while Kursk wasn't a good idea objectively, if you consider it in its context it probably was the best idea if the goal is to actually win the war
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while Kursk wasn't a good idea objectively, if you consider it in its context it probably was the best idea if the goal is to actually win the war
That too, of course. Model was fully aware of it (he'd commanded at the Rzhev salient during 1942), but Manstein did not care at all about that, he just wanted to attack as if it was still June 1941. By then, another traditional Prussian hyper-aggressive general, Guderian, had also realized that the Ostheer just could not spend another year attacking and suffering the kind of losses suffered in 1941 and 1942, and he wanted to shift to the strategic defensive on the East. Hitler wavered because he respected the professional abilities of Model and Guderian, but there were other generals who want to attack: Manstein, Zeitzler and Kluge. And finally Hitler chose this option mainly for political reasons: after Stalingrad, Germany's allies were starting to waver (Finland actually began secret peace talks with the USA through the American embassy in Stockholm, Franco retired the Blue Division, etc.), and he felt that he needed a clear victory in the East (not necessarily a great strategical victory, mind you, but a clear, brilliant victory), or he risked having all his smaller allies jump ship.
Rommel was outnumbered massively in north Africa theatre, and he only commanded 1 division in battle of france.
d) Rundstedt
Generals are only as good as their headquarters and subordinate command staff. Technically, the best commanders of men are going to be the lower ranking field and junior officers because their decisions will be much more easily executed. Major Generals and above will hardly have an idea of what is transpiring over half their area of operations. The best general officers will have a brilliant concept of their logistical strengths and the enemies weaknesses. Realistically, an officer like a politician is just a stuffed coat compared too the army or nation's individual advantages.
Gerd von Rundstedt is the best commander of those listed. He grew up in the army and by the time of operation Barbarossa was commander Army Group South. Under his direction and against the best forces and commanders in the Soviet Union the army group performed the most amazing feats in war history. Rundstedt gave his panzer army under Kleist just enough freedom too put the efforts of the other panzer armies too shame without allowing them to run out of fuel and supplies. He ordered his infantry armies too stretch a battle line of over 600km and advanced over 500km in the campaign season. With 2. Panzerarmee's assistance the largest mass encirclement and pocket destruction of armed forces was conducted at Kiev. None of this would have been possible without AGS's excellent officers and men. I don't think any other group commander would have prepared so efficiently and made mid-campaign decisions that led to such a success as Rundstedt either.
Generals are only as good as their headquarters and subordinate command staff. Technically, the best commanders of men are going to be the lower ranking field and junior officers because their decisions will be much more easily executed. Major Generals and above will hardly have an idea of what is transpiring over half their area of operations. The best general officers will have a brilliant concept of their logistical strengths and the enemies weaknesses. Realistically, an officer like a politician is just a stuffed coat compared too the army or nation's individual advantages.
Gerd von Rundstedt is the best commander of those listed. He grew up in the army and by the time of operation Barbarossa was commander Army Group South. Under his direction and against the best forces and commanders in the Soviet Union the army group performed the most amazing feats in war history. Rundstedt gave his panzer army under Kleist just enough freedom too put the efforts of the other panzer armies too shame without allowing them to run out of fuel and supplies. He ordered his infantry armies too stretch a battle line of over 600km and advanced over 500km in the campaign season. With 2. Panzerarmee's assistance the largest mass encirclement and pocket destruction of armed forces was conducted at Kiev. None of this would have been possible without AGS's excellent officers and men. I don't think any other group commander would have prepared so efficiently and made mid-campaign decisions that led to such a success as Rundstedt either.
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In the first instance, if he was massively outnumbered why did he risk the lives under his command on foolhardy attempts to capture the entirety of North Africa against a numerically superior enemy? Part of being a military commander is to look after the men's lives under your command ... they are afterall the ones who will do the fighting.Then, when we look at the two major offensives that Rommel undertook in North Africa.
The first major German success following deployment of German forces to North Africa ('Sonnenblume'), was the reconquest of Lybia and pushing the British back through Egypt. This occurred on the back of the best equipped British units from XIII corps being sent to Greece. At this point, Rommel had the best part of 7 divisions (2 German and 5 Italian), strong air-forces and the benefit of having essentially new equipment. Compared to the British situation who had 1 Division and 3 independent Brigades (i.e. missing Divisional support elements) - not only were they massively outnumbered but the 3rd armoured brigade had few tanks (and those they had were literally falling to pieces due to lack of spare parts) and the 7th Armoured division was unable to reequip (having been left in North Africa as one of the worse equipped units). The operational reserve was a motor brigade with no artillery or anti-tank guns. The German forces were free to outmanouver and outflank the British who had limited opportunity to counter-attack and harry the advancing force. In summary, Rommel had significant numerical and equipment superiority which enabled him to keep preventing the British from re-grouping and setting a defensive line.
