Best Generals of ww2 and their role in this game

[Dalwin]

I'm not sure America would have used bombs on Germany. Dropping them on Japan was a totally different prospect. Japanese were asian and racism was far more widely accepted and even culturally ingrained. I think the decision to drop bombs on white Europeans would have been far more difficult. ESPECIALLY if bombs had been dropped on Japan already. In addition, the strategic impact of atom bombs at that point in the war against Germany would have been dubious. The German cities were already basically rubble, and as a tactical weapon, it is debatable how effective dropping nukes on dispersed German forces would have been. Not to mention dropping them anywhere near the front where friendly casualties would have been nearly equal.

To a large degree, the destruction caused by early nukes was comparable to the firebombing of some cities. The nukes were partly for shock value vs the Japanese and partly to demonstrate our capability to the Soviets before post-war lines were drawn on the map.

 

[Dark Jakkaru]

Which leaders specifically? And to blame the likes of Voroshilov, Budenny and Kulik is to also put a large share of the blame on Stalin for elevating such idiots after the Purges.

Ah, see, thus the responsibility of the blame changes somewhat. That's what folks want to accurately find out rather than a surface blame the Supremo Commando for everything. Of course, anyone that becomes the leader will get blamed for everything that isn't a success given the nature of their position and the ease with which to express an outrage. We've gotten some great info post '00 in the West that largely removes the alibi of merely blaming the boss all the time (i.e. the guy with the Tie and Mustache).

 

[Secret Master]

I gotta side with Porkman on this one.

If there was no prospect of immediate surrender from Germany when two bombs were ready to go, they would have been dropped on Germany. In fact, defeating Germany was an even bigger priority than Japan. There was a real fear (which turned out to be unfounded) that the Germans were right on the heels of the Manhattan Project.

As for the status of German cities, they were in better shape than their Japanese counterparts. Even in January of 1945, there would have been worthwhile targets for nuclear attack.

The question to me is what targets would the Allies have selected. Would they have picked a target where Hitler was residing in order to decapitate the regime for a quicker surrender? Would they have focused on a symbolic strike, like Berlin? Would they have hit industry concentrations that hadn't been damaged enough already? Would they have avoided a strike on Hitler's location in the hopes that he continued to fail as a leader?

And what would they Soviets have said about the issue? After one was dropped, would the Soviets have asked for one to be dropped closer to their front to facilitate a collapse on the Eastern Front?

 

[phantomrider]

I think a major issue with the decline of German success tactically and operationally has to do with their lack of a formalized doctrine. If you think about what formal doctrine does, especially if it continues to evolve, it creates a catalog of what works and what doesn't work as per the requirements of your doctrine. The Germans didn't have this overarching guideline and as a result, I would argue many mistakes which were repeated throughout the war could have been avoided by providing the framework of a formal doctrine.

My reading of this is that the quality of the German soldier at all levels decreased as the war continued because leaders and soldiers could not be trained up to the level of expertise that existed in 1939-40. The 1939-40 group was lost as KIA, wounded and/or captured in the many battles of the war. Granted experience tends to be a very rapidway of learning (until you kill off the learner) and can shorten significantly the 20 years experience (in peacetime that some in the US army say it takes to train an effective battallion commander). The German army as a whole did an excellent job at training replacements but WWII like WWI ended up being a war of attrition in terms of manpower, equipment, resources, supplies and industrial capacity it just differed from WWI in that the fronts showed much more change geographically than in WWI. German economy, resources, manpower etc were essentially exhausted despite its attempt at exploiting occupied territory.

I also take issue with Zinegata's claim that by the Normandy campaign the average American battallion commander was better than the German (much as I would like it to be true). The US Army probably doesn't think so (base on Dupuy's post war analysis of quality of troops) which still rated the German soldier of 1944-45 better than US, Brit or Soviet (plus the Israeli's of the 67 war).

 

[Dinglehoff]

I gotta side with Porkman on this one.

If there was no prospect of immediate surrender from Germany when two bombs were ready to go, they would have been dropped on Germany. In fact, defeating Germany was an even bigger priority than Japan. There was a real fear (which turned out to be unfounded) that the Germans were right on the heels of the Manhattan Project.

As for the status of German cities, they were in better shape than their Japanese counterparts. Even in January of 1945, there would have been worthwhile targets for nuclear attack.

