Introduction
By mid-1944, the war was not going well by any standard for the once-mighty Axis Powers: A series of defeats in the Soviet Union, Africa, and Italy, as well as an extensive Anglo-American strategic bombing campaign against German industry, infrastructure, and already-scarce sources of strategic resources (especially petroleum) had reduced the Axis war machine to a mere shadow of its former glory:
With a front extending from the Arctic to the Greek Peninsula in the south and another, rapidly advancing front opened by the Allies after their successful landings at Normandy and northern France, it was considered by the public of many an Allied state that it was only a matter of time before a general German collapse, whether from an American or Soviet fist, both prospects feared greatly by the average German.
Opposing them stood the Allied Powers or the United Nations (the designation as of January 1st, 1942). Despite early successes on the part of the German Reich and Japanese Empire and Allied propaganda material from the period, the war, from its very inception, had been a battle of the "haves" versus the "have nots" and it had begun to show as early as mid-1940, but had become extremely apparent during the following four years:
In possession of the vast majority of the world's population, industrial capacity, and war-making capability, for the Axis, two biggest problems by far were the United States of America and the Soviet Union: Both blessed with a seemingly-bottomless pool of resources and manpower, as well as vast swaths of territory from which to draw them; respectively, the main strengths of the two titans were the speed and quality of their armaments and the mass production and single-minded brutality towards which they would put achieving a goal. While still very much alive and kicking, the declining British Empire was considered less of a threat.
Of course, the Empire of Japan was no exception to these setbacks: Having had pursued a full-scale, somewhat-successful campaign against the First Republic of China since 1937, the resulting American embargo in 1940 on top of several other provocations prompted a spectacular backlash against the Western Powers from Tokyo, beginning on December 7th, 1941 in Hawaii, extending to the borders of British India in the west, the North Central Pacific in the east, and the island of New Guinea by mid-1942. But much like that of their German ally, these successes were to be fleeting: A string of defeats in the Pacific on land and at sea, American training and modernization of the National Revolutionary Army, and an extensive submarine campaign was putting the Japanese war effort in increasing peril by 1944.
At an emergency staff meeting during the night of June 20th-21st, an unusually-incensed Hirohito[1] urged his general staff to "put an end to this nonsensical bickering and figure out a solution to this problem." As Prime Minister and Chief of Staff, General Hideki Tojo found himself under increasing pressure, from both his monarch and fellow ministers to set a new direction which would at the very least, prevent a complete defeat of the empire. To this end, his long-time protege Admiral Shigetarō Shimada was replaced with Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa, the most capable admirals in the entire Imperial Japanese Navy and the foremost advocate of naval aviation after the assassination of Yamamoto. Elevated to
Gensui (in this context, Grand Admiral), Ozawa was given the task of reassembling the battered Combined Fleet for the inevitable clash with the US Navy. Tojo himself took over the as operational commander of the Kempeitai and Tokkō, while appointing prominent industrialist Ginjiro Fujiwara to maximize Japan's industrial capacity even further.
Having consulted with many of the finest minds in the entirety of the army and navy (particularly Generals Tomoyuki Yamashita, Tadamichi Kuryibayashi, and Yasuji Okamura) and hours of panning by their fellow members of
Daihon'ei, Tojo and Ozawa eventually managed to come out with a strategic template: The situation was obviously grave, but not hopeless. However, the empire would have to, at all costs, retake the offensive initiative were this strategy to succeed:
One of, if not the foremost concern was to retake the island of Saipan from the American landing forces: Should the American strategic bombing wings gain a foothold in the region, the home islands and what remained of Japanese shipping would be at their mercy. Just as vital was the preservation of imperial positions in the Mariana Islands:
Equally as vital to the war effort as the preservation of the defensive ring around the home islands was the final defeat and destruction of the Republic of China: If the eastern coast of China was to fall, American bombers would more or less have free reign over the empire. To this end, Okamura proposed an offensive, Operation Ichi-Go, with the immediate goal being "to drive the Kuomintang and Communist forces into the interior with the ultimate goal of the destruction of the Republic of China." With this longtime goal accomplished, hundreds of thousands of battle-hardened Japanese troops would be freed up for other purposes:
While not as immediate a threat as the landings on the Saipan, the Japanese position on New Guinea had deteriorated to the point of near-collapse, possibly putting the occupied Philippines and Dutch East Indies in danger, with three divisions cut off from the American-held ports of Hollandia and Lae yet bracing themselves for the inevitable American assault. Unfortunately, it was a nearly-unanimous opinion among the IJN planners that it would be impossible to evacuate these men without putting precious transports in grave danger from the American fleets in the area. High Command issued an order, roughly translating to "hold in place and hope for the best."
The situation on the periphery, while not as dire as the above locales, could easily have become a massive problem for the Japanese:
While in possession of vast swaths of Burma, were the British to reinforce these positions to any real degree, the situation would have been become very untenable, endangering the Dutch Indies and the empire's main source of precious petroleum. In spite of this, not many forces could be spared for the defense of Burma by the middle of 1944.
However, for the Empire of Japan in 1944, there was one wild card, probably the wildest of all cards in the situation:
Japan was in the extremely odd position of being a member of the Axis Powers, yet not at war with the Soviet Union like her allies, due to the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and ignoring Hitler's repeated pleas to join in the assault against the red giant in 1941-42. While a source of much-needed raw materials, relations between Tokyo and Moscow remained chilly at the very best. Even in spite of this uneasy "peace," many in the Japanese military establishment knew that, sooner or later, that the Empire of the Sun and the Red Monster would have to clash.
With the war against Germany more or less concluded in the minds of the publics of the United Kingdom and the United States, American economist Harry Dexter White, perhaps inspired by his close colleague, issued his vision for the post-war order in East Asia, which was met with rave reviews by many in the Anglo-American government and literati. Titled the "
White Plan for Perpetual Peace and Prosperity in East Asia," the plan consisted of the following stipulations as part of a general Japanese surrender:
I: The fair and speedy trial and execution of all war criminals, such as every member of the Imperial family above 13 years of age, and the perpetual exile and reeducation of those underage
II: The partition of the Japanese archipelago into two sovereign, independent republics under Allied supervision
III: Technology introduced after the year 1700 will be completely forbidden on the Japanese islands; in addition any and all modern industry will be forbidden
IV: Territorial cessations to our Russian friends are in dark red, while new American territories are in dark purple
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[1] Traditionally in East Asia, emperors would have a posthumous name, by which they are to be spoken of after their passing. For example, the previous
tennō is to be referred to as the Shōwa Emperor (Japanese:
Shōwa Tennō) in Japanese, never his given name. In contrast, his son's reign name
Heisei is reserved for after his death and son's ascension to the Chrysanthemum Throne. I use the given name Hirohito as a courtesy-slash-convenience for English speakers.
