I often hear, watch and read a lot of bullcrap on the period (both by common people, in books, movies, games, and even by historians, but I believe that first and foremost the culprit is Machiaveli), so I decided I'd open a thread.
For the sake of easy writing and easy reading, I'll go with a point by point case, although some of them might overlap.
1) The "Standing army vs army of mercenaries" myth.
I've often heard that people believe that the Italian Wars marked the introduction of standing armies from France to a broader european scenario, and that the weakness of italian statues was due to the fact that they relied exclusively on mercenary forces. That is false. Most italian states already had extensive standing permanent armies by mid 1400. In fact, one of the clauses of the Italic League was that each state maintained a sizeable standing army for purposes of mutual defense. The first real standing army in Italy was organized by Bernabò Visconti in Milan in 1369, when many sons of noble families were enlisted in a cavalry regiment and were obligated to serve in it for two months each year, and would receive a regular wage al year, even in peace time.
In the 15th century almost all italian states got themselves standing armies, and most often before Charles VIII created his compagnies d'ordonnances. In some cases they were rather big. By the beginning of 1400, it's esteemed that the standing forces of Giangaleazzo Visconti were around 15.000 strong. By 1456 (in peace time) Milan had a standing force of 12.000 knights, which was bigger than the compagnies d'ordonnances, and again by 1476 we know that they had 10.000 "provisionati" (standing infantry).
Venice was no different, and Naples had a sizeable standing army as well.
Similarly, the French army (or any other army in Europe) employed mercenaries in great numbers as well.
2) The presumed "bloodless battles of the 15th century".
I blame Machiavelli here. He hated the practice of italian state hiring Condottieri, with a passion, believing them to be a tool of the Signori to keep control on the cities they ruled (and, most importantly, part of that same social class which he despised) and made up a lot of stuff. He blatantly lied about some battles, such as the battle of Anghiari (about 900 deaths) or the battle of Molinella (about 600 deaths), saying no single death occured. It is true that the battles weren't as bloody as other periods, but that's a huge exaggeration. In reality the somewhat lower number of deaths can be explained by the fact that many professional soldiers wore heavy armor, and that every respectable condottiero had his own field surgeon and doctor who could tend to the wounds of the soldiers. In fact we have many accounts of wounded soldiers from the period being able to survive, as well as many condottieri who were wounded in battle (in a much lower number than the number of condottieri who were killed in battle). Similarly, the practice of sparing and releasing prisoners (unless wealthy / of noble descent) after stripping them of thei weapons was common and followed by pretty much everyone.
Besides, one has to keep in mind that his own soldiers (and the equipment they carried as well as their horses) represented an investment for the Condottiero. They would rarely seek a decisive battle by risking their whole army, because it'd mean total economical ruin. The tactics employed were conservative, which meant that they would try to avoid the possibility of a complete defeat (although that occasionally happened). But they would still attempt to win on the battlefield if conditions were favourable: after all it'd mean ransoms and loot, which could make them rich.
3) The technological & doctrinal inferiority of the italian armies.
To this myth contributed some historians as well (for instance, Taylor with his influential "The art of war in Italy").
I often hear that infantry had a marginal role in Italy, which is false. One would have to ignore all the battles fought in the Quattrocento which were decided by infantry.
I saw in a popular tv series (The Borgias, the one with Jeremy Irons) that they showed Italy as not having artillery / cannons whatsoever, which is of course ridiculous as cannons had been used since 150 years at least, and all fortresses had cannons. Firearms spreaded quickly, and there were several innovations brought forward in Italy. Milan in particular was extremely quick with fabricating new guns for its armies.
People claim that the french army brought a new way of fighting, but it's not true. Their way of fighting in battle was the same as the italian one, as their army was composed at least by 50% of heavy cavalry, and the so famous swiss pikemen weren't actually invincible (more on them later).
