Casualties and Operational Attrition
Oddly enough this thread is not really about its title but to understand what it is about I need to talk about casualties and operational attrition. First of all what do I mean by these …
Casualties: For the purposes of this thread these are losses of personnel and equipment
Operational Attrition: This is the non-casualty loss of personnel and equipment from a unit as a consequence of operational activities.
For this thread I am going to discuss infantry divisions and armoured divisions as these two unit types illustrate the problem that I am raising. The general ideas being expressed are easily translated to other division types so they get no specific mention.
First of all I am going to consider casualties. In combat casualties tend to be concentrated in the direct fire units within a division. This generally means things like infantry companies and tank companies. Obviously there are other direct fire units in the divisions but I will stick with the infantry and tanks as my illustrative forces.
In an infantry company losses tend to be personnel first and equipment after. It is rare for a squad to lose its LMG as this is a very small target. As a result an infantry division tends to lose actual combat power slower than it loses personnel and a 10% understrength infantry division my still have 98% of its firepower. When an infantry division takes heavy losses these tend to extend into other sectors of the division. The divisional artillery will take a pounding, anti-tank platoons will be overrun and destroyed. Ultimately all the combat elements will be destroyed leaving the shell of the division with no combat power at all. This is all modelled in HOI2 with …
An infantry division only takes 8 manpower to restore from 0 to full strength. This reflects 2 manpower being in the supply tail of the division and is a reasonable model for the split between combat units and non-combat units (there are substantial “non-combat” personnel throughout the division but they rapidly become combat personnel when losses occur).
Reinforcement IC costs are much lower than a new division. This clearly shows that much of the equipment in the division is just fine and only very limited quantities are actually being replaced. Again this is fine for infantry divisions and reflects their nature.
Moving onto tanks we have an interesting contracts to the above. In a tank company the equipment goes first and personnel second. A tank company may lose all of its tanks and whilst much of its personnel will be OK. This is very different from the infantry division. In addition the reason a tank division is so hellishly expensive is that the tanks are really expensive. This is revealing, for a tank division the distribution of equipment cost is concentrated in the direct fire units and much lower in the support units. Not only that but we lose equipment much faster than personnel.
Looking at the HOI2 model we see lower personnel costs for armoured divisions but the same personnel loss model as infantry divisions. There is nothing particularly bad about this except that a tank division which is 10% understrength (in personnel) is probably 20% understrength in firepower. The division can be said to be much more brittle.
Reinforcement IC costs for tank divisions are on exactly the same model as infantry divisions. This is now quite wrong and profoundly inaccurate. For some reason our tank divisions aren’t losing dozens of really expensive tanks. They do cost a lot more to reinforce than infantry but not nearly as much as they should be.
This leads us to wonder how HOI2 has been balanced and a quick examination of tank division statistics reveals the trick. A typical tank division had twice the firepower of an infantry division but in the game it doesn’t. This makes it look like the game tank division simulates a division that has already taken heavy losses are represents the operational “average” tank division rather than a fresh one. It is apparent that this has gone some way to rebalance the game but leaves us with some problems.
An aside about operational attrition
This is a further confounding factor. Operational attrition is about losses from manoeuvre on operational scale and above. That is the movement of forces when out of direct fire range of the enemy. As far as the game is concerned all that happens is you lose org as you move. This is again not a bad simulation of infantry divisions. The men get tired, they straggle a bit, you rest for a week and they all get back together, carry out a but of equipment maintenance and everything is good. This isn’t quite right as trucks wear out so long movement for infantry does have some real equipment consequences but nothing too dramatic.
Tanks (and other tracked vehicles) have things much, much worse. They are intensely vulnerable to wear and tear and nobody in their right mind carries out redeployments by driving them. Tanks get shifted around on trains except when on actual operations. This is because they will wear out, not might but will. Drive a tank 1,000 miles and you have a good chance it is now broken down. HOI2 does not simulate this at all. Driving tanks around is extremely expensive, it requires lots of spare parts and a lot of mechanics.
How Armour Really Works (in combat)
This is going to be an interesting section because it is an explanation of why the allies were right in 1939 about the usage of tanks. Distributing them to the infantry is a very valid way to use tanks, its just that the German approach is even better. So let’s see what it is all about.