The question to me is what targets would the Allies have selected. Would they have picked a target where Hitler was residing in order to decapitate the regime for a quicker surrender? Would they have focused on a symbolic strike, like Berlin? Would they have hit industry concentrations that hadn't been damaged enough already? Would they have avoided a strike on Hitler's location in the hopes that he continued to fail as a leader?

It's certainly possible but I'm not sold on that decision as a sure thing. Does some policy document or opinion type evidence exist from FDR or Truman that they wanted to nuke Germany first if it wouldn't surrender? You know, spelling it out? Like:
Truman: "Hey science nerd, hurry up with these bombs so we can nuke Germany!" or "If Germany don't surrender, we'll use the super weapon on them."
No I'm not source trolling. I'm asking if you know of it or have seen it.

 

[Invader_Canuck]

Makes sense. didn't they pull sort of the same trick in preparation for Bagration? Mass a bunch of troops in the south, until the Germans think they're gunning for Romania, then quietly move everything in the dead of night. I might be getting things mixed up again.

Close. Their favorite trick here was to allow themselves to be seen moving in one direction during the day, and then to double time to the actual destination at night. It worked over and over again. Backed up by disinformation the Germans could SEE the Soviets moving in one direction, and intelligence confirmed these destinations. This is why time and time again the Germans would strip the actual target of a Soviet offensive of manpower and ship it to where the Soviet forces had just come from. They would reinforce against the weakest portions of the Soviet lines and weaken the intended targets.

 

[Invader_Canuck]

To a large degree, the destruction caused by early nukes was comparable to the firebombing of some cities. The nukes were partly for shock value vs the Japanese and partly to demonstrate our capability to the Soviets before post-war lines were drawn on the map.

Yes. That has nothing to do with what I said. The concept of dropping an atomic bomb in Germany versus Japan was completely different in the time frame. It doesn't matter that the incendiary raids on Tokyo were more destructive and more catastrophic than either of the atomic bombs. It was the idea of a single blow versus death by a million cuts. The nukes were also dropped for more practical reasons.

They saved lives. Not only American lives, but tens of millions of Japanese and Chinese lives. Had the war resulted in an invasion, millions of Japanese civilians would have died in a humanitarian crisis. Unpotable water and starvation resultant from the annihilation of infrastructure and clean water supplies as well as the disruption of food growing. As it was, the last people in Japan to die of starvation resulting from the war, did so in around 1950 if memory serves.

 

[Dalwin]

Yes. That has nothing to do with what I said. The concept of dropping an atomic bomb in Germany versus Japan was completely different in the time frame. It doesn't matter that the incendiary raids on Tokyo were more destructive and more catastrophic than either of the atomic bombs. It was the idea of a single blow versus death by a million cuts. The nukes were also dropped for more practical reasons.

They saved lives. Not only American lives, but tens of millions of Japanese and Chinese lives. Had the war resulted in an invasion, millions of Japanese civilians would have died in a humanitarian crisis. Unpotable water and starvation resultant from the annihilation of infrastructure and clean water supplies as well as the disruption of food growing. As it was, the last people in Japan to die of starvation resulting from the war, did so in around 1950 if memory serves.

I don't think my statement should be seen as disagreeing with your earlier one. It was not meant as such. I agree that it was much less likely that they'd have been used in Europe, though not completely out of the question.

I was simply pointing out that in terms of mass destruction from the air, nukes were nothing like an order of magitude greater than other means already being employed. Many seem to suffer from the misconception that they were.

 

[Invader_Canuck]

I don't think my statement should be seen as disagreeing with your earlier one. It was not meant as such. I agree that it was much less likely that they'd have been used in Europe, though not completely out of the question.

I was simply pointing out that in terms of mass destruction from the air, nukes were nothing like an order of magitude greater than other means already being employed. Many seem to suffer from the misconception that they were.

Right, people equate the 2 nukes dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima with the world killers that were developed later. In terms of magnitude they were certainly much larger scale than anything conventional, but their actual effectiveness did not exceed what was possible with a large raid of WP (I'm assuming the incendiaries were WP).

Like I mentioned before, in addition to what we've illustrated, most people have no idea how many lives were saved in the dropping of the bombs. It shifted the political power in the Japenese diet to those who were prepared to surrender. A ground invasion and the total devastation it would have wrought would have caused millions of civilian casualties at minimum.

