Blitzkrieg lives today as a buzzword people who don't actually understand WW2 era doctrines throw around thinking they are talking about something, when, in fact they are not.
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Blitzkrieg : the best tactic ?
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Blitzkrieg lives today as a buzzword people who don't actually understand WW2 era doctrines throw around thinking they are talking about something, when, in fact they are not.
Whenever there are blitzkrieg mentioned appears post, that it is not a doctrine of WW2 so eveyone should shut up. It doesnt meen we can not discuss it from todays hindsight and as a game's strategy.
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Mobile warfare doctrine have huge planing speed bonuses and high organization combined with extra speed and less org loss then moving. Its direct combat ability is lacking however, grand battle plan can get much better planing bonus and mass assult can use more divisions in combat at the same time.
http://www.hoi4wiki.com/Research#Mobile_Warfare_doctrine
All doctrines are made to be viable and to have differen't advantage over each other.
http://www.hoi4wiki.com/Research#Mobile_Warfare_doctrine
All doctrines are made to be viable and to have differen't advantage over each other.
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Please enlighten us, since we don't know what we are talking about. We're here to learn and share, aren't we? I'm no expert, but I truly enjoy the game, however unrealistic it may be. Thanks in advance.
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I do realise that, German doctrine since the early & mid 1700s was the same, the techs changed. Due to smaller population and lesser resources, the idea to surround, cut-off and destroy by moving fast was always present. I am not saying BLITZKRIEG was a real doctrine, just a improvement on existing doctrines but it worked. My whole point was that it worked.
Exactly.
People don't understand the disadvantages of Blitzkrieg either.
Your supply lines will be stretched and you're vulnerable to counter-attack, your lines of communications will be stretched and ineffective. And you can only push so far until you have to stop due to inevitable equipment and vehicle repairs, and running out of supplies.
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That and as long as the enemy is surprised by it.
Let's take Napoleon. He used speed as his main strategy. He would always seek to engage enemy armies before they were able to merge into a more powerful one. After 10 years or so, the Allies finally figured out how to negate this strategy. Waterloo was the logical consequence.
You can only fool the enemy with the same strategy a limited number of times before even the most stupid one knows how to counter it.
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Blitzkreig was never a name used by the germans to describe their tactics or military doctrines. It was a name made up by the british press to describe the quick battles and advances made by the Germans.
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In fairness to the US and its coalition allies, when the Iraqis put so much of their armed forces in Kuwait with only screening infantry forces along the road to Al Busayyah, they doomed the forces in Kuwait. The Iraqis had, what, two infantry divisions and a single armored division (in the desert mind you) facing off against three armored divisions (one British, two American), two cavalry divisions, and an infantry division in the critical corridor that kept the supply and communication lines open with the bulk of Iraqi forces in Kuwait. You don't have to be Patton or Rommel to see the outcome, even if air superiority was in question.
A fully armed and trained Soviet force from 1985 of similar size would have also been enveloped in the same situation. Of course, if Soviet leaders were running the Iraqi state during this time, they would have immediately invaded Saudi Arabia to stop the build up of war material in the region. It's not the Fulda Gap, but you get the idea.
But rather than Monday Morning Quarterback Operation Desert Storm, I'd like to point out that Guderian and Rommel's moves in the Battle of France were risky. Very risky. They worked, not just because those guys knew what they were doing, but because of some key failings on the French side. The much vaunted "blitzkrieg" in this case was just having a higher operational tempo and better combined arms than the French.
I'm not discounting either Rommel or Guderian, but sometimes people turn blitzkrieg (whatever we want to say about it) as some kind of magic wand of strategy. But the most famous test cases for it are in some ways just good examples of innovative impromptu decision making. It's the kind of thing that makes for good all around generals, whether or not we even think blitzkrieg is real or not.
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Thanks for the reminder. I remember reading that a long, long time ago. I've also read the books by JFC Fuller, B.H. Lidell Hart, John Toland, Cornelius Ryan, Paul Carell etc plus Official US Army histories and manuals.
Blitzkrieg to me is generic term describing modern integrated and mechanized offensive operations. Apparently that's "incorrect"?