First of all we need to look at long-term historical trends (go read my “Critique of HOI2 combat” for more detail). The key one is that as firepower increases casualties decrease and dispersion increases. This sounds odd but the statistics generally support it with some interesting anomalies. The primary one that can be observed is that increased firepower needs the doctrinal changes that lead to dispersion to properly reduce casualties. In truth the troops don’t entirely need the doctrines as they work it out fairly sharpish and disperse themselves. Perhaps the most obvious example is the increased dispersion inherent in infantry squad sizes. Look at a WW2 squad and a present day squad. You will see fewer men (increased dispersion) and significantly more firepower.
The key issue here is a big modern(ish) anomaly. It is quite clear that tanks represent a significant increase in battlefield firepower but for some reason they also give a significant reduction in dispersion. This seems inconsistent with the original assertion but is not. Tanks introduce a high level of protection and in fact a higher level of protection than the increase in firepower. There isn’t really any such thing as an automatic anti-tank (ie an anti-tank cannon that fire like an MG). So what we end up with is adding tanks gives a big increase in real firepower and an actual decrease in dispersion, ie concentration. This means that tanks significantly increase the intensity of combat. This is the key point of this whole essay. Let’s put it plainly…
Tank divisions (or simply tanks added to a division) should take costly equipment casualties
Tanks significantly increase the firepower of a division without requiring more space
Tanks increase the intensity of combat (it all happens quicker)
For combat purposes this is all that tanks are but just so everyone understands the German view I will add those elements although they are not important to this post. The German view is that tanks not only enhance combat capability but by concentrating them you can maximise the concentration of force advantage and achieve a better effective force ratio against the enemy (this presupposes a game with proper diminishing returns effects). They also have good operational manoeuvrability as long as they are not tied to foot infantry and similarly for strategic mobility. That is, infantry tanks are good for enhancing infantry and giving an attack more punch but independent tank divisions are even better.
This leads to core problem with HOI2 and its underlying model. Tank divisions are significantly underrated in terms of combat capabilities. This has a significant impact on their value as a unit to the point where I (and others) have argued that you are better of building motorised infantry than armour. The core of the problem is that the attrition handicap of tanks is not simulated in the game and therefore their combat capabilities are severely downgraded to compensate and maintain game balance.
The Solution
The first part of the solution is quite simple. Instead of global manpower reinforcement and IC reinforcement values there should be separate values for each unit reflecting the internal dynamics. By making losses to armoured units cost less manpower but more IC we can accurately simulate the impact of combat losses. We can simulate different levels of material and personnel in the rump 0% part of the division. In compensation we can massively increase the firepower of armoured divisions (twice that of infantry) and allow them an impact on the other combat algorithms to intensify combat (I am not going to discuss that area here as it overlaps and presupposes implementation of ideas in my critique thread).
As far as I can see this is a sufficient change to HOI2 standard rules to satisfactorily simulate combat casualties. It doesn’t give a realistic profile this doesn’t really matter since the objective is simply to create the pattern of cost. We can now uses tanks as sledge hammer units to crack open difficult attacks but if we do it is very expensive. Lots of tanks will be lost and will be very expensive to replace. If tank divisions (and brigades) are heavily used in combat then great expense should ensue.
This does leave us with the second issue of operational attrition. I remain concerned that the effects of this may be critical to realistically simulate armoured offensives running out of steam. The existing rules are based on org reduction through movement but this has the weakness that it affects infantry and armour units equally but based on time rather than distance. This has the interesting effect that infantry divisions will lose twice as much org travelling a certain distance as an armoured unit. I would suggest that org loss from movement needs to be reviewed and possibly made distance related instead of time based. Even this is probably inadequate but without modelling the rest of the new combat system I couldn’t venture to recommend whether it matters. This is unfortunate as it looks like that will have to be left for comment for the first HOI3 add on, I guess we can’t have everything.
I apologise for having such a long post leading up to such a simple change in the game algorithms but the long elaborate explanation is needed to justify why it is important rather than a peripheral issue.
