Ah, well, that explains it. I don't cheese the AI. It's more important that my divisions look pretty.
China's stength compared to Japan in the new DLC
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Nope.
The Chinese lacked anything that could penetrate the heavy structure of the Japanese naval infantry HQ and other Japanese fortifications in Shanghai. That's why it's still standing in the middle of Shanghai today. Go read any of the histories and they reflect this - the Japanese tanks certainly didn't help, but they weren't the primary cause of the failure of the Chinese assault at the start of the battle, nor do they explain the eventual Chinese defeat, which came down ultimately to the threat of being encircled after the Japanese amphibious landings.
Tianjin yes, Beijing no. It was given up without a shot (your quote does not regard fighting in Beijing). Various warlords tried to do deals with the Japanese ... including Yan Xishan in 1935. Han Fuju was likely a scape-goat for a wide-ranging problem amongst Chinese warlords thoughout the war - failure to fight or fight hard enough due to fear of being diminished relative to other warlords. The retreat of Chinese forces in Northern China was no less discreditable than Han Fuju's. The same might be said of Chiang's abandonment of Nanjing.
In which case the problem wasn't the lack of anti-tank weapons, was it? It was tactics and training.
"With minor changes to cover, for instance, tank warfare or machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals continued to be used at the Central Military Academy until the beginning of the war" - from the essay "The Nationalist Army On The Eve Of The War" by Chang Jui-Te, p.96-97 of The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. He goes on to note that even when new manuals for small-unit tactics were issued under German advice few adopted them - specifically the tendency to bunch, making the Chinese an easy target for artillery and machine-gun fire, had not be cured.
Somehow I doubt that the entire Nationalist army simply changed its entire doctrine three times in eight years whilst at war - more likely different parts of the army used different tactics, which is what Chang Jui-Te essentially tells us vis-a-vis the new manuals issued under German influence.
The German influence was clearly seen in the forces they trained, but this was only a fraction of Chinese forces. The Soviet influence was of a different (possibly better?) character in that their advisors were mostly at a higher level, not directly trying to re-shape the Chinese army in their own image, and they allowed the Chinese to take the credit rather than trying to claim the credit for everything. The US influence was clear, but again only in the forces they trained - that is, X Force and Y Force, but the influence on the rest of Chinese forces is less clear.
Well, I'm not sure exactly how you characterise battles in which the Japanese suffered a fraction of the kind of casualties the Germans suffered even in their easiest victories. I certainly don't think "lots of Chinese were killed for little effect and the Japanese quickly reached their objective" is a good measure of resistance.
Can you please explain why you keep reciting Wuhan as a successful battle for the Chinese? Ultimately it still fell in 1938. Sure, it did not fall as quickly as the Japanese had hoped, but fall it did. I think it can be legitimately argued that the importance of the Wuhan battle was primarily seen in Chinese morale - they had shown they could resist, had successfully given themselves time to build up the base in Chongqing, and the KMT generals had co-operated in a much better way than previously seen.
Similarly, whilst the Japanese certainly hoped that the Chinese could be forced to surrender by further defeats, General Anami's specific reason for attacking Changsha, with 4 divisions (so not even a quarter of the forces employed in a major offensive like Ichi-Go) was to destroy the Chinese army there - that's why in the first assault the Japanese took the city in ten days and then retreated from there rather than hold it. The casualty ratio for the first battle was 44,000 Chinese casualties versus less than 4,000 Japanese . This was entirely in line with the Japanese Sokusen Sokketsu ("rapid combat, quick decision") doctrine which focused on the destruction of enemy forces rather than the taking of territory. The Japanese arrogance in trying to play the same trick twice by attacking again in 1941 is what cost them that battle.
There is something a bit Ah-Q-esque about claiming heavy Chinese casualties and lost battles as moral victories.
