Did the ERE constantly perform poorly against it's enemies despite it's resources?

[joak]

I don't think there's a problem with military failure when they are indeed under attack on all sides, but there were numerous occasions when the ERE was offered the chance to focus on a single enemy when they managed to establish peace on other fronts. Even with this, they generally fail. Between the eighth to ninth century, they were consistently offered the chance to concentrate their all to destroy Bulgaria.

What with the various people weighing in on performance, not sure which side I'm on--broadly speaking I think they did about how I'd expect, such expectations being admittedly influenced by how they actually did.

The eighth through tenth centuries were a pretty tumultuous time, starting with a massive assault on Constantinople by a much more powerful Arab state, and seeing IIRC the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, and Cyprus, and the conquest of Crete, Cyprus, most of the Greek penninsula, the Bulgarians and the rest of the Balkans, and probably losses then net gains in the east and the Crimea though I'm too bored to look it up. Plus civil strife. In this context the opportunity to use "their all" against Bulgaria may have come up more than once, but it wasn't consistent and I'd say they did OK overall. It's not like every invasion is a slam dunk, even if you have more resources. Otherwise the Arabs should have completely steamrolled Byzantium before the end of the 8th century.

At any rate, what's wrong being a centralized state? I thought one of the key strength of the ERE over it's contemporaries was it's centralized form.

Centralization gets overrated in history, because we know modern states are ones that successfully centralized so the Whiggish instinct is to say centralized states are 'ahead of their time.' In a lot of situations central states are just unsustainable.

I don't think I'm out in left field in saying there was probably too little leadership interest in the Anatolian hinterland from elites who owned estates there and but were focused on life and politics inside the capital.

 

[darthfanta]

Stopped reading right there. The simple fact that you had to use destroyed twice , with 200 years between them, shows the resilience and greatness that was Byzantium.

The various "Turk" tribes, clans and quasi-nations that Byzantium exterminated and destroyed are many. The opposite can be said only once, Ottomans.

Normans were beaten in the Balkans, humbled in the holy land and made to kneel down before the Emperors, and their state in Italy lasted a blink of the eye compared to the longevity of Byzantium. You are impressed the Normans took over southern Italy, but not impressed that in the same time Byzantine Greeks ruled an area and population several times as large?

It sounds like if you can't be impressed with a Empire that lasted a thousand years..... then the only thing that would impress you is mythological lands?

Are you asking or questioning WHY Byzantium sometimes lost battles? Because they were an Empire of humans, and not angels, is your answer.

Was Byzantium more successful then basically any other state from late antiquity to the late middle ages? Yes. And that's impressive enough without a flawless victory battle ratio.

p.s. why is it a "utter" and "total" failure if Byzantium failed to destroy EVERY enemy the ever had? If that's the case Byzantium was surrounded by epic failures of nations for one thousand years because they ALL failed to destroy Byzantium, right?

Normans tried how many times to take over the Byzantine Empire? Three times? AND THEY FAILED UTTERLY!!! omg we must now analyze why Normans were so pathetic and incompetent, I mean they could not even keep a toe hold in the Balkans , much less realize their goal of taking over!!

Turks first appeared when? Sometime in late antiquity proably in the form of barbarians steppe peoples above the Black Sea? so THEY FAILED so HARD because despite their wish to have all that gold in Constantinople it took them over 900 years to finally get it! Just think of it, over 10 generations of complete failure Turks!!

(see what I did there?)

The problem is that they survived, but ultimately, there's always a form of net loss. They survived the Norman onslaught, though barely and definitely resulted in the permanent loss of southern Italy. They survived the Seljuk Turks, but ultimately resulted in the permanent loss of the Anatolian hinterlands. They 'survived' the crusaders(you can actually argue they actually destroyed the ERE in 1204) and when they made a comeback, the most they can do was recover only 'some' of Greece,barely, and took decades to even do that, even though the crusaders were outnumbered in a hostile environment. The problem isn't surviving. The root of the problem is that there's way too many military defeats that defy all odds on paper. They somehow always lose land in some place or another and was rarely able to make a lasting recovery of these lands.

What's impressive here is their skill in diplomacy, intrigue and economic strength, not their military. It seems to me that these are the main reasons why they were able to survive so long was diplomacy,intrigue and economic power. What I'm stating is that their military force seemed completely overrated in history books considering the amount of failures they've endured despite a greater degree of professionalism,size and resources that were devoted to support them.It most certainly played a role in their survival,no nation would be able to survive without their military force, but their failure is the reason behind the ever-shrinking borders save the Macedonian period.What I'm trying to state here is that their military performance is quite average considering the amount of money and men used to support it.

