Tilly rises, tugs the hem of his suit, and clears his throat. He gives the judge a wan smile. Taking up a position behind the podium, he launches into a long oratory:
I. Introduction
The case before the Court today presents vital questions about the extent of a judge's discretion when judging. It is the contention of the MILE that, by issuing a death penalty verdict in the trial of Luis Gonzaga on the charge of assault, Judge Cesar Anton overstepped the bounds of his office. In doing so, Anton unlawfully caused Gonzaga's death. We further contend that, given the egregiousness of this violation, Anton should be stripped of his judicial immunity for the course of this prosecution. We thus conclude that Judge Anton is guilty of the crime of VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.
II. Facts
The facts of this case are not in dispute. As was
widely reported in the news, on March 19th of this year, Luis Gonzaga was charged with assault after throwing a rock at then-President Talbott. Talbott was slightly injured in the attack. However, the Judge in the case, here the defendant,
handed down a death sentence, then oversaw Gonzaga's summary execution. Gonzaga was executed on April 5th, barely two weeks after he attacked President Talbott, and without the opportunity to appeal the judgment against him. These facts were implicitly accepted by the defendant when Anton contested his discharge in
Anton v. Gov't Investigation Commission, and some (the lack of the opportunity to appeal) were explicitly referenced.
III. The Charge
However misguided he may be, it is not the prosecution's belief that Judge Anton acted with malice in judging and executing Per Gonzaga. However, he of course knew what he was doing; ergo, voluntary manslaughter is the appropriate charge in this case.
The MILE contends that Judge Anton criminally violated Gonzaga's rights on two counts: by issuing an unlawful sentence, and by denying the accused an appeal.
IV. The Unlawfulness of the Sentence Handed Down
A. Eutopian Law
Eutopian law holds no specific limits on the issuance of the death penalty, trusting to the wisdom and good conscience of the sitting judge. This has, over the years, created a body of precedent which suggests that the death penalty should be issued only in the most serious cases. In addition, all formalized Eutopian discussion of the death penalty – including the Eutopian Bar Association's discussions, President Talbott's proposed Death Penalty Reform Bill, and the original discussions of the Death Penalty Review Bill – all presupposed that the death penalty would be applied in only the most serious cases. The two charges specifically mentioned in these discussions were murder and treason; assault clearly does not approach the seriousness of those crimes.
Given the dearth of clear Eutopian law on point, it may be valuable to look as well to other jurisdictions.
B. United States Law
The scope of the U.S. death penalty is clearly limited to crimes of at least the severity of murder. This was made clear in
Coker v. Georgia, a 1977 case where the Supreme Court wrote that " a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape" and that for that reason, its application would be "cruel and unusual punishment." This language is of the utmost significance, for cruel and unusual punishment is also expressly forbidden by Section XXV of our own Third Amendment (the Eutopian Charter of Rights.) It is clear that assault cannot compare to rape in terms of the damage it causes to the nation or her people, so surely it cannot compare to murder.
C. International Instruments
International law is also quite clear about the circumstances under which a sentence of death may be imposed. Indeed, many international instruments expressly or impliedly prohibit the application of the death penalty. However, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) – the favored human rights document in the Western world – presupposes that some countries, like Eutopia, may still utilize the death penalty. Even then, the language of Article 6(2) is unequivocal: "In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes... and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant". Those provisions include the aforementioned prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (Article 7) and the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of life (Article 6(1)). It also guarantees the right to appeal one's conviction to a higher court (Article 14(5)) – something clearly denied in this case.
D. Summary
Eutopian, United States, and international law all mandate that the application of the death penalty take place in only the most serious of cases. Per Anton is a veteran judge, with many years on the bench. It would be ridiculous to suggest that he did not know, or should not have known, that his actions were against the law.
V. The Denial of Any Appeal
Nevertheless, even the illegal application of the death penalty in an assault case would have been acceptable had Judge Anton permitted an appeal; though he may have been the recipient of some censure for his actions, nevertheless the unlawful judgment could have been overturned by a higher court. This is the very reason that we possess appeals courts; to review judgments and guarantee that they comport with the law. In all Western systems of law, this forms part of the due process guarantees, codified in our own law in Section XXVI of the Third Amendment (the Eutopian Charter of Rights).
In Gonzaga's case, however, the almost-immediate execution of Per Gonzaga guaranteed that Judge Anton's ruling was effectively unreviewable. Indeed, by ordering a swift execution, the case was rendered effectively moot. It is no excuse, as Per Anton argued in the
Gov't Investigation Commission case, that his decision
could have been reviewed, for in reality, with Per Gonzaga already dead, there was nothing
to review. In point of fact, had this case arisen in the United States, Supreme Court jurisprudence would suggest that it would never have been reviewed due to the mootness issue. Thus, it can be seen that, for the due process guarantee to mean anything, a death row inmate must be kept alive at least until his avenue of immediate appeal has been exhausted. The extent of this right is not something we address here, but we would call upon the court to establish at least a minimum threshold in death penalty cases.
VI. Judicial Immunity
Per Anton's chief argument is that, no matter the content of his ruling, he should be afforded judicial immunity for his decisions while on the bench. The prosecution is sensitive to this argument. The essential idea of judicial immunity is to protect judges from political backlash of unpopular judgments – precisely what Judge Anton claims is happening in this case. But while judicial immunity provides a necessary and valuable shield to judges while they are judging, it should not also provide a sword which permits judges to overstep the bounds of law, perhaps arbitrarily or capriciously, and yet avoid punishment. As the old saw goes, "no man is above the law", and judicial immunity should not provide a vehicle for him to achieve such an end.
In Eutopia, we have no case law dictating the boundaries of judicial immunity. However, here again the United States is informative. In
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, the Supreme Court stated that "we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial… officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivations of constitutional rights. On the contrary, the judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach 'so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress.'" (Citations omitted.) This is precisely what happened in the case of Per Gonzaga – Judge Anton, in inflicting a cruel and unusual punishment and denying a due process right to appeal, worked a criminal deprivation of Gonzaga's constitutionally-guaranteed rights.
The MILE believes that the judiciary of Eutopia will not suffer if this rule is applied in our nation. So long as a judge such as Judge Anton remains immune from civil liability for his judicial acts – as is the case in the United States – he shall "be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself" (
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335). The People agree that this is necessary for an ordered and independent judicial system, which is to the benefit of the Republic. Indeed, even protecting wrong or illegal judgments is fruitful, provided they can be appealed, for in overturning such improper judgments, higher courts draw lines, create tests, and generate Eutopian case law. It is when the line of criminality is crossed that the cloak of judicial immunity must be lifted. Failing to do so would give judges unfettered leave to issue whatever manner of judgment they might care to, and totally avoid repercussions for their actions, no matter how unlawful.
VII. Conclusion
In the case of Per Gonzaga, Judge Anton misused his powers and overstepped his bounds. In doing so, he criminally deprived Gonzaga of the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, and the due process right to pursue an appeal. For these reasons, his cloak of judicial immunity should be lifted. The remaining facts are not in dispute, and we would thus ask the court to enter a judgment of guilty for the charge of voluntary manslaughter.
His task complete, Tilly gives the judge a final nod of respect and returns to his seat. On the way, he gives defense council a cocky grin (out of view of the judge, of course.)
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