Here is an interesting study:
I think this is mostly true, what the study misses are the secondary effects. If you only take a look at the armored vehicles lost vs. airpower lost, you can come to the conclusion that it was hardly worth the effort. I think this is more about the secondary effects airpower had. First of all the disruption and damage to the units themselves, the restricted movement, the need to camouflage and be on the watch all the time, direct fire support, recon, destruction of soft targets and support elements made CAS worthwhile. I think the allies would have had a hard time advancing in France 1944 without their airpower.
BTW- the side has some other good articles.
I think this is mostly true, what the study misses are the secondary effects. If you only take a look at the armored vehicles lost vs. airpower lost, you can come to the conclusion that it was hardly worth the effort. I think this is more about the secondary effects airpower had. First of all the disruption and damage to the units themselves, the restricted movement, the need to camouflage and be on the watch all the time, direct fire support, recon, destruction of soft targets and support elements made CAS worthwhile. I think the allies would have had a hard time advancing in France 1944 without their airpower.
BTW- the side has some other good articles.