military potentials of such a vast amount of evergy was immediately recognized, and further research was begun. Werner Heisenberg, who received the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1933, became the unofficial, self-appointed leader of German nuclear research. Despite this early lead, there were still many problems to be solved. No one knew whether the fission of uranium could be developed into a chain reaction. How the vast energy could be controlled was another problem. Several teams of scientists were formed to research further, and in one design a heavy water reactor was envisioned. Germany produced some heavy water, and the Norsk Hydro plant in Norway produced a lot more. The plant, however, was destroyed by Norwegian commandos in 1942, and then annihilated for good by American bombers in 1943. It is noteworthy, though, that Germany had already had a significant amount of heavy water and could have built a small reactor with it. The problem of the supply of uranium was solved in 1940 when over 1,000 tons of mixed uranium products were captured at Oolen in Belgium. Germany had everything ready, but just seemed unable to do anything with it.
For one thing, there were heated arguments within the German scientific community over the direction of nuclear research. Heisenberg's group preferred a reactor using uranium, and heavy water as moderator. Its research, however, had been going on at a snail's pace. Heisenberg just seemed unable to grasp some fundamental principles of making an atomic bomb. This group seemed to believe that a whole reactor would have to be dropped as a nuclear bomb. Even the scientists involved admitted that no atomic bomb could be built before the end of the war.
Another group, led by Paul Harteckk and backed by Dr. Wilhelm Ohnesorge, head of the Reich Post Office, opted for the low-temperature (-80oC) reactor. A low-temperature reactor would produce neither heat nor power, but would leave radioactive material behind in the forms of spent fuel, radioactive isotopes and plutonium. These by-products, except plutonium, of course, did not amount to an atomic bomb, but there was another possibility. Fine sand and dust could be mixed with the radioactive material to make themselves radioactive. Packed around the high explosive warheads of the V-1 and V-2, the radioactive dust could spread far and wide, and knock out large cities like London. Harteck, however, met oppositions from Heisenberg, who disagreed with Harteck and withheld crucial materials. As a result, Harteck and others' work did not amount to much.
Fortunately for all, the long answer is, no.
Could Germany have built an atomic bomb during World War II? The short answer is, no.
Before the war, Germany started and took the lead of nuclear research when Otto Hahn and Friedrich Strassman demonstrated the fission of uranium U.235 in December 1938. The military potentials of such a vast amount of evergy was immediately recognized, and further research was begun. Werner Heisenberg, who received the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1933, became the unofficial, self-appointed leader of German nuclear research. Despite this early lead, there were still many problems to be solved. No one knew whether the fission of uranium could be developed into a chain reaction. How the vast energy could be controlled was another problem. Several teams of scientists were formed to research further, and in one design a heavy water reactor was envisioned. Germany produced some heavy water, and the Norsk Hydro plant in Norway produced a lot more. The plant, however, was destroyed by Norwegian commandos in 1942, and then annihilated for good by American bombers in 1943. It is noteworthy, though, that Germany had already had a significant amount of heavy water and could have built a small reactor with it. The problem of the supply of uranium was solved in 1940 when over 1,000 tons of mixed uranium products were captured at Oolen in Belgium. Germany had everything ready, but just seemed unable to do anything with it.
For one thing, there were heated arguments within the German scientific community over the direction of nuclear research. Heisenberg's group preferred a reactor using uranium, and heavy water as moderator. Its research, however, had been going on at a snail's pace. Heisenberg just seemed unable to grasp some fundamental principles of making an atomic bomb. This group seemed to believe that a whole reactor would have to be dropped as a nuclear bomb. Even the scientists involved admitted that no atomic bomb could be built before the end of the war.
Another group, led by Paul Harteckk and backed by Dr. Wilhelm Ohnesorge, head of the Reich Post Office, opted for the low-temperature (-80oC) reactor. A low-temperature reactor would produce neither heat nor power, but would leave radioactive material behind in the forms of spent fuel, radioactive isotopes and plutonium. These by-products, except plutonium, of course, did not amount to an atomic bomb, but there was another possibility. Fine sand and dust could be mixed with the radioactive material to make themselves radioactive. Packed around the high explosive warheads of the V-1 and V-2, the radioactive dust could spread far and wide, and knock out large cities like London. Harteck, however, met oppositions from Heisenberg, who disagreed with Harteck and withheld crucial materials. As a result, Harteck and others' work did not amount to much.
Fortunately for all, the long answer is, no.
Quite so, but the reason he wanted the Luftwaffe to do it was that he thought the Panzer corps needed a rest. Maybe so, but how rested was the BEF? That's the overcaution I referred to.
