Gaarq said:
i would only agree with the thesis that poland was not to launch an attack against CZE due to the fear of soviets as soviets would happily abuse the situation if poland would go for a war with CZE to kick an offensive against poland.
Soviets could hardly launch anything at that time. Poland had extensive spy network in the SU and Germany and was well informed about military situation.
Soviets were in the middle of the purges which seriously disrupted their abilty to fight at that time.
Some diplomatic posturing was all the could do.
i do not believe jozef beck had much sympathy for czechoslovakia and he would let it die happily.
Nobody really liked Czechoslovakia in Poland, BUT nobody was willing to help in its demise - ANY help for Germany would break the political line of the doctrine of two enemies and would seriously move Poland towards fascist camp which couldn't be allowed to happen.
Poland would most likely fight Germany if Czechoslovakia did, not because it loved Benes, but because it would be a perfect opportunity to derail German expansion. However when Czechoslovak government didn't do anything it was pointless to support it where it wasn't going to fight for its own interests.
There is a strong possibility that Poland would later demand a plebistite or a new conference to get Zaolzie back, it might try to get Ruthenia too, but as Beck admitted it would be all in Polish interest to support Czechoslovakia if it decided to fight, otherwise take back Zaolzie at least.
germany wasn't enemy that time, didn't poland and germany have a NA pact (not full NA, but some kinda) in late 1938?
As Pilsudski said about this pact - '4-5 years gentlemen' - it was a piece of paper which was supposed to buy some time to improve defences and persuade the French to renew its alliance with Poland. After all it was only signed after the French refused to support the preventive war Pilsudski proposed them in 1933-34 promising a suitable incident in Danzig ( at that time there were 4 incidents in the area - recent studies seem to conclude their were triggered on purpose).
Essentially it was seen as little more than a piece of paper and together with German hopes for Poland joining the Axis (carefully nourished by Polish diplomacy which 'never said no, but never said yes') it meant Germany kept better relationship with Poland under Hitler than before him - it would never stop Poland from hitting them if an opportunity was there, but there was none so...
In general Poland tried to keep its distance from both enemies, buying time to find a way from increasinly worse situation - French were seen as unreliable ( Rydz-Smigly described their officer corps as 'utter mess'), Britain was 'without a backbone' (and Lloyed George was still well remembered), Czechoslovakia hostile, Lithuania even worse - only Hungary, Romania and Latvia were friendly, but Romania had its use only against the Soviets (so alliance was signed here) and was in conflict with Hungary, while Latvia was a pathetic ally to say the least (Finland and Estonia were afraid of the SU too much) and uncertain to say the least.
In other words the situation sucked a lot, so anything to improve it without allying with Germany or the Soviets would be seen as an opportunity which CANNOT be wasted.
Sometimes enemy (czechoslovakia) of your enemy (Germany) is a fried - not to be loved, but certainly with its uses.
poland would gor, me thinks, for an independence for slovakia as potential partner. wasn't it lacizski, who informed hlinka in march 28, 1938, that poland would prefer to have a stable south border with free slovakia as an ally?
Slovakian seperatism was supported for a long time, but German-Czech war would be an excellent opportunity to stop Germany and move the western border of Poland in Upper Silesia (and maybe Eastern Prussia) a bit - not to mention the highly probable demand for Zaolzie after victorius end of the war.