This is the second time you have brought this up, and I am confused. When exactly did the Red Army fight NATO?
Best Generals of ww2 and their role in this game
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This is the second time you have brought this up, and I am confused. When exactly did the Red Army fight NATO?
It amazes me to see that so few people put Von Manstein at the top of their list. The man was a strategic mastermind whose military genius was unrivalled. Even excellent generals like Guderian, Rommel,… never reached his level of competence in my opinion.
His operation in Ukraine in early ’43 where he turned a certain defeat into a smashing victory is perhaps the most impressive feature of military craftsmanship in the entire war. And don’t forget he is the mastermind behind “Fall Gelb”, defeating the allies in one smooth sweep in ’40. And there are more fine examples. The list would have been even longer if Hitler hadn’t dismissed him. The idiot.
I’m not certain that, if had von Manstein been in charge of all the forces on the eastern front, world war 2 would have had the same ending.
His operation in Ukraine in early ’43 where he turned a certain defeat into a smashing victory is perhaps the most impressive feature of military craftsmanship in the entire war. And don’t forget he is the mastermind behind “Fall Gelb”, defeating the allies in one smooth sweep in ’40. And there are more fine examples. The list would have been even longer if Hitler hadn’t dismissed him. The idiot.
I’m not certain that, if had von Manstein been in charge of all the forces on the eastern front, world war 2 would have had the same ending.
Because Manstein was able to encircle and destroy atomic weapons with panzers.
If Germany had survived into the latter half of 45, it loses automatically.
Yes he has to up there with the best. It is difficult to compare Generals because some had less opportunities Some had more difficult situations etc. But Von Manstein was very well tested both on the offensive and on the defensive and he performed very well. Von Manstein also stood up to hitler and debated tactics with him far more effectively than other Generals.
Guderian for sure, he won the political battles to get a panzer army as well as get away with insubordination throughout his career and generally was ahead of the curve throughout. His real genious was handling the assasination attempt on Hitler! von Manstein certainly. Model I keep off for not agreeing to work with von Manstein in the spring of 43 to take care of the kursk pocket and we all know what that caused. I don't think however that von Manstein could have changed anything other than maybe who entered Berlin first.
Sure von Manstein was good, but to say that 3rd Kharkov was the best thing since 2-minute noodles is a mistake. Sure the Germans had taken severe losses, but he had had time to pull back and reinforce some units, including the quality SS divisions he had while the Soviet troops were way to over stretched and tired, and were being pushed even further by Vatutin and Stalin. Also, despite that the SS troops took heavy losses in taking control of the city itself.
Why do you think that they were overstretched and tired? Because Von Manstein had been leading them on a merry chase.
When you are alive you take risks every day. In the US between 30-50,000 people are killed in auto accidents each year yet most people go out either in cars or to places where autos go. The best that you can hope for is to "manage" risk to some level and there is always risk of either missed opportunities if you are too passive or mistakes of action if you are too aggressive. In addition, data which allows you to predict the future is not always available or accurate even if some MBA with a spread sheet (in business) or a staff office from the intell shop says it is so even "data driven" decision making which is a current "catch phrase" sometimes leads you astray from the ideal path. I would disagree with you about aggressiveness in the Wall Street collapse/mortgage crisis -- the problem there is that everybody was making so much money on buying and selling "stuff" that they forgot to properly evaluate the true worth of what they were buying and selling. In addition, the rating agencies who were supposed to be the safety valve for the system and tell everyone whether they were buying and selling something of value or junk stopped doing the appropriate amount of due dilligence. The MBAs kept putting numbers in the spread sheets that said everyone was fine but the numbers were basically garbage that had no basis in reality but "proved" that everyone was going to keep making money. Then, reality raised its head and the bubble burst. In Custer's case at the Little Big Horn the intelligence that he had or thought he had was wrong. He ran into several times more Indians than he expected and he and his command paid for it. Getting the balance right for what is an acceptable amount of risk taking is quite difficult and is the subject of a lot thought in the training of junior combat officers in particular. Their job is to achieve their mission (take that town/hill/area for example) but to do so with the least amount of expenditure of resources (the lives of their troops) possible. Sometimes if the mission is "impossible" it is ok to not try to hard but other times it is not -- this attack is really to draw enemy forces to the area and weaken other areas so that the decisive action can fought elsewhere. Age does seem to make a difference in risk taking as teen agers think they are immortal (and sometimes make fearless assault troops until they get convinced by experience that guys like them are not) and as you grow older you tend to become more aware of adverse consequences. In addition, it really does take awhile to understand the complexities of the world so that you can effectively command/lead complex organizations. So I agree young alpha males are not necessarily good for high command. On the other hand, sometimes these individuals are able to inspire or lead others into very dangerous situations (getting 20 or 30 men to follow you out of a relative "safe" position into one where everyone know 5 to 10 men will be injured or killed) Most armies can't afford to have an NKVD battallion behind every advance to assure that everyone goes forward when they are supposed to.