Oddly enough this thread is not really about its title but to understand what it is about I need to talk about casualties and operational attrition. First of all what do I mean by these …
Casualties: For the purposes of this thread these are losses of personnel and equipment
Operational Attrition: This is the non-casualty loss of personnel and equipment from a unit as a consequence of operational activities.
For this thread I am going to discuss infantry divisions and armoured divisions as these two unit types illustrate the problem that I am raising. The general ideas being expressed are easily translated to other division types so they get no specific mention.
First of all I am going to consider casualties. In combat casualties tend to be concentrated in the direct fire units within a division. This generally means things like infantry companies and tank companies. Obviously there are other direct fire units in the divisions but I will stick with the infantry and tanks as my illustrative forces.
In an infantry company losses tend to be personnel first and equipment after. It is rare for a squad to lose its LMG as this is a very small target. As a result an infantry division tends to lose actual combat power slower than it loses personnel and a 10% understrength infantry division my still have 98% of its firepower. When an infantry division takes heavy losses these tend to extend into other sectors of the division. The divisional artillery will take a pounding, anti-tank platoons will be overrun and destroyed. Ultimately all the combat elements will be destroyed leaving the shell of the division with no combat power at all. This is all modelled in HOI2 with …
An infantry division only takes 8 manpower to restore from 0 to full strength. This reflects 2 manpower being in the supply tail of the division and is a reasonable model for the split between combat units and non-combat units (there are substantial “non-combat” personnel throughout the division but they rapidly become combat personnel when losses occur).
Reinforcement IC costs are much lower than a new division. This clearly shows that much of the equipment in the division is just fine and only very limited quantities are actually being replaced. Again this is fine for infantry divisions and reflects their nature.
Moving onto tanks we have an interesting contracts to the above. In a tank company the equipment goes first and personnel second. A tank company may lose all of its tanks and whilst much of its personnel will be OK. This is very different from the infantry division. In addition the reason a tank division is so hellishly expensive is that the tanks are really expensive. This is revealing, for a tank division the distribution of equipment cost is concentrated in the direct fire units and much lower in the support units. Not only that but we lose equipment much faster than personnel.
Looking at the HOI2 model we see lower personnel costs for armoured divisions but the same personnel loss model as infantry divisions. There is nothing particularly bad about this except that a tank division which is 10% understrength (in personnel) is probably 20% understrength in firepower. The division can be said to be much more brittle.
Reinforcement IC costs for tank divisions are on exactly the same model as infantry divisions. This is now quite wrong and profoundly inaccurate. For some reason our tank divisions aren’t losing dozens of really expensive tanks. They do cost a lot more to reinforce than infantry but not nearly as much as they should be.
This leads us to wonder how HOI2 has been balanced and a quick examination of tank division statistics reveals the trick. A typical tank division had twice the firepower of an infantry division but in the game it doesn’t. This makes it look like the game tank division simulates a division that has already taken heavy losses are represents the operational “average” tank division rather than a fresh one. It is apparent that this has gone some way to rebalance the game but leaves us with some problems.
An aside about operational attrition
This is a further confounding factor. Operational attrition is about losses from manoeuvre on operational scale and above. That is the movement of forces when out of direct fire range of the enemy. As far as the game is concerned all that happens is you lose org as you move. This is again not a bad simulation of infantry divisions. The men get tired, they straggle a bit, you rest for a week and they all get back together, carry out a but of equipment maintenance and everything is good. This isn’t quite right as trucks wear out so long movement for infantry does have some real equipment consequences but nothing too dramatic.
Tanks (and other tracked vehicles) have things much, much worse. They are intensely vulnerable to wear and tear and nobody in their right mind carries out redeployments by driving them. Tanks get shifted around on trains except when on actual operations. This is because they will wear out, not might but will. Drive a tank 1,000 miles and you have a good chance it is now broken down. HOI2 does not simulate this at all. Driving tanks around is extremely expensive, it requires lots of spare parts and a lot of mechanics.
How Armour Really Works (in combat)
This is going to be an interesting section because it is an explanation of why the allies were right in 1939 about the usage of tanks. Distributing them to the infantry is a very valid way to use tanks, its just that the German approach is even better. So let’s see what it is all about.
