Czechoslovakia defence/forts

[Mandraug]

It wasn't just Keitel.

Von Manstein also testified at Nuremburg: "If a war had broken out, neither our western border nor our Polish frontier could have been effectively defended by us, and there is no doubt whatsoever that had Czechoslovakia defended herself, we would have been held up by her fortifications, for we did not have the means to break through."

Post-occupation, Hitler also went and inspected the lines and is quoted as having told Dr. Carl Burkhardt "When after Munich we were in a position to examine Czechoslovak military strength from within, what we saw of it greatly disturbed us; We had run a serious danger. The plan prepared by the Czech generals was formidable. I now understand why my generals urged restraint."

Thanks for these. I'd heard of some statement attributed to Hitler but always wondered where it was from and whether it was credible. Looks like it was.

Thanks for your well written post, it´s one of the best in this thread.

Happy to oblige! Like I said, It's one of my favourite scenarios and I couldn't resist.

 

[llib]

There are several things one must consider when it comes to army of Czechoslovakia against Wehrmacht.
Considering all factors, the ability of Czechoslovakia to successfully defend is vastly overestimated these days.

I think it is sometimes perhaps overestimated, but you seem to seriously underestimate. If it was Czechoslovakia vs. Germany, it's one thing. If it's Czechoslovaka and France vs. Germany in 1938, it's completely another.

- Tanks - the often mentioned weapon - were not nearly in sufficient numbers, not to mention their tactical implementation

I don't know much about the tactical implementation. What information exactly do you have?

- Forts - the other factor - were also not nearly sufficient. The original plans for heavy fortifications were not finished due to time and budget constraints. Anschulss of Austria created new border. The replacement light fortifications could only stop pure infantry attack. They had no way of stopping mechanized units or survive artillery fire. They were shallow and equiped only with few light and even fewer heavy machine guns.

I am not sure where are you getting most of the info. Original plan was not finished, but nor was Werhmacht's and Luftwaffe rearmament in 1938. Those "light fortifications" with mostly light machine guns could use AP ammo that would be pretty efficient against panzer 1 and panzer 2 - there were very few panzer 3/4-s back then. Further, they were _not_ intended for isolate defense, but as a strenghtening of the defensive line, with other troops in field fortifications. So far as I recall, AT gun numbers were quite adequate for the time, and let's not forget that even field guns of the time would ruin any German contemporary tank with single hit.

- Infantry was sufficiently equiped, the nuber of machine guns per soldiers were comparable, but there were severe problems with training and tactics, that for example didn't allow effective use of said machine guns

Any reference, please?

-Artillery - the lightning of generals - was based on outdated principle of favouring super-heavy guns and there was sever lack of smaller and mobile pieces that were shown to be crucial in the early years

I don't know exactly what was lacked - I don't think there was lack in the planned numbers, there may have been actually quite bit of surplus, due to new types replacing the old. There were some old very heavy pieces, that were usable more or less as siege artillery or for static lines, but they were by no means core of artillery.

- Airforce was clearly unsufficient. Avia fighters were result of wrong bet on maneauverability over speed, French bomber produced under license were outdated and both were not nearly in sufficient numbers

Well, yes. Airforce was inferior, there was no radar network, it would have been biggest weakness. Unfortunately antiaircraft armament was not on desirable numbers as well.

- Tactical and strategic skills of Czech generals were not on par with Germans. For example when the army was mobilized in September 1938, all units took exactly the same positions as they did during prior mobilization earlier that year. This is horrible mistake that would have been punished severly

I am not sure what exactly is your background, but when defending, you take best terrain. The choice may be obvious, but so what. Element of surprise is not everything - critical was to mobilize fast enough to get into position and not to be caught with your pants down. To try to conclude negative judgement from that is I think not rational.

- Support of local population in the border areas was questionable at best. Germany could rely on large number of agents and volunteer units that were even inside the Czechoslovakian army itself and would easily create chaos

As far as I recall from what I read, there were some uprisings that were supressed already, and the remaining main problem was that part of Germans would not mobilize. I have no idea what do you think few lightly-armed poorly-trained men could do behind the lines.

- Planning and strategy was clearly on German side. They did prepare for the eventual invasion very carefully. Previously mentioned agents mapped all possible routes very carefully including the position and nationality of gandarmes, capacity and structure of bridges, roads and railways.