 

[Olfert Fischer]

......
Sure, the Allies may not reach Berlin in 1943, but the dominant and false narrative is that a 1943 invasion was mass suicide when in reality this is far from the case. The Western Allies were almost guaranteed that they could land their forces successfully and with much less loss, and the force ratio for the post-landing campaign was in fact in many ways more favorable than in 1944 which means they could very likely replicate and perhaps even exceed their performance in 1944.

Stop with the unsubstantiated claims about guaranteed success with a 1943 D-Day (actually ROUNDUP to be exact). I will save you the trouble by citing this quote:

[In the second place,] Marshall and King proposed for 1942 "a combined operation against the NORTH and NORTHWEST
COAST of AFRICA," but not as a simple alternative to cross-Channel operations for the year within the framework of the ac-
cepted strategy of BOLERO. They proposed instead:

That it be understood that a commitment
to this operation renders ROUND-UP, in all
probability impracticable of successful exe-
cution in 1943 and therefore that we have
definitely accepted a defensive, encircling
line of action for the CONTINENTAL EU-
ROPEAN THEATER, except as to air
operation.
​

They proposed that the decision whether to abandon ROUNDUP and to accept the strategic defensive be put off till 15 Sep-
tember, and be made then on the basis of the probable course of the war in Russia as it would affect the prospects for suc-
cessful invasion of the Continent in the first half of 1943

That's Marshall and King doing the talking - you know American military leaders. And since I know you like sources--->Source: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942, p. 280.

The landings in 1943 simply weren't possible, but for none of the reasons anyone has mentioned:
1. Landing craft had barely been invented in 1943 and there would not be enough of them to even launch 1/10 the D-Day force.
2. Their would be no port available to the allies, as it would be destroyed by the germans, so no supplies except by landing craft. The Allies built the floating ports and this served as the primary ports for several months after D-Day.
3. Oil pipelines for the troops (operation pluto) would have not existed yet, which would need to be shipped in by convoy (which see #2 the allies wouldn't have). Also I believe most oil terminals are in southern France not Northern.
4. Convoy transports were in extremely desperate need, to the point that they almost delayed the African campaign, and D-day as it was. Yes the USA had built 10,000's of vehicles and weapons, but there was such a shortage of convoys that they couldn't get it to Britain in time for 1943 invasion. If the allies hadn't broken the naval enigma when they did, both would have been delayed due to the hundreds of additional convoy transports sunk.

All of that added up means allies simply could not even possibly do a 1943 invasion of mainland Europe and 1944 was the earliest possible time.

Almost completely agree with you on this - 2, 3, and 4 100%. #1 though -

The United States program for mass production of landing craft got under way in April 1942. A White House conference on
4 April resulted in a tentative construction program being set up under which the United States was to make available 8,200
craft in the United Kingdom for ROUNDUP, of which 6,700 were to be carriers for small tanks and vehicles. The objective for SLEDGEHAMMER was 2,500 craft, including 2,000 tank and vehicle carriers. This number, supposed to be sufficient to move two
infantry divisions and two regiments of tanks in one trip, did not correspond to the expected U. S. troop participation in SLEDGEHAMMER.

And as an interesting comment on how much prioritizing needed to be done -

For ROUNDUP, current plans called for an assault force of approximately 77,000 men, 18,000 vehicles, and 2,250 tanks,
which meant that the United States would have to build some 765 craft of several types by March 1943. Construction in time
would be physically possible only if landing craft were given priority over all other items in the defense program of production.

These two quotes also come from the same source above, pps. 192-3.

 

[Invader_Canuck]

It's certainly possible but I'm not sold on that decision as a sure thing. Does some policy document or opinion type evidence exist from FDR or Truman that they wanted to nuke Germany first if it wouldn't surrender? You know, spelling it out? Like:
Truman: "Hey science nerd, hurry up with these bombs so we can nuke Germany!" or "If Germany don't surrender, we'll use the super weapon on them."
No I'm not source trolling. I'm asking if you know of it or have seen it.

I agree. Dropping the atomic bombs on Germany would have been a much greater moral dilemma. The decision to drop them on Japan was a much easier decision in that regard when you consider the contemporary feelings. While conventional raids were capable of inflicting the same level of devastation with more effort, the concept of a singular bomb bringing that devastation, and then dropping it on a White European nation. That is a total different situation for the US administration at that time.

The possibility of dropping atomic bombs on Germany in 1942 given the strategic feeling at that time would be far more possible than dropping the bombs on Germany in 1944 or 1945 when the writing was on the wall and everyone knew that while there was still fighting to do, that's all that was left. The fighting to finish up.