What with the various people weighing in on performance, not sure which side I'm on--broadly speaking I think they did about how I'd expect, such expectations being admittedly influenced by how they actually did.

The eighth through tenth centuries were a pretty tumultuous time, starting with a massive assault on Constantinople by a much more powerful Arab state, and seeing IIRC the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, and Cyprus, and the conquest of Crete, Cyprus, most of the Greek penninsula, the Bulgarians and the rest of the Balkans, and probably losses then net gains in the east and the Crimea though I'm too bored to look it up. Plus civil strife. In this context the opportunity to use "their all" against Bulgaria may have come up more than once, but it wasn't consistent and I'd say they did OK overall. It's not like every invasion is a slam dunk, even if you have more resources. Otherwise the Arabs should have completely steamrolled Byzantium before the end of the 8th century.



Centralization gets overrated in history, because we know modern states are ones that successfully centralized so the Whiggish instinct is to say centralized states are 'ahead of their time.' In a lot of situations central states are just unsustainable.

I don't think I'm out in left field in saying there was probably too little leadership interest in the Anatolian hinterland from elites who owned estates there and but were focused on life and politics inside the capital.

I'm starting to believe this too. When I read their history, there seems to be very little local resistance on a regional level against invaders.There seems to be very few local rebellions in lands occupied by enemy invaders in favor of returned imperial rule.For some reason, the population sometimes even find it preferable under non-Byzantine rule. In a book I've read, it detailed how ethnic Greeks in Seljuk occupied Anatolia chose to help the Seljuks resist the ERE's attempts to reconquer Anatolia under John I Komnenos due to such reasons.

 

[profxyz]

Well I would certainly argue that for a so-called 'medieval superpower', Byzantium could probably have done much better. The problem I see with them are:

a) Wayy too many fronts. Half of the Roman Empire simply didn't have the resources to hold on to all of the Roman Empire, and so on in progressively smaller amounts. Even when an Emperor is focusing all his efforts on a single front that doesn't actually mean he can use every troop available to campaign. All fights against Bulgaria, for example, had to be two-front fights, because engagement in Bulgaria almost inevitably means trouble on the Arab frontier, where gazis (Caliphate-sanctioned or otherwise) would launch attacks into Byzantium.

b) Flawed political structure. Many of the 'collapses' darkfanta describes are military collapses whose damage is made much worse by attendant political collapse. The Sassanids managed to make so much headway in 600s because of the Maurice-Phocas-Heraclius chaos, and the Arabs took advantage of post-Sasanian + iconoclast anarchy. Manzikert was not the only reason for why Byzantium lost Anatolia and Southern Italy - it was also the collapse of Romanos IV's regime. The Fourth Crusade was just the culminating blow in the post-Komnenian chaos that led to the loss of Manuel I's gains and a bit beyond that.

I would argue that, less dramatically, the dangerous political scene of the Byzantines also translated into military inefficiency, as it seems reasonable that Byzantine Emperors would rather lead armies themselves than have a general do it for them, with all the potential incompetence that could result in.

However, it's not fair to just give a list of military defeats and then argue that Byzantium sucked because of them.

1) Defending is much easier than attacking. Places like Southern Italy, once wrested out of Byzantine hands, will require disproportionate effort to reclaim simply because of things like 'the stopping power of water'. Similarly so for the mountain passes and hinterlands of the Balkans and Anatolia, especially after their fortification by gazis and suchlike. (And if you're going to ask why the Byzantines lost them in the first place, see point b) earlier).

2) Byzantium was, in a sense, a rather top-heavy state for its time, and that meant taxes which people resented. Added to the fact that their theology was pretty intolerant and prone to sectarian movements (Miaphysitism, Paulicianism) meant that few welcomed the return of the Empire. Arabs and Turks, initially at least, did not suffer from this problem.

3) You also have to look at timescale. Yes, if you view the history of Byzantium in some 1 minute Youtube the Empire does seem to shrink perennially. But hidden within that are time periods between 700-900 where the Empire basically held together against the Arabs, and even managed to inflict a few defeats on marauding Arab armies when the Muslims' main focus was on destroying the Empire. Even after the Turks you had a 100 year period where no further inroads were had, which ended because of Byzantine collapse under the Angeloi.

4) There's also something to be said about the idea that the Byzantines, being at a literal crossroads of the world, had to deal with numerous enemies of different types. A Byzantine army that developed a doctrine around Sassanid columns assaulting well-prepared fortifications is not going to perform well against an Arab army that relies more on light soldiers harassing, demoralizing then moving in for the kill. Similarly a Byzantine army that adjusts its doctrine to deal with seasonal, small-scale Arab raiding bands into Anatolia isn't going to fare well against the large-scale, horse-archer hit-and-run tactics of the Turks, nor against heavy Norman knights.