I also think you have a rather narrow view of leadership and have difficulty differentiating between leadership and management of complex organization. Yes the role of the theater commander or company CEO is to set direction of the force or organization and to expend the resources in order to best fulfill that direction and also inspire/convince the members of the organization that the path chosen really is the one that should be followed. Hopefully, the goals set are based on a realistic evaluation of the environment as well as the capabilities of the organization that the CEO/theater commander has. If not then also hopefully the goal or plan can be modified as the errors are recognized. While this is primarily a leadership function (chosing an appropriate, realistic goal) there is still a lot of "busy work" involved of making sure the leader has the best information available on which to make their decision about the goal particularly when all sorts of others in the world might have an advantage if the data is not so good. The second leadership role is to convince/inspire others to follow on the chosen path with a reasonable degree of enthusiasm. Finally, in large organizations, the other role of the leader is personnel management of picking, recognizing and developing individuals to handle key subordinate roles within the organization who can act independently in an appropriate fashion to best further to best further the achievement of the goal set. The other management function of the leader is to recognize when what should be simple management functions (do the trains really run on time, can you get an appointment at a VA hospital within a reasonable time frame, does a widget cost 2 or 3 times what it should within our organization compared to another, are the ammo, food and replacements getting to where they are needed) are being fulfilled by subordinates within the organization and if the answer is NO figuring out what to do about it.
If you want to see the effects of lack of risk taking at the highest level vs too much risk taking you can go to your favorite group the German national command. In World War I, the German General staff really did have control once the path to war was set. In the pre war period they had adopted and failed to modify significantly a plan that was developed for a previous generation. In the intervening time a few things had happened (better artillery and more and better machine guns) and the improved ability of all sides to concentrate troops more rapidly. (pretty much every European army was similarly guilty) They failed to change their plans because it would be too "risky" to deviated from their well studied war plans. The result was obviously not good.
In World War II, Hitler believed that his army was significantly better than any opponent and took too many risks based on that percieved superiority of the army and his personal leadership. This was reinforced by many dramatic victories in stark contrast to the early days of WWI. Any officer who disagreed tended to eventually be replaced which tends to lead organizations/staffs to present plans and information that fits with the desired path for the leader. Barbarossa was decisive particularly in the way it was executed because it was possible that the whole Soviet army could "fold" after the losses the Germans could and did inflict. On the other hand, if you want an army to fold up you should exploit its weakness which was that opposition to Stalin was rapant in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Offering a better government better life or liberating the various subdivisions of the Soviet Union by deposing the bad Czar (some Russians have estimated that Stalin was responsible for more deaths of Soviet citizens than Hitler was despite the fact that Hitler was probably trying to kill them all and had the German army to help) is a theme that has worked in many similar circumstances. That seemed conflict with Hitler's war aim of lebenraum in the east and reducing the population there so he could grow more Germans and he was not smart enough to just lie about his war aims, win the war and do what he wanted. So the war became one where the only choice for any Soviet was to follow Stalin or Soviet would survive. But even then, Russian prisoners of war knowing they were abandoned by Stalin and would face consequences after a Soviet victory were recruitable into German forces (although the wretched way the Germans treated them also had something to do with it as well).
So in hindsight at least in WWI you had a stodgy old non risk taking General Staff who executed the plan because it was the plan and in WWII you had a national leader who was willing to repeatedly bet the house on high risk operations and in both cases the result was disaster for the people and the regime.
Can you please not use that? Because it is simply incorrect. NKVD (nor any other SOV unit) never placed machine guns at the back of units, to shoot deserters. NKVD acted a lot like MPs.
Why do we think the A bombs would have been used on Germany instead of Japan?
Good one, very funny! Or wait, are you actually seriously suggesting that the catastrophic retreat of the entire German AG South from Caucasus and Stalingrad all the way to Kharkov (which widely regarded as a turning point in the war) was part of some "mastermind plan" by Manstein?
Kharkov was a case of striking an overextended opponent withyour fresh reserves. A tactic employed so many times by Germans, Soviets and Allies, both before and after Kharkov, that is incredible how Manstein tries to claim "copyright" of sorts on the tactic.
Because the entire impetus for the Manhattan project was to develop Atomic weapons before the Germans did.
Europe First was the strategy because the US saw the Germans as a greater threat, so if Germany is still alive and kicking in August of 45, they'll be the first to get the bomb.
Also, the US was set to produce 5 more bombs in September and then 10 every month after that. There is no counterfactual where brilliant generalship for the Germans pulls it out in 1944.
It's the name of a book by Ralph Peters (probably the best fictional war book ever written) which covers the NORTHAG sector of a hypothetical war, completely from the Russian's side. The Soviets are able to put NATO into a situation whereby although they make a series of relatively successful local counterattacks, their ignorance of the bigger picture leads to their loss. As Soviet tanks shoot up their rear area, the Red Army is so deeply "inside" that the enemy hesitates to use nuclear arms. I won't post the exact ending.
I just wonder what Zinegata thinks of Starukhin.
I'm referring to the novel "Red Army" by Ralph Peters, which is the sole Third World War techno-thriller that ends with the Red Army winning; an in large part it's because NATO was too focused on a tactical battle at Alfeld (which turned out to be entirely a Red Army distraction) while the Red Army already surrounded most of the Forward Defense units of the German Army.