First of all we need to look at long-term historical trends (go read my “Critique of HOI2 combat” for more detail). The key one is that as firepower increases casualties decrease and dispersion increases. This sounds odd but the statistics generally support it with some interesting anomalies. The primary one that can be observed is that increased firepower needs the doctrinal changes that lead to dispersion to properly reduce casualties. In truth the troops don’t entirely need the doctrines as they work it out fairly sharpish and disperse themselves. Perhaps the most obvious example is the increased dispersion inherent in infantry squad sizes. Look at a WW2 squad and a present day squad. You will see fewer men (increased dispersion) and significantly more firepower.
The key issue here is a big modern(ish) anomaly. It is quite clear that tanks represent a significant increase in battlefield firepower but for some reason they also give a significant reduction in dispersion. This seems inconsistent with the original assertion but is not. Tanks introduce a high level of protection and in fact a higher level of protection than the increase in firepower. There isn’t really any such thing as an automatic anti-tank (ie an anti-tank cannon that fire like an MG). So what we end up with is adding tanks gives a big increase in real firepower and an actual decrease in dispersion, ie concentration. This means that tanks significantly increase the intensity of combat. This is the key point of this whole essay. Let’s put it plainly…
Tank divisions (or simply tanks added to a division) should take costly equipment casualties
Tanks significantly increase the firepower of a division without requiring more space
Tanks increase the intensity of combat (it all happens quicker)
For combat purposes this is all that tanks are but just so everyone understands the German view I will add those elements although they are not important to this post. The German view is that tanks not only enhance combat capability but by concentrating them you can maximise the concentration of force advantage and achieve a better effective force ratio against the enemy (this presupposes a game with proper diminishing returns effects). They also have good operational manoeuvrability as long as they are not tied to foot infantry and similarly for strategic mobility. That is, infantry tanks are good for enhancing infantry and giving an attack more punch but independent tank divisions are even better.
This leads to core problem with HOI2 and its underlying model. Tank divisions are significantly underrated in terms of combat capabilities. This has a significant impact on their value as a unit to the point where I (and others) have argued that you are better of building motorised infantry than armour. The core of the problem is that the attrition handicap of tanks is not simulated in the game and therefore their combat capabilities are severely downgraded to compensate and maintain game balance.
The Solution
The first part of the solution is quite simple. Instead of global manpower reinforcement and IC reinforcement values there should be separate values for each unit reflecting the internal dynamics. By making losses to armoured units cost less manpower but more IC we can accurately simulate the impact of combat losses. We can simulate different levels of material and personnel in the rump 0% part of the division. In compensation we can massively increase the firepower of armoured divisions (twice that of infantry) and allow them an impact on the other combat algorithms to intensify combat (I am not going to discuss that area here as it overlaps and presupposes implementation of ideas in my critique thread).
As far as I can see this is a sufficient change to HOI2 standard rules to satisfactorily simulate combat casualties. It doesn’t give a realistic profile this doesn’t really matter since the objective is simply to create the pattern of cost. We can now uses tanks as sledge hammer units to crack open difficult attacks but if we do it is very expensive. Lots of tanks will be lost and will be very expensive to replace. If tank divisions (and brigades) are heavily used in combat then great expense should ensue.
This does leave us with the second issue of operational attrition. I remain concerned that the effects of this may be critical to realistically simulate armoured offensives running out of steam. The existing rules are based on org reduction through movement but this has the weakness that it affects infantry and armour units equally but based on time rather than distance. This has the interesting effect that infantry divisions will lose twice as much org travelling a certain distance as an armoured unit. I would suggest that org loss from movement needs to be reviewed and possibly made distance related instead of time based. Even this is probably inadequate but without modelling the rest of the new combat system I couldn’t venture to recommend whether it matters. This is unfortunate as it looks like that will have to be left for comment for the first HOI3 add on, I guess we can’t have everything.
I apologise for having such a long post leading up to such a simple change in the game algorithms but the long elaborate explanation is needed to justify why it is important rather than a peripheral issue.
). Currently the system is simpler: terrain type affects movement time, which is the only (AFAIK?) movement-related variable that affects org loss. But you're definately right in what you say: armour loses less org (in good terrain) because they're faster, and that's wrong. I would however like to see the effects of terrain on armoured units to be much greater, even strength losses in mud and mountains.