While his generals were demanding that they be allowed to attack, claiming that their troops were ready for battle. I think that Hitler simply got swayed by Goering's claims that the Luftwaffe was invincible, and so allowed him to make his risky attack rather than using tried and true methods.
The BEF was exhausted, but it was still capable of putting up some stiff resistance. The Panzers could probably have taken the pocket, but would likely have taken significant loses doing so. Why not let the Luftwaffe sort them out so the Panzers divisions can have a quick rest before turning south and finishing the French. Heck- it's not as if the British would keep on fighting after the fall of France, eh?
If germany could have invaded Britain and concluded a peace giving Germany only Poland; let France, Denmark, Norway, Holand, Belgium, luxemburg, and England be free. Then when Uncle Joe attacks, Britain and the US side with Germany and the US uses its nuke on moscow.
How was Germany meant to invade Britain? Although unlikely, they might have been able to bomb Britain into submission or starve her. However, an actual invasion with any chance of success was impossible with the resources that Germany had.
We've been down this road a coupla times, and I warn you in advance that mere facts will NOT convince some people!
Totally unrealistic. Stalin wouldn´t have attacked a Germany at peace in the West. I believe he would have attacked if the invasion of France would have ended up as it did in 1914, but a strong Germany with peace on its Western borders would never have been attacked by Stalin.
You can say what you want about Stalin (most negative comments you can think of are probably true
), but suicide was not his thing...
Thing is that most of these arguments only get Germany close to a potential victory by changing every German mistake during the war and assuming that the allies simply sit still and take it.
Take Dunkirk for example. Common in these threads is the assumption that ordering the Panzers to attack instantly creates 250k prisoners. However, IRL, air power over the potential battlefield was contested. So a more valid examination would be to find examples of German assaults on fortified positions without air superiority. You might have trouble finding one which could be transposed to a total victory at Dunkirk. You have a better chance of assuming slightly worse weather in the channel which would have created a natural disaster for the British withdrawl.
Next, Moscow. While we will never know the true political changes which might have occured with a directed attack on Moscow in 1941, to assume instant victory in Moscow's streets is also a weak proposition. Germany's record in Street fighting within Russia is not exactly steller. Further, the 500k troops who were historically captured in Ukraine are now sitting, and very much alive on the German flank. Moscow might have meant Stalingrad 2 years early.
Same with the Middle East. "Rommel needs to take Cairo." Well to do so he has to secure Tobruk in early 1942 to allow for a more stable supply line. To do that he has to take Malta in 1942/1941, and seeing as he is outnumbered and awaiting to defend against Operation Crusader in late 1941, that means that any Malta-Tobruk-Cairo campaign changes the timing of his historic march on Alexandria. Do we simply assume that Britain sits by waiting for those two key targets to fall into German hands?
These points are pretty minor, and so too IMHO are the outcomes of individual battles within the war. In the grand scheme of things, in order to change the outcome of the war, a dramatic and focused shift in industrial capacity needs to be made in order to make even the slightest difference. That means that Germany cannot be at war with any two of Britain, Russia, USA at the same time.
When industrial capacity is so slanted against Germany with the historic war scenario then we are relying on wonder-weapons and era changing outcomes of historic battles. It's hard to find a number of historic battles whose outcome would directly and solely change the result of any war, to come up with a number of them within a 5 year timescale so to ensure a German victory is, I submit impossible.
Germany could have won the war, to do so it has to focus and defeat one enemy at a time.
Take Dunkirk for example. Common in these threads is the assumption that ordering the Panzers to attack instantly creates 250k prisoners. However, IRL, air power over the potential battlefield was contested. So a more valid examination would be to find examples of German assaults on fortified positions without air superiority. You might have trouble finding one which could be transposed to a total victory at Dunkirk. You have a better chance of assuming slightly worse weather in the channel which would have created a natural disaster for the British withdrawl.
Next, Moscow. While we will never know the true political changes which might have occured with a directed attack on Moscow in 1941, to assume instant victory in Moscow's streets is also a weak proposition. Germany's record in Street fighting within Russia is not exactly steller. Further, the 500k troops who were historically captured in Ukraine are now sitting, and very much alive on the German flank. Moscow might have meant Stalingrad 2 years early.
Same with the Middle East. "Rommel needs to take Cairo." Well to do so he has to secure Tobruk in early 1942 to allow for a more stable supply line. To do that he has to take Malta in 1942/1941, and seeing as he is outnumbered and awaiting to defend against Operation Crusader in late 1941, that means that any Malta-Tobruk-Cairo campaign changes the timing of his historic march on Alexandria. Do we simply assume that Britain sits by waiting for those two key targets to fall into German hands?