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And the thing is, Guderian didn't stop. There was a quite large stretch of time (a couple of days, if I remember correctly) when he was completely cut off the main force, with rapidly depleting ammo and fuel taken from civilian gas stations. While it did work, it was a stupid move because it put at risk of annihilation basically the entire armored forces Germany could muster - and not substitute, probably, as the German economy was a hair from collapse before the loot from France arrived. And it isn't like the absence of the reserve was the only error the French generals made, either: the bridgehead at Sedan was consolidating and vulnerable for a fair while, but hours passed without a single shot being fired by the French in that delicate moment. All in all, Fall Gelb was doomed to disaster... and yet worked, the French officers managing to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. That's it.
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In fairness to Iraqis, US ambassador all but told him, that invasion of Kuwait was OK with Washington.
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Superior firepower all the way. Combined arms, massive amounts of artillery, shells are cheaper than lives, etc.
In fairness to the US ambassador, even in the alleged transcripts (the veracity of which have yet to be confirmed by the State Department), the ambassador said nothing of the sort, simply that the US does not want Iraq to use force, but has no explicit security commitments to Kuwait. That doesn't rule out a response, but Saddam wasn't the shrewdest statesman either.
In fairness to the US ambassador, even in the alleged transcripts (the veracity of which have yet to be confirmed by the State Department), the ambassador said nothing of the sort, simply that the US does not want Iraq to use force, but has no explicit security commitments to Kuwait. That doesn't rule out a response, but Saddam wasn't the shrewdest statesman either.
Well, the diplomatic SNAFUof the situation do not excuse the deployment of Iraqi forces on the ground once the invasion was complete.
To be honest, I'm surprised that with the obvious air supremacy of the coalition that Iraqi forces didn't assume that para drops would be in the equation. They seemed focused on holding the coast and Kuwait City from amphibious assault without regard to other way troops could get behind them.
Although given what I know about the Iraqi army (and a few other armies in the region at the time), I'm guessing political reliability of certain units was preying on the minds of Saddam's leadership.
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I dunno about Superior Firepower, it strikes me as the doctrine most terminally dependent on infrastructure, air superiority, and complete logistical control.
Take any of those away and it suffers the worst.
Take any of those away and it suffers the worst.
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All doctrines got there problems:
- Grand Battle Plan: if you don't have the long time it takes to recive the big planing bonus you basically get nothing.
- Mobile Warfare: in poor terrain that don't allow for mobility you will be at a disadvantage.
- Mass Assult: If you can not make use of numbers you will be at a disadvantage.
- Superior Firepower: If you can not afford the needed material you will be at a disadvantage.
Take away air superiority and you still have a ton of artillery, AA, tanks, combined arms, etc.
Infrastructure is not as big a factor in this situation since the divisions that used superior firepower historically were largely mechanized.
What exactly do you mean by "logistical control"? If you mean efficient logistics see my earlier comment regarding mechanization. Material production must be sufficient (which is why a historical German playthrough shouldn't use it) but someone like the USA, Soviets, or UK could use it well.
I like Superior Firepower since it really has the best of combined arms. Just look at how a US division was built in 1944.
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Thanks for the reminder. I remember reading that a long, long time ago. I've also read the books by JFC Fuller, B.H. Lidell Hart, John Toland, Cornelius Ryan, Paul Carell etc plus Official US Army histories and manuals.
Blitzkrieg to me is generic term describing modern integrated and mechanized offensive operations. Apparently that's "incorrect"?
Well that is what blitzkreig means but a German officer in 1940 would never have heard of the term blitzkreig. Their ideas were spearhead breakthrough and encirclement. The fact they did it so well and so quickly led to the term blitzkreig.
Seeing you have given me some interesting books to read there is one book I would highly recommend. If you want to know more about german armoured warfare theories read Achtung Panzer by heinz guderian. It can be found on I-books, or a quick google will probably show other ways to get it. His ideas werent accepted by many in the german army, but they were the basis the panzer divisions worked on, and they were the reason for Germanys success in Poland and France.
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I find this complete nonsense.
Sure Hannibal encircling a much bigger roman army with a smaller force was down to his tactis
Waterloo, the french cav made a tactical error
Nearly all of Napoleons victories due to his superior tactics
Salamis, Actium... Tactical victories
desert fox was outmaneuvered
The three most specific examples:
Tannenburg
Austerlitz
Cannae
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