In fact, I would claim the opposite: that the french way of fighting (seeking a decisive battle at all costs, no matter the odds) was the outdated one, a relic of the medieval era, while the careful, almost scientific maneuvering that was fashionable among the condottieri was the modern way of fighting. One could say that Gonzalo de Cordova took inspiration by the Condottieri (as well as Cuntactor, most likely; after all he, like the condottieri, looked at the roman era for inspiration) for the delaying strategy he adopted in southern Italy. The french would be on the offensive and the decisive battle, but they encountered enemies who refused battle and stay on the defensive, and only accept battle on their terms.
There was a notable exception to this: the battle of Fornovo. The marquis of Gonzaga could easily have blocked the mountain passes on the Appennines and block the way, but he probably sought personal glory, and thus decided to engage the french army on open field. There he elaborated a overly complex plan that eventually failed: the french retreated and the italian coalition managed to chase them off and conquer their baggage train, but the king and most of his army escaped. But that was the exception, due to Gonzaga's idiocy, not the rule. In fact his behaviour in that campaign was against all the principles that were common among the Condottieri of his time.
What was the strategical doctrine of the condottieri? Delaying and outmaneuvering the adversary, and only conceding battle if the odds were greatly in your favour, and possibly forcing your enemy in a position in which he was incapable of fighting. The Condottieri, throughout all the Quattrocento, had become fascinated with the ancient world, and obviously admired the organization roman armies had. Most of them were literate men and owned personal libraries. They read (and sometimes wrote) ancient and modern treatises on the art of warfare, and were obsessed with the art of maneuver and stratagem (sometimes even too much - the perfect victory was considered to be the one obtained with minimal losses; Cesare Borgia was infamous for this: he managed to conquer the cities of the Romagna without fighting a single field battle). They also understood the importance of logistics, intelligence and field fortifications, and were able to move sizeable armies with unprecedented speed.
During battles, they were generally able to have more control over their armies than their foreign counterparts: just look at the complex tactics adopted by Braccio da Montone and his successors (sometimes this could backfire: there was the risk of making overly complex plans. and only really skilled condottieri could successfully use elaborate plans, especially in larger armies, as you had to rely on other condottieri to carry out your orders, and there could be personal rivalries or disagreements making coordinating the whole army a mess, so while strong personalities like Braccio di Montone, Bartolomeo Colleoni or Francesco Sforza could pull it out, others like Francesco Gonzaga or Niccolò di Pitigliano at Agnadello tried but failed utterly).
In short, I wouldn't say their doctrine was outdated. In fact, I believe (and in this I agree with Taylor) that this scenario was the birthplace of modern strategy.
4) The presumed isolation of italian warfare is what made it lag behind.
Not only I don't believe that it lagged behind, but the whole assumption that it was isolated from the rest of Europe is false. Cannons and firearms spreaded in Italy just like elsewhere (in most cases, earlier than elsewhere in Europe), as well as the innovation in fortifications (in which italian engineers were the forerunners). It's true that the period of great foreign mercenary leaders was over in the Quattrocento as almost all Condottieri now belonged to the local aristocratic class, but there were still many foreign soldiers & officers fighting and serving in Italy in the Quattrocento: french soldiers left unemployed by the truces in the war in France, spaniards following the Aragonese in southern Italy in the wars versus the Anjou, greek and albanian stradiots fighting for Venice (Venice had light cavalry before the eruption of the Italian Wars, despite what Taylor claims), hungarians, germans, slavs, even turks (at some point Naples hired 2000 turkish cavalrymen). Likewise, many italian condottieri fought abroad during the Quattrocento. Pippo Spano was the commander of the Hungarian army, Cola di Monforte served for duke Charles the Bold of Burgundy (Philippe de Commines esteemed that italian soldiers formed the bulk of the army of duke Charles) and Jacopo Galeota served the king of France. Later, during the french invasion of Italy of 1494, it was Gian Giacomo Trivulzio and Francesco Secco who led the french army (along with Charles VIII) at the battle of Fornovo against the italian coalition, while the Colonna brothers had important commands in the spanish army (and were instrumental in the victory at Cerignola, but more on that later).