These points are pretty minor, and so too IMHO are the outcomes of individual battles within the war. In the grand scheme of things, in order to change the outcome of the war, a dramatic and focused shift in industrial capacity needs to be made in order to make even the slightest difference. That means that Germany cannot be at war with any two of Britain, Russia, USA at the same time.
When industrial capacity is so slanted against Germany with the historic war scenario then we are relying on wonder-weapons and era changing outcomes of historic battles. It's hard to find a number of historic battles whose outcome would directly and solely change the result of any war, to come up with a number of them within a 5 year timescale so to ensure a German victory is, I submit impossible.
Germany could have won the war, to do so it has to focus and defeat one enemy at a time.
Which was not going to happen according to an interview I saw with a member of the German general staff, since Stalin would have hit them in the back. So its impossible
Originally posted by Aetius
Which was not going to happen according to an interview I saw with a member of the German general staff, since Stalin would have hit them in the back. So its impossible
Isn't the whole Russia-attacks-first theory all based on the writings of Suvarov? Is there any independent verification of his work?
The German officer (I forget who, but it might be from the BBC World at War documentary) said that the Germans had to attack the Soviets as early as possible and knock them out (i.e. 1941), because if they waited longer they would have to face the Soviets, UK and the USA at the same time otherwise, which was clearly impossible to handle.
I can't remember if he said anything in particular about any hard intelligence about the Soviets preparing to attack the Germans in 1942 or 1943, but he said that the German High Command believed that they would, given the opportunity. What the Soviets actually believed I don't know and obviously the German High Command didn't either, so they had to guess.
And what is wrong with Suvorow writings? IMHO
main problem is that his style of writing is much more interesting that many other authors.
But seriosly - try to read books and sources used by Suvorow to write his books. Like old soviet "Great Patriotic War" (12 tomes) or memories of Zukov, or german generals.
I don't believe in all that Suvorow writes - his book about purges is rather weak based on documents (but a chapter about Tuchaczevsky is quite good), but "Icebreaker" teory is pretty good explaination of 1941 events.
And the facts are - in 1941, soviet army was concentrating on western borders of USSR. Zukov, victor of Kalkin Gol was High commander, other commanders, like Rokossovsky were released from gulags. They had huge number of tanks, in many cases of superior quality (the same case - artillery). Most of armoured units were deployed on the areas good to attack and cut of german-held territories (it's not Suvorow, it's map from "Great Patriotic War").
If Stalin didn't believe in german attack (his reactions on June 22nd confirms that), then why this huge army was concentrated there?
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It was concentrated there because Stalin wasn´t going to let the Germans get one inch of Soviet land. Every part of the Soviet Union had to be defended. He kept this up after the German invasion forbidding retreats which resulted in huge numbers of POWs. That´s the reason, not Stalin wanting to attack Germany.
Besides, the Red Army wasn´t even mobilized. Timoshenko and Zhukov pleaded with Stalin on 14 June to start mobilizing, but the dictator refused, fearing this would give Hitler a pretext to attack. This "huge" army that was waiting on Germany´s border was in fact two times smaller than the Axis´ armies on the other side of that border. The Wehrmacht was fully mobilized, Soviet divisions contained only 6,000-8,000 men, although at war time this should have been some 15,000. Red Army attacking Germany in this setting? Don´t think so. And I´m not even talking about huge ammunition shortages, more than 70% of old tanks needing serious repairs, only a handfull of modern tanks available at that time etc, etc, etc.
Once again (check my previous post), Stalin would have attacked Germany if Hitler would have had a seriuous fight on his hand in the West (be it against France in 1940 or against UK-US in 1944), but attacking Germany as things stood in 1941 wasn´t an option. Not even for Stalin.
(PS: I didn´t call myself Suvorov in order to glorify the "historian" with the same name, it refers to the 18th century Russian general. Don´t get the wrong idea. Suvorov writes well, but has a problem with one thing. It´s called E-V-I-D-E-N-C-E. He should write fiction.)
Besides, the Red Army wasn´t even mobilized. Timoshenko and Zhukov pleaded with Stalin on 14 June to start mobilizing, but the dictator refused, fearing this would give Hitler a pretext to attack. This "huge" army that was waiting on Germany´s border was in fact two times smaller than the Axis´ armies on the other side of that border. The Wehrmacht was fully mobilized, Soviet divisions contained only 6,000-8,000 men, although at war time this should have been some 15,000. Red Army attacking Germany in this setting? Don´t think so. And I´m not even talking about huge ammunition shortages, more than 70% of old tanks needing serious repairs, only a handfull of modern tanks available at that time etc, etc, etc.
Once again (check my previous post), Stalin would have attacked Germany if Hitler would have had a seriuous fight on his hand in the West (be it against France in 1940 or against UK-US in 1944), but attacking Germany as things stood in 1941 wasn´t an option. Not even for Stalin.
