Neither Japanese nor the Americans lost huge fraction of their carriers at the start of the war.
For the US: Langley, Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp and Hornet were sunk by the end of 1942 leaving the Saratoga and Enterprise.
For Japan: Kaga, Akagi, Ryujo, Soryu, Hiryu, Shoho were sunk, leaving Hosho, Ryuho, Zuiho, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Junyo and Hiyo.
The proportions look much worse if you only count fleet carriers and don't count stupid barely useful ships for Japan.
Seriously, you cannot just ignore loss statistics entirely because you don't like them. We just need to place them in proper context. And when it comes to the Navy, we can safely say that Kriegsmarine wasn't that good - because so many engagements between them and the Royal Navy turned out to be defeats for Germans.
And yet they lost 0% as many carriers as the US, UK and Japan! The only time a pure comparison of loss rates makes any sense is when what's being compared fights only against similar enemies, the numbers and surrounding doctrine and support equipment isn't overshadowing the differences between the equipment being compared, and no outside system has a major impact on losses. Tanks fill none of those criteria. Non-proportional loss counts are literally the single worst metric of a weapon's performance. They can be changed far more dramatically by doctrine than by the actual details of their use. Context, not doctrine, is the prime determinant of loss rates. Even if Germany had no tanks, the Soviets would have tanks and uses for them that took them into the way of enemy fire. So if the Germans didn't use their tanks, the Soviets would lose literally infinitely more tanks! For obvious reasons, despite the loss rates argument, tanks do not become more useful if you refuse to use them.
There are three different levels of quality to consider for any weapon system: the tactical, the operational and the strategic.
If we only consider strategic, then the Sherman wins because Americans could turn them out in massive numbers and they won the war. Similarly, the T-34 is a strategically a good tank for the same reasons. On the operational level, priorities change - you value reliability and fuel economy/range more than anything else. On the tactical level, the priorities change yet again - now survivability, visibility and the ability to destroy enemy tanks becomes most important. There is not a single tank that clearly excels in all three categories.
Amusingly, the Panther, with its high consumption of armor steel, which the Germans were straining to produce, complex suspension and other components that slowed manufacture and general oversizedness was bad on the strategic level. On the operational level it was bad because it had bad "fuel" range where fuel is a quaint euphemism for final drives (and petroleum distillates, but that's a minor matter in comparison). On the tactical level it finally shows its strengths and attains the lofty heights of mediocrity, since its visibility is bad, its ability to destroy enemy tanks is pretty good if it actually sees them (incidentally it's amusing to note that you missed a whole range of other things tanks do as part of a combined arms team, but the Panther was bad at them so it's not like they're remarkable), and its survivability is actually kind of decent from the right angle. From any other angle than like a sixty degree arc on the front, pretty much whatever can have a good chance of penetrating the sponsons which are full of ammunition, meaning one of the worst weaknesses on any tank is actually worse protected on the Panther than on its competitors. Neat!
For Arracourt, it's worth to recap the basics:
Germans had 262 AFV's, which included 107 Panthers and 75 Panzer IVs. The German Panzer brigades were total rookies, the German 11th Panzer Division was an experienced formation. The Americans had many fewer AFV's but they were all experienced by then, as the 4th Armoured had been in combat for months. So it wasn't a case of veteran Germans against rookie Americans. Another mistake is to say that air power played no part, as Americans did use tactical airpower from 21st September onwards and many German units had come under air attacks while marching towards the front even before the battle. It's also noteworthy that 5th Panzer Army lacked recon assets, meaning that the Panzer brigades with their Panthers advanced practically blind against the Americans.
Finally, for some reason, the Germans repeated the same attacks multiple times, instead of changing their operations plan.
Yeah the funny thing is the reason I brought up Arracourt in the first place. Everyone knows it was a ridiculous one-sided slaughter. But it's not that the Germans got their faces chewed off by well organized and equipped enemies, or the gap between the German formations and a modern unit (if it were that I'd bring up Dompaire, where the French did worse to the Germans), it's that when you look at the very few US losses, 12 of them, nearly half of them, came from an ambush laid by a German force based on the Pz IV, which killed six Shermans in the opening salvo and then was able to deal with the American maneuver well enough that they knocked out six more Shermans when the Americans gained better positions and re-engaged. None of the other actions in the first two days had the German forces reacting with such flexibility, and it's not an accident that they were in Panzer IVs. With Panthers, it was more like the column of Panthers that got hit for three of their number, and were re-engaged twice by the US tanks. They weren't able to mount an effective response to Shermans, in fact they were utterly defeated by tactical maneuver. It's not an accident that the ungainly tanks with very low capability to spot the enemy and react to him quickly died without being able to respond to the enemy.