Besides, one shouldn't forget that in the Quattrocento italian states often fought with foreign powers. Milan sent an expeditionary force in France in 1465. Venice often fought against the Turks, and beat the Hungarians repeatedly. Milan defeated the imperial forces in 1401 at Brescia, then twice the french army of the Duke of Orleans (during the brief Ambrosian republic interlude, in 1447 and 1449), and the french were once again defeated in Genoa in 1461. Milan also defeated the dreadful swiss pikemen, twice, at Arbedo (1422) and at Crevola (1487) (and in both cases, it was milanese infantry, or dismounted cavalry, defeating the swiss pikemen (once again, Taylor's claim that italian states weren't ready for infantry warfare and weren't ready to sustain the impact of the swiss pikemen is bullcrap). Speaking of the swiss pikemen, one shouldn't forget the role that field fortifications played during those years. The condottieri were masters in that (we have accounts of condottieri army building ditches long dozens of kilometers or fortifying huge regions in really short times). The field fortifications built by Fabrizio and Prospero Colonna is what gave the victory to the army of Gonzalo de Cordova at Cerignola, and since then the swiss pikemen forever lost their reputation.
But even if we ignore all of that, we have hundreds of accounts of italian diplomats in european courts sending letters homes and informing their dukes, princes and doges about the state of european armies during all the Quattrocento. To claim that Italy was isolated from the military innovations across the Alps is madness.
5) The alleged chivalric "ethos" of the Condottieri is what made them fail.
I've actually heard this a lot (and saw it reflected in some cultural products, for instance a movie by Ermanno Olmi and a novel by Antonio Scurati). People claiming that the Condottieri style of warfare became outdated for that reason, while french and spanish army were modern and had left it behind, and seeing it under a romantic light. First of all, let me start by saying that the chivalry ethos was present in the same measure in the french and spanish nobility, if not more. Secondly, to say that Condottieri were costrained by ethical rules is madness. Sure, they liked to speak of honour, and had concepts such as "mala guerra" (as in, dishonourable conduct in warfare), but it mostly consisted in the prohibition to kill or mutilate prisoners (as I said before, soldiers were normally liberated immediately after they were stripped of their weapons, while condottieri were ransomed - and in rare cases, jailed). Besides that, anything goes. Sure, some condottieri were criticized by contemporaries for having targetted horses on purpose (Micheletto Attendolo at the battle of L'Aquila), but everyone did that anyway. They would often employ stratagems such as nightly raids, poisoning the supplies or wells of the enemy, assassination of enemy leaders (even through poison or chemical weapons - there is a record about this in Venice), kidnappings of hostages, catapulting corpses over the walls during sieges, bribing traitors to backstab the enemy army, use spies, spread false information and fabricate evidence of treason, deviating rivers to flood the enemy camp, taking cities by surprise, not respecting truces and so on.
If anything, their constant delaying and avoiding battle was considered unchivalrous by their french contemporaries.
6) Taylor claiming that italians didn't understand the importance of topographical barriers.
And here I just lol, as both Venice and Milan had a system of fortresses on the Alps and on the big rivers of Lombardia. Rivers such as the Adda (which whole line was fortified) or the Livenza (fortified in 1421) or the Adige were considered extremely important, and both states had fleets of dozens of galleys on the rivers and on the lakes of northern Italy, and the control of such rivers was considered of mandatory important by both states (in fact, they fought several river battles: at the battle of Cremona in 1431 Venice had 85 galleys on the Po river). And I've read myself the letters between Francesco Sforza and the commanders of his alpine fortresses: the interest of the duke in the maintenance of those border fortresses (as well as his interest in having informers on what happens in Switzerland) is evident.
7) The lack of will by the italian states to fight a total war.
This post is getting already extremely long, so I will be brief here: let me just say that it's not true that they only fought limited wars in scope and objectives, as italian states did fight total wars in the Quattrocento. The struggle between the Anjou and the Aragonese was a total war, and so were the wars fought in Lombardy and Tuscany in the first half of the 15th century (during which some states actually had to fight for survival). Milan under Giangaleazzo Visconti, while he was trying to achieve hegemony in Northern Italy, often fought on two fronts at once, and had a force of over 40.000 soldiers. In fact the cost for military actions skyrocketed throughout all the Quattrocento, despite the fact that the wages of soldiers actually went down. All italian states by the second half of the Quattrocento were spending way more of their budget in their army than what they had been spending just a century before, and all of them started employing standing armies to fight all year long, and not just during spring, early summer and autumn.