 

[Kyriakos]

As was already said:

The Byz Empire was far more centralised than the countries it was bordering. They usually were 1-dimensional horde-like in their army campaigns, while the Empire actually had enough to focus on without thinking of expansion. Let alone that obviously people who have little and are facing harder conditions do tend to fight far more violently. By contrast, against somewhat organised enemies (eg Sassanid empire, or the arabian states in Syria) the Empire did not lose significant territories for long times, in war conclusions.

Surely the Byz Empire was not Sparta (

), but it did have serious armies for most of its existence, such as the elite tagmata and the varangian guards. It failed cause it was surrounded by smaller or far less developed entities, which seemed to mostly have been about expanding to the urban lands of the Byzantine world.

 

[darthfanta]

Well I would certainly argue that for a so-called 'medieval superpower', Byzantium could probably have done much better. The problem I see with them are:

a) Wayy too many fronts. Half of the Roman Empire simply didn't have the resources to hold on to all of the Roman Empire, and so on in progressively smaller amounts. Even when an Emperor is focusing all his efforts on a single front that doesn't actually mean he can use every troop available to campaign. All fights against Bulgaria, for example, had to be two-front fights, because engagement in Bulgaria almost inevitably means trouble on the Arab frontier, where gazis (Caliphate-sanctioned or otherwise) would launch attacks into Byzantium.

b) Flawed political structure. Many of the 'collapses' darkfanta describes are military collapses whose damage is made much worse by attendant political collapse. The Sassanids managed to make so much headway in 600s because of the Maurice-Phocas-Heraclius chaos, and the Arabs took advantage of post-Sasanian + iconoclast anarchy. Manzikert was not the only reason for why Byzantium lost Anatolia and Southern Italy - it was also the collapse of Romanos IV's regime. The Fourth Crusade was just the culminating blow in the post-Komnenian chaos that led to the loss of Manuel I's gains and a bit beyond that.

I would argue that, less dramatically, the dangerous political scene of the Byzantines also translated into military inefficiency, as it seems reasonable that Byzantine Emperors would rather lead armies themselves than have a general do it for them, with all the potential incompetence that could result in.

However, it's not fair to just give a list of military defeats and then argue that Byzantium sucked because of them.

1) Defending is much easier than attacking. Places like Southern Italy, once wrested out of Byzantine hands, will require disproportionate effort to reclaim simply because of things like 'the stopping power of water'. Similarly so for the mountain passes and hinterlands of the Balkans and Anatolia, especially after their fortification by gazis and suchlike. (And if you're going to ask why the Byzantines lost them in the first place, see point b) earlier).

2) Byzantium was, in a sense, a rather top-heavy state for its time, and that meant taxes which people resented. Added to the fact that their theology was pretty intolerant and prone to sectarian movements (Miaphysitism, Paulicianism) meant that few welcomed the return of the Empire. Arabs and Turks, initially at least, did not suffer from this problem.

3) You also have to look at timescale. Yes, if you view the history of Byzantium in some 1 minute Youtube the Empire does seem to shrink perennially. But hidden within that are time periods between 700-900 where the Empire basically held together against the Arabs, and even managed to inflict a few defeats on marauding Arab armies when the Muslims' main focus was on destroying the Empire. Even after the Turks you had a 100 year period where no further inroads were had, which ended because of Byzantine collapse under the Angeloi.

4) There's also something to be said about the idea that the Byzantines, being at a literal crossroads of the world, had to deal with numerous enemies of different types. A Byzantine army that developed a doctrine around Sassanid columns assaulting well-prepared fortifications is not going to perform well against an Arab army that relies more on light soldiers harassing, demoralizing then moving in for the kill. Similarly a Byzantine army that adjusts its doctrine to deal with seasonal, small-scale Arab raiding bands into Anatolia isn't going to fare well against the large-scale, horse-archer hit-and-run tactics of the Turks, nor against heavy Norman knights.

Another thing that amazed me was how the ERE lost these areas relatively easily and quickly even when the ERE outnumbered these enemies but when under the control of their foes, their foes were able to easily defeat attempts to reclaim them, even though the control of their foes over these lands were relatively short.Perfect example would be Bulgaria. The ERE outnumbered the Bulghars during the latter's invasion of Moesia, but lost control of Moesia despite the terrain's favour of defense. Yet, when the ERE tried to reclaim these areas, once again outnumbering the Bulghars/Bulgarians, they got massacred over and over again because of the terrain.