The historical record is very clear on why, after taking China's capital for the second time, the Japanese did not launch further major offensives until Ichi-Go. After the fall of Wuhan the IJA adopted a policy of "Peace and Order First" whereby they would try to bring the Chinese government to the negotiating table by what was called "long term siege". The policy document in which this was decided reads as follows:
"One stage of the war ended with the Hankou and Guangzhou operations. We should now give priority to restoring peace and order in occupied areas. Efforts to destroy remaining anti-Japanese forces will be continued but mainly by political means .... Only Wuhan and Guangzhou are 'areas of operation.' We will use these areas as bases for destroying the anti-Japanese forces at opportune moments if Chinese forces are concentrated or preparing for and offensive." (quoted from The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, p. 215)
Please note this document was issued before any of the Changsha battles, so the adoption of this policy was not influenced by them. Even interlude during the Yichang operation predates the 1941 battle.
Whilst the Japanese weren't always guided by logic, this would have been a pretty illogical way to go. More to the point, we know from the historical records that it isn't true. We know this from the testimony of people like Major Imoto who was transferred from the Chinese Expeditionary Army to the Operations Section of the Army General Staff in October 1940 and found people there completely uninterested in China, with all talk there being of the opportunity presented by the German victories in Europe to seize the British, French, and Dutch colonial empires. All of this, again, before most of the battles that you are talking about.
As noted above, the decision to pursue a political victory came from within the Japanese army itself.
The reprimand from the Emperor, who was ultimately a figure-head, proves nothing. As for the idea that the did try to advance multiple times but just happened not to succeed until 1944, we know this isn't true because we know the force-levels and rationale behind each battle. The battles you are discussing used a fraction of the forces that Ichi-Go did - for example the 1941 Changsha offensive used four divisions and was only sanctioned by IJA command on the specific understanding that it be kept to a minimum duration as forces were needed for the move into South-East Asia. Had an occupation of the city be planned these orders would not have been as they were.
But Japan was later capable of maintaining additional troops in offensives throughout South-East Asia whilst still maintaining its China garrison, so the conclusion has to be that it could do more. Why didn't they? Possibly for reasons of national morale, similar to the Germans before the 1943 "Total War" speech.
There's a number of misunderstandings at play here:
1) The 500,000 figure includes logistical support and army/corps-level troops, many of these weren't in divisions of the kind modelled in HOI4.
2) By 1944 many Japanese divisions were of the smaller, triangular type. This is particularly true of the China garrison which made use of the lower-calibre "guard" divisions.
3) HOI4 allows large-size divisions. You can have a ~20,000-strong division (16 infantry battalions in four brigades plus support battalions). There is no reason to use a 10k per division statistic.
4) Even taking your assumptions at face value, mathematically there is no way of getting to anything like 100 divisions. 31 x 2.2 = ~68. Typically I'm seeing as many as 100 Japanese divisions there in early 1939 in my play-throughs with Japan under AI control, and these are of historical square (i.e., large) divisions.
2) By 1944 many Japanese divisions were of the smaller, triangular type. This is particularly true of the China garrison which made use of the lower-calibre "guard" divisions.
3) HOI4 allows large-size divisions. You can have a ~20,000-strong division (16 infantry battalions in four brigades plus support battalions). There is no reason to use a 10k per division statistic.
4) Even taking your assumptions at face value, mathematically there is no way of getting to anything like 100 divisions. 31 x 2.2 = ~68. Typically I'm seeing as many as 100 Japanese divisions there in early 1939 in my play-throughs with Japan under AI control, and these are of historical square (i.e., large) divisions.
Thing is, something more is needed to model warfare in China properly. Whatever that thing is, it is not turning China into a theatre of war where a 1-200 Japanese divisions crush China in 1-2 years as presently happens. If a "seize the coast" event is the only way of doing this then fine, but I think a better option must exist. Simply making China stronger is no solution at all because of the knock-on effect once China is defeated.
My preferred solution is that, once a desired line is reached, an event should fire forcing the player to either seek a political victory in China, or abandon the focus route leading to conquests in South-East Asia and incur severe economic penalties, but there's so many new mechanisms needed to make this a reality that I doubt it will happen.
I personally really dislike the idea of making these kind of mechanics for just one circumstance to force the game to play out a certain way. They need to make infrastructure a lot harder to improve in China (perhaps separating China into a lot more states) and have partisans constantly destroying infrastructure in occupied regions.