Basically, my whole thesis is that Italy during those years wasn't militarily inferior at all. Then why did the italian states fail? It was political weakness. The Italic League established in 1454 contained the embryo for a "confederation" (at some point there were even talks of a unified command for all the armed forces in Italy), but ultimately it rested on two pillars: the power and prestige of Francesco Sforza and the money and influence of Cosimo de' Medici (as well as that of Lorenzo). In 1494 the political situation was much more fragile as Piero de' Medici was extremely weak and Ludovico "the Moor" Sforza was a brutal backstabbing bastard no one liked. Ludovico crapped on the Italic League by allying with France, and the florentine political system collapsed (with Piero having to flee the city). Meanwhile, in Rome the Borgia were alienating the local aristocracy of the Orsini and the Colonna, causing even more dissent, while the throne of Naples had been weakened just a few years before by a revolt of the barons. It was the perfect storm, Italy was politically fragile and France took advantage of the situation.
In short, France played the old game of the "divide et impera", and was able to do it as a Signoria was extremely weak and susceptible to revolts in the moment in which its signore was disliked by the local middle and upper class and its neighbours. The duchy of Milan under Giangaleazzo Visconti or Filippo Maria Visconti, or Francesco Sforza (or even during the brief Ambrosian Republic) was a powerful state able to field a large professional army and had ambitions to hegemonize northern Italy. Under Ludovico it collapsed and crumbled like a castle of cards. The same could be said of the signoria of the Medici in Florence, which was in those years an extremely turbulent city (although later they managed to regain their city through diplomacy). In 1494 France was able to march undisturbed down to Naples without fighting a single battle.
The exception was the Republic of Venice, and that's why it managed to defend itself successfully during those two decades of incessant warfare (and had to face the ever worrying Ottoman threat to boot). The difference is that Venice managed to win the loyalty of the cities it ruled, but that could be the subject for another thread, and I feel like this is already too long.
For the sake of easy writing and easy reading, I'll go with a point by point case, although some of them might overlap.
1) The "Standing army vs army of mercenaries" myth.
I've often heard that people believe that the Italian Wars marked the introduction of standing armies from France to a broader european scenario, and that the weakness of italian statues was due to the fact that they relied exclusively on mercenary forces. That is false. Most italian states already had extensive standing permanent armies by mid 1400. In fact, one of the clauses of the Italic League was that each state maintained a sizeable standing army for purposes of mutual defense. The first real standing army in Italy was organized by Bernabò Visconti in Milan in 1369, when many sons of noble families were enlisted in a cavalry regiment and were obligated to serve in it for two months each year, and would receive a regular wage al year, even in peace time.
In the 15th century almost all italian states got themselves standing armies, and most often before Charles VIII created his compagnies d'ordonnances. In some cases they were rather big. By the beginning of 1400, it's esteemed that the standing forces of Giangaleazzo Visconti were around 15.000 strong. By 1456 (in peace time) Milan had a standing force of 12.000 knights, which was bigger than the compagnies d'ordonnances, and again by 1476 we know that they had 10.000 "provisionati" (standing infantry).
Venice was no different, and Naples had a sizeable standing army as well.
Similarly, the French army (or any other army in Europe) employed mercenaries in great numbers as well.
2) The presumed "bloodless battles of the 15th century".
I blame Machiavelli here. He hated the practice of italian state hiring Condottieri, with a passion, believing them to be a tool of the Signori to keep control on the cities they ruled (and, most importantly, part of that same social class which he despised) and made up a lot of stuff. He blatantly lied about some battles, such as the battle of Anghiari (about 900 deaths) or the battle of Molinella (about 600 deaths), saying no single death occured. It is true that the battles weren't as bloody as other periods, but that's a huge exaggeration. In reality the somewhat lower number of deaths can be explained by the fact that many professional soldiers wore heavy armor, and that every respectable condottiero had his own field surgeon and doctor who could tend to the wounds of the soldiers. In fact we have many accounts of wounded soldiers from the period being able to survive, as well as many condottieri who were wounded in battle (in a much lower number than the number of condottieri who were killed in battle). Similarly, the practice of sparing and releasing prisoners (unless wealthy / of noble descent) after stripping them of thei weapons was common and followed by pretty much everyone.