At any rate, I was given the impression that the vast majority of the emperors that campaigned in person were in fact militarily competent or had extensive military background. The ones that didn't, like Michael VII Doukas generally sent out a general or two in command of their armies instead.

So basically, you are saying that the ERE's army's performance was pretty average (or even pretty bad considering the amount of resources,numbers and training they are getting) against it's enemies overall because it's the jack of all trades and master of none?

 

[Nicophorus]

Well, master of diplomacy at least. You just don't see the spectacular coup de'tats Byzantium lays down with diplomacy/espionage on a regular basis, from any other powers in history. To me that's far more interesting to read about then winning with "yet another strong military".

I was going to say the same thing Kyriakos said above but felt my posts were getting too long and dropped it. But all those nomadic semi-barbarian hordes that descended on the Empire DID have the advantage of being warlike, hardened and with a single focus: carving out a homeland for their people/families. That's right there puts them at an advantage vs. a Byzantium that does have many more things to worry about, not least of which is an elite that is competing with itself.

Just think about the same type of barbarian invasion in the old Roman Empire, all the same things can be said about them that you said above about Byzantine defeats in the face of them. On paper the old Roman Empire had the better organized armies, the money, etc. And still?

Byzantium did retake lands that were overrun, and hold them. They did retake southern Italy, Crete, Cyprus, Northern Syria, Armenia, Bulgaria, and maybe more I'm forgetting. And these were not just extended campaigns for a few years, but held again for decades (centuries?).

Arabs did take and keep Egypt and Palestine from Byzantium forever, but then the Muslims took everything from France to India and beyond right? Yet the Byzantine Empire that boardered so close to their own heartlands? They failed to take it over and that is nothing short of miraculous and a testament at just how resilient Byzantium was.

Byzantines were not a war-like people, they are quoted saying as much out of their own mouths. Other more warlike people insulted them for this trait, but who was usually left smiling at the end?

I'm also not seeing where you read that Byzantium had this pumped up military reputation. Everything I've read pretty much states that they had a military, they used it, but it was not the strongest card they had in their deck.

 

[darthfanta]

Well, master of diplomacy at least. You just don't see the spectacular coup de'tats Byzantium lays down with diplomacy/espionage on a regular basis, from any other powers in history. To me that's far more interesting to read about then winning with "yet another strong military".

I was going to say the same thing Kyriakos said above but felt my posts were getting too long and dropped it. But all those nomadic semi-barbarian hordes that descended on the Empire DID have the advantage of being warlike, hardened and with a single focus: carving out a homeland for their people/families. That's right there puts them at an advantage vs. a Byzantium that does have many more things to worry about, not least of which is an elite that is competing with itself.

Just think about the same type of barbarian invasion in the old Roman Empire, all the same things can be said about them that you said above about Byzantine defeats in the face of them. On paper the old Roman Empire had the better organized armies, the money, etc. And still?

Byzantium did retake lands that were overrun, and hold them. They did retake southern Italy, Crete, Cyprus, Northern Syria, Armenia, Bulgaria, and maybe more I'm forgetting. And these were not just extended campaigns for a few years, but held again for decades (centuries?).

Arabs did take and keep Egypt and Palestine from Byzantium forever, but then the Muslims took everything from France to India and beyond right? Yet the Byzantine Empire that boardered so close to their own heartlands? They failed to take it over and that is nothing short of miraculous and a testament at just how resilient Byzantium was.

Byzantines were not a war-like people, they are quoted saying as much out of their own mouths. Other more warlike people insulted them for this trait, but who was usually left smiling at the end?

I'm also not seeing where you read that Byzantium had this pumped up military reputation. Everything I've read pretty much states that they had a military, they used it, but it was not the strongest card they had in their deck.

The comments of the Byzantine army I've read were usually along the lines of 'they have one of the best trained and equipped armies in the dark ages middle ages', they are a 'medieval superpower','had a versatile fighting force via their recruitment of foreign mercenaries and defeated nomadic tribesmen','their armies have one of the best medical corps during the period', 'inheritors of Roman strategy and tactics', 'had large,disciplined and professional army','had some of the best heavy infantry of the world during the period','their cataphracts struck fear in their enemies','were able to fund a large and powerful army because of their economic strength',had a 'powerful artillery force that even impressed the crusaders','highly adaptable and versatile when compared to their enemies', 'formidable military power' etc etc.....

About the old Roman empire, it's more like it collapsed because a large number of factors, like they couldn't afford a large professional army any longer both economically and in terms of manpower(in the West at least),discipline was appalling compared to the earlier one. The ERE on the other hand could afford a large and well trained force compared to their enemies...most of the time at least.

