Could the Germans have done anything to take Leningrad in 41/42?

[seattle]

The Kiev mistake cost the Soviets an entire fronts worth of soldiers, took some of their most industrialized areas for weapons production, and opened up a new avenue of supply and attack for Typhoon. How "stupid" and "useless" is it to clear your gigantically extended flanks before going on a huge advance away from your railheads, and setting your enemy up for encirclement (Vyazma-Bryansk pockets)? Contrary to all the German revisionists, the Kiev encirclement was the best thing that could've been done before Typhoon (not to mention encouraging the Soviets into trying to relieve pressure on Kiev, which was a near success but that's another story entirely). When Typhoon was prepared, it was able to be supplied for longer because the supplies caught up and they hit surprised soviet defenders who didn't expect to see an offensive so late in the year.

The victory at Kiev was of course important, but the question remains whether the diverted panzer army contributed to its fall. If I recall the sources I've read correctly then the panzer army wasn't needed.
The real problem was rather the unsolved northern flank which lead Hitler to halt the Moscow advance. He should have used the panzer army though to take out Leningrad.

 

[ComradeCommissar]

I'm not saying they were a different species, nor am I saying it was winter that stopped the advance. But it did make it more difficult. Look at how the defenders of Stalingrad were outfitted. Because they were in almost a full siege defense, they were outfitted accordingly. And logistically, coats are easier to outfit than rifles. Factories making clothes can switch to other types more easily than factories changing to making rifles or ammunition. Besides, not every front had units with soldiers to one rifle. That horrible tactic was limited to near suicidal charges of german positions in already besieged places.

But it is absolutely true that engine fluids for Soviet vehicles could withstand much colder temperatures than German ones.

Mud helps the defender, not hurts him. (Except for counterattacks) Snow and cold helps the defender, not hurts him.

Please see: Chew, Allen F. (1981), "Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies" Combat Studies Institute. In December of '41 Winter Coats were readily available at Soviet Supply depots and had begun making their way en masse to front line divisions.

German horses froze to death in the cold. The more native horses survived. When the cold freezes your engine oil trucks become near useless. When your horses keel over and die from the cold you have a logistical nightmare.

Soviet tanks had higher ground clearance and wider tracks - i.e. less affected by deep snow on top of frozen mud.

Weather merely made an impossible situation worse for the Germans, they were over stretched and just kept going despite common sense, hence when they met the dilemma "hmmm, should we send them ammo and fuel or winter coats" they decided to keep sending ammo instead of winter equipment. A soldier without ammo is not a soldier: he is a prisoner waiting to happen.

The victory at Kiev was of course important, but the question remains whether the diverted panzer army contributed to its fall. If I recall the sources I've read correctly then the panzer army wasn't needed.
The real problem was rather the unsolved northern flank which lead Hitler to halt the Moscow advance. He should have used the panzer army though to take out Leningrad.

I'm pretty sure they were needed to link up at Lokhvitsa, otherwise there's a slower advance, if one at all and Kirponos could convince Timoshenko encirclement is imminent, and it's time to pull back. Although the dilemma remains, if the Germans went immediately for typhoon, their supply lines haven't caught up and their Panzers haven't rested after months of straight action. That puts a limit on how far they could go. Instead of snapping in front of Moscow and at Volokolamsk, their supply line will break somewhere near Vyazma and their culminating point is reached - they can go no further without disaster.
Not to mention they will be attacking forces not squandered in the Yelnya offensives.

 

[MGL 86]

It will open two of the history`s favorite tactics called flanking and counter-offensive If Germans had keep going to Moscow.

 

[Xsio]

I'm not saying they were a different species, nor am I saying it was winter that stopped the advance. But it did make it more difficult. Look at how the defenders of Stalingrad were outfitted. Because they were in almost a full siege defense, they were outfitted accordingly. And logistically, coats are easier to outfit than rifles. Factories making clothes can switch to other types more easily than factories changing to making rifles or ammunition. Besides, not every front had units with soldiers to one rifle. That horrible tactic was limited to near suicidal charges of german positions in already besieged places.

But it is absolutely true that engine fluids for Soviet vehicles could withstand much colder temperatures than German ones.

Mud helps the defender, not hurts him. (Except for counterattacks) Snow and cold helps the defender, not hurts him.

Please see: Chew, Allen F. (1981), "Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies" Combat Studies Institute. In December of '41 Winter Coats were readily available at Soviet Supply depots and had begun making their way en masse to front line divisions.

German horses froze to death in the cold. The more native horses survived. When the cold freezes your engine oil trucks become near useless. When your horses keel over and die from the cold you have a logistical nightmare.

Soviet tanks had higher ground clearance and wider tracks - i.e. less affected by deep snow on top of frozen mud.

You kidding me, wright? In Stalingrad the only way to supply soviet troops fighting in city were by slowly crossing a Volga river under constant artillery shelling and bombing strikes wile German had a straight railway to the city. Yes fresh soldiers who just came to the front and were able to get to the fight were equipped with winter gear but so were fresh German divisions.

