At various points in it's history Byzantium did indeed have the most professional, best equipped, well resourced, and highly trained fighting force.
Is that a guarantee of constant, decisive tactical victory? No, not at all. Even Old Rome, which arguably fielded an even superior army had it's fair share of defeats.
As others have said; the longevity of Byzantium is testament to its prowess. It outlasted all of its enemies, save the Turk.
In terms of performance, it's important to bear in mind strategic goals, in addition to bearing in mind the Byzantine attitude to diplomacy, which they viewed as a continuation of warfare. It's also important to note the context of some of the Empire's territorial losses, specifically the hostility of the civilian population.
So why is it that the military effectiveness of the East Roman forces isn't much better than those of feudal states? I simply cannot comprehend how large well-trained,disciplined,highly organised and better equipped armies aren't more effective than feudal armies that are more or less deficient in all these areas.In the antiquity, feudal armies like these would have gotten completely massacred by Roman/Macedonian armies.
To use a
grossly oversimplified modern comparison: the Vietnam War.
The problem is that they survived, but ultimately, there's always a form of net loss. They survived the Norman onslaught, though barely and definitely resulted in the permanent loss of southern Italy. They survived the Seljuk Turks, but ultimately resulted in the permanent loss of the Anatolian hinterlands. They 'survived' the crusaders and when they made a comeback, the most they can do was recover only 'some' of Greece,barely, and took decades to even do that, even though the crusaders were outnumbered in a hostile environment.
Isn't survival a victory in itself?
Under Robert Guiscard the Normans' goal was nothing less than the conquest of Constantinople. At the time of his invasion of Greece the Byzantine army was at the nadir of it's power and Alexios I was only able to deploy a mere
500 Tagmatic soldiers. To add insult to injury, at the battle of Dyrrachion the Byzantines were unfamiliar with the Norman couched lance charge, which proved devastating. With the professional core of his army wiped out, Alexios was forced to fight the Balkan campaign with (effectively) pseudofeudal soldiers. That he managed to strongarm the seasoned, battle hungry Normans into negotiating a truce is testament to the Byzantine ability to 'box clever'.
The Seljuk occupation of Anatolia was viewed by the Byzantines as just that - an occupation. The Byzantines were in no hurry to oust the Seljuks from Anatolia because they looked on them as they did the Slavs who had earlier penetrated and settled in Greece i.e. that they would eventually assimilate. Tactically, they performed no better or worse than any of the peoples the Turks had fought.
As for Latin domination and the reconquest of Greece forget Alexios above; the Byzantine army by this time was well and truly a shambles, constantly outnumbered, outgunned, and poorly led. It would also be incorrect to describe the local civilian population as hostile to the Latins, ambivalent would be better.
I'm starting to believe this too. When I read their history, there seems to be very little local resistance on a regional level against invaders.There seems to be very few local rebellions in lands occupied by enemy invaders in favor of returned imperial rule.For some reason, the population sometimes even find it preferable under non-Byzantine rule. In a book I've read, it detailed how ethnic Greeks in Seljuk occupied Anatolia chose to help the Seljuks resist the ERE's attempts to reconquer Anatolia under John I Komnenos due to such reasons.
Byzantium has never been a 'beloved' occupier; it's taxes were crippling and religious deviation was not tolerated. Unfortunately Byzantium's enemies were able to indirectly exploit this with lower taxes, local autonomy, or religious indifference.
They couldn't even dislodge the Normans from Antioch even though they earnestly tried to do so under Alexios I Komnenos against the regent Tancred.
No attempt was made to retake Antioch during the reign of Alexios. He was shrewd enough to know he didn't have the resources to force Bohemund to capitulate, hence the treaty of Devol which was intended to peacefully transfer the city over eventually. Ioannes II gathered an expedition to take the city by force but died before he could force the issue. Manuel I managed to swap the previous titular overlordship for actual overlordship and to enter the city with the Imperial army.