My problem isn't with the ERE getting beaten up. Some of the defeats were quite logical, like how they were defeated by Arabs after they were exhausted from war against the Persians, how they lost Anatolia to the Turks during the 1070s because of civil war etc etc...My problem is with them being unable to defeat their enemies during moments when they are well-resourced, better trained and quite a lot of times even outnumber their enemies(e.g. against Bulgaria, Armenia, against the Normans in general(except during Alexios' years. When Robert Guiscard invaded the Greek mainland, the empire was heavily depleted),the Seljuk Turks during the Komnenian period.)

 

[Arilou]

Centralization gets overrated in history, because we know modern states are ones that successfully centralized so the Whiggish instinct is to say centralized states are 'ahead of their time.' In a lot of situations central states are just unsustainable.

This is a point: Centralization really only becomes a major advantage in modern times. When firearms, cannons, etc. become important. Before that you can get almost as much military effectiveness out of a decentralized warrior-elite.

 

[darthfanta]

This is a point: Centralization really only becomes a major advantage in modern times. When firearms, cannons, etc. become important. Before that you can get almost as much military effectiveness out of a decentralized warrior-elite.

Problem is shouldn't armies like that have poor discipline and abysmal training(except for the warrior elites)? Feudal levies, except for knights and men at arms, who compose only a small part of such armies, are barely trained. As for knights, they are experts at fighting on an individual basis, but wasn't their discipline extremely bad when they fought as a group?The service of these levies are also restricted by their term of service. The lord/king has to pay extra money to keep them beyond their term of service, which in Europe was only a mere forty days, and the problem is that these lords struggle to do so because of how decentralised their states are.There's also a problem with command structure. The nobles tend to fight over who has the right to command the army in the absence of the king.I remember one Scottish army getting defeated comprehensively because the King's favorite fought with this other high ranking noble about who has the command of the army.Sometimes this even happened when the monarch himself was present.Apparently, this was precisely the reason why the Kingdom of Jerusalem lost the Battle of Hattin alongside other reasons of course.

 

[Lord Tim]

Problem is shouldn't armies like that have poor discipline and abysmal training(except for the warrior elites)? Feudal levies, except for knights and men at arms, who compose only a small part of such armies, are barely trained.

Considering that most militia forces were expected to train for at least one afternnon every week, I wouldn't think they were particularly badly trained in their basic weapon skills, and probably better trained in formation fighting than knights who often would only have experience with much smaller groups. And of course this assumes that many armies had significant amounts of feudal levies, which was not always the case.

As for knights, they are experts at fighting in an individual basis, but wasn't their discipline extremely bad when they fought as a group?

Sometimes. The ones who remained in formation for several hours under muslim archery harrassment would probably differ in their opinion of how disciplined they were.

[quotes]The service of these levies are also restricted by their term of service. The lord/king has to pay extra money to keep them beyond their term of service, which in Europe was only a mere forty days, and the problem is that these lords struggle to do so because of how decentralised their states are.[/quote]

Which is why most rules preferred money in place of feudal service, made laws which allowed people to avoid the messy, dangerous, and unprofitavly business of going to war provided they were willing to pay what was nominally a fine rather than a tax, and used the money this provided to pay experienced captains/lords who could provide reliable troops for their armies.

There's also a problem with command structure. The nobles tend to fight over who has the right to command the army in the absence of the king.

So did Roman commanders when they weren't directly under the eyes of someone who clearly outranked them.

I remember one Scottish army getting defeated comprehensively because the King's favorite fought with this other high ranking noble about who has the command of the army.

Scottish armies didn't need that sort of help to lose to the English.

Sometimes this even happened when the monarch himself was present. Apparently, this was precisely the reason why the Kingdom of Jerusalem lost the Battle of Hattin alongside other reasons of course.

The Kingdom of Jerusalem had a king who wasn't really willing to command, and the council before the battle wasn't an argument about who should command but about what the tactics whould be.

 

[Kyriakos]

Haven't read much about the later golden age (Komnenian period of 12th century), but the empire still had multiple fronts and couldn't just send most of the armies to Anatolia, where the turkish positions were only inland and the region is mountanous. The Myriocephalon campaign is usually named as the defining 'defeat', but it was a very costly stalemate and a defeat only if one argues that the Komnenoi (Manuel iirc?) should have ended the turkish presence in Anatolia in that campaign. Maybe they could have had- haven't read much about that. But the empire also had to maintain the newly-gotten lands in the victorious war against Hungary, in the reign of Ioannes B' Komnenos, and also resettle the pechenegs to asia minor, and disband the tourma they had formed for a while (not that trustworthy/loyal, and iirc it was another reason for the failed campaigns in Anatolia in the times).