Your proposition that Japan would have moved more of their army to China if they could should be considered in the context of other factors that undermined prospects of Japanese success. Although your point was not the focus of my research in reading Rikugun: Guide to Japanese Ground Forces 1937-1945, there is extensive detail there on Japanese Army formations and seemingly continual detachments and reorrganizations that were made to adapt the forces available in China to an evolving military situation that needed more troops than they were willing to request. The creation of a variety of independently operating sub-divisional units was part of this. My impression was one of extreme reluctance in the Kwantung Army to admit any need for more forces even though they were thin on the ground. These were not commanders willing to consider themselves or indicate to others that they might be inadequate to the ambitious task and mission to which they had committed in 1937 and to which they had to give the impression of continuing victories to the people at home.
This reminded me of the period of illusion in Germany in 1940 when France was freshly defeated and the world as well as the German people quite reasonably expected a negotiated peace and demobilization.
I found the Japanese Army surprisingly slow to call up additional manpower to raise additional divisions, even given its underestimates of force requirements for the Pacific War. If there is a method to Japanese conduct of the war, it is seeking to win by hastily throwing in scratch forces with scant planning and shoestring logistics, overcoming larger enemy enemy forces with superior Japanese fighting spirit (and in practice the ability of the Japanese conscript to endure unlimited privation and die for the Emperor).
Just as there are important historical factors that are not reflected as constraints or incentives on the Chinese side, the above are important factors on the Japanese side.
P.S. There is currently little sense of the Japanese being tied down by the need to garrison cities, towns, bridges, railroads etc.
Much of the guerrilla war might resemble recurrent border clashes but in the interior.
There is a lot of potential with the new features including decisions, border wars, and event chains that could create the need to maintain static garrisons as well as mobile forces to keep a lid on irregular activity.
Isn't supply a thing already? You can get the coast, but then supply should go to hell and you just can't push further without starving your army. I mean, I'm pretty sure you could try - and maybe succeed - but, as said, it would be a horrific cost for little gains.
It does. We can argue that it might not push for it hard enough, but it's a thing. It's a matter of finding the perfect balance of mechanics and representation of the land.
Supply length doesn't matter which means Hoi4 doesn't simulate something like that. The supply never goes to hell and you can just finish off China, and then exploit it's manpower without any ill-effects.
Then it should. It would also help with Germany and the Soviet Union.
Operation ichigo wouldn't have worked in 1941. China still had the Burma road then, and hyperinflation hadn't taken off.
Japan's plan to defeat China historically was to cut it off from the outside world and seek a political settlement.
Ichigo happened in 1944 in the context of China being weaker than it was in 1940.
Also, supply is not a thing that is adequately modeled in HOI4.
There were two original design decisions which were bad decisions. They have made HOI4 a broken game and forced the designers to make odd kludges to try to paper over their initial bad decisions. They will not be successful.
BAD decision 1) Infrastructure at the state level as opposed to the provincial level. In Europe, this makes some sense, but outside of Europe, modern infrastructure existed in points in line.
BAD decision 2) Not separating roads and rails. - in the context of China... Japan could keep more troops and fight more effectively along the Jingguang railway from Beijing to Guangzhou. Outside of the rails... costs got prohibitive. This is also what should keep China with lower troop numbers in theater.
So to to recap... we can complain about modelling China... nothing we say can fix it.
Paradox broke the China theater beyond repair by deciding to be lazy about modelling logistics.
There were two original design decisions which were bad decisions. They have made HOI4 a broken game and forced the designers to make odd kludges to try to paper over their initial bad decisions. They will not be successful.
BAD decision 1) Infrastructure at the state level as opposed to the provincial level. In Europe, this makes some sense, but outside of Europe, modern infrastructure existed in points in line.
BAD decision 2) Not separating roads and rails. - in the context of China... Japan could keep more troops and fight more effectively along the Jingguang railway from Beijing to Guangzhou. Outside of the rails... costs got prohibitive. This is also what should keep China with lower troop numbers in theater.
So to to recap... we can complain about modelling China... nothing we say can fix it.
Paradox broke the China theater beyond repair by deciding to be lazy about modelling logistics.
I agree with your characterisation of the Japanese strategy post-Wuhan, however I don't think anyone can state with certainty that an offensive on the scale of Ichi-Go wouldn't have succeeded in 1940. I mean, an offensive of a similar scale had succeeded in taking Wuhan and its surroundings. We've talked a lot about Changsha here (a city of limited value after it was burned to the ground on CKS's orders in 1938) but limited offensives towards Nanning, Guangzhou, Yichang all succeeded during this period.