Besides, one has to keep in mind that his own soldiers (and the equipment they carried as well as their horses) represented an investment for the Condottiero. They would rarely seek a decisive battle by risking their whole army, because it'd mean total economical ruin. The tactics employed were conservative, which meant that they would try to avoid the possibility of a complete defeat (although that occasionally happened). But they would still attempt to win on the battlefield if conditions were favourable: after all it'd mean ransoms and loot, which could make them rich.
3) The technological & doctrinal inferiority of the italian armies.
To this myth contributed some historians as well (for instance, Taylor with his influential "The art of war in Italy").
I often hear that infantry had a marginal role in Italy, which is false. One would have to ignore all the battles fought in the Quattrocento which were decided by infantry.
I saw in a popular tv series (The Borgias, the one with Jeremy Irons) that they showed Italy as not having artillery / cannons whatsoever, which is of course ridiculous as cannons had been used since 150 years at least, and all fortresses had cannons. Firearms spreaded quickly, and there were several innovations brought forward in Italy. Milan in particular was extremely quick with fabricating new guns for its armies.
People claim that the french army brought a new way of fighting, but it's not true. Their way of fighting in battle was the same as the italian one, as their army was composed at least by 50% of heavy cavalry, and the so famous swiss pikemen weren't actually invincible (more on them later).
In fact, I would claim the opposite: that the french way of fighting (seeking a decisive battle at all costs, no matter the odds) was the outdated one, a relic of the medieval era, while the careful, almost scientific maneuvering that was fashionable among the condottieri was the modern way of fighting. One could say that Gonzalo de Cordova took inspiration by the Condottieri (as well as Cuntactor, most likely; after all he, like the condottieri, looked at the roman era for inspiration) for the delaying strategy he adopted in southern Italy. The french would be on the offensive and the decisive battle, but they encountered enemies who refused battle and stay on the defensive, and only accept battle on their terms.
There was a notable exception to this: the battle of Fornovo. The marquis of Gonzaga could easily have blocked the mountain passes on the Appennines and block the way, but he probably sought personal glory, and thus decided to engage the french army on open field. There he elaborated a overly complex plan that eventually failed: the french retreated and the italian coalition managed to chase them off and conquer their baggage train, but the king and most of his army escaped. But that was the exception, due to Gonzaga's idiocy, not the rule. In fact his behaviour in that campaign was against all the principles that were common among the Condottieri of his time.
What was the strategical doctrine of the condottieri? Delaying and outmaneuvering the adversary, and only conceding battle if the odds were greatly in your favour, and possibly forcing your enemy in a position in which he was incapable of fighting. The Condottieri, throughout all the Quattrocento, had become fascinated with the ancient world, and obviously admired the organization roman armies had. Most of them were literate men and owned personal libraries. They read (and sometimes wrote) ancient and modern treatises on the art of warfare, and were obsessed with the art of maneuver and stratagem (sometimes even too much - the perfect victory was considered to be the one obtained with minimal losses; Cesare Borgia was infamous for this: he managed to conquer the cities of the Romagna without fighting a single field battle). They also understood the importance of logistics, intelligence and field fortifications, and were able to move sizeable armies with unprecedented speed.
During battles, they were generally able to have more control over their armies than their foreign counterparts: just look at the complex tactics adopted by Braccio da Montone and his successors (sometimes this could backfire: there was the risk of making overly complex plans. and only really skilled condottieri could successfully use elaborate plans, especially in larger armies, as you had to rely on other condottieri to carry out your orders, and there could be personal rivalries or disagreements making coordinating the whole army a mess, so while strong personalities like Braccio di Montone, Bartolomeo Colleoni or Francesco Sforza could pull it out, others like Francesco Gonzaga or Niccolò di Pitigliano at Agnadello tried but failed utterly).