Basically the Empire was in the worst geographical position for its clear economic and likely cultural supremacy (at least in the world west of East Asia). On all sides there were kingdoms of small size, or hordes, or religious war fronts (arab and then turkish sultanates and khaliphates). Sort of building a huge wall in the entire med, or developing ww1 speeds for its fleets, it could do little to null those conditions around it. Of course the Angeloi were instrumental in the collapse (1204), and from 1261 (rebirth, Constantinople back in the empire) the Palaiologoi had both a much smaller (1/4?) realm than the Komnenoi, and no naval supremacy, AND a taste of the western kingdoms for expansion again in the Byz territories. Sicilean vespers stopped the main war comming, but the following emperors were not as masterful as Michael VIII.

 

[Arilou]

Problem is shouldn't armies like that have poor discipline and abysmal training(except for the warrior elites)? Feudal levies, except for knights and men at arms, who compose only a small part of such armies, are barely trained. As for knights, they are experts at fighting in an individual basis, but wasn't their discipline extremely bad when they fought as a group?The service of these levies are also restricted by their term of service. The lord/king has to pay extra money to keep them beyond their term of service, which in Europe was only a mere forty days, and the problem is that these lords struggle to do so because of how decentralised their states are.There's also a problem with command structure. The nobles tend to fight over who has the right to command the army in the absence of the king.I remember one Scottish army getting defeated comprehensively because the King's favorite fought with this other high ranking noble about who has the command of the army.Sometimes this even happened when the monarch himself was present.Apparently, this was precisely the reason why the Kingdom of Jerusalem lost the Battle of Hattin alongside other reasons of course.

Oh, definitely. But the point is that the military effectiveness (as opposed to political problems) weren't neccessarily that much worse. All of these problems also appeared in the byzantine, and other "centralized" (for the time) states. And they didn't have relatively large groups of very well-trained fighters availible on the cheap.

Consider how often steppe nomads managed to completely destroy centralized bureaucratic states.

Before say... 1500 you could still probably argue that centralized states weren't neccessarily any more effective militarily than nomad confederations or "barbarian" tribes. It was the gun that turned that around decisively.

 

[Enravota]

Byzantium did retake lands that were overrun, and hold them. They did retake southern Italy, Crete, Cyprus, Northern Syria, Armenia, Bulgaria, and maybe more I'm forgetting. And these were not just extended campaigns for a few years, but held again for decades (centuries?).

Byzantium did retake lands, however failed reintegrating them into the empire. All of the conquests you mention were eventually lost. With the exception of the Greek islands, all of those lands were completely changed by the time the empire tried to take over.

Other more warlike people insulted them for this trait, but who was usually left smiling at the end?

Considering that few people think of themselves Roman in the Byzantine sense of the word, I'd wager on the warlike people.

 

[darthfanta]

Oh, definitely. But the point is that the military effectiveness (as opposed to political problems) weren't neccessarily that much worse. All of these problems also appeared in the byzantine, and other "centralized" (for the time) states. And they didn't have relatively large groups of very well-trained fighters availible on the cheap.

Consider how often steppe nomads managed to completely destroy centralized bureaucratic states.

Before say... 1500 you could still probably argue that centralized states weren't neccessarily any more effective militarily than nomad confederations or "barbarian" tribes. It was the gun that turned that around decisively.

So why is it that the military effectiveness of the East Roman forces isn't much better than those of feudal states? I simply cannot comprehend how large well-trained,disciplined,highly organised and better equipped armies aren't more effective than feudal armies that are more or less deficient in all these areas.In the antiquity, feudal armies like these would have gotten completely massacred by Roman/Macedonian armies.

 

[Arilou]

So why is it that the military effectiveness of the East Roman forces isn't much better than those of feudal states? I simply cannot comprehend how large well-trained,disciplined,highly organised and better equipped armies aren't more effective than feudal armies that are more or less deficient in all these areas.

Because it's hard to turn "normal" citizens into viable warriors. Meanwhile warrior elites, be they europan knights, nomads, samurai, whatever.... Spend all their time fighting, it's what they do.

 

[Enravota]

So why is it that the military effectiveness of the East Roman forces isn't much better than those of feudal states? I simply cannot comprehend how large well-trained,disciplined,highly organised and better equipped armies aren't more effective than feudal armies that are more or less deficient in all these areas.