I partly agree with your comment regarding it being unfortunate that the game does not model transportation with sufficient granularity, but . . . right now it's exactly as "broken"* as it was in HOI3 and HOI2 - the war in China is typically finished in a few years with a Japanese victory.
*I hate this term, it is over-used and often applied to things that just don't function very well rather than being actually broken.
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I have few things to say about this.
1) the AI is actually relatively good at managing a front line these days. It has some issues, but when faced with a linear problem space and no water it does relatively well. If you have a mobility advantage you can of course cut it to ribbons, but that would be true for a player army too.
2) the AI strategic, unit design and logistical game is dogshit. The tactical and low operational AI does well when the defines are properly structured, but the templates are ass, the AI can't manage its production needs for shit, and it has zero clue how to fight in a high attrition or low supply environment. With heavy production and template scripting it can do a passable job, which is why Expert AI mod is so crucial. Without it, an attritional approach can bring the strongest AI to its knees in about a year.
3) the AI has no concept of speed and never creates an operationally relevant maneuver group that can be used for envelopment or bypassing enemy lines. While infantry support is a valid role for armor the lack of any operationally relevant maneuver group is a critical flaw during a period where the existence of such formations was the defining feature of land warfare.
I prefer playing majors with Expert AI set to use player style 40w templates (challenging mode), large production bonuses and an additional scaling bonus based on how close they are to defeat. In addition to these elements I also like to incorporate the custom difficulty sliders and a house rule on not abusing paratroopers.
I think people underestimate how badly the AI designs its templates and how incapable it is of reacting to player action. Most of the complaints about poor ai are really complaints about poor ai templates that splinter like twigs when faced with serious player templates.
China was also broken in those games, but so was everywhere else to an equal degree.
However, hoi3 had provincial infra, and hoi4 has taken a step back with that.
It's like watching some some buy an amazing new graphics card and then run the display in 256 colors.
They had the tools to do it right and they didn't use them.
It's always been a major weak point of the HoI series that it has never correctly simulated the war in China, nor ever even really tried to. Modders found it extraordinarily difficult too.
So on a meta level there is a lot to be excited about with the current mechanics, because they represent the first ever attempt by Paradox to try to simulate the way the China theatre actually worked. They probably won't be a cure all, but it is a gigantic step in the right direction.
This is an excellent discussion thread and resource and I appreciate the care put into comments, which I hope continue on to examine and critique the woken tiger and Paradoxical East Asia in general.
Nationalist China AI has absolutely no idea of how to preserve forces and picking their battles. They suicide non-stop into the japanese troops. In the end they do not have any equipment or organization left in mid 1938 and completely collapses.
Anyone else experiencing this?
Playing as PRC is rage inducing, because you cannot trust NChina to do anything but dying in heaps and collapsing like withered leaves in the wind.
Anyone else experiencing this?
Playing as PRC is rage inducing, because you cannot trust NChina to do anything but dying in heaps and collapsing like withered leaves in the wind.
Yes, Chiang Kai-shek in 1938.
I mean, heh, it's kinda adorable how different treads declaring China too strong and too weak in some time, and both sides declaring universal quantification. No offence.
The political victory doesnt make much sense. I read some stuff you wrote and its like you think that the Japanese didnt win only because they didnt want to win (cuz they though china wasnt as important as south east or something like that).
Its imposible to actually demostrate wich side was stronger or how much importance japan gave to China, but there are 3 thing that we are sure: first china emerged as a great power after that war and the civil war, wich means that chinese armies were not weak, its not mad saying that their power was the MAIN reason why japan couldnt win in 8 years; second, china was important for Japan (way more important than any particular area of south east asia); and third more occupation was necessary to force the chinese goverments to capitulate or to cooperate.
Which means that Japan couldnt have archieve the victory (political or not) without forcing the main chinese armies and factions to surrender. A total war between Japanese vs all the chinese forces with some optional side wars and optional supports is not a bad idea if its well balanced, (tho it wont be able to represent the friction between chinese parties and warlords, but that would be asking for too much)