Stressed his supply lines? In the entire war, Germany produced about 350K trucks ... approximately 70k of those were lost in the North African campaign. That is 20% of the German military's mobility thrown away on a campaign that would have had little impact on the wider war, supplying an overstretched army that should really have built up static defences.
Lost because Hitler simply refused to make this theatre the priority after it became clear that the British were not going to capitulate. He did not shift sufficient forces here at any point during the war, not in the air, on land or by sea. The African group of German formations was always operating on a shoestring of resources, secondary to Barbarossa even before that campaign materialised. Build up static defences? In a region of Allied strategic superiority? Hardly. That is what ended up happening historically after the Second Battle of Alamein and became a complete waste of resources and manpower. Every static German-Italian position in Libya and then Tunisia was destroyed by the cautious, systematic Montgomery, who because he had been afforded so much time and space could turn the battle into one of attrition, which Rommel was never going to win.
Any kind of early German success here would've altered the course of the war, but probably not its outcome all other things being equal. Italy would've been safe from initial attack until 1944/45 at least. It is remarkable, and indicative, that the very concentration the W. Allies established in this theatre enabled them to transition very quickly to attacking Italy, taking just 8 months between victory at second Alamein and landing in Sicily.
Such as making sure the British dont send troops away from Egypt to Greece and Madagascar? All these scenarios that say if only XYZ had been different and then ignore the fact that people made choices because of XYZ... they are very foolish.
There is a reason that nobody but Rommel thought attacking was a good idea.
Well, there was an opportunity after Operation Compass for the British to liquidate what remained of the Axis forces in North Africa and cut short that entire see-saw campaign, instead of trying to prop up Greece, which was foolish. But in any case an actual commitment would have sufficed instead of the reigning attitude that any theatre other than the east was of secondary importance. The very fact that Hitler waited until 1941, even though the British had a presence here since the start of the war, before deciding to send troops, is representative of that attitude. He might be forgiven somewhat for thinking the Italians would put up a decent fight, outnumbering the British as they did, but it's bizarre that he didn't consider sending German units anyway.
But of course, what else could Rommel do? If he sat there and waited, he merely invited the British to build on serious strategic superiority. They had zones of control all over this region, and their lines of supply were almost totally unharmed while they held both Gibraltar and Suez, and to a tertiary extent, Malta. Moreover, the Italians were already being slowly but surely destroyed in East Africa and, after Compass, would never again be an effective fighting force in this theatre. And so he could only throw his forces immediately into the attack in order to throw the British off-guard, with a forceful attempt at
Bewegungskrieg. It failed but not for lack of trying - additional formations and the proper application of air power would have averted the need to siege Tobruk, and Alamein would've fallen first time around.