(PS: I didn´t call myself Suvorov in order to glorify the "historian" with the same name, it refers to the 18th century Russian general. Don´t get the wrong idea. Suvorov writes well, but has a problem with one thing. It´s called E-V-I-D-E-N-C-E. He should write fiction.)
Easy man, I know who Suvorov was. I'm from Poland - and Suvorov is known here as "slayer of Prague" (Eastern half of Warsaw). No offence though...
I can't accept thesis, that Soviet Army was concentrated in such great number (I talk mainly about eqiupment) for defence purposes, and when finally war started, Stalin doesn't believe in it and Zukov totally losses control.
70% of older tanks... ok, so it gives almost 6 000 old type tanks ready. It's 2x more than panzers, and we don't count new models like KW and T-36. Also, no army on the worl has 100% their eqiupment ready to use - I don't remember how many panzers were ready to fight - 85% (very high index)? It's still not many...
Mobilisation... And what for? To show everyone, that something is happening? Germany knew nothing about USSR, thanks to Stalins paranoia all inteligence had serious problems there, but something like mobilisation is a bit hard to hide...
There is no conflict between teory, that Stalin wanted to attack West when Germany attack Brittain and ofensive in summer 1941. After all, in spring Germany were involved on 3 fronts - Africa, air-sea battle over English Channel and Balkans. And Operation Sealion was not offcially canceled - now we know about it, but in 1941?
I repeat - I don't believe at all Suvorov wrote (read about Tuchachevsky, it is one of Suvorov's best...
, but "Icebreaker" looks quite real.
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Copernicus, there are many problems with Suvarovs theory, the most important IMHO, being that it is completely uncorroborated. When an historian writes a controversial piece, out of line with the majority, then it needs more evidence than Suvarov provides in his book.
That's the reason for looking for corroborating sources. Unless Stalin destroyed every record of his alledged attack there have to be records in Russia which would confirm that a Soviet pre-emptive strike was being prepared.
The troop dispositions can be explained as defensive in nature just as easily as offensive, and unfortunately for Suvarov, Stalin's rejection that the German army was about to invade, and his subsequent orders, or lack of, right after invasion do not characterize an army ready to attack.
Both Britain and his own Soviet agents gave Stalin warning of Barbarossa, if he was truly going to strike pre-emptively why wouldn't Stalin simply order the attack, or order it moments after Germany invaded?
That's the reason for looking for corroborating sources. Unless Stalin destroyed every record of his alledged attack there have to be records in Russia which would confirm that a Soviet pre-emptive strike was being prepared.
The troop dispositions can be explained as defensive in nature just as easily as offensive, and unfortunately for Suvarov, Stalin's rejection that the German army was about to invade, and his subsequent orders, or lack of, right after invasion do not characterize an army ready to attack.
Both Britain and his own Soviet agents gave Stalin warning of Barbarossa, if he was truly going to strike pre-emptively why wouldn't Stalin simply order the attack, or order it moments after Germany invaded?
It's actually very weak argument - there real question there is "Why exactly Stalin would believe Churchill?" Same Churchill who wanted real intervention during Civil War, and before the war was good example of real anti communist? In 1940, Allies almost send troops to Finland (those forces were send to Narvik instead). In 1941, England was in defence - France gone, Europe lost, Africa - well, we all know who Rommel was...For us, Churchill is right - but only AFTER events. In 1941, for Stalin, he was very controversial source.
Intelligence... Again, now we know. But what was known in 1941? We talk about intelligence here - usually reports of their sources differ. It's easy to say - "agents warned...", but we don't talk about others, who doesn't warned or even confirmed, that Sealion will start in 1941.
Stalin... Who knows, what was Stalin thinking? I agree with you, that June 22nd Soviet Army was not ready for attack. They also wasn't ready for defence - all the talk about broken tanks, half-strength divisions confirm that. They simply were there, in huge numbers (sorry Suvorov, but if defender is almost the same size as attacker and have got more equipment of any kind, then I call it "huge"). They wasn't there to defend USSR - Stalin was not ready for that (even didn't belive in german attacks after it started), Zukov was not ready for that...
Of course I can't deny your argument about lack of "hard" evidence. Suvorov teory is still a teory, not part of textbooks - but very reasonable one.
USSR was very unique country, and you can't underestimate it's ability to false history. Why something like that should be revealed? USSR - no interest in that, being an innocent victim is much better. West - If in 50's or 60's someone wrote, that Hitler was right that Stalin is preparing attack, unlucky historian would get "nazi-lover" sticker.
And after some time myth had become legend, legend became history...
I repeat - no "hard" evidence, just teory. But very reasonable one.