If they couldn't get that many radios, the french should have concentrated on cavalry and infantry with AT to form the line.
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In my opinion the Allies made a crtical blunder that ensured that they had no chance. The commitment into Belgium used up all of the allies mobile reserves. If they had gone for the orginal plan and aimed to hold a much shorter line in Beligum they would fo had a few reserve divisions.
Reserves are the key here with say 5 mobile divisions in reserve the Allied commanders have options. Wether Gamlin would of been able to make best use of these options is quite another matter, but having them gives the allies opertunities to improve the outcome. Whether these opertunities would be enough to change the outcome is not clear.
Reserves are the key here with say 5 mobile divisions in reserve the Allied commanders have options. Wether Gamlin would of been able to make best use of these options is quite another matter, but having them gives the allies opertunities to improve the outcome. Whether these opertunities would be enough to change the outcome is not clear.
Maybe the S-40 should have futured a larger 47mm gun? It should have been possible to upgrade the 47mm SA35 (L32) to the newer 47mm SA37 (L52), and this would be a reasonable upgrade, as it would give the Somua a very strong AT punch.
The French did several mistakes, which could have been corrected even '39. The existing motorized, mech and panzer divisions should have been put into larger mobile formations, instead of dispearsing them amoing infantry corps.
The infantry support battalions could have formed the core for 3 or 4 tank divisions, slow and not as capable as the DCR but with quite a punch.
The French did several mistakes, which could have been corrected even '39. The existing motorized, mech and panzer divisions should have been put into larger mobile formations, instead of dispearsing them amoing infantry corps.
The infantry support battalions could have formed the core for 3 or 4 tank divisions, slow and not as capable as the DCR but with quite a punch.
France was doomed because the Germans were simply on a whole new level of their own when it came to strategy and tactics. France and the Allies were still ussing thinking in terms of attrition instead of manouve, this doomed them. If the Germans went through Belguim it would have been tougher, but the out come would have been the same except with more French casualties.
I think they can handle the radio if they accept little restriction on other part of the weapon plan. The choice to avoid radio was mostly a odd idea from old fashion general => "It isn't very important in an big wwI assault to get that radio so keep the money to get sth else"
The french HQ get some infantery in reserve (not sth to put in attack in front of tank i think) and few tank too (1 DCR + some light support or recon tank batallion) but they were use with the least efficient way. The group were scattered and they didn't get the proper supply wich is a shame according the fact the german gave a proper one to their division at 250 km from the border when the french were at less than 200 km from Paris...
I'm working for the industrial tool industry and can swear you that's much cheaper to made several tool for the same model than to devellopp different tool for different model. The prototype tool are not the same than the production one so if you choose two model you have to built two different industrial set of tool, better to have to built two time the same set.
The french industry already know that in WWI and they should have made the economical choice according the fact they want an economical/attrition war.
PS: May be the economy should even get them enought money to buy proper radio
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Not to be picky, but didnt the germans go though Belgium, the Ardenes part of it.
Mr.Penguin
Should France stand a few weeks in the north i think the outcome should have been much different.
They have been very quick to react in the industrial way (tank killer were think and send in a few week).
Same for the troops and HQ who made much more problem to the german after the destruction of the main army. The "herisson" defense was made by infantery with 75mm campaign gun and every AT and mines they can used to stop the german. I think Weygand was the one who ask for it (i didn't like the guy but i think he was a good general)
This emergency tactical disposition should have been much more effective if they have a real front of that type. In june 40, the german only have to turn them but they get more problem than in May.
If the german have made a whole belgium attack, manouver won't have been such advantage and the "heavy direct fight of tank" wasn't such good for the german (no real advantage).
The air superiority alone won't have gave the storm advance effect that a great strategy plan gave them historically.
About the casualties, in the end, much of french casualties came from the desorganisation of unit 'cause of Guderian advance in the south and the stormly shock of such a break on the weak point.
Really think the german plan and organisation was good but i don't think the wermacht was unstoppable with an efficient strategical plan.
Attrition war wasn't out of idea in 1940. At the end it was attrition of economical and human ressource that gave victory in WWII.
You're picky indeed.
Yes they did... They just choose to took the walk trought the "hill and forest trip" when everyone would have choose the field and city way... By "Belgium" i think we speak of the flat and densively populated part of it.
Mechanized corp...
I think Prioux corp was the only one made by the HQ at time.
