Chapter III: Austria Must Still be Great
The long reign of Franz Josef had been a difficult one. The old emperor had endured many defeats and setbacks throughout the years; the loss of Lombardia and Venetia, the humiliation by Prussia. The result of these had been that while Austria was still considered to be a Great Power it was, some thought, not quite in the same league as the others. The Ottoman Empire was the “sick man” of Europe, rotting from within, but Austria-Hungary then was the “old man,” staggering under the weight of the centuries. This weighed heavily on the mind of Franz Josef, who still felt the shame from previous defeats. He had kept his country at peace for decades but he also wished to make up for his failings, take some action to restore the honor and prestige of Austria. Such an opportunity came in 1908.
Bosnia and Herzegovina was a former province of the Ottoman empire that had split off during that countries long retreat in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary had signed a pledge not to annex the area unless there was the threat of another power doing so. That was not likely to happen as the other powers did not want to give Austria-Hungary an excuse to take Bosnia. During the early 1900’s a group called the Young Turks seized power of the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks were nationalists and determined to modernize their country to hold it together. Members of the Austrian cabinet looked at these reforms with a measure of concern; the last thing they wanted was a revitalized Turkey capable of asserting influence in the Balkans. Suddenly, the threat of Bosnia drifting back into Ottoman influence became a very real possibility. Hawks in the government began calling for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to forestall this outcome. Franz Josef remained cautious, however, and was unwilling to consider such a course of action that would be a blatant breach of treaty and go against international opinion.
Enter Foreign Minister the Baron von Aehrenthal. Aehrenthal was looking for a diplomatic coup and saw the annexation of Bosnia as his chance. Aehrenthal was a fairly intelligent and capable diplomat who managed to fail spectacularly as his country’s Foreign Minister. In some ways he was like his counterparts, a product of the times. Aehrenthal was proud and vain, concerned firstly with prestige and secondly with diplomacy. He linked national prestige with his own, turning negotiations into personal contests with foreign diplomats. As a result, Austria-Hungary’s dealings with her neighbors often ended up as attempts by Aerhenthal to one-up the other party. Unsurprisingly, these negotiations had the tendency of alienating or offending that party. This was exactly what happened with the annexation of Bosnia.
On July 2, 1908, the Russian Foreign Minister, Alexander Isvolsky, proposed a meeting between himself and Aehrenthal to discuss matters of “mutual interest.” Isvolsky did not specify but the focus would undoubtedly be on the Balkans. Russian attention had turned once more toward Constantinople and the Straits and Isvolsky was scouting out potential support for his country. Russia was still smarting from its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 where the Russian fleet had been smashed at the battle of Tsushima. Many in the Russian court thought that if the Black Sea fleet had not been trapped and forced to stay idle the battle might have gone the other way. Russia was looking, in the short term, to guarantee the passage of warships through the Straits and, in the long term, maybe gain control of the waterways themselves. Isvolsky’s idea heading into the meeting was a quid-pro-quo with Austria-Hungary; in exchange for Austrian support on the issue of the Straits, Russia would, in turn, recognize desired annexation of Bosnia.
The two Foreign Ministers finally met on September 15 at Aehrenthal’s country seat in Buchlau. They talked alone for six hours and then left. Their discussion was not recorded and therefore the exact content cannot be known for sure. It was clear, however, that some sort of agreement had been reached. Aehrenthal then turned to the task of convincing the Emperor of the annexation plans. It would serve twofold, he argued. One, it would show the world that Austria-Hungary was still independent and full of vitality, greatly enhancing its international prestige. The annexation, Aehrenthal said, would “put Austria on the map.” Two, it would further efforts to create a South-Slav bloc in the Empire to act as a counter to Serbia. The Emperor agreed.
On October 6, Franz Josef announced to the world the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The world was shocked, as this move came seemingly out of the blue. Isvolsky, in Paris at the time of the announcement, erupted in fury. Recriminations flew back and forth for weeks but, slowly, it became clear that Austria-Hungary had agreed to support the issue of free passage in the Straits in exchange for recognition of the Annexation, which was to occur at a later date. Aehrenthal had jumped to gun, betraying the terms of the agreement in order to “score points” on Isvolsky and get something for nothing. Isvolsky had been had, and he knew it, but it had been done in an amateurish way. When Isvolsky returned to Petrograd he carried with him a detestation of Aehrenthal and a determination to punish Austria-Hungary. The Bosnian Annexation was supposed to be the crowning masterpiece of Aehrenthal’s career; instead, it alienated Russia and ended any hopes of a rapprochement with Petrograd. One of Aehrenthal’s goals as Foreign Minister had been to avoid a collision between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans; an eventual collision now seemed inevitable.
This is my first AAR so, please, be kind. 
