Air and armour combined assaults were developed by the British and French at the end of WW1, but were not put into effective and total practice. WW2 would have been a lot different had WW1 lasted into 1919.
Britain and France were leaders in combined arms theory, but unfortunately their high commands were not keen in implementing the lessons. What would make HoI good is to allow for some change in historic paths, but not to have France easily emulate Germany in 1939. Britain didn't set up their own armoured division until they saw how effective Germany was in Poland, even though they had extensive tests with their "Mobile Division" in the 1930's.
There was a high command in both Britain and France, as well as a memory of the losses of WW1 that dictated their strategies more than any individual could.
However, I don't see this as a total impossibility. How about an event that allows for the change of doctrine, to offensive doctrine, but in response you have a series of large scale retirements from your officer pool and dissent raising (from the population seeing such a large number of generals leaving the army). There is nothing worse than a top ranking general being told that their military thinking is outdated and backward, and pride would tend to override national interest, especially in this era.
Even when Mitchell showed that air power was the next dominating factor he was unable to totally convince the Admiralty that carriers should be seen as the core of a battle fleet rather than its eyes. It is hard to change strategic doctrines when the current high command is based on leaders who developed the current mode of thought. Germany was fortunate, as they created their high command which was based upon the new lessons, since there was not an old one to tear down.
Britain and France were leaders in combined arms theory, but unfortunately their high commands were not keen in implementing the lessons. What would make HoI good is to allow for some change in historic paths, but not to have France easily emulate Germany in 1939. Britain didn't set up their own armoured division until they saw how effective Germany was in Poland, even though they had extensive tests with their "Mobile Division" in the 1930's.
There was a high command in both Britain and France, as well as a memory of the losses of WW1 that dictated their strategies more than any individual could.
However, I don't see this as a total impossibility. How about an event that allows for the change of doctrine, to offensive doctrine, but in response you have a series of large scale retirements from your officer pool and dissent raising (from the population seeing such a large number of generals leaving the army). There is nothing worse than a top ranking general being told that their military thinking is outdated and backward, and pride would tend to override national interest, especially in this era.
Even when Mitchell showed that air power was the next dominating factor he was unable to totally convince the Admiralty that carriers should be seen as the core of a battle fleet rather than its eyes. It is hard to change strategic doctrines when the current high command is based on leaders who developed the current mode of thought. Germany was fortunate, as they created their high command which was based upon the new lessons, since there was not an old one to tear down.
...too many times for an ahistorical event IMO), and i can confirm that the event adds those units to the force pool, but the ai seems to take a day or two to deploy them all. In my tests, they could deploy them before being attacked, but if by any chance, Nat Spain was moving a unit to Bilbao when ESK is created it can arrive and take it before the ai deploys the units. Usually theres some SPR unit in Bilbao who can defend it until theyve organized their troops, but if its undefended then the disaster is possible.