Read "How the Mighty Fall". Almost every corporation studied by Collins (based on hard data, instead of subjective supposition that dominates most "leadership" discussions) which collapsed in fact hired "dynamic" and "risk-taking" CEO and ended up collapsing faster, because the issue is that it is the "undisciplined pursuit" of new goals that destroys great companies and organizations.
Discipline is what you need to succeed in business, just the same as in war, and it's not a popular viewpoint simply because nobody wants to be the quarterback who has the discipline to do his drills 100 times without complaining instead of the guy who keeps doing spectacular touchdowns that do not necessarily win the game.
The Schlieffen Plan was in fact extremely high-risk, betting everything on an early and immediate defeat of France. The Moltke Plan (defeat Russia first, then France) was more disciplined and saner - and in practice what really happened. Albeit the sanest plan was really Bismarck's and the lowest risk - keep Russia an ally so no two-front war happens in the first place.
The First World War was not an example of generals being very timid and traditional; that's again the British period drama version. Even the French army, derided for its antiquated uniforms, had a commander who regularly and ruthlessly sacked any General who showed timidity or refusal to adapt under fire. Their war plan moreover was in fact extremely aggressive and risky - an immediate offensive into Germany ("Don't worry about the machine guns and fortifications, our men can cross the battlefield in under 20 seconds because of elan and bayonet the machine-gunners!") so that they could get back Alsace-Lorraine.
In fact the only major army that wasn't sending its army into a suicidal grand offensive was the British, as John French and his British regulars knew everyone was insane for thinking you can charge machineguns or even riflemen in entrenchments. And French was the first of the army commanders to get sacked for timidity and lack of nerve, to be replaced by Haig whose first grand offensive (which they were so sure would work, thanks to better technology) resulted in 60,000 casualties on the first day of the Somme. And ironically, Haig's best British subordinate - Plumer - was the oldest of the British Generals, known for having extremely limited and disciplined objectives, and was the only British Army commander to consistently take ground while minimizing losses (his Aussie and Canadian counterparts showed a similarly disciplined approach and were consistently derided by Haig, who wanted his "aggressive" cavalry commanders like Gough to shine)
The problem in fact with all sides is over-confidence that the new repeating rifles, machine guns, and artillery would allow for immediate and hugely successful offensives - despite no data to support this and that all small-scale conflicts just prior to the war showed that attacking was often near-suicidal at the tactical level without crushing artillery superiority.
This is in fact a prime example of the "undisciplined pursuit" Collins talked about. Rather than figure out how to properly use these new technologies, everyone bet the farm on machine guns, artillery, and bolt action rifles winning the war for them in weeks. When that failed, everyone kept doubling down on their stupidity - insisting that they could win if the governments could just send them another million more shells - instead of acknowledging that the military solution was going to be bloody and largely pointless.
Ten million lives were lost because a continent was too proud to admit that war in fact would not be quick and relatively cheap; and that it would be long and drawn-out just as it always had been. Really, people forget that people entered the First World War more enthusiastic and jingoistic than they were in the Second, and that the continent was (justifiably) brimming with overconfidence because they had advanced technologically and economically so quickly from 1850-1910. It's just the persistent "Tank rendered trenches obsolete" myth that was perpetually parroted by British historians to excuse their bad performance in 1940 that causes this jilted version of the narrative to become the norm when it in fact is very far from reality.
Meanwhile, the German Panzer Corps of 1940 was in fact a highly developed force. It was created out of a stunningly disciplined, incremental approach that somehow managed to evade the inter-arm rivalries that plagued all the other tank forces. The view that Germany's inherent "warlike" skills being responsible for the Panzer arm evaporates the moment one realizes that the direct ancestor of the Panzer Corps was not infantry, cavalry, or even artillery. Instead, the Panzer Corps was born from the Weimar Republic's motorized supply transport Corps - the only Weimar Army unit allowed to have any vehicles under the Versailles treaty - and it was the discipline and dedication of this small unit that allowed Germany to go from having "zero tanks" to having the first "tank army" when the Versailles Treaty was repudiated.
Really, again, think about it - the fearsome Panzer Divisions were born out of units which, in Guderian's words, were supposed to "haul flour". Does this sound like an arm that's all about daring charges and offensives; or one whose ultimate background was simple, disciplined logistics?
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Partially yes, partially no.
Custer was not what I'd call a 'deep thinker' but more of a highly competent *tactical* general; he was a very thorough calvary commander, noted for his ability to place his troops well, scout the terrain, etc.
Getting his command massacred was a pretty awesome black mark, but he fought some very good engagements in the Civil war, including shutting down JEB Stuart @ gettysburg.
Custer was not what I'd call a 'deep thinker' but more of a highly competent *tactical* general; he was a very thorough calvary commander, noted for his ability to place his troops well, scout the terrain, etc.
Getting his command massacred was a pretty awesome black mark, but he fought some very good engagements in the Civil war, including shutting down JEB Stuart @ gettysburg.
That's what I'm asking you. Your fantasy version makesabsolutely no sense. Somehow the the rout of the whole AG South is "Manstein had leading them on a merry chase". Which is obviously insane.