Earlier in this thread someone mentioned Georing's Four Year Plan, but it seems as though the idea fizzled out due to lack of information. You could consider Goering's four year plan akin to the already present industrialization triggers for Britain and the USSR, except instead of focusing on new labor programs, it was primarily driven towards autarky in food, industrial output, raw materials and machinery output. In the end, there was certainly some success to achieve this end.
-Unemployment was certainly lowered - it drew great praise from nations outside Germany. Many historians have come to question the success of the programme in actually lowering unemployment as their a natural up-turn in the world economy after 1933.
-Work creation schemes and massive social programmes certainly gave the impression of a vibrant, exciting and exhilarating work for all scheme. The GLF, through Strength Through Joy and The Beauty of Work, may have improved working conditions but real wages rarely rose between 1933-39 despite a distinct labour shortage.
-Heavy industry certainly showed improvement in output - especially industries related to the military and rearmament.
-Iron, steel and chemicals also saw an up-turn in their output figures - this again was partly due to international sales and government patronage.
-Rearmament plans were extensive but they did not provide the platform for full-scale war. That was certainly realised in Sept and Oct 1939. At best the army had enough ammunition and shells for 6 weeks of warfare.
-The strains of attempting to produce for guns and butter produced an economic crisis by 1939 which (according to the historian Ian Kershaw) may have convinced Hitler to go to war early. As such, we understand Hilter's motive for war as resources.
Now, at the bottom of the page http://www.kdhs.org.uk/history/as/as_unit3/4_year_plan_eval.htm there is a graph depicting the overall output of German raw materials for the year. Perhaps each year could be a trigger giving x amount of coal, steel, rubber, and oil to add to the stockpiles up until 1939.
As for how much? Well, I did some rudimentary math conversions based on things I've read about. It was said that von Paulus's 6th army at Stalingrad needed 700 tons of supplies daily to keep it up to par, and it was a 20 division army, mostly infantry, give or take some mechanized and maybe an artillery division or what not here and there. In CORE, that translates to about 35-45 supplies daily. So you're looking at every point in supplies and raw materials and what not as being 17 tons of whatever it may be. Looking at the graph which is in thousands of tons, that would be a ridiculous amount of stuff to stockpile for Germany.
One thing we have to keep in mind is to make the output increase for each subsequent year. So, start with 1936, and I'd say 3000 coal, 2000 steel, 1000 oil, and maybe 500 rubber. Up until 1939, the increase in steel and oil should probably go up by 40 percent each subsequent year, while coal and rubber goes up by 20 percent, as the plan was mostly geared towards the two former. The percentage should be of the base value, so steel will go up 800 every year, oil will go up by 400, coal by 600, and rubber by 100 hundred. So it would look something like this.
1937 - Coal: 3000
Steel: 2000
Oil: 1000
Rubber: 500
1938 - Coal: 3600
Steel: 2800
Oil: 1400
Rubber: 600
1939 - Coal: 4200
- Steel: 3600
- Oil: 1800
- Rubber: 700
1940 - Coal: 4800
-Steel: 4400
- Oil: 2200
- Rubber: 800
Since it also mentioned that the army had only enough shells and ammo for 6 weeks of fighting when the war in Poland began, a decrease in supplies yearly in exchange for this increase in raw materials could be factored in. Say you lose 2000 supplies in the beginning, with an increase of supply loss yearly by 30 percent. This would mean minus 2000 in '37, 2600 in '38, 3200 in '39, and 3800 in '40. This way, it's a double-edged sword. While it enables Germany to carry on with their industry that much longer, it means they'll have to seriously devote more energy to produce enough supplies to feed and fuel their army.
Yes? No?
*edit* Oh yeah, the trigger would read something like this.
Title: Goering and the 4 Year Plan
In September 1936, with the inauguration of the Four Year-Plan under the iron control of Goering, who replaced Schacht as economic dictator though he was almost as ignorant of business as was Hitler, Germany went over to a total war economy. The purpose of the plan was to make Germany self-sufficient in four years, so that a wartime blockade would not stifle it. Imports were reduced to a bare minimum, severe price and wage controls were introduced, dividends restricted to 6 percent, great factories set up to make, synthetic rubber, textiles, fuel and other products from Germany’s own sources of raw materials, and a giant Hermann Goering Works established to make steel out of the local low-grade ore. In short, the German economy was mobilized for war, and businessmen, though their profits soared, became mere cogs in a war machine, their work circumscribed by so many restrictions. (Shirer, William L.) The plan was largely a success, except it curtailed production of guns and butter. By 1939 a severe economic crisis had emerged as the army estimated it had only enough shells and ammunition for 6 weeks of fighting.