What you mention as careful planning is really only basics. If you think that gave them superior knowledge of terrain, you are plain wrong. German understanding of Czechoslovak army organization was rather inaccurate in many areas.

All-in-all: if you think Germany stormed over Poland, they would have even easier time against Czechoslovakia

There was _huge_ difference because Polish military was grossly delusioned and unwilling to make hard choices. Czechoslovak had no ilusions and planned to fall back east from Prague where Polish were unwilling to cede much less crucial areas to improve front lines to something that could have been perhaps defensible.
For your information, Czechoslovak army in South Moravia at the time of Munich conference was numerically superior to Germans (because that was the crucial area).

 

[llib]

Ad forts - heavy fortresses were complex concrete monsters with artilery bunkers and AT artillery. The light fortifications (řopík) were machine gun only and very vunlerable against artillery fire and bombs. Good enough against infantry without support, easy to overcome by dedicated attack of combined forces.

As I mentioned in another post - řopiks were supposed to make the defensive line stronger and give time. They were not designed as impenetrable fort - so yes they weren't that, but they also were not supposed to be that.
"vulnerable against artillery fire and bombs"... řopik's were supposed to be good enough to resist 105mm fire or in hardened warriant 155mm fire. There also weren't just few of them in particular place, and Czechoslovakia had plenty artillery. As for air bombing, germany at the time of Munich had huge shortage of bombs. As for heavy german artillery - Germany was forbidden by Treaty of Versailles to have artillery, and they didn't really fixed that too much by the time of Munich (they got some from Austria and probably manufactured some as well - what they later got from Czechoslovakia was huge boost).
As mentioned elsewhere, heavy/ap shots from MGs(or rifles but of course with less rate of fire) could deal with more than 90% of German tanks.

Ad infantry - IIRC there was a problem of insufficient training and numbers of NCO personel, which is kind of key factor for effective use of small infantry unit. Other than that there was severe lack of AT artillery and ammunition and even worse motorization than in German army

Ad artillery - except the already mentioned missing light AT guns for infantry units, there were other problems. Useless heavy guns like the 6 240mm heavy guns. When you have pieces, that take 20 hours to prepare for fire, they are useless in mobile encounter. Even worse was the situation with 16 305mm howitzers. Even the seemingly useful 150mm guns had terrible rate of fire in 3 shots per minute for whole battery, which is not nearly enough to cause big enough casualties to attacking infantry. The biggest problem was of course very insufficient mobility. Only one regiment was fully motorized! And mind you, this wasn't due to lack of resources, but it was deliberate decision due to sever lack of drivers.
Light artillery units were better equiped (although still worse equiped than their German counterparts), but they were still held back by insufficient number of fire controll stations in the fortification system. They were essentially blind against mobile units.

I don't know where you get info about lack of AT guns, I think around 1K AT guns was pretty plenty for Czechoslovakia.
The few siege gun examples are just irrelevant - they were not core of artillery. I don't know which gun in particular do you mean had cadency of 3 shots per battery, but I doubt it was one of those more numerous.
As for motorization - I don't know what is it that you are lacking. Divisional artillery(belonging to infantry divisions!) was motorized more than 20%, corps artillery around 70%, heavy artillery (belonging to "Hlavní Štáb" reserve) 100%.
Against mobile units, defensive lines strengthened in critical places by fortifications were supposed to delay the attacker until command could react properly.

ad tactics and planning - yes, they built forts, but as mentioned earlier, despite the romantic ideas of today, they were not nearly sufficient way to stop focused attack. Except the few finished larger systems, they would have been easily isolated and destroyed. Later in war Germans showed that they can effectively overcome much heavier fortifications.
20% loss estimate is nice, but it doesn't say much. Everyone - including Germans - was surprised how effective their strategic doctrine showed up to be against Poland.
Don't really see how delaying of WW2 is a factor here, sorry.

They were not supposed to stop attack - heavy fortifications were, but light fortifications were not supposed. And forts were not all there was. Later attack successes against fortifications can be partially attributed to the experience Germany got with occupied Czechoslovak fortifications.

Doctrine of Czechoslovakian army did rely on static defense, but wasn't able to make the key strongpoints strong enough.

Czechoslovak army did not really rely on static defense, but strategy was generally defensive(although until Anschluss, for case of war with Germany plans included armed intrusion into Austria to protect the southern flank).
In Ruthenia, on 15th March, upon learning on the Hungarian attack, first order was to counterattack(that was before information about occupation of Czech countries made it through).