Japan, on top of being non-European, would have looked to be a much more costly endeavor for the United States, especially the final reduction of the home islands. The US has never faced the kinds of casualties the Germans and Soviets took in the East, and they would have been expected to face in an invasion of Japan since the civil war.

I'd like to see any official documentation that indicates that dropping an atomic bomb on Germany was even in the cards, let alone a priority.

 

[Olfert Fischer]

It's certainly possible but I'm not sold on that decision as a sure thing. Does some policy document or opinion type evidence exist from FDR or Truman that they wanted to nuke Germany first if it wouldn't surrender? You know, spelling it out? Like:
Truman: "Hey science nerd, hurry up with these bombs so we can nuke Germany!" or "If Germany don't surrender, we'll use the super weapon on them."
No I'm not source trolling. I'm asking if you know of it or have seen it.

First known discussion 5.5.43:

5. The point of use of the first bomb was discussed and the general
view appeared to be that its best point of use would be on a Japanese fleet
concentration in the Harbor of Truk. General Styer suggested Tokyo but it
was pointed out that the bomb should be used where, if it failed to go off,
it would land in water of sufficient depth to prevent easy salvage. The
Japanese were selected as they would not be so apt to secure knowledge from
it as would the Germans.

Source: http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/R03-T06-F23-Military-Policy-Committee-Minutes-of-Meetings.pdf

The next occurence is Target Committee Meetings on 10 and 11 May 1945 at Los Alamos. Given the dates, the war in Europe is already over, so only Japanese targets are valid.

 

[Rubidium]

Japan, on top of being non-European, would have looked to be a much more costly endeavor for the United States, especially the final reduction of the home islands. The US has never faced the kinds of casualties the Germans and Soviets took in the East, and they would have been expected to face in an invasion of Japan since the civil war.

It's worth noting that while Germans were "white," they were still portrayed in plenty of wartime propaganda as monstrous barbarian Huns who knew only war, death and destruction.

No one had any problems with bombing German cities to the ground; the only difference was that German air defenses were significantly stronger and construction less vulnerable.

 

[Dinglehoff]

In Europe; the Allies and Axis refrained from using chemical and biological weapons in the war. With a German target for the Bomb and with Germany not ready to surrender; would there be any similar reluctance to use the a-bomb on a German target? I wouldn't think so with this.

 

[Dark Jakkaru]

In Europe; the Allies and Axis refrained from using chemical and biological weapons in the war. With a German target for the Bomb and with Germany not ready to surrender; would there be any similar reluctance to use the a-bomb on a German target? I wouldn't think so with this.

Well, there is also at the end of the war some "bargaining" done regarding secret weapons technologies every faction was going to inspect and get their hands already looking for ways to exit into a good position post war.

 

[Axe99]

Stop with the unsubstantiated claims about guaranteed success with a 1943 D-Day (actually ROUNDUP to be exact).

Further to your quote above (listed below here as well)...

[In the second place,] Marshall and King proposed for 1942 "a combined operation against the NORTH and NORTHWEST
COAST of AFRICA," but not as a simple alternative to cross-Channel operations for the year within the framework of the ac-
cepted strategy of BOLERO. They proposed instead:
That it be understood that a commitment
to this operation renders ROUND-UP, in all
probability impracticable of successful exe-
cution in 1943 and therefore that we have
definitely accepted a defensive, encircling
line of action for the CONTINENTAL EU-
ROPEAN THEATER, except as to air
operation.
They proposed that the decision whether to abandon ROUNDUP and to accept the strategic defensive be put off till 15 Sep-
tember, and be made then on the basis of the probable course of the war in Russia as it would affect the prospects for suc-
cessful invasion of the Continent in the first half of 1943

We have, from page 30 of US Army in WW II: European Theater of Operations, Cross Channel Attack (URL in spoiler because it's big and ugly - note that URL opens up to page 31, source is on page 30)

Spoiler

http://books.google.com.au/books?id...operation round-up decision to cancel&f=false

the statement that this admission that Torch would lead to no Round-up was included on American admission, and that the decision to go with Torch was driven by the US President's decision to go with Gymnast (but like any good President, he didn't make it clear that he was abandoning Round-up, it was just implicit because the resources weren't available for both). Bashing the Brits for not going ahead with Round-up is the wrong tack - it was a US decision to focus on North Africa, from the highest level.