Early French monarchs tried to keep the number of keeps limited, a few centuries and some Viking invasions later castles were omnipresent. Local feudal levies can react significantly faster while splitting up the responsibility of fielding them reduces the overall logistical complexity. Centralised, professional armies do not necessarily mean better suited to deal with the task at hand. It is no coincidence that Byzantium constantly shifted the mix between levies and professionals (be it mercenaries or warrior class), it simply had to deal with vastly different environments throughout the ages. A feudal lord, or at least one with sufficient freedom from the central authority, can deal with raiders and fortify terrain on ad hoc basis and in timely manner. A centralised bureaucracy, be it civil or martial, simply needs the time to turn the wheels of government.

 

[profxyz]

Another thing that amazed me was how the ERE lost these areas relatively easily and quickly even when the ERE outnumbered these enemies but when under the control of their foes, their foes were able to easily defeat attempts to reclaim them, even though the control of their foes over these lands were relatively short.Perfect example would be Bulgaria. The ERE outnumbered the Bulghars during the latter's invasion of Moesia, but lost control of Moesia despite the terrain's favour of defense. Yet, when the ERE tried to reclaim these areas, once again outnumbering the Bulghars/Bulgarians, they got massacred over and over again because of the terrain.

Well in a sense that goes back to the difference between centralized and horde polities, doesn't it. A centralized state usually loses land following the defeat of a single army (even more so for such a comparatively 'oppressive' state as Byzantium), whereas to wrest control of lands from a horde you basically do have to occupy everything, which generally required resources Byzantium didn't have. I think freedom from Byzantine taxes probably meant that peasants were more than happy to welcome their new masters, in general.

If you're talking about the Bulgar invasion of Moesia in the 7th Century, bear in mind that the Bulgars invaded while the Umayyads were on the verge of destroying the Empire, so I'm not terribly surprised that there wasn't much resistance to their attacks. So when Constantine IV was trying to 'defend' Moesia against the Bulgar invasion, he was in actuality going on the offense against Bulgarian strongpoints in Moesia in order to force them out of the region. The same applies to the Byzantine losses during the reign of Theophilos.

Your point about the constant Byzantine defeats against the Bulgarians is a good point... you'd have expected the guys to have gotten wise to the Bulgarian tactic of 'ambush in mountain passes' sooner. Bear in mind that most of these ambushes occured after the end of a relatively-decent campaign (like Nikephoros I or Basil II), so fatigue and just general discipline breakdown might have contributed to those as well.

We also do have to note that 1) there was a period of around 100 years after Asparukh where Bulgaria didn't do much and was in fact constantly defeated and raided by monarchs such as Constantine V & Nikephoros I (the latter of course resulting in disaster, but it doesn't diminish the fact), 2) when Bulgaria was faced with two-front wars (against the Holy Roman Empire) Byzantium similarly managed to take land from them, and 3) even under its greatest monarchs Bulgaria didn't achieve its goals vs. the Byzantine Empire (which was to take Constantinople).

At any rate, I was given the impression that the vast majority of the emperors that campaigned in person were in fact militarily competent or had extensive military background. The ones that didn't, like Michael VII Doukas generally sent out a general or two in command of their armies instead.

The short answer is probably that the bad emperors commanding armies were the ones who lost the land. The amount of desertions/defections that Romanos IV sustained during the Manzikert campaign doesn't seem to be an indicator of good generalship to me, and the prevalence of Byzantine armies being 'ambushed' seems to indicate that there was a certain degree of tactical incompetence around at the highest levels.

Curiously enough, it seems that the competent generals were rarely in a hurry to re-annex all lost lands. Constantine V, for example, didn't bother formally annexing Bulgaria; John I didn't bother keeping the Levant when he pushed all the way to Nazareth. Perhaps they were only interested in the plunder; but you could also make an argument that the competent generals were not Alexander-types who wanted to conquer everything, only to keep what was strategically important for the Empire (like the border fortresses/gazi emirates of Tarsus, Melitene and Germanikeia).

So basically, you are saying that the ERE's army's performance was pretty average (or even pretty bad considering the amount of resources,numbers and training they are getting) against it's enemies overall because it's the jack of all trades and master of none?

I wouldn't put it that way; it's more like the Byzantine army can't be the master of all trades - it has a doctrine tailored to a specific enemy and a specific way of fighting; and anything that doesn't line up with that is likely to go terribly wrong, especially in the hands of incompetents. Training and tactics need time to adapt, and in the course of transition Byzantium generally performed poorly. But then again, so do most nations in that situation.

As an example, the Strategikon, with its emphasis on Roman-esque fortified camps and sources of food and water placed safely in the army's rear, seems to be written more for Sassanid columns (or large Arab armies), rather than the light skirmishing and maneuver of the early Arab invasions. The Tactica of Leo VI was written with the expectation of massive Caliphate armies invading on multiple fronts with the intent of capturing major cities, not for fractured emirates that were content with small-scale raiding with occasional spurts of activity. Praecepta Militaria was written in light of Nikephoros II Phocas' experiences against the gazi emirates on the Anatolian border who raided for booty, not against Turkish hordes who invaded and then stayed.