I really don't understand how -30C could help the defender, when you sit without movement in trench or lie in snow for days, or how mud can help the logistic or reinforcement of the defender. Native horses survived..... probably the were different species with additional hair. I mean may be there were situations when native horses survived but I doubt it was in mass.

I won't say anything about engine fluids or height clearance I don't know but probably you are right, but you really think that's the only thing influenced tank battles?

I don't need to read a book to understand that weapons and ammunition were primary things that were moved to the front line and not clothing especially in Stalingrad. (because of river crossing)

 

[mighij]

At the start of barbarossa 45 german divisions where kept on the west coast and more than 1500 planes grounded there. If england had been kicked out of the battle in 1940 by not following the 10 june stop order. at least 30 of those divisions would have been available to push towards Moscow. Not even counting those 1500 planes as support on the east front... Those divisions would have been enough to close the net around Kiev without taking on the North and center Group strength, letting them continue teir march on Moscow and Leningrad.

1 infantry division = 150 tons of supply. 30 division would mean an additional supply load of 4500 tons each day on a supply network that was already inadequate.

In addition the city of Leningrad, although symobilic and strategically (for the navy) important for the USSR, could only be turned into a strategic asset for the German Army if they could capture an intact and operational harbor and destroy/disable the USSR Baltic fleet. Something which is quite unlikely.

 

[VA GHOST]

You kidding me, wright? In Stalingrad the only way to supply soviet troops fighting in city were by slowly crossing a Volga river under constant artillery shelling and bombing strikes wile German had a straight railway to the city. Yes fresh soldiers who just came to the front and were able to get to the fight were equipped with winter gear but so were fresh German divisions.

I really don't understand how -30C could help the defender, when you sit without movement in trench or lie in snow for days, or how mud can help the logistic or reinforcement of the defender. Native horses survived..... probably the were different species with additional hair. I mean may be there were situations when native horses survived but I doubt it was in mass.

I won't say anything about engine fluids or height clearance I don't know but probably you are right, but you really think that's the only thing influenced tank battles?

I don't need to read a book to understand that weapons and ammunition were primary things that were moved to the front line and not clothing especially in Stalingrad. (because of river crossing)

No, the german divisions were not. As there was not a lot of planning time for the attack as this was the Fuhrer's plan, and high command scrambled afterwards - poorly. There were Christmas clothing drives in Germany because news was getting back of men in -30 to -40 degree weather in just their uniforms. When you're defending you are generally hunkering down in a location. Villages were the norm. You're inside - sheltered from the wind. Even without fires radiant heating from men inside structures raises the temperature. When you're attacking or counter-attacking you're exposed to the elements.

A tank whose engine needs an hour or two of warming underneath it isn't as useful. Tanks who lubricants in their guns are frozen, keeping them from being able to be fired, are less than useless - except as targets.

The smaller steppe ponies, which definitely are a different species of horse, (germans called them panje - hence panje units) are naturally better suited to the cold. I believe due to extra layers of fat and a thicker coat.

 

[Xsio]

Yeah those was what he was talking about. About half of the axis force at that time was elsewhere.

Ummm.... I don't know where you take the numbers from...

Official information from Russian war ministry archive site states that at June 1941 German forces consisted of 179 inf and cav divisions, 35 motorized and tank divisions and 7 brigades. On Eastern front were 119 inf and cav divisions (66.5%) and 33 mot and tank divisions and 2 brigades (94%) plus 29 divisions and 16 brigades of Axis countries. Don't know about planes.

 

[Nicolas I]

So, in your opinions why did the Germans fail to take Leningrad in 41?

They failed to make a choice to allocate (limited) resources to a priority target. They tried to do too many things at the same time when they were already overstretched.

 

[VA GHOST]

Weather merely made an impossible situation worse for the Germans, they were over stretched and just kept going despite common sense, hence when they met the dilemma "hmmm, should we send them ammo and fuel or winter coats" they decided to keep sending ammo instead of winter equipment. A soldier without ammo is not a soldier: he is a prisoner waiting to happen.



I'm pretty sure they were needed to link up at Lokhvitsa, otherwise there's a slower advance, if one at all and Kirponos could convince Timoshenko encirclement is imminent, and it's time to pull back. Although the dilemma remains, if the Germans went immediately for typhoon, their supply lines haven't caught up and their Panzers haven't rested after months of straight action. That puts a limit on how far they could go. Instead of snapping in front of Moscow and at Volokolamsk, their supply line will break somewhere near Vyazma and their culminating point is reached - they can go no further without disaster.
Not to mention they will be attacking forces not squandered in the Yelnya offensives.

I completely agree. A horrendous situation because worse because of the weather. Except in localized situations where it helped them as the weather prevented counter attacks upon vulnerable areas. My point on pervious page was an attack with an extra year of planning, and started earlier in the year (no diversion to Greece) could have had a much different result.

 

[Secret Master]

We aren't bringing up or discussing Auschwitz in comparison to Leningrad.

Thread closed.