In short, I wouldn't say their doctrine was outdated. In fact, I believe (and in this I agree with Taylor) that this scenario was the birthplace of modern strategy.
4) The presumed isolation of italian warfare is what made it lag behind.
Not only I don't believe that it lagged behind, but the whole assumption that it was isolated from the rest of Europe is false. Cannons and firearms spreaded in Italy just like elsewhere (in most cases, earlier than elsewhere in Europe), as well as the innovation in fortifications (in which italian engineers were the forerunners). It's true that the period of great foreign mercenary leaders was over in the Quattrocento as almost all Condottieri now belonged to the local aristocratic class, but there were still many foreign soldiers & officers fighting and serving in Italy in the Quattrocento: french soldiers left unemployed by the truces in the war in France, spaniards following the Aragonese in southern Italy in the wars versus the Anjou, greek and albanian stradiots fighting for Venice (Venice had light cavalry before the eruption of the Italian Wars, despite what Taylor claims), hungarians, germans, slavs, even turks (at some point Naples hired 2000 turkish cavalrymen). Likewise, many italian condottieri fought abroad during the Quattrocento. Pippo Spano was the commander of the Hungarian army, Cola di Monforte served for duke Charles the Bold of Burgundy (Philippe de Commines esteemed that italian soldiers formed the bulk of the army of duke Charles) and Jacopo Galeota served the king of France. Later, during the french invasion of Italy of 1494, it was Gian Giacomo Trivulzio and Francesco Secco who led the french army (along with Charles VIII) at the battle of Fornovo against the italian coalition, while the Colonna brothers had important commands in the spanish army (and were instrumental in the victory at Cerignola, but more on that later).
Besides, one shouldn't forget that in the Quattrocento italian states often fought with foreign powers. Milan sent an expeditionary force in France in 1465. Venice often fought against the Turks, and beat the Hungarians repeatedly. Milan defeated the imperial forces in 1401 at Brescia, then twice the french army of the Duke of Orleans (during the brief Ambrosian republic interlude, in 1447 and 1449), and the french were once again defeated in Genoa in 1461. Milan also defeated the dreadful swiss pikemen, twice, at Arbedo (1422) and at Crevola (1487) (and in both cases, it was milanese infantry, or dismounted cavalry, defeating the swiss pikemen (once again, Taylor's claim that italian states weren't ready for infantry warfare and weren't ready to sustain the impact of the swiss pikemen is bullcrap). Speaking of the swiss pikemen, one shouldn't forget the role that field fortifications played during those years. The condottieri were masters in that (we have accounts of condottieri army building ditches long dozens of kilometers or fortifying huge regions in really short times). The field fortifications built by Fabrizio and Prospero Colonna is what gave the victory to the army of Gonzalo de Cordova at Cerignola, and since then the swiss pikemen forever lost their reputation.
But even if we ignore all of that, we have hundreds of accounts of italian diplomats in european courts sending letters homes and informing their dukes, princes and doges about the state of european armies during all the Quattrocento. To claim that Italy was isolated from the military innovations across the Alps is madness.
5) The alleged chivalric "ethos" of the Condottieri is what made them fail.
I've actually heard this a lot (and saw it reflected in some cultural products, for instance a movie by Ermanno Olmi and a novel by Antonio Scurati). People claiming that the Condottieri style of warfare became outdated for that reason, while french and spanish army were modern and had left it behind, and seeing it under a romantic light. First of all, let me start by saying that the chivalry ethos was present in the same measure in the french and spanish nobility, if not more. Secondly, to say that Condottieri were costrained by ethical rules is madness. Sure, they liked to speak of honour, and had concepts such as "mala guerra" (as in, dishonourable conduct in warfare), but it mostly consisted in the prohibition to kill or mutilate prisoners (as I said before, soldiers were normally liberated immediately after they were stripped of their weapons, while condottieri were ransomed - and in rare cases, jailed). Besides that, anything goes. Sure, some condottieri were criticized by contemporaries for having targetted horses on purpose (Micheletto Attendolo at the battle of L'Aquila), but everyone did that anyway. They would often employ stratagems such as nightly raids, poisoning the supplies or wells of the enemy, assassination of enemy leaders (even through poison or chemical weapons - there is a record about this in Venice), kidnappings of hostages, catapulting corpses over the walls during sieges, bribing traitors to backstab the enemy army, use spies, spread false information and fabricate evidence of treason, deviating rivers to flood the enemy camp, taking cities by surprise, not respecting truces and so on.