I'm not sure the "infantery support tank" should have made real effective unit. They were mostly R-35, AMR... (even FT 17) they didn't fit a tank to tank fight. Usefull to support infantery and recon task but to weak to face tank in organized battle. Most R-35, AMR and FCM 36 were quickly destroyed by german Pz and didn't have the weapon to answer.
The french should have concentrated on cheaper AT guns and antitank rifles rather than tanks. They should have used cavalry and motorised infantry as a reserve.
The french did have lots of cheap AT guns. Mainly their 25mm light anti tank guns, but also 47mm and 75mm guns. The problem wasnt their numbers, but how they was deployed.
25mm AT guns:
Canon leger de 25 antichar sa-l mle 34, some 4500 produced by Hotchkiss by 1940. used as the standard regimental and battalion AT gun.
Canon leger de 25 antichar sa-l mle 37, some 1600 produced by Puteaux by 1940. A lighter and more simple version of the sa-l mle 34, introduced to supplement the sa-l mle 34.
6 25mm AT guns was issued per infantry regiment, plus another 2 25mm AT guns in each battalion of the regiment, giving it 12 guns in all. Otfen was all of them placed in the regimental heavy weapons company, such depriveing the infantry battalions of an internal AT capacity.
47mm guns:
Canon de 47 antichar sa mle 37 APX, some 800 made by Puteaux. Was the most powerfull AT gun in the world by 1940, fired a tungsten APCR rounds, however a lack of APCR rounds prevented the gun from being fully deployed.
Each division was issued 12 mle 37 APX in their divisional AT company, but in reality most divisions only had 6 or 4 if any at all.
75mm guns:
Canon de 75 antichar mle 97/35, converted 75mm field gun mle 1897, several hundred converted in 1935, unknown number in use by 1940. Used to supplement the mle 37 APX as a divisional gun.
The divisonal AT companies was organized under the divisional field artiliery, resulting in they rarely was deployed at the front.
Mr.Penguin
The corps was part of the first army, and thus it wasn't an indipedent formation. Compare that with Panzer groupe Kleist, 5 panzer and 3 motorized divisions. (The French could have build such an formation as well)
De Gaule argued for it:
"He also suggested to regroup the various light tank battlions into autonomopus brigades under the direct command of an Army General to avoid tank scattering." also, when you think about it, about half of the German tanks were obsolote Pz-II and Pz-I, so the infantry support tanks could have acted as sort of second line armoured divisions.
Most tanks aren't destroyed by other tanks, so the lack of AT capability (paired with a lot of protection) wouldn't make them that absolote.
Originally posted by madner
The corps was part of the first army, and thus it wasn't an indipedent formation. Compare that with Panzer groupe Kleist, 5 panzer and 3 motorized divisions. (The French could have build such an formation as well)
De Gaule argued for it:
"He also suggested to regroup the various light tank battlions into autonomopus brigades under the direct command of an Army General to avoid tank scattering." also, when you think about it, about half of the German tanks were obsolote Pz-II and Pz-I, so the infantry support tanks could have acted as sort of second line armoured divisions.
Most tanks aren't destroyed by other tanks, so the lack of AT capability (paired with a lot of protection) wouldn't make them that absolote.
That's right.
And the scattered infantery support tank batallions were a logistic nightmare for supply forces, so better to have them in an independent groupp...
AH please the French were completly out classed on a strategitec and tactical level. Sure their were a few exceptions to the rule but generaly the French and many of the British were still stuck in a WWI mindset. You may say that the Germans won because of Attrition but lets face it thoughts and ideas can only go so far. But German units were vastly better trained and lead by people who had a good grasp of manuvere warfare. Because of this vastly more allies died compared to germans, even if you just compare western allies and germans.
I'm just saying that the french never needed tanks for their defense. Some artillery and AT guns set near the Ardennes would have stopped the Germans cold.
we only needed leaders with balls and adaptability, instead of the bunch of old guys we had.
No the Germans won becouse they avoided atrittion warfare, had they used a blunter approch they could have lost.
German infantry divisions were not superior to French infantry divisions. German panzer divisions were not superior to French panzer divisions.
German panzer groups had no match. Those groups, along with a risky plan were decisive. Also, like later in Russia, the German burned they panzer force out, it was from this time that Guderian said: "Panzer are saving lives, but who is going to save them"
Afaik the French officier schools, along with the defensive mindset, didn't produce such officiers. De Gaulle had written a book in the 30-ies on the charakter of the offizier and the need to be able to train to adapt, this ideas were also not well taken.