Have you ever read anything written by the Japanese themselves on this subjects? It is interesting. It's a mistake to think that everyone else is ignorant of the material.
In anycase, the idea that there was "no choice but war", overlooks the moral dilema of the fact that the Japanese were already "at war", and presently invading and destroying large parts of China at the time the US began its interventions, diplomatic or otherwise. To assert that the US and FDR is not innocent, is not the same as to say that the Japanese were innocent, either -- they chose war in China. These are the ambitions which I referred too.
Sure, if you assert that the Japanese had some essential right to conquest in Asia, that others did not, the basic premise upon which the empire predicated its propaganda, then you might argue that the US intervention was immoral. But my view is that once one asserts that the "right of conquest" is the essential moral principle of foreign policy you are opening yourself up to the exact same moral principle, from those who are stronger and more able.
Regardless, even in Tojo's cabinet, there were several who actually disagreed with the idea that there was "no choice but war". The members of Japanese Liason Conference were not mere stupid pupets of FDR's guile, but cold calculated hard nosed imperialists (that is why they called it an "empire") who thought they might be able to slip up the middle, while everyone else was engaged elsewhere and assert Japanese interests over the European powers in the Pacific, China especially.
There was also the question of who to war against. This was a far from simple decision. And an even more hotly debated topic in the Japanese war cabinet than wether or not to go to war, for many, in particular the army were opposed to a direct strike against the US. These Generals would likely have won the day, had it not been for the fact that Admiral Yamamato, insisted on threat of resignation, that any Japanese war plan against the European powers, must include a pre-emptive strike against the US fleet at Pearl Harbour.
They thought, perhaps, that FDR was bluffing. Of FDR's brinksmanshp, they believed that he had perhaps overplayed his hand, and that domestic considerations, and the war in Europe would prevent the full commitment to a war against Japan, and that some kind of limited conflict might be fought, in which reasonable terms favourable to Japan would result. They imagined a protracted island guerilla war, which they thought the US would find to costly, if fought on the behalf of the British or the Dutch. If they were right in this regard, when they decided that war was the only choice, they made themselves wrong by choosing to attack the US directly.
Even when wrong, they were not idiots. They gambled, knowing full well the risks and they lost.