So in conclusion could Byzantium have done better? Sure. But to say it constantly performed poorly, even with good generals and good armies, is a bit of an overstatement.

 

[Enravota]

Because it's hard to turn "normal" citizens into viable warriors. Meanwhile warrior elites, be they europan knights, nomads, samurai, whatever.... Spend all their time fighting, it's what they do.

Depends. There were a number of very successful citizen armies. Conscription was nigh omnipresent a few decades ago. The root of the problem is usually costs. A professional soldier usually has little ability to partake in other endeavours.

 

[Andrelvis]

So why is it that the military effectiveness of the East Roman forces isn't much better than those of feudal states? I simply cannot comprehend how large well-trained,disciplined,highly organised and better equipped armies aren't more effective than feudal armies that are more or less deficient in all these areas.In the antiquity, feudal armies like these would have gotten completely massacred by Roman/Macedonian armies.

Quite possibly much of the "advanced" character of Byzantium was more apparent than real. The Maddison Project gives the Byzantine core areas a GDP per capita of $600 (in 1990 international GK dollars) in 1020 AD, while England had a GDP per capita of $757 in 1000 AD. As such, their society doesn't seem to have been particularly productive. What is the point of keeping the trappings of an advanced society, if in order to sustain that you'll have to squeeze a not particularly advanced economy?

 

[Enravota]

If you're talking about the Bulgar invasion of Moesia in the 7th Century, bear in mind that the Bulgars invaded while the Umayyads were on the verge of destroying the Empire, so I'm not terribly surprised that there wasn't much resistance to their attacks. So when Constantine IV was trying to 'defend' Moesia against the Bulgar invasion, he was in actuality going on the offense against Bulgarian strongpoints in Moesia in order to force them out of the region. The same applies to the Byzantine losses during the reign of Theophilos.

There was only one strong point originally. The thing is though that Byzantium didn't have effective control over the Balkan hinterland for centuries, with the exception of a few fortified points. Constantine's campaign was essentially limited to sailing by the coast. BTW Tervel actually helped during the second siege of Constantinople, so in some way Constantine's failure could be considered a boon in disguise.

Your point about the constant Byzantine defeats against the Bulgarians is a good point... you'd have expected the guys to have gotten wise to the Bulgarian tactic of 'ambush in mountain passes' sooner. Bear in mind that most of these ambushes occured after the end of a relatively-decent campaign (like Nikephoros I or Basil II), so fatigue and just general discipline breakdown might have contributed to those as well.

That's not really something that the Byzantine armies could have adapted to in any meaningful way. A fortified pass means either trying to force through or going home or starving (depending on which side of the mountain one is). It's even more problematic when a feigned retreat into bad terrain is used during battle, which was also a local favourite. Crusading armies (both passing though and participating in the Fourth Crusade) had difficulty dealing with the same issue as well.

We also do have to note that 1) there was a period of around 100 years after Asparukh where Bulgaria didn't do much and was in fact constantly defeated and raided by monarchs such as Constantine V & Nikephoros I (the latter of course resulting in disaster, but it doesn't diminish the fact), 2) when Bulgaria was faced with two-front wars (against the Holy Roman Empire) Byzantium similarly managed to take land from them, and 3) even under its greatest monarchs Bulgaria didn't achieve its goals vs. the Byzantine Empire (which was to take Constantinople).

The interregnum and Constantine V's campaigns aren't exactly a point for centralised armies. Essentially he was prevented from achieving much by the border tribal chiefs, while the court nobility in Pliska argued who's to be boss. Ditto for Nikephoros' campaign. Border forces were able to prepare the ground for the army, that was occupied northwards.
As far as the third point goes, capturing Constantinople or dismantling Byzantium was hardly an overall objective of the state, with the exception of a few sovereigns (Simeon being more or less the only one with a holistic plan about it and that possibly evolved from a trade war), just like dismantling Bulgaria or general reconquest was not the general objective of Byzantium, with the exception of a few emperors. Wars were hardly the norm, there were quite a few Bulgarian rulers that were fairly cordial to Byzantium, like the already mentioned Tervel or Peter I. As some historians say we don't really have historical sources for the history of medieval Bulgaria, but for Bulgarian-Byantine wars. Byzantine chronicles are the most voluminous source and those sources usually dealt with the subject only in the case of a war. Wars were usually related to perceived ad hoc opportunities, rather than a constant strategy.