In a gameplay sense, I wonder if it would be possible to have something that helped play out these kind of decisions between allies?

 

[Klausewitz]

It's worth noting that while Germans were "white," they were still portrayed in plenty of wartime propaganda as monstrous barbarian Huns who knew only war, death and destruction.

Though when you look at the General Staff you find people with german roots no later than two generations, plenty of grunts in the trenches with German names, while the Japanese had to beg to get their chance to field the nisei (?).
Even if we assume that Germans were really believed to be the scum of Western civilization, that still made them better than Russians, Japanese or all those other "half"- and subhumans (don't forget that there were lynchings of blacks and Asians well into the second half of the 20th century, while i am unaware of anything like that ever happening to germans)... probably even better than the 'southern' Europeans (oh man, i could write a book on all the racism the USA practiced and believed at one point or another).
Point is that Germans were almost the only group of immigrants never explicitly singled out for discrimination and German Americans were conscious of their roots while still being really 'Muricans.
So dropping the Bomb on Germany is dropping it on the ancestral homes of a third of Americans, the land of Beethoven, Nietzsche, etc.
But Japan was barely even a proper country in the eyes of the US.

 

[misterbean]

Though when you look at the General Staff you find people with german roots no later than two generations, plenty of grunts in the trenches with German names, while the Japanese had to beg to get their chance to field the nisei (?).
Even if we assume that Germans were really believed to be the scum of Western civilization, that still made them better than Russians, Japanese or all those other "half"- and subhumans (don't forget that there were lynchings of blacks and Asians well into the second half of the 20th century, while i am unaware of anything like that ever happening to germans)... probably even better than the 'southern' Europeans (oh man, i could write a book on all the racism the USA practiced and believed at one point or another).
Point is that Germans were almost the only group of immigrants never explicitly singled out for discrimination and German Americans were conscious of their roots while still being really 'Muricans.
So dropping the Bomb on Germany is dropping it on the ancestral homes of a third of Americans, the land of Beethoven, Nietzsche, etc.
But Japan was barely even a proper country in the eyes of the US.

I'm enjoying the discussions. Please be careful what you write. I don't want to see this closed.

 

[Olfert Fischer]

......
In a gameplay sense, I wonder if it would be possible to have something that helped play out these kind of decisions between allies?

It would really add flavor to the game. Imagine having to use your diplomatic points to convince your ally to follow your battle plan in a specific theater and being able to prioritize theaters?

 

[BigPoppa1111]

Though when you look at the General Staff you find people with german roots no later than two generations, plenty of grunts in the trenches with German names, while the Japanese had to beg to get their chance to field the nisei (?).
Even if we assume that Germans were really believed to be the scum of Western civilization, that still made them better than Russians, Japanese or all those other "half"- and subhumans (don't forget that there were lynchings of blacks and Asians well into the second half of the 20th century, while i am unaware of anything like that ever happening to germans)... probably even better than the 'southern' Europeans (oh man, i could write a book on all the racism the USA practiced and believed at one point or another).
Point is that Germans were almost the only group of immigrants never explicitly singled out for discrimination and German Americans were conscious of their roots while still being really 'Muricans.
So dropping the Bomb on Germany is dropping it on the ancestral homes of a third of Americans, the land of Beethoven, Nietzsche, etc.
But Japan was barely even a proper country in the eyes of the US.

Oh stop. I mean I realize this is what your college history professor is shoving down your throat, but your implications have no basis in reality as has been shown by the fact that there is zero evidence anywhere that the race of Germans versus Japanese was a factor in the bomb dropping decision making.

It is true that probably a lot white Americans have German roots somewhere in their line. By the time of WW2, many were still first generation. But we see little reluctance of GIs with said roots to firebomb German cities, reduce other cities to dust with conventional bombs, kill German soldiers on the ground with guns, mines, or flamethrowers. Even the scientists of the day were not in agreement what damage the bomb would do or what the after affects of the radiation would be if any. So to try and say there was reluctance to use a new weapon on white people because even the people that built it couldn't say for certain how much damage it would cause is beyond absurd, and really should only be debated in the same sentence as unicorns and Santa Claus.

I swear, the next thing you know you delusional leftists will be talking about how the US prioritized the role in Europe because they wanted to end the killing of white people before they ended the killing of Japanese or other such nonsense. Hey, maybe Roosevelt even did it so he wouldn't have to drop the A-bomb on white people. Get a grip.