-Unemployment was certainly lowered - it drew great praise from nations outside Germany. Many historians have come to question the success of the programme in actually lowering unemployment as their a natural up-turn in the world economy after 1933.
-Work creation schemes and massive social programmes certainly gave the impression of a vibrant, exciting and exhilarating work for all scheme. The GLF, through Strength Through Joy and The Beauty of Work, may have improved working conditions but real wages rarely rose between 1933-39 despite a distinct labour shortage.
-Heavy industry certainly showed improvement in output - especially industries related to the military and rearmament.
-Iron, steel and chemicals also saw an up-turn in their output figures - this again was partly due to international sales and government patronage.
-Rearmament plans were extensive but they did not provide the platform for full-scale war. That was certainly realised in Sept and Oct 1939. At best the army had enough ammunition and shells for 6 weeks of warfare.
-The strains of attempting to produce for guns and butter produced an economic crisis by 1939 which (according to the historian Ian Kershaw) may have convinced Hitler to go to war early. As such, we understand Hilter's motive for war as resources.
Now, at the bottom of the page http://www.kdhs.org.uk/history/as/as_unit3/4_year_plan_eval.htm there is a graph depicting the overall output of German raw materials for the year. Perhaps each year could be a trigger giving x amount of coal, steel, rubber, and oil to add to the stockpiles up until 1939.
As for how much? Well, I did some rudimentary math conversions based on things I've read about. It was said that von Paulus's 6th army at Stalingrad needed 700 tons of supplies daily to keep it up to par, and it was a 20 division army, mostly infantry, give or take some mechanized and maybe an artillery division or what not here and there. In CORE, that translates to about 35-45 supplies daily. So you're looking at every point in supplies and raw materials and what not as being 17 tons of whatever it may be. Looking at the graph which is in thousands of tons, that would be a ridiculous amount of stuff to stockpile for Germany.
One thing we have to keep in mind is to make the output increase for each subsequent year. So, start with 1936, and I'd say 3000 coal, 2000 steel, 1000 oil, and maybe 500 rubber. Up until 1939, the increase in steel and oil should probably go up by 40 percent each subsequent year, while coal and rubber goes up by 20 percent, as the plan was mostly geared towards the two former. The percentage should be of the base value, so steel will go up 800 every year, oil will go up by 400, coal by 600, and rubber by 100 hundred. So it would look something like this.
1937 - Coal: 3000
Steel: 2000
Oil: 1000
Rubber: 500
1938 - Coal: 3600
Steel: 2800
Oil: 1400
Rubber: 600
1939 - Coal: 4200
- Steel: 3600
- Oil: 1800
- Rubber: 700
1940 - Coal: 4800
-Steel: 4400
- Oil: 2200
- Rubber: 800
Since it also mentioned that the army had only enough shells and ammo for 6 weeks of fighting when the war in Poland began, a decrease in supplies yearly in exchange for this increase in raw materials could be factored in. Say you lose 2000 supplies in the beginning, with an increase of supply loss yearly by 30 percent. This would mean minus 2000 in '37, 2600 in '38, 3200 in '39, and 3800 in '40. This way, it's a double-edged sword. While it enables Germany to carry on with their industry that much longer, it means they'll have to seriously devote more energy to produce enough supplies to feed and fuel their army.
Yes? No?
*edit* Oh yeah, the trigger would read something like this.
Title: Goering and the 4 Year Plan
In September 1936, with the inauguration of the Four Year-Plan under the iron control of Goering, who replaced Schacht as economic dictator though he was almost as ignorant of business as was Hitler, Germany went over to a total war economy. The purpose of the plan was to make Germany self-sufficient in four years, so that a wartime blockade would not stifle it. Imports were reduced to a bare minimum, severe price and wage controls were introduced, dividends restricted to 6 percent, great factories set up to make, synthetic rubber, textiles, fuel and other products from Germany’s own sources of raw materials, and a giant Hermann Goering Works established to make steel out of the local low-grade ore. In short, the German economy was mobilized for war, and businessmen, though their profits soared, became mere cogs in a war machine, their work circumscribed by so many restrictions. (Shirer, William L.) The plan was largely a success, except it curtailed production of guns and butter. By 1939 a severe economic crisis had emerged as the army estimated it had only enough shells and ammunition for 6 weeks of fighting.
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