If anything, their constant delaying and avoiding battle was considered unchivalrous by their french contemporaries.
6) Taylor claiming that italians didn't understand the importance of topographical barriers.
And here I just lol, as both Venice and Milan had a system of fortresses on the Alps and on the big rivers of Lombardia. Rivers such as the Adda (which whole line was fortified) or the Livenza (fortified in 1421) or the Adige were considered extremely important, and both states had fleets of dozens of galleys on the rivers and on the lakes of northern Italy, and the control of such rivers was considered of mandatory important by both states (in fact, they fought several river battles: at the battle of Cremona in 1431 Venice had 85 galleys on the Po river). And I've read myself the letters between Francesco Sforza and the commanders of his alpine fortresses: the interest of the duke in the maintenance of those border fortresses (as well as his interest in having informers on what happens in Switzerland) is evident.
7) The lack of will by the italian states to fight a total war.
This post is getting already extremely long, so I will be brief here: let me just say that it's not true that they only fought limited wars in scope and objectives, as italian states did fight total wars in the Quattrocento. The struggle between the Anjou and the Aragonese was a total war, and so were the wars fought in Lombardy and Tuscany in the first half of the 15th century (during which some states actually had to fight for survival). Milan under Giangaleazzo Visconti, while he was trying to achieve hegemony in Northern Italy, often fought on two fronts at once, and had a force of over 40.000 soldiers. In fact the cost for military actions skyrocketed throughout all the Quattrocento, despite the fact that the wages of soldiers actually went down. All italian states by the second half of the Quattrocento were spending way more of their budget in their army than what they had been spending just a century before, and all of them started employing standing armies to fight all year long, and not just during spring, early summer and autumn.
Basically, my whole thesis is that Italy during those years wasn't militarily inferior at all. Then why did the italian states fail? It was political weakness. The Italic League established in 1454 contained the embryo for a "confederation" (at some point there were even talks of a unified command for all the armed forces in Italy), but ultimately it rested on two pillars: the power and prestige of Francesco Sforza and the money and influence of Cosimo de' Medici (as well as that of Lorenzo). In 1494 the political situation was much more fragile as Piero de' Medici was extremely weak and Ludovico "the Moor" Sforza was a brutal backstabbing bastard no one liked. Ludovico crapped on the Italic League by allying with France, and the florentine political system collapsed (with Piero having to flee the city). Meanwhile, in Rome the Borgia were alienating the local aristocracy of the Orsini and the Colonna, causing even more dissent, while the throne of Naples had been weakened just a few years before by a revolt of the barons. It was the perfect storm, Italy was politically fragile and France took advantage of the situation.
In short, France played the old game of the "divide et impera", and was able to do it as a Signoria was extremely weak and susceptible to revolts in the moment in which its signore was disliked by the local middle and upper class and its neighbours. The duchy of Milan under Giangaleazzo Visconti or Filippo Maria Visconti, or Francesco Sforza (or even during the brief Ambrosian Republic) was a powerful state able to field a large professional army and had ambitions to hegemonize northern Italy. Under Ludovico it collapsed and crumbled like a castle of cards. The same could be said of the signoria of the Medici in Florence, which was in those years an extremely turbulent city (although later they managed to regain their city through diplomacy). In 1494 France was able to march undisturbed down to Naples without fighting a single battle.
The exception was the Republic of Venice, and that's why it managed to defend itself successfully during those two decades of incessant warfare (and had to face the ever worrying Ottoman threat to boot). The difference is that Venice managed to win the loyalty of the cities it ruled, but that could be the subject for another thread, and I feel like this is already too long.
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