As for the second major success, the Axis forces were only lightly outnumbered. However, what has to be considered there is that most of the British forces were relatively new - poorly equiped and inexperienced. Late in 1941 the Allies (well, Britain and the commonwealth) were also fighting in Syria and Persia - the Veteran Australian 6th 7th and 9th Divisions were supposed to be available to Middle-East command (according to Brooke's diaries, one of the reasons the British pushed to such a forward position), but were subsequently sent to the Eastern theatre instead. Fortunately, for Rommel, this left a thinly spread, tenuously supplied force ready to be attacked. Far from being a master-stroke of Rommel's, it was more a matter of poor strategic planning and over-confidence on the British.
So, no, Rommel wasn't massively outnumbered. In most cases, he had local superiority and was aided by the fact that the British had to keep moving forces around the world to firefight strategic setbacks.
There's also the point that the TOE of a British Armoured Division in the early war was absolutely atrocious, e.g., the entire thing had only 2 infantry battalions. And the division holding the frontline was new and untested. And O'Connor got captured early on. It was basically a reverse of the defeat the British had just inflicted on the Italians; i.e., everything that could possibly go wrong does go wrong in a situation that was already wrong.
Really the early German successes in North Africa were just the result of British overstretch. And honestly, credit must go to Wavell for achieving the results he did in the circumstances. He had to fight in the Western Desert, Syria, Iraq, East Africa, Greece, and Crete, theatres seperated by hundreds of miles and poor communications, with limited resources and constant political intervention, and still managed to do pretty well.
Really the early German successes in North Africa were just the result of British overstretch. And honestly, credit must go to Wavell for achieving the results he did in the circumstances. He had to fight in the Western Desert, Syria, Iraq, East Africa, Greece, and Crete, theatres seperated by hundreds of miles and poor communications, with limited resources and constant political intervention, and still managed to do pretty well.
Well, British "incompetence" doesn't make Rommel bad, though. It's not his fault the opposition gave him an easier time than he perhaps should have had. The fact that he managed to use all the advantages he had instead of squandering them (which many historical commanders did in many situations ^^) should at least be somewhat praiseworthy.
And what was the alternative anyway? Digging in would have been hopeless, too. Once Hitler began being focused on Russia (maybe even before that), it was essentially a matter of time for the Axis forces in North Africa to be defeated. So maybe he was too aggressive at times, and made mistakes, and yes, his super-legendary status in some circles is surely exaggerated (as it always is in such cases) but the Nazis really could have had a worse guy to wreak havoc to Allied interests in the region.
And what was the alternative anyway? Digging in would have been hopeless, too. Once Hitler began being focused on Russia (maybe even before that), it was essentially a matter of time for the Axis forces in North Africa to be defeated. So maybe he was too aggressive at times, and made mistakes, and yes, his super-legendary status in some circles is surely exaggerated (as it always is in such cases) but the Nazis really could have had a worse guy to wreak havoc to Allied interests in the region.
But he DID squander them. He made strategically meaningless advances that not only achieved nothing on the balance but squandered precious resources and precious times. A conservative commander could have carefully tendered his resources and economized on forces to not consume resources desperately needed on other fronts. A bold commander could have used aggressive attacks to inflict costly defeats on the british and win a battle of attrition. Rommel did neither. He consumed so many resources he bankrupted the Italian war effort and the net result of his efforts was far greater losses for his own men then the Commonwealth. All this despite an opponent that was constantly being forced to send men away so that Rommel had opportunity after opportunity.
Rommel had both resources and opportunities and then complained that he didn't have more when he squandered them. If he'd had more, he would have squandered those too.
Rommel's vainglorious attacks required troops be supplied at the end of extremely long supply lines. A more conservative general would have taken the oil pissed away driving in the desert and stockpiled it so that when the British were finally ready to advance they would have faced a fight, not been kicking over the traces of an exhausted expedition.
It's the fetish of the attack. But WWII was a war of economics as much as anything. The economic attrition that Rommel imposed on his own forces was far worse then he imposed on the Commonwealth. This inevitably resulted in the casualties on his own force being far worse then the casualties inflicted on the British. Both sides committed roughly equal forces into North Africa but at the end of the day the British had a powerful, veteran army while the Axis troops were prisoners.
I still don't see what more he could have achieved. I mean, in terms of significant achievements.
Sure, you are right, as often has been pointed out, he overstretched already stretched logistics, which created more problems than what he could have had.
But was there a way to change the ultimately outcome? I really don't see it. A bit more damage here or there wouldn't have changed that much, I personally feel. The Allies still control the Mediterranean. They still crack Axis codes. They still start sinking more and more supply ships. He couldn't have saved his troops, there just was no way without changing circumstances that were beyond his control.
If he had been more passive, sure, he might have been able to put up a stiffer resistance at the end. It might have been strategically better.
But war is also fought by humans, and the sheer obsession the British had with him was I feel in part due to his quick advances. Maybe it was not objectively a good strategy, but it seem to really put the British in a caught-out mindset.
With him being more defensive, who knows? Maybe the British would have managed to organize much quicker, confine him to a smaller region that much earlier, and ultimately take out the Axis forces in Africa the exactly the same as they did anyway, but with less trouble being caused before then.
Sure, you are right, as often has been pointed out, he overstretched already stretched logistics, which created more problems than what he could have had.
But was there a way to change the ultimately outcome? I really don't see it. A bit more damage here or there wouldn't have changed that much, I personally feel. The Allies still control the Mediterranean. They still crack Axis codes. They still start sinking more and more supply ships. He couldn't have saved his troops, there just was no way without changing circumstances that were beyond his control.
If he had been more passive, sure, he might have been able to put up a stiffer resistance at the end. It might have been strategically better.
But war is also fought by humans, and the sheer obsession the British had with him was I feel in part due to his quick advances. Maybe it was not objectively a good strategy, but it seem to really put the British in a caught-out mindset.
With him being more defensive, who knows? Maybe the British would have managed to organize much quicker, confine him to a smaller region that much earlier, and ultimately take out the Axis forces in Africa the exactly the same as they did anyway, but with less trouble being caused before then.
What more could he have achieved - Well you could try asking the tens of thousands of men who died as a result of his operations. I am quite sure that the allied troops might have at least preferred not to die in some futile German effort that achieved only as much as it could have. I honestly wonder how often we (and I count myself among that) ignore the human cost of war.
Well, if that's your criteria then he's at least better than everyone involved in the Eastern Front ^^;
It should have already been obvious to the German leadership that their ability to win the war was gone. In 41 they managed Barbarossa, in 42 their offensive strength was limited to the southern front. By Kursk their offensive strength was limited to a much smaller operation, they ad suffered huge defeats in Stalingrad and North Africa, while their economic growth was stagnating. Simply put, their offensive strength was obviously diminished and the allies were advancing against them in all areas.
This is creating a false dichotomy. You are implying that the only alternative to Rommel being a good general is that some other general would have achieved an impossible standard. No, there is no German general who would have ended up in Iraq without the British being incompetant. However there are plenty of German generals who would have improved the situation not just in North Africa but also in Russia. Supplying German offensives in North Africa was prohibitively expensive and did not need to be. Tens of thousands of trucks and the entire Italian navy was wasted on that effort. This immense amount of fuel and machinery was desperately needed on other fronts. And it could have been preserved simply by replacing Rommel.
I agree with your last sentence but must point out that Zjukov was a worse to let his soldiers die in his attacks in ww-2.But---- no single general in WW2 played as great a role as he did, or contributed as much to the ultimate outcome of the war. His only competitor for the top ranking is Mannstein but he is only nr. two.
So explain how great his role was? In the Fall of France, he was a foolhardy Panzer commander who committed his entire force without maintaining a tactical reserve (hell, the whole German army marched on this principal). It was only good fortune that allowed the operation to pass.
In North Africa, he got the largest part of the German Army's mobile forces destroyed and captured for no strategic gain.
Sorry I think you missunderstood me I almust called Zjukov a butcher and when I wrote no single general in WW2 played as great a role as he did, or contributed as much to the ultimate outcome of the war. His only competitor for the top ranking is Mannstein but he is only nr. two I ment him. My English is not so good and Rommel had nothing to do with outcome of the war.
No problems - communication is a two person process, so I probably misunderstood your English just as much! I'm not sure I agree with the Zhukov prose, but that's a different discussion!
Nope it was the lack of tactical reserves which allowed the operations to pass*. Hit first hit hard.
(Germany could not win a war of attrition therefore there was no reason not to commit everything whatever you had)
*it is a bit more complicated when viewed